Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election Part 23

"The system proved in practice as simple and accurate as it was scrupulously fair in character."--_Bloemfontein Post_.]

CHAPTER XII

THE KEY TO ELECTORAL AND CONSt.i.tUTIONAL REFORM

"De la maniere de regler le suffrage depend la ruine ou le salut des Etats."--MONTESQUIEU

_Electoral problems awaiting solution._

The Liberal, Conservative, and Labour parties are all agreed that a large measure of electoral reform is long overdue, but hitherto the various parties have contended only for such reforms as would strengthen their own parliamentary position. Liberal and Labour politicians, looking at the inequality in the voting power of electors, have demanded a reform of the franchise; they urge that every man should have one vote and no more. The Conservative party, looking at the inequalities in the size of const.i.tuencies, have demanded a redistribution of seats on the ground that all votes should be of equal value. Liberals, again, feeling the difficulties which have attended the emergence of third-party candidatures in the const.i.tuencies, ask for a reform in the method of voting so as to ensure that the member elected for any const.i.tuency shall represent a majority of the citizens. Apart from the question of the enfranchis.e.m.e.nt of women, which involves considerations of a different order, these are the three electoral problems with which public opinion has been chiefly concerned.

The efforts of parties to give effect to the reforms in which they have been more particularly interested have so far ended in failure. In 1905 Mr. Balfour introduced a Bill for the redistribution of seats, unaccompanied by any reform of the franchise. The measure was met with the cry of "gerrymander!" and its disappearance with the fall of the Government was regretted by few. In 1907 the Liberal Government attempted to deal with the franchise problem, apart from any scheme of redistribution. It endeavoured in Mr. Harcourt's Plural Voting Bill, a highly complex measure, to give effect to the principle of "one man, one vote." This Bill was strongly opposed on the ground that the reform was partial in character. If, said the opponents of the measure, it is unfair that one elector should have twelve votes whilst another elector has but one, it is equally unfair that the vote of an elector in one const.i.tuency should be twelve times as valuable as the vote of an elector in another const.i.tuency. The justice of the argument must be admitted, and explains why the rejection of the Plural Voting Bill by the House of Lords aroused comparatively little public feeling. Yet the rejection of this Bill has focussed attention upon the deficiencies of our franchise laws, and the eyes of all politicians are turning towards that more comprehensive measure of electoral reform which cannot be indefinitely postponed. Such a measure has been categorically promised by Mr. Asquith on more than one occasion. So far back as 1908, soon after his accession to the Premiership,[1] he made the following public declaration: "I regard it as a duty, and indeed as a binding obligation on the part of the Government, that before this Parliament comes to an end they should submit a really effective scheme for the reform of our electoral system."

_The simplification of the franchise._

What are the lines on which a really effective scheme can be framed? The fate of the partial measures already referred to is at least an indication of the difficulties which will attend any attempt to carry an incomplete scheme. It may be a.s.sumed that an effective scheme must deal with the three problems named: franchise (including registration), redistribution, and three-cornered contests. Each of these factors must be dealt with as simply as a due recognition of the problem to be solved will allow. The complexity of Mr. Harcourt's Plural Voting Bill was due to the fact that we possess no less than twenty[2] different franchises. But the remedy is easy. "If," said the late Sir Charles Dilke, "they wanted to cheapen the cost, to remove the disgrace from this country of having registration more full of fraud and error than anywhere else, they could only do so by some simple franchise. All registration reform was condemned to failure until they made up their minds on a simple and easy basis for the franchise, sufficiently wide to enable them to absorb all existing franchises." Such a simple franchise is to be found in manhood suffrage, which would admit of the easy transfer of electors' names from the register of one electoral division to another. The chief objection to this solution, which arises from the fear that the most numerous cla.s.s in the country may monopolise representation, may be met by linking the adoption of a simple franchise with a system of election which shall give due representation to minorities.

_Redistribution._

Redistribution must be treated with like boldness, but before considering the principle on which this reform must be based, it would be well to give some indication of its urgency. Here are the figures of four of the largest and four of the smallest English const.i.tuencies as given in the Parliamentary Return of 1911:-- ***

Const.i.tuency. Electors. Const.i.tuency. Electors. Romford (Ess.e.x) 55,951 Durham. 2,698 Walthamstow (Ess.e.x) 42,029 Bury St. Edmunds 2,878 Wandsworth 39,821 Whitehaven 2,989 Harrow (Middles.e.x) 38,865 St. George's, Tower Hamlets 3,252

_Should be automatic._

It will be observed that an elector in Durham has twenty times the political power of an elector in the Romford Division of Ess.e.x. Nor are these discrepancies confined to England. There are great divergencies between the electorates of individual const.i.tuencies in Scotland and Ireland, and any measure of redistribution which attempted to deal effectively with these would necessarily have to be of a far-reaching character. Even were it possible to effect a readjustment by the creation of parliamentary areas containing an equal number of electors, so rapid are the changes in the electorate that the scheme would be out of date almost before it came into force. Mr. Ellis T. Powell has published a valuable table ent.i.tled "the process of electoral evolution,"[3] in which he has arranged the const.i.tuencies in the order of their size as measured by the number of electors who were on the registers in 1886, and again in 1906. The table shows how remarkable has been the change in their relative importance. The rapidity of the change is still further indicated by a comparison based upon the 1908 register.

Any one who has the curiosity to count the number of const.i.tuencies which retained the same position on the list both in 1906 and 1908 will find this to be the case in nineteen const.i.tuencies only out of a total of 481. So great, indeed, has been the change since 1901, the date of the last census, that no satisfactory scheme of redistribution could be framed upon the population figures of that year. It would seem that the only satisfactory principle upon which the problem can be solved is that of an automatic redistribution of seats on the completion of every census, but the difficulties a.s.sociated with such a solution, if the present system of single-member const.i.tuencies is retained, are so overwhelming as to render it almost inadmissible. True, the South African Const.i.tution provides for the automatic redistribution of seats after every quinquennial census,[4] and the Canadian Const.i.tution contains a similar provision, but the inconveniences attaching to a rearrangement of boundaries are not so great in new countries as those which obtain in an established country. Moreover, as time goes on, the inconveniences a.s.sociated with rapid changes in boundaries will be felt more and more both in Canada and in South Africa. For local authorities[5] rightly complain of the difficulties which arise from the creation of different areas for different purposes and the consequent overlapping of boundaries, and these difficulties would increase were fresh parliamentary divisions created every ten years. The problem which would be involved in the creation of new parliamentary divisions for London is such as to render a satisfactory scheme almost impossible.

Apart, however, from these considerations, the difficulties of another kind attendant upon the creation of new const.i.tuencies are so great that it is quite easy to understand the unwillingness of the leaders of both political parties to embark upon schemes of redistribution. The influence of boundaries upon the political fortunes of parties is so well known that any rearrangement, whether in the metropolis or in the large towns, would probably be looked upon with very grave suspicion, and the more so that in several towns party organizations have already endeavoured to obtain the maximum of party advantage under existing conditions.

_Secures neither one vote, one value nor true representation._ Further, it has been proved beyond question that a redistribution of seats will, if single-member const.i.tuencies are retained, fail to accomplish the end which its advocates have in view, namely, one vote one value. For redistribution can only secure equality in the size of electoral districts, and this is not the same as equality in the value of votes.

With equal electoral districts it would still be possible in two adjoining const.i.tuencies for one member to be returned by a large majority and the other by a small majority. In Wales it might still happen that a Conservative vote would be valueless for the purpose of obtaining representation. Equality in vote value is only secured when the votes of electors of all parties are equally effective. This can only happen when the representation of parties is brought into agreement with their voting strength.

The Royal Commission on Electoral Systems entered very carefully into the probable effect of redistribution upon the representation of parties within the House of Commons, and came to the conclusion that, so far "as facts can be adduced to test it, the theory that the varying size of const.i.tuencies accounts for the exaggeration of majorities falls to the ground." This conclusion--and the Commission could hardly have come to any other--is in agreement with the opinions expressed both by Mr. S.

Rosenbaum, of the Royal Statistical Society,[6] and by Mr. J. Rooke Corbett, of the Manchester Statistical Society.[7] The following summary of the results of Mr. Corbett's a.n.a.lyses of the eight General Elections 1885-1910 shows conclusively that redistribution would fail to remedy the inequalities in representation arising from a system of single-member const.i.tuencies:

GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1885-1910

Majority Majority Year of of seats under system Majority under Election Party. actually of equal a proportional gained. electorates. system.

1885 Liberal 158 178 86 Liberal 1886 Conservative 104 102 8 Liberal 1892 Liberal 44 46 34 Liberal 1895 Conservative 150 172 12 Conservative 1900 Conservative 134 150 16 Conservative 1906 Liberal 356 362 104 Liberal 1910(Jan.) Liberal 124 136 66 Liberal 1910(Dec.) Liberal 126 122 38 Liberal

"It is sometimes said," states Mr. Corbett, "that if the single-member const.i.tuencies were made equal in size these inequalities of representation would disappear. It is difficult to understand how any one with even the most elementary knowledge of the facts can support such a proposition. An examination of the foregoing summary will show that no readjustment of the electoral const.i.tuencies would do much to remedy the enormous inequalities which occur at present. In fact strict equalization of the const.i.tuencies would be as likely to make matters worse as to make them better. Thus, in the year 1885 the Liberal majority of 158, which under a proportional system would have been 86, by a system of equal electorates would have been transformed into a majority of 178; in the following year a Conservative majority of 104, which, with a proportional system, would have been a Liberal majority of 8, would under a system of equal electorates have been transformed into a Conservative majority of 102." Mr. Rosenbaum states: "I am firmly persuaded that it is not possible for redistribution alone to effect those particular reforms which the advocates of proportional representation urge.... Proportional representation would secure in the House of Commons a representation of each party in strict arithmetical proportion to the number of its supporters in the country.

Redistribution can remove anomalies due to over-representation in one part and under-representation in another part of the country. So far as the over-representation in one area is accompanied by an excessive proportion of members of one party, and the under-representation in another area is accompanied by a deficiency of members of the opposite party, redistribution might have some counterbalancing results. There is, however, no real security that redistribution by itself might not aggravate rather than mitigate this particular trouble."

_The problem simplified by proportional representation._

It will have been observed that the difficulties of redistribution arise from the system of single-member const.i.tuencies, and it is this which also renders all schemes useless for the purpose of securing equality in the value of votes. An effective and simple solution of all difficulties is available. Abandon the system of single-member const.i.tuencies with their ever-changing boundaries, and treat the natural divisions of the country (its counties, large towns, &c.) as permanent const.i.tuencies with representation varying with the rise or fall of their population.

This is the scheme of redistribution required by a system of proportional representation, and its adoption would simplify the most difficult of all the problems of electoral reform. It would make possible that automatic redistribution of seats, which must be an essential feature of any satisfactory scheme of redistribution, without involving these alterations of boundaries which, in addition to their other disadvantages and even dangers, interfere so seriously with administrative efficiency. With such a system the areas for local or parliamentary purposes might easily be brought into agreement. Already "we have strong county patriotism fostered by tradition, by ecclesiastical and judicial affairs, county council government, county territorial organization, and even county cricket and football; to have, therefore, county electoral areas would be at once popular and intelligible to all; besides, it would be a reversion to an old tradition ";[8] and if the large towns were made parliamentary const.i.tuencies this also would be a reversion to the conditions which existed before 1885. It would be infinitely easier to add representatives to or take them away from such electoral areas than it would be to redivide the boroughs and counties for the purpose of creating new const.i.tuencies.

Commenting on the work of the Delimitation Commission, to which was entrusted the duty of creating the new const.i.tuencies for the South African a.s.sembly and Provincial Councils, the Secretary, in a letter to the author, says: "The task set the Commission proved exceedingly difficult. While it was, so to speak, imperative to give due consideration to all the principles enjoined by the Act, the great object naturally was the framing of const.i.tuencies both for the Union a.s.sembly and for the Provincial Councils which would be able to send representatives who, in turn, would reflect the will of the various sections of the people. The conditions enjoined by the Act made it very difficult to produce schemes which could on all hands be considered entirely satisfactory.... Good as the result is, there is no question that had the first recommendation of the South African Convention in favour of proportional representation been adopted, the work of the Commission would not only have been much simplified, but the chances of framing const.i.tuencies with representatives forming a true mirror of the various sections of the people would have been increased by more than fifty per cent.... If there had been any doubt in my mind my work on this Commission has removed that doubt, and proved to me that the only remedy for our various electoral ills is a system of proportional representation." This considered testimony, from one who has been immersed in the practical details of redistribution, is of great value, but it can occasion no surprise, for proportional representation admits of automatic redistribution of seats, provides for the permanence of boundaries, renders gerrymandering impossible, and, above all, secures equality in the value of votes.

_The case of Ireland._ There is one special difficulty,[9] however, which must be faced in the consideration of any scheme of redistribution for the United Kingdom--the number of representatives to be allotted to Ireland. The permanent over-representation of any one part of a kingdom united for common purposes cannot easily be defended, but the South African Const.i.tution furnishes an example of a larger representation being accorded temporarily to the smaller states for the purpose of facilitating the union of all; whilst in South Africa, Australia, and the United States the separate states or provinces have equal representation, irrespective of size, in the Senate. If the continued over-representation of Ireland would in any way facilitate the process of the unification of the United Kingdom, that in itself would be a very powerful and sufficient reason for maintaining the number of Irish members at its present level. A system of proportional representation might simplify the solution of this particular difficulty, for the over-representation of Ireland would not have the same disturbing effect upon the composition of the House of Commons if the different divisions of political opinions within Ireland obtained their fair share of representation. For proportional representation would produce a very important modification of the electoral conditions within Ireland.

According to Mr. J. Rooke Corbett, the Irish Unionists who, at the General Election of 1906, obtained 18 representatives, were ent.i.tled to 34. But that is not the only change that would take place. There would result a softening of those racial divisions which are now the chief characteristic of Irish representation. Moderate opinion would be encouraged to take a more active part in elections and to seek representation. Nor can it be said that the political conditions of Ireland are such as to render proportional representation within Ireland either impracticable or nugatory in its effect. Mr. Archibald E. Dobbs, High Sheriff of county Antrim, has framed a scheme with special reference to Irish conditions[10], and Lord MacDonnell, who was intimately a.s.sociated with the details of the Irish Council Bill of 1907, has said: "He made the subject the matter of as close a study as he could at the time, and everything he read more fully satisfied him of the great desirability of the system. He felt that it was more needed in Ireland than in any other part of the British Empire, because, although for the purpose of general politics the division into Nationalists and Unionists could be defended, for the purpose he had in view--the internal administration of Ireland--it was essential that all views, not only the Nationalists and the Unionists, but the great political school of thought under the name of the old Whigs should also be represented.

The results of his labours perhaps it would not be discreet for him to disclose, but he was quite satisfied of the practicability in Ireland of a scheme of proportional representation[11]."

_Three-cornered contests._

But even if the Electoral Reform Bill provided for a simplification of the franchise and a redistribution of seats, yet such a measure could not be described as a complete and effective scheme of reform. The Bill must provide a solution for the further problem arising from three-cornered contests, which have greatly increased in number in recent elections. On what principle is this difficulty to be solved?

Formerly there was a strong demand for the second ballot, but its defects have been so constantly exposed that the remedy more generally advocated is the one recommended by the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, viz., the adoption of the alternative vote (the transferable vote in single-member const.i.tuencies). This proposal, however, ignores the real difficulty, which is found in the fact that three parties, and not two, are now seeking representation. Three-cornered contests have, so far, affected adversely the fortunes of the Liberal Party; and the alternative vote, whilst tending, at least temporarily, to redress the situation, does so without providing any adequate guarantee for the fair representation of other parties. Were this remedy adopted it may be a.s.sumed that Liberal candidates would be nominated in those const.i.tuencies which are now represented by members of the Labour Party, and at least there would be a cessation of the process of withdrawing Liberal candidates from other const.i.tuencies ear-marked by the Labour Party. Were all these const.i.tuencies contested by the three parties it might easily happen that the smallest party would obtain no representation whatever. Conservative electors might record their second choice for the Liberal candidate, and in this way secure in each case the defeat of the Labour candidates. On the other hand, an alliance between Labour and Conservatives might procure the defeat of the Liberal candidates. The representation of any one party would depend upon the action taken by members of other parties.

As the probable effects of the alternative vote becomes more fully understood its inadequacy as a remedy will be more clearly realized, and this proposal, instead of facilitating, may hinder the pa.s.sage of a comprehensive measure of reform. On the contrary, the wider reform of proportional representation, providing as it would for the just and fair representation of three parties (and this is the problem for which a solution has to be found), has far greater claims to the consideration of practical politicians. It simplifies the problem of redistribution; it is the way by which equality in the value of votes can be secured; it provides for the fair representation of three parties, and, in guaranteeing the adequate representation of minorities, facilitates the adoption of a simple franchise. Proportional representation is, as it were, the master key which unlocks the difficulties a.s.sociated with a comprehensive measure of electoral reform. Based on a broad simple principle, the justice of which is apparent to all, it provides the means by which each of the separate parts of such a measure can be most easily and effectively dealt with. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive on what other principle any permanent solution of the electoral problem can be based, or by what other means the difficulties inherent in a comprehensive measure of reform can be successfully overcome.

_Partial adoption of proportional representation not desirable_

Some who recognize the great merits of proportional representation have suggested its application to urban const.i.tuencies by way of experiment.

Thus, Mr. Winston Churchill has expressed the opinion that "the proportional representation of great cities was a point upon which electoral reformers ought to concentrate their minds."[12] A partial application of the reform might be of value as further evidence of its practicability, but there is no need for this further evidence. The full benefits of the system cannot be expected from such experiments, and although a partial measure is apparently working satisfactorily in Wurtemberg, the history of the movement shows that such schemes usually arouse fierce opposition. An attempt to introduce a partial scheme in Belgium provoked a storm of indignation and had to be withdrawn, and the amendment to the original draft of the South African Const.i.tution, carried in the Cape Parliament, limiting the proposed application of proportional representation to the towns, resulted in its complete abandonment for the elections for the House of a.s.sembly. All partial applications of proportional representation are apt to work unfairly. In Belgium, the Catholics were stronger in the rural districts than in the towns and the proportional representation of the towns alone would have strengthened the political position of the Catholics. Similarly the limitation of proportional representation to the towns in South Africa would have strengthened the political position of the Dutch in those const.i.tuencies without giving a corresponding advantage to the minorities in the country areas. Were a partial application attempted in Great Britain it would be necessary to overcome the initial difficulty of selecting the const.i.tuencies to which the experiment should be applied, and in the absence of an agreement between the parties, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to escape the fatal charge of partisan selection.

_Proportional representation and democratic principles._

What hinders the adoption of a complete scheme of proportional representation? Is it not primarily a lack of courage and of trust in the principle of democracy? But does it need a greater courage, a greater belief in the value of the democratic principle than the grant of self-government to the Transvaal and to the Orange River Colony within a few years of the Boer War? The courage and faith in the latter case have been abundantly justified, and were statesmen actuated by a similar courage and belief in democracy to propose a system of proportional representation there would undoubtedly be a public response which would astonish them; for reforms which are obviously based upon justice are quickly and gladly accepted. Democracy cannot be carried to its highest pitch of perfection if the electoral methods by which representative inst.i.tutions are brought into being are fundamentally defective. "By proportional representation," said Mr. James Gibb, "if electors were enabled to put more intelligence and conscience into their votes, the nation would be the gainer. The character of the electorate is of paramount importance, one outcome of it being the character of the House of Commons. The electors have not yet had a fair chance of showing what they can do in the making of a House of Commons. The question put to them is in such a form that they can hardly give an intelligible reply. The single-member system seems to imply a belief that the elector's liberty of choice must be narrow. We have now arrived at a point when another step is due in the evolution of the people's liberties, when an individual elector should obtain a greater freedom of choice and therefore a more intimate relation to national affairs.[13]

Further, the smooth working of democratic inst.i.tutions requires that no section of the electors should be permanently divorced from the governing body. Such separation begets a feeling of hostility towards the inst.i.tutions of the country. Thus, Lord Dunraven has referred to Ireland as a country in the government of which some of its best citizens are not allowed to take part. Similarly, many British settlers in the Orange Free State, although resident for several years, never had any representative in the State a.s.sembly. The natural feeling arose that the government of the country was a matter which did not concern them, and they never attended the meetings addressed by the member of the a.s.sembly for the district. It may be true that minorities must suffer, but there is no reason why they should suffer needlessly. Here justice and expediency go hand in hand. It is to the advantage of the country that all should be a.s.sociated with the representative body which speaks in the name of the whole, whether that body be a town council, a county council, or a House of Commons.

_Const.i.tutional reform._

As pointed out in the opening chapter, the question of electoral reform is intimately a.s.sociated with the const.i.tutional problem which has occupied Parliament since 1906. This problem contains two factors--the relation between the two Houses of Parliament, and the const.i.tution of the House of Lords. The House of Commons claims greater power in legislation on the ground that it is the expression of the national will. This demand has called forth a movement for reforming the House of Lords in order that it may fulfil more adequately its duties as a Second Chamber. The Unionist leaders have proposed that the peers should delegate their powers to a small number and that the House should be strengthened by the introduction of nominated and elected elements. With regard to the suggestion that a certain number of Lords of Parliament should be nominated by the Crown, all evidence points to the fact that such nominations invariably become party in character. No Government can afford to ignore the claims of the party which supports it, or to miss the opportunity of strengthening its position in one of the Houses of Parliament. The Canadian Senate, which is a nominated body, fails to give satisfaction, and there is a strong demand for its reform. At the conclusion of Sir John Macdonald's long lease of power the Senate consisted nearly wholly of Conservatives. Now that the Liberal Government has been in office for a good many years, the Senate is nearly wholly Liberal. Obviously, the introduction of a nominated element will not provide a Second Chamber that will command public confidence.

The elected element might be chosen indirectly by the County Councils or by the House of Commons, or the much bolder course of direct popular election, advocated by Sir Edward Grey, might be adopted. Direct election is distinctly preferable to indirect election by bodies created for other purposes. The experience of the United States, France, Sweden, and all other countries where the Upper House is elected by local legislatures, provincial councils, or munic.i.p.alities, show that elections to the local authorities are fought on questions of national politics. But whether indirect or direct election is determined upon, it is already clear that the only possible method of election is that of proportional representation. The Royal Commission on Electoral Systems has reported that there is much to be said in favour of the transferable vote as a method of election for a Second Chamber, and this verdict has since been endorsed in numerous articles in the press. Thus a writer in the _Quarterly Review_ says that: "If an elected element is thought to be necessary for the popularity and effectiveness of a reformed Upper House, then let a certain number of members be elected in large const.i.tuencies by means of proportional representation."[14] Were the minimum age qualifying for a vote in such elections raised to twenty-five or more there would naturally be provided the conservative tendency to which that House is intended to give expression, and were peers eligible as candidates doubtless such peers as were interested in politics would experience little difficulty in securing election.[15]

The principle of election has been adopted for the Senates of Australia and of South Africa. In the former the majority system with direct election is used; in the latter, a proportional system with indirect election. The difference in the results is most striking. In Australia each of the States is polled as a separate const.i.tuency, each elector having three votes. The result of the election of 1910 was as follows:--

AUSTRALIA: SENATE ELECTIONS, 1910

State. Votes Polled. Labour Non-Labour Seats Obtained. Votes. Votes.

Labour. Non-Labour. Victoria 648,889 692,474 3 -- New South Wales 736,666 735,566 3 -- Queensland 244,292 124,048 3 -- South Australia 171,858 148,626 3 -- Western Australia 128,452 109,565 3 -- Tasmania 92,033 75,115 3 -- --------- --------- -- -- 2,021,090 1,997,029[16]

18 --

It will be seen that the Labour Party polled 2,021,090 votes and obtained 18 seats, whilst their opponents, with a poll of no less than 1,997,029 votes, obtained none. So effectively does the majority system in the form of the block vote blot out minorities. The Hon. W. Pember Reeves, in commenting upon these figures,[17] said that: "Such results give rise to revolutions."

In South Africa each State is represented by eight Senators chosen by the local Parliaments by means of the single transferable vote. The first elections gave the following result:--

SOUTH AFRICA: SENATE ELECTIONS, 1910

Seats Obtained. States. Dutch Parties[18] British Parties[18]

Cape Colony South African 6 Progressive 2 Transvaal Het Volk and Progressive and Nationalist 5 Labour 3 Natal Dutch 1 British 7 Orange Free State Orangia Unie 6 Const.i.tutionalist 2 -- -- Total 18 Total 14

In the one case minorities are completely suppressed; in the other the minority in each State obtains representation.

These two ill.u.s.trations show that if the House of Lords is to be strengthened by the infusion of an elected element chosen by large const.i.tuencies, a true system of election must be adopted. This is the conclusion arrived at by Professor Ramsay Muir[19] after a careful examination of the different methods by which a Second Chamber can be const.i.tuted. All suggestions as to the selection of peers by hereditary peers, of peers qualified by service, by nomination, by indirect election, by direct election on a limited franchise, are ruled out and the direct election of a new Second Chamber by the single transferable vote is advocated in order that the new House may contain those elements which fail to secure representation with a system of single-member const.i.tuencies. But if, by the adoption of direct popular election and proportional representation, the Upper House were made more truly representative than the Lower, then whatever resolutions were pa.s.sed defining the relations between the two Houses there is not much doubt that power would tend to pa.s.s into the hands of the more representative House. In commenting upon the Royal Commission's report _The Nation_[20]