Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election Part 25

TABLE III

THE CITY OF KYOTO (3 seats)

Parties. Number of Seats in Seats Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained to Votes.

Seiyu-kwai 1 1,284 0.45 - Kensei-honto - - - - Daido-ha - - - - Yuko-Kwai - - - - Churitsu 3 7,304 2.55 3 - ----- ---- - Total 4 8,588 3.00 3

TABLE IV

KYOTO-FU (5 seats)

Parties. Number of Seats in Seats Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained.

to Votes.

Seiyu-kwai 5 18,928 4.01 4 Kensei-honto -- -- -- -- Daido-ha -- -- -- -- Yuko-kwai -- -- -- -- Churitsu 1 4,701 0.99 1 -------------------------------------- Total.... 6 23,629 5.00 5

TABLE V

THE CITY OF OSAKA (6 seats)

Parties. Number of Seats in Seats Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained.

to Votes.

Seiyu-kwai 5 8,666 3.32 4 Kensei-honto -- -- -- -- Daido-ha -- -- -- -- Yuko-kwai 1 2,612 1.00 1 Churitsu 2 4,368 1.68 1 --------------------------------------------- Total.... 8 15,646 6.00 6

TABLE VI

OSAKU-FU (6 seats)

Parties. Number of Seats in Seats Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained.

to Votes.

Seiyu-kwai 5 15,137 3.57 5 Kensei-honto -- -- -- -- Daido-ha 1 2,199 0.52 -- Yuko-kwai 1 1,304 0.31 -- Churitsu 3 6,786 1.60 1 --------------------------------------------- Total.... 10 25,426 6.00 6

Throughout all electoral districts similar results were obtained. The Churitsu (_i.e._ those belonging to no party), considered as a group, had not everywhere been as successful as the other parties, as observe in Tables V. and VI. Each candidate of this group is quite independent of the other, and has no political views or propaganda in common, nor any organization whatever. Therefore, each case is totally different from the other. Although all independent candidates or voters are in these tables grouped as Churitsu, it is not proper to consider them in the same category with the other parties.

Now, judging from the results in the General Election, a few instances of which are given above, I may say that our present system, if not fully satisfactory, tolerably secures the representation of each political party in approximate proportion to its voting capacity.

_The new system and party organization._

As to the first part of your second question, whether, to obtain these results, the system involves a great deal of calculation on the part of political organizations as to the exact number of their supporters, I should say that, as the same system and method of election are uniformly adopted in the city, county, borough and village elections as well as in the elections of the Prefectural a.s.sembly, it is not a very difficult task for all political parties to ascertain from the results of all these elections their relative strength, and to estimate the number of their supporters.

As to the second part of the question, whether it is necessary to issue precise instructions to the electors as to the candidates for whom they should vote, my answer is this: as every political organization through its branch in every _Fu_ and _Ken_ and the sub-branches in the cities, counties, towns and villages, is always in close touch with its const.i.tuents, and is constantly explaining its position and propaganda, with the view not only to instruct them but also to extend the sphere of its influence, it is not so difficult as it seems to decide the number of candidates. When it is once decided efforts are made on the part of the organization to distribute the votes among the candidates in such a way that not one of them receives a defeat at the hands of the other party. To attain this object the methods are not very complicated, for every elector has but one vote for one candidate; and, moreover, the stronger candidates, so long as their own position is secured, will endeavour to distribute a portion of their votes among the weaker candidates. This being the case, the member returned with the greatest number of votes may not be the most popular candidate, but the party as a whole is much more likely to succeed in getting representatives in proportion to the strength of its voters.

_The position of independents._

As to the third question, whether the system enables men of independent mind and character to maintain their position in Parliament, I should emphatically state that the revised system is much better than the old in this respect. Under the old system even such a prominent man as Mr.

M. Matsuda (the Speaker of the House of Representatives some years ago, and the Minister of Finance in the present Government) suffered several defeats. But under the new system it has never happened that the leader of a party has lost his seat at any election, as he may seek his election at the safest district. To men of independent mind and character the new system offers the greater opportunity to maintain their position in the House, for in the election they may, in spite of the opposition of parties, draw their votes from all parts within a large electoral district. It may be said that the larger electoral district we have, the greater opportunity we afford to independent candidates. For instance, both Mr. Y. Ozaki, the Mayor of Tokyo, and Mr.

S. Shimada, by being independent candidates, have never lost their seat in Parliament, and in the last General Election were returned for their native prefecture or town with a great number of votes.

This brings me to the end of my answers to your inquiries. In conclusion I may say a few words about the public opinions in our country as to the Election Laws.

_Public opinion and the new system._

Despite the fact that the new system enables the elector of the country to be more reasonably represented in the House, still there are some ambitious politicians urging for their own selfish purpose to restore the old system. But, as almost all prominent members in both Houses are fully cognizant of the relative merits and demerits of the two systems, there is not much chance of our returning to the old system.

APPENDIX II

THE SECOND BALLOT

A Note on the German General Elections of 1903 and 1907.

The German Reichstag, which consists of 397 members, is elected by a system of single-member const.i.tuencies. Every member, however, must have obtained a majority of the votes polled, either at a first or second ballot, in the const.i.tuency for which he has been returned. The German Official Returns furnish very complete details of the elections, including the figures for the first and second ballots, and the summaries at the end of the Returns disclose a very striking divergence between the proportions of seats obtained and votes polled by the various political parties. These discrepancies have attracted general attention, and have usually been attributed to the great variation in the size of German const.i.tuencies. As a matter of fact, the effect of redistribution on the proportionality between seats and votes is not nearly so large as is generally supposed. Apart from the consequences of neglecting the votes of the minority or minorities in each const.i.tuency, wherein lies the gravest defect of a single-member system, the second ballot is a disturbing factor of considerable importance. So far from diminishing the disproportion between seats and votes polled by the various parties, the second ballot frequently increases that disproportion. In order to appreciate the respective effects of unequal const.i.tuencies and of the second ballots it is necessary to consider these two factors separately. This will be facilitated by making a comparison between the results which would have been obtained without second ballots with the results actually obtained. The following tables, which are based upon the official returns, give the votes polled and the seats obtained by the five princ.i.p.al groups:--

GERMAN GENERAL ELECTION, 1903

Parties. Votes. Results without Results with Second Ballot. Second Ballot.

Social Democrats 3,010,771 122 81 (31.7%) (30.7%) (20.4%) Centre Party 1,875,273 104 100 (19.7%) (26.2%) (25.2%) National Liberals 1,317,401 32 51 (13.9%) ( 8.1%) (12.8%) Conservatives 1,281,852 79 75 (13.6%) (19.9%) (18.9%) Radical Parties 872,653 11 36 ( 9.2%) ( 2.8%) ( 9.1%)

GERMAN GENERAL ELECTION, 1907

Parties. Votes. Results without Results with Second Ballot. Second Ballot.

Social Democrats 3,259,029 73 43 (28.9%) (18.4%) (10.8%) Centre Party 2,179,743 101 105 (19.3%) (26.4%) (26.4%) National Liberals 1,630,681 47 54 (14.5%) (11.8%) (13.6%) Conservatives 1,632,072 91 84 (13.6%) (22.9%) (21.2%) Radical Parties 1,233,933 30 49 (10.9%) ( 7.6%) (12.3%)

_The effect of unequal const.i.tuencies on representation_.

The Social Democrats were affected to a greater extent than any other party by both the factors referred to. In 1903 the Socialists polled 31.7 per cent, of the votes, and, at the first ballots, were at the head of the poll in 122, or 30.7 per cent, of the const.i.tuencies. In other words, if the system of second ballots had not been in force, the Social Democrats would have obtained very nearly their fair share of representation. If, in addition, there had been a redistribution of seats by which the sizes of const.i.tuencies had been equalized, the Social Democrats would have obtained more than their share of representation. The strength of the party lay in the large towns, and if, for example, Berlin had the additional eight seats to which it was ent.i.tled nearly all of them would have fallen to the Social Democrats.

Again the three divisions of the district of Hamburg returned Social Democrats with overwhelming majorities. Were the representation allotted to Hamburg doubled, as it should be, all six seats might possibly have fallen to the Social Democrats.[1] An equalization of the size of const.i.tuencies might have produced in 1903 the phenomenon which has occurred so often in England. The largest party would have secured a number of seats far in excess of that to which it was ent.i.tled by reason of its strength. In 1907 the Socialists polled 28.9 of the votes, but only succeeded in reaching the head of the poll at the first ballot in 73, or 18.4 per cent. of the const.i.tuencies. A redistribution of seats would have added to their representation in the large towns, and the first ballots would have yielded a result which would have corresponded more fairly with their polling strength.

_The effect of second ballots_.

In both years the system of second ballots has had the effect of reducing very considerably the representation of the Social Democrats.

In the year 1903 the Social Democrats won 56 const.i.tuencies by absolute majorities, and were engaged in the second ballots in 118 const.i.tuencies. In 66 of these const.i.tuencies they were at the head of the poll, but succeeded in maintaining this position at the second ballots in 24 only. In the remaining 52 const.i.tuencies they were second on the poll, and at the second ballots they were able to win only _one_ of these seats. In these 118 const.i.tuencies the Socialists polled 1,170,000 votes at the first ballots, whilst the other parties polled 1,920,000. As a result of the second ballots the Socialists obtained 25 seats and the remaining parties obtained 93 seats.

The figures of the year 1907 tell a similar tale. At the first ballots the Social Democrats were at the head of the poll in 73 const.i.tuencies.

The second ballots reduced this number to 43. They were engaged in the second ballots in 90 const.i.tuencies; they were at the head of the poll in the first ballot in 44 of these const.i.tuencies, but kept this position in 11 only; they were second on the poll in the remaining 46 const.i.tuencies and won in 3 cases only. In these 90 const.i.tuencies the Social Democrats polled at the first ballot 1,185,000 votes, whilst the other parties taken together polled 1,888,000 votes; the Socialists obtained 14 seats, the other parties obtained 76 seats.

In both these elections the second ballots affected very adversely the representation of the largest party. If this party, without the second ballot and with a fair distribution of seats, might have obtained more than its share of representation, then the second ballots would have acted as a corrective, but not necessarily so. There is no reason why the second ballots should not have added to the over-representation already obtained. This will be seen from the figures of the elections in the Kingdom of Saxony. This division of the German Empire is ent.i.tled to 23 representatives in the Reichstag. In 1903 the Socialists won 18 of these seats with absolute majorities; they were engaged in the second ballots in the remaining five const.i.tuencies; they won four (all those in which they were at the head of the poll at the first ballots) and only lost the one const.i.tuency in which they were second on the poll.

The Social Democrats, who at the first ballots polled 58.8 per cent, of the votes, thus obtained 22 seats out of 23, and the second ballots in this case only confirmed the overwhelming preponderance which the system of single-member const.i.tuencies had conferred upon the larger party.

_Second ballots and the swing of the pendulum_.] It would, indeed, seem that a system of second ballots rather accentuates those great changes in representation which are the normal characteristic of a system of single-member const.i.tuencies. In the elections in Saxony in 1907 the Social Democrats were still by far the largest party, obtaining 48.5 per cent. of the votes. They succeeded in obtaining eight seats by absolute majorities and were engaged at the second ballots in eight other const.i.tuencies. They lost every one of these const.i.tuencies, although at the first ballots they had been at the head of the poll in five of them. The unfavourable swing of the pendulum reduced their representation at the first ballots, and the second ballots merely increased their misfortunes.

Nor would redistribution have lessened the violence of these changes in the const.i.tuencies in which second ballots were necessary. Thus, for example, Frankfort-On-Main, with an electorate of 77,164, should return two members instead of one. The const.i.tuency was won by the Socialists in the second ballots of 1903, but was lost at the second ballots in 1907. In both years the Socialist candidate was at the head of the poll at the first ballots. Similarly the const.i.tuency of Elberfeld-Barmen, with an electorate of 67,241, won by an absolute majority in 1903, was lost by the Socialists at the second ballots in 1907, although their candidate had been at the head of the poll at the first ballot. If these and other const.i.tuencies had received additional representatives, the violence of the changes in the composition of the legislative body would in all probability have been increased.

_The second ballot and the representation of minorities_.

A study of the statistics of the German General Elections shows that the representation obtained by the various parties depends very largely upon their supremacy in certain localities. In these districts the minorities have been unrepresented for many years, the second ballots having in no way saved them from practical disfranchis.e.m.e.nt. Thus the Centre Party is in the ascendant in the Rhenish Provinces. In the district of Cologne, Munster, and Aix-la-Chapelle, the Centre Party monopolizes the representation, returning in 1907 every one of the 15 members to which the districts were ent.i.tled. In the adjoining districts of Dusseldorf, Coblentz and Treves they returned 16 out of 24. In Bavaria, the districts of Lower Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate, Lower Franconia and Schwabia, which are ent.i.tled to 23 members, were represented wholly by members of the Centre Party. Taking the kingdom of Bavaria as a whole, the Centre Party obtained 34 seats out of 48, although they polled only 44.7 per cent of the votes at the first ballots. There is therefore reproduced in Germany the conditions which obtain in certain parts of the United Kingdom--the permanent supremacy of one party which monopolizes, or nearly so, the representation of the district.

_Summary_

The system of second ballots has therefore had a considerable influence in creating that divergence between the votes polled and the seats obtained which has characterized German elections. The representation of any one party depends, to a very large degree, upon the att.i.tude taken towards it by other parties. The system in no way acts as a corrective to the anomalies arising from single-member const.i.tuencies, and may even accentuate the violent changes a.s.sociated with them. Moreover, the system does not provide representation for minorities, and therefore does not ensure a fully representative character to popularly elected legislative bodies. It may be mentioned that all the criticisms here directed against the second ballot apply with nearly equal force to the use of the alternative vote (_see_ p. 95), a thinly disguised form of the same principle which appears to be meeting with some acceptance in this country.