Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election Part 24

said: "Perhaps the most pregnant sentence in this whole report is that in which the Commission suggests that proportional representation might be a suitable basis for an elective Senate. We have our liberty of choice, and democracy may find its account in either alternative. We may prefer to retain an imperfectly representative Lower House. But if we place above it a really representative Senate the whole balance of the Const.i.tution might be altered, and the Senate become the more venerable, the more democratic, and in the end, the more powerful Chamber. We may, on the other hand, reform the House of Commons, and render any Senate superfluous. In either event, proportional representation may become the ultimate key to our const.i.tutional problem."

_Federal Home Rule._

The same question, the method of election, must enter into the consideration of those larger schemes, Federal Home Rule and Imperial Federation, which have been mooted in the discussion of the const.i.tutional relations between the two Houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. A writer in _The Times_,[21] whose series of letters attracted considerable attention, said that the "central idea of Federalism appears to be that our present single Imperial Parliament, which does, or makes an attempt at doing, all the complicated work--first of the Empire, and second of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and third of the various countries which together make up the United Kingdom--is no longer adequate to the purpose. The Federalists therefore propose that the Imperial Parliament, while maintaining its supremacy absolutely intact, shall delegate a large part of its functions to a number of subordinate national or provincial Parliaments, who shall manage the domestic affairs of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales, or of such other territorial divisions as may be agreed upon. These national or provincial Parliaments will be entirely independent one of another, but all will acknowledge the full and absolute sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament." Mr. Birrell stated that "Federation beginning here at home, as it is called, is ripening for a speedy decision. Such a Federation once established would be able to find room for our Dominions overseas as and when they wished to come in. We should have then a truly Imperial Parliament, at the door of which any one of our Dominions could come in, and as it were hang up its hat and coat in his Mother's House and take part in common Imperial proceedings, and in the government of this great Empire."[22] These are great changes, and without entering too deeply into details of how these new bodies are to be brought into being, it is certain that one of the conditions of their successful working is that they must be fully representative. It is inconceivable that a national council can be set up for Wales, or for Scotland, or for Ireland, without provision for the adequate representation of minorities. Lord Morley, in inst.i.tuting the new Councils in India, was compelled to make provision for the representation of Muhammedans. Mr. Birrell, in the Irish Council Bill of 1907, proposed that minorities should be represented by members nominated by the Crown. It is impossible to reconcile this reactionary proposal with democratic principles, and there can be no possible reason for its adoption when there is a method of election available which enables minorities to choose their own representatives.

_Imperial federation._

Mr. Birrell's vision of an Imperial Parliament for the British Empire raises once more the value of a true method of election. An Imperial Parliament will not accomplish its purpose--the consolidation of the Empire--if the basis of representation is such as to give undue emphasis to the separate interests of the const.i.tuent States. Further, it would seem desirable that the establishment of such a Parliament should be preceded by the more complete unification of the various States, for in no other Empire are there so many racial divisions, and it is from these that the greatest of political difficulties spring--in Ireland the division between north and south; in the United Kingdom between Ireland and Great Britain; in South Africa between the Dutch and British; in Canada between the French and British. The majority system of election brings out these differences in their acutest form. In Canada in 1910 no representative from the Province of Quebec attended the National Conference of Canadian Conservatives; of the four Provinces forming the South African Union it was in the Orange Free State, where in the local Parliament the minority was almost wholly deprived of representation, that racial differences gave rise to the keenest feeling. Proportional representation has proved itself to have been of the greatest value in bi-racial countries such as Belgium where the representation of political parties no longer coincides with racial divisions. The adoption of proportional representation in the United Kingdom, in Canada, and for all elections in South Africa would complete the consolidation of these various divisions of the Empire, and even where racial difficulties do not exist, as in Australia and New Zealand, the fair representation of all cla.s.ses of citizens would free questions of Imperial politics from the dangers of exaggerated party majorities.

_Conclusion._

Whether it is a question of improving existing inst.i.tutions, or the creation of further representative bodies, the method of election is all important. All other departments or human activity show continuous improvement, and the subst.i.tution of scientific for rule-of-thumb methods of election is an improvement long overdue. It may even be said that the continued successful working of representative inst.i.tutions demand such an improvement. The accomplishment of other electoral reforms can be more easily attained by the adoption of a system which allows of the fair representation of all. The reform of the House of Lords, whether by the delegation of the powers of existing peers to a small number, or by the introduction of an elected element, or its establishment on a completely democratic basis, necessitates the adequate representation of minorities. Federal Home Rule is impracticable unless due provision is made for minority representation.

But in the contemplation of newer legislative bodies it must not be forgotten that it is of the utmost importance that the prestige of the House of Commons--the mother of parliaments, and, as such, the glory of English-speaking peoples--should be maintained at the highest level. Yet its predominance in the Parliament of the United Kingdom can be permanently secured only if it is made fully and completely representative. The House of Commons must once more renew itself; it must establish itself on sounder foundations. Its privileges and powers have been won by the efforts of past generations. To the present generation falls the opportunity of perfecting its organization and of strengthening its foundations by making it in truth the expression of the national will.

[Footnote 1: Reply to Deputation of Liberal members at House of Commons, 20 May 1908.]

[Footnote 2: "This number might be reduced to eleven, if minor variations were grouped."--Sir Charles Dilke, National Liberal Club, 10 May 1909.]

[Footnote 3: _The Essentials of Self-Government,_ 1909, p. 62.]

[Footnote 4: Section 41 of the South Africa Act, 1909, reads thus: "As soon as may be after every quinquennial census the Governor-General-in-Council shall appoint a commission consisting of three Judges of the Supreme Court of South Africa to carry out any redivision which may have become necessary as between the different electoral divisions in each Province, and to provide for the allocation of the number of members to which such Province may have become ent.i.tled under the provisions of this Act."]

[Footnote 5: The Town Clerk of Edinburgh, Dr. Hunter, urges a rearrangement of the Parliamentary Divisions of the city, so as to a.s.similate them to the munic.i.p.al wards. "Confusion and unnecessary expense are caused by the present arrangement.... The munic.i.p.al area of the city is represented in Parliament partly by the four city members, partly by the member for Leith Burghs, and partly by the member for the County of Midlothian. The distinction thus existing between the Munic.i.p.al and Parliamentary divisions of the city necessitates the annual making up of separate rolls of voters for munic.i.p.al and for Parliamentary purposes respectively, involving heavy additional expense (amounting to upwards of 1100 per annum), which would be avoided if the areas for both purposes were a.s.similated." a.s.similation is desirable "not merely in order to save needless expense, but in the interests of candidates and electors as well as of the electoral agencies. In the dual arrangement at present existing the usual organizations for electoral purposes of all kinds have to be duplicated. Not one of the Parliamentary wards correspond with any of the munic.i.p.al wards."--_The Scotsman_, 9 August 1910.]

[Footnote 6: "The General Election of January 1910, and the Bearing of the Results on some Problems of Representation." Paper read before the Royal Statistical Society, 19 April 1910. Mr. Rosenbaum, however, rejects proportional representation on political grounds. These have been considered in the two previous chapters.]

[Footnote 7: "Electoral Statistics." Paper read before the Manchester Statistical Society, 12 December 1906.]

[Footnote 8: Joseph King, M.P., in evidence before the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, 1909.]

[Footnote 9: This difficulty would disappear with the adoption of Home Rule.]

[Footnote 10: _Real Representation for Ireland_, 1908.]

[Footnote 11: Report of Annual Meeting of the Proportional Representation Society, 21 July 1909.--_Representation,_ vol. ii.

p. 154.]

[Footnote 12: In reply to a deputation of the Manchester Liberal Federation, 22 May 1909.]

[Footnote 13: _Minutes of Evidence_, Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, 1910 (Cd. 6352), p. 104.]

[Footnote 14: _Cf._ "Two Chambers or One," _Quarterly Review_, July 1910.]

[Footnote 15: The indirect election of the United States Senate gives so little satisfaction that the House of Representatives on 14 April 1911 approved of the proposed amendment to the Const.i.tution providing for popular election by 296 votes to 6.]

[Footnote 16: Of these, the Fusionists polled 1,830,353 votes.]

[Footnote 17: Address to the London School of Economics, 5 October 1910.]

[Footnote 18: These broad distinctive t.i.tles are here given, although the author recognizes that the Nationalist and Unionist parties in South Africa are not exclusively Dutch or British.]

[Footnote 19: _Peers and Bureaucrats_, by Ramsay Muir, Professor of Modern History at Liverpool University.]

[Footnote 20: 21 May 1910.]

[Footnote 21: "Pacificus," _The Times_, 31 October 1910.]

[Footnote 22: Address to the Eighty Club, 25 July 1910.]

APPENDIX I

THE j.a.pANESE ELECTORAL SYSTEM--THE SINGLE NON-TRANSFERABLE VOTE

The following memorandum has been written by Mr. Kametaro Hayasbida, the Chief Secretary of the j.a.panese House of Representatives, in reply to a series of questions, the particulars of which are set out in the memorandum.

_Failure of single member system._

The Original Election Law of our country was promulgated in 1889, the same year in which took place the promulgation of the Const.i.tution.

Under this law the system of small electoral districts was single-adopted, and each _Fu_ or _Ken_ (administrative district) was divided into several electoral districts each of which const.i.tuted a single-member const.i.tuency (with the exception of some large districts which, impossible of further division, had two seats allotted with the system of _scrutin de liste_). The system was, however, found in practice to be very unsatisfactory, as it often happened that a minority of the voters, instead of the majority, in certain _Fu_ or _Ken_ obtained the majority of the members returned, and, on the other hand, a party with a majority at the polls could not sometimes, as the result of the grouping of the voters in the small electoral districts, secure any representation at all. Under such circ.u.mstances it was utterly impossible for each political party to obtain representation in reasonable proportion to the strength of its voters; or, in other words, the electors of the country at large had never succeeded in being properly represented in their legislative body. As the inadequacy of the system was thus apparently shown I formulated in 1891, by somewhat what modifying Marshal's c.u.mulative voting system, a system of large electoral districts combined with that of the single vote, and urged for a revision of the Election Law.

_Multi-member const.i.tuencies. Single vote adopted 1900._

Since then several elections had taken place; and the defects of the existing law were more strongly p.r.o.nounced at each successive election.

It was, however, not until the year 1898 that the Government at last introduced a Bill for a revision of the law with the view of adopting the system I had the honour of formulating. After heated discussion in three successive sessions, the Bill was pa.s.sed in 1900 and sanctioned as a law. This is our present Election Law. In the revised system the _Fu, Ken_, and _Shi_ (the administrative districts) const.i.tute at the same time the electoral districts, and a voter in each district has but one vote for one candidate, while several seats (according to the population) are allotted to the district.

The above is a brief historical sketch of our electoral system. I shall now try to answer your questions in order.

_Equitable results._

As to the first question whether our system secures the representation of each party in reasonable proportion to its voting strength, I cannot do better than answer it by pointing out a few instances in the General Election which took place on the 15 May 1908.

TABLE I

THE CITY OF TOKYO (11 seats)

Seats in Seats Parties. Votes. Proportion Obtained.

to votes.

Seiyu-Kwai (Liberals) 6,579 2.71 2 Konsei-honto (Progressives) 2,216 0.91 1 Daido-ha (Conservatives) 2,879 1.18 2 Yuko-Kwai (Radicals) 4,656 1.91 2 Churitsu (Independent) 10,414 4.29 4 ------ ----- -- Total 26,744 11.00 11

All parties except the Seiyu-kwai and Daido-ha succeeded in obtaining their representatives in reasonable proportion to their respective voting strength. The explanation given for the particular case of the Seiyu-kwai is that the party, unable for some reason or other to limit the number of candidates, had placed five candidates instead of three or four, and caused its own defeat by splitting the votes. I take at random, or rather in the order they come, a few more districts, and the results obtained are as follows:--

TABLE II

TOKYO-FU (5 seats)

Parties. Number of Seats in Seats Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained to Votes.

Seiyu-kwai 5 12,794 4.02 4 Kensei-honto - - - - Daido-ha. 1 13,122 .98 1 Churitsu - - - - ------ ---- - Total 6 15,916 5.00 5