The Philosophy of Spinoza Part 17

_Explanation._--We have said above, that desire is appet.i.te which is self-conscious, and that appet.i.te is the essence itself of man in so far as it is determined to such acts as contribute to his preservation. But I have taken care to remark that in truth I cannot recognize any difference between human appet.i.te and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appet.i.te or not, it remains one and the same appet.i.te, and so, lest I might appear to be guilty of tautology, I have not explained desire by appet.i.te, but have tried to give such a definition of desire as would include all the efforts of human nature to which we give the name of appet.i.te, desire, will, or impulse. For I might have said that desire is the essence itself of man in so far as it is considered as determined to any action; but from this definition it would not follow that the mind could be conscious of its desire or appet.i.te, and therefore, in order that I might include the cause of this consciousness, it was necessary to add the words, _in so far as it is conceived as determined to any action by any one of his modifications_.

For by a modification of the human essence we understand any const.i.tution of that essence, whether it be innate, whether it be conceived through the attribute of thought alone or of extension alone, or whether it be related to both. By the word "desire," therefore, I understand all the efforts, impulses, appet.i.tes, and volitions of a man, which vary according to his changing disposition, and not unfrequently are so opposed to one another that he is drawn hither and thither, and knows not whither he ought to turn.

II. _Joy_ is man's pa.s.sage from a less to a greater perfection.

III. _Sorrow_ is man's pa.s.sage from a greater to a less perfection.

_Explanation._--I say pa.s.sage, for joy is not perfection itself. If a man were born with the perfection to which he pa.s.ses, he would possess it without the emotion of joy; a truth which will appear the more clearly from the emotion of sorrow, which is the opposite to joy. For that sorrow consists in the pa.s.sage to a less perfection, but not in the less perfection itself, no one can deny, since in so far as a man shares any perfection he cannot be sad. Nor can we say that sorrow consists in the privation of a greater perfection for privation is nothing. But the emotion of sorrow is a reality, and it therefore must be the reality of the pa.s.sage to a lesser perfection, or the reality by which man's power of acting is diminished or limited. As for the definitions of cheerfulness, pleasurable excitement, melancholy, and grief, I pa.s.s these by, because they are related rather to the body than to the mind, and are merely different kinds of joy or of sorrow.

IV. _Astonishment_ is the imagination of an object in which the mind remains fixed because this particular imagination has no connection with others.

_Explanation._--That which causes the mind from the contemplation of one thing immediately to pa.s.s to the thought of another is that the images of these things are connected one with the other, and are so arranged that the one follows the other; a process which cannot be conceived when the image of the thing is new, for the mind will be held in the contemplation of the same object until other causes determine it to think of other things. The imagination, therefore, considered in itself, of a new object is of the same character as other imaginations; and for this reason I do not cla.s.s astonishment among the emotions, nor do I see any reason why I should do it, since this abstraction of the mind arises from no positive cause by which it is abstracted from other things, but merely from the absence of any cause by which from the contemplation of one thing the mind is determined to think other things. I acknowledge, therefore, only three primitive or primary emotions, those of joy, sorrow, and desire; and the only reason which has induced me to speak of astonishment is, that it has been the custom to give other names to certain emotions derived from the three primitives whenever these emotions are related to objects at which we are astonished. This same reason also induces me to add the definition of contempt.

V. _Contempt_ is the imagination of an object which so little touches the mind that the mind is moved by the presence of the object to imagine those qualities which are not in it rather than those which are in it.

The definitions of veneration and scorn I pa.s.s by here, because they give a name, so far as I know, to none of the emotions.

VI. _Love_ is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause.

_Explanation._--This definition explains with sufficient clearness the essence of love; that which is given by some authors, who define love to be the will of the lover to unite himself to the beloved object, expresses not the essence of love but one of its properties. In as much as these authors have not seen with sufficient clearness what is the essence of love, they could not have a distinct conception of its properties, and consequently their definition has by everybody been thought very obscure. I must observe, however, when I say that it is a property in a lover to will a union with the beloved object, that I do not understand by will a consent or deliberation or a free decree of the mind (for that this is a fiction we have demonstrated above), nor even a desire of the lover to unite himself with the beloved object when it is absent, nor a desire to continue in its presence when it is present, for love can be conceived without either one or the other of these desires; but by will I understand the satisfaction that the beloved object produces in the lover by its presence, by virtue of which the joy of the lover is strengthened, or at any rate supported.

VII. _Hatred_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of an external cause.

_Explanation._--What is to be observed here will easily be seen from what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition.

VIII. _Inclination_ (_propensio_) is a joy with the accompanying idea of some object as being accidentally the cause of joy.

IX. _Aversion_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of some object which is accidentally the cause of the sorrow.

X. _Devotion_ is love towards an object which astonishes us.

_Explanation._--Astonishment arises from the novelty of the object. If, therefore, it should happen that we often imagine the object at which we are astonished, we shall cease to be astonished at it, and hence we see that the emotion of devotion easily degenerates into simple love.

XI. _Derision_ is joy arising from the imagination that something we despise is present in an object we hate.

_Explanation._--In so far as we despise a thing we hate do we deny its existence, and so far do we rejoice. But inasmuch as we suppose that a man hates what he ridicules, it follows that this joy is not solid.

XII. _Hope_ is a joy not constant, arising from the idea of something future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt.

XIII. _Fear_ is a sorrow not constant, arising from the idea of something future or past, about the issue of which we sometimes doubt.

_Explanation._--From these definitions it follows that there is no hope without fear nor fear without hope, for the person who wavers in hope and doubts concerning the issue of anything is supposed to imagine something which may exclude its existence, and so far, therefore, to be sad, and consequently while he wavers in hope, to fear lest his wishes should not be accomplished. So also the person who fears, that is to say, who doubts whether what he hates will not come to pa.s.s, imagines something which excludes the existence of what he hates, and therefore is rejoiced, and consequently so far hopes that it will not happen.

XIV. _Confidence_ is joy arising from the idea of a past or future object from which cause for doubting is removed.

XV. _Despair_ is sorrow arising from the idea of a past or future object from which cause for doubting is removed.

_Explanation._--Confidence, therefore, springs from hope and despair from fear, whenever the reason for doubting the issue is taken away; a case which occurs either because we imagine a thing past or future to be present and contemplate it as present, or because we imagine other things which exclude the existence of those which made us to doubt.

For although we can never be sure about the issue of individual objects, it may nevertheless happen that we do not doubt it. For elsewhere we have shown that it is one thing not to doubt and another to possess cert.i.tude, and so it may happen that from the image of an object either past or future we are affected with the same emotion of joy or sorrow as that by which we should be affected from the image of an object present.

XVI. _Gladness_ (_gaudium_) is a joy with the accompanying idea of something past, which, unhoped for, has happened.

XVII. _Remorse_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of something past, which, unhoped for, has happened.

XVIII. _Commiseration_ is sorrow with the accompanying idea of evil which has happened to some one whom we imagine like ourselves.

_Explanation._--Between commiseration and compa.s.sion there seems to be no difference, excepting perhaps that commiseration refers rather to an individual emotion and compa.s.sion to it as a habit.

XIX. _Favor_ is love towards those who have benefited others.

XX. _Indignation_ is hatred towards those who have injured others.

_Explanation._--I am aware that these names in common bear a different meaning. But my object is not to explain the meaning of words but the nature of things, and to indicate them by words whose customary meaning shall not be altogether opposed to the meaning which I desire to bestow upon them. I consider it sufficient to have said this once for all.

XXI. _Over-estimation_ consists in thinking too highly of another person in consequence of our love for him.

XXII. _Contempt_ consists in thinking too little of another person in consequence of our hatred for him.

_Explanation._--Over-estimation and contempt are therefore respectively effects or properties of love or hatred, and so over-estimation may be defined as love in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too much of the beloved object; and, on the contrary, contempt may be defined as hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he thinks too little of the object he hates.

XXIII. _Envy_ is hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he is sad at the good fortune of another person and is glad when any evil happens to him.

_Explanation._--To envy is generally opposed compa.s.sion (_misericordia_), which may therefore be defined as follows, notwithstanding the usual signification of the word:--

XXIV. _Compa.s.sion_ is love in so far as it affects a man so that he is glad at the prosperity of another person and is sad when any evil happens to him.

I pa.s.s now to consider other emotions which are attended by the idea of something within us as the cause.

XXV. _Self-satisfaction_ is the joy which is produced by contemplating ourselves and our own power of action.

XXVI. _Humility_ is the sorrow which is produced by contemplating our impotence or helplessness.

Self-satisfaction is opposed to humility in so far as we understand by the former the joy which arises from contemplating our power of action, but in so far as we understand by it joy attended with the idea of something done, which we believe has been done by a free decree of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we may thus define:--

XXVII. _Repentance_ is sorrow accompanied with the idea of something done which we believe has been done by a free decree of our mind.

It is not to be wondered at that sorrow should always follow all those actions which are from _custom_ called wicked, and that joy should follow those which are called good. But that this is chiefly the effect of education will be evident from what we have before said. Parents, by reprobating what are called bad actions, and frequently blaming their children whenever they commit them, while they persuade them to what are called good actions, and praise their children when they perform them, have caused the emotions of sorrow to connect themselves with the former, and those of joy with the latter. Experience proves this, for custom and religion are not the same everywhere; but, on the contrary, things which are sacred to some are profane to others, and what are honorable with some are disgraceful with others. Education alone, therefore, will determine whether a man will repent of any deed or boast of it.

XXVIII. _Pride_ is thinking too much of ourselves, through self-love.

_Explanation._--Pride differs, therefore, from over-estimation, inasmuch as the latter is related to an external object, but pride to the man himself who thinks of himself too highly. As over-estimation, therefore, is an effect or property of love, so pride is an effect or property of self-love, and it may therefore be defined as love of ourselves or self-satisfaction, in so far as it affects us so that we think too highly of ourselves.

To this emotion a contrary does not exist, for no one, through hatred of himself, thinks too little of himself; indeed, we may say that no one thinks too little of himself, in so far as he imagines himself unable to do this or that thing. For whatever he imagines that he cannot do, that thing he necessarily imagines, and by his imagination is so disposed that he is actually incapable of doing what he imagines he cannot do. So long, therefore, as he imagines himself unable to do this or that thing, so long is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long it is impossible for him to do it. If, however, we pay attention to what depends upon opinion alone, we shall be able to conceive it possible for a man to think too little of himself, for it may happen that while he sorrowfully contemplates his own weakness he will imagine himself despised by everybody, although nothing could be further from their thoughts than to despise him. A man may also think too little of himself if in the present he denies something of himself in relation to a future time of which he is not sure; for example, when he denies that he can conceive of nothing with cert.i.tude, and that he can desire and do nothing which is not wicked and base. We may also say that a man thinks too little of himself when we see that, from an excess of fear or shame, he does not dare to do what others who are his equals dare to do. This emotion, to which I will give the name of despondency, may therefore be opposed to pride; for as self-satisfaction springs from pride, so despondency springs from humility, and it may therefore be defined thus:

XXIX. _Despondency_ is thinking too little of ourselves through sorrow.

_Explanation._--We are, nevertheless, often in the habit of opposing humility to pride, but only when we attend to their effects rather than to their nature. For we are accustomed to call a man proud who boasts too much, who talks about nothing but his own virtues and other people's vices, who wishes to be preferred to everybody else, and who marches along with that stateliness and pomp which belong to others whose position is far above his. On the other hand, we call a man humble who often blushes, who confesses his own faults and talks about the virtues of others, who yields to every one, who walks with bended head, and who neglects to adorn himself. These emotions, humility and despondency, are very rare, for human nature, considered in itself, struggles against them as much as it can, and hence those who have the most credit for being abject and humble are generally the most ambitious and envious.