The Philosophy of Spinoza Part 16

G.o.d I in no wise subject to fate: I conceive that all things follow with inevitable necessity from the nature of G.o.d, in the same way as every one conceives that it follows from G.o.d's nature that G.o.d understands Himself. This latter consequence all admit to follow necessarily from the divine nature, yet no one conceives that G.o.d is under the compulsion of any fate, but that He understands Himself quite freely, though necessarily.

Further, this inevitable necessity in things does away neither with divine nor human laws. The principles of morality, whether they receive from G.o.d Himself the form of laws or inst.i.tutions, or whether they do not, are still divine and salutary; whether we receive the good, which flows from virtue and the divine love, as from G.o.d in the capacity of a judge, or as from the necessity of the divine nature, it will in either case be equally desirable; on the other hand, the evils following from wicked actions and pa.s.sions are not less to be feared because they are necessary consequences.[23] Lastly, in our actions, whether they be necessary or contingent, we are led by hope and fear.

Men are only without excuse before G.o.d, because they are in G.o.d's power, as clay is in the hands of the potter, who from the same lump makes vessels, some to honor, some to dishonor.... [24] When I said in my former letter that we are inexcusable, because we are in the power of G.o.d, like clay in the hands of the potter, I meant to be understood in the sense that no one can bring a complaint against G.o.d for having given him a weak nature, or infirm spirit. A circle might as well complain to G.o.d for not being endowed with the properties of a sphere, or a child who is tortured, say, with stone, for not being given a healthy body, as a man of feeble spirit, because G.o.d has denied to him fort.i.tude, and the true knowledge and love of the Deity, or because he is endowed with so weak a nature that he cannot check or moderate his desires. For the nature of each thing is only competent to do that which follows necessarily from its given cause.

That every man cannot be brave, and that we can no more command for ourselves a healthy body than a healthy mind, n.o.body can deny, without giving the lie to experience, as well as to reason. "But," you urge, "if men sin by nature, they are excusable"; but you do not state the conclusion you draw, whether that G.o.d cannot be angry with them, or that they are worthy of blessedness--that is, of the knowledge and love of G.o.d. If you say the former, I fully admit that G.o.d cannot be angry, and that all things are done in accordance with His will; but I deny that all men ought, therefore, to be blessed--men may be excusable, and nevertheless, be without blessedness and afflicted in many ways.[25] A horse is excusable for being a horse and not a man; but, nevertheless, he must needs be a horse and not a man. He who goes mad from the bite of a dog is excusable, yet he is rightly suffocated. Lastly, he who cannot govern his desires, and keep them in check with the fear of the laws, though his weakness may be excusable, yet he cannot enjoy with contentment, the knowledge and love of G.o.d, but necessarily perishes.

FOOTNOTES:

[19] ... I say that a thing is free, which exists and acts solely by the necessity of its own nature. Thus also G.o.d understands Himself and all things freely, because it follows solely from the necessity of His nature that He should understand all things. You see I do not place freedom in free decision, but in free necessity. However, let us descend to created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and operate in a given determinate manner. In order that this may be clearly understood, let us conceive a very simple thing. For instance, a stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause a certain quant.i.ty of motion, by virtue of which it continues to move after the impulsion given by the external cause has ceased. The permanence of the stone's motion is constrained, not necessary because it must be defined by the impulsion of an external cause. What is true of the stone is true of an individual, however complicated its nature, or varied its functions, inasmuch as every individual thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and operate in a fixed and determinate manner.

Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, while continuing in motion, should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavoring, as far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being conscious merely of its own endeavor and not at all indifferent, would believe itself to be completely free, and would think that it continued in motion solely because of its own wish. This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess, and which consists solely in the fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire has been determined.[20] ...

[20] _From a letter to G. H. Schaller_ (1674).

[21] _From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Dec., 1675).

[22] The _Ethics_.--ED.

[23] I received on Sat.u.r.day last your very short letter dated 15th Nov.

In it you merely indicated the points in the theological treatise which have given pain to readers, whereas I had hoped to learn from it what were the opinions which militated against the practice of religious virtue.... I make this chief distinction between religion and superst.i.tion; the latter is founded on ignorance, the former on knowledge. This, I take it, is the reason why Christians are distinguished from the rest of the world, not by faith, nor by charity, nor by the other fruits of the Holy Spirit, but solely by their opinions, inasmuch as they defend their cause, like every one else, by miracles, that is, by ignorance, which is the source of all malice. Thus they turn a faith, which may be true, into superst.i.tion. _From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Dec., 1675).

[24] _From a letter to Henry Oldenburg_ (Feb. 7, 1676).

[25] A mouse no less than an angel, and sorrow no less than joy depend on G.o.d; yet a mouse is not a kind of angel, neither is sorrow a kind of joy. _From a letter to Wm. Blyenbergh_ (March 13, 1665).

CHAPTER XII

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

_Introductory_

Most persons who have written about the emotions and man's conduct of life seem to discuss, not the natural things which follow the common laws of Nature, but things which are outside her. They seem indeed to consider man in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe that man disturbs rather than follows her order; that he has an absolute power over his own actions; and that he is altogether self-determined.

They then proceed to attribute the cause of human weakness and changeableness, not to the common power of Nature, but to some vice of human nature, which they therefore bewail, laugh at, mock, or, as is more generally the case, detest; whilst he who knows how to revile most eloquently or subtilely the weakness of the mind is looked upon as divine.

It is true that very eminent men have not been wanting, to whose labor and industry we confess ourselves much indebted, who have written many excellent things about the right conduct of life, and who have given to mortals counsels full of prudence. But no one so far as I know has determined the nature and strength of the emotions, and what the mind is able to do towards controlling them. I remember, indeed, that the celebrated Descartes, although he believed that the mind is absolute master over its own actions, tried nevertheless to explain by their first causes human emotions, and at the same time to show the way by which the mind could obtain absolute power over them. But in my opinion he has shown nothing but the acuteness of his great intellect, as I shall make evident in the proper place, for I wish to return to those who prefer to detest and scoff at human affects and actions than understand them.

To such as these it will doubtless seem a marvelous thing for me to endeavor to treat by a geometrical method the vices and follies of men, and to desire by a sure method to demonstrate those things which these people cry out against as being opposed to reason, or as being vanities, absurdities, and monstrosities. The following is my reason for so doing.

Nothing happens in Nature which can be attributed to any vice of Nature, for she is always the same and everywhere one. Her virtue is the same, and her power of acting; that is to say, her laws and rules, according to which all things are and are changed from form to form, are everywhere and always the same; so that there must also be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, that is to say, by the universal laws and rules of Nature. The emotions, therefore, of hatred, anger, envy, considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and virtue of Nature as other individual things; they have therefore certain causes through which they are to be understood, and certain properties which are just as worthy of being known as the properties of any other thing in the contemplation alone of which we delight. I shall, therefore, pursue the same method in considering the nature and strength of the emotions and the power of the mind over them which I pursued in our previous discussion of G.o.d and the mind, and I shall consider human actions and appet.i.tes just as if I were considering lines, planes or bodies.

_Definitions_

I.--I call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived by means of the cause. I call that an inadequate or partial cause whose effect cannot be understood by means of the cause alone.

II.--I say that we act when anything is done, either within us or without us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is to say (by the preceding Definition), when from our nature anything follows, either within us or without us, which by that nature alone can be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we suffer when anything is done within us, or when anything follows from our nature, of which we are not the cause excepting partially.

III.--By emotion I understand the modifications of the body, by which the power of acting of the body itself is increased, diminished, helped, or hindered, together with the ideas of these modifications.

If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications, I understand the emotion to be an action, otherwise it is a pa.s.sion.

_Postulates_

1.--The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, and also in other ways which make its power of acting neither greater nor less.

2.--The human body is capable of suffering many changes, and, nevertheless, can retain the impressions or traces of objects, and consequently the same images of things.

_The Two States of Mind: Active and Pa.s.sive_

In every human mind some ideas are adequate, and others mutilated and confused. But the ideas which in any mind are adequate are adequate in G.o.d in so far as He forms the essence of that mind, while those again which are inadequate in the mind are also adequate in G.o.d, not in so far as He contains the essence of that mind only, but in so far as He contains the ideas of other things at the same time in Himself. Again, from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow, of which G.o.d is the adequate cause, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is considered as affected with the given idea. But of that effect of which G.o.d is the cause, in so far as He is affected by an idea which is adequate in any mind, that same mind is the adequate cause. Our mind, therefore, in so far as it has adequate ideas, necessarily at times acts. Again, if there be anything which necessarily follows from an idea which is adequate in G.o.d, not in so far as He contains within Himself the mind of one man only, but also, together with this, the ideas[26]

of other things, then the mind of that man is not the adequate cause of that thing, but is only its partial cause, and therefore, in so far as the mind has inadequate ideas, it necessarily at times suffers.

_The Basic Endeavor of All Things_

Individual things are modes by which the attributes of G.o.d are expressed in a certain and determinate manner; that is to say, they are things which express in a certain and determinate manner the power of G.o.d, by which He is and acts. A thing, too, has nothing in itself through which it can be destroyed, or which can negate its existence,[27] but, on the contrary, it is opposed to everything which could negate its existence.

Therefore, in so far as it can and is in itself, it endeavors to persevere in its own being.

_The Three Primary Emotions_

I

_Desire_

The essence of the mind is composed of adequate and inadequate ideas (as we have shown), and therefore both in so far as it has the former and in so far as it has the latter, it endeavors to persevere in its being, and endeavors to persevere in it for an indefinite time. But since the mind, through the ideas of the modifications of the body, is necessarily conscious of itself, it is therefore conscious of its effort.

This effort, when it is related to the mind alone, is called _will_, but when it is related at the same time both to the mind and the body, is called _appet.i.te_, which is therefore nothing but the very essence of man, from the nature of which necessarily follow those things which promote his preservation, and thus he is determined to do those things.

Hence there is no difference between appet.i.te and desire, unless in this particular, that desire is generally related to men in so far as they are conscious of their appet.i.tes, and it may therefore be defined as appet.i.te of which we are conscious. From what has been said it is plain, therefore, that we neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything because we think it to be good, but, on the contrary, we adjudge a thing to be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it.

II

_Joy and Sorrow_

If anything increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our body's power of action, the idea of that thing increases, diminishes, helps, or limits our mind's power of thought.

We thus see that the mind can suffer great changes, and can pa.s.s now to a greater and now to a lesser perfection; these pa.s.sions explaining to us the emotions of joy and sorrow. By _joy_, therefore, in what follows, I shall understand the pa.s.sion by which the mind pa.s.ses to a greater perfection; by _sorrow_, on the other hand, the pa.s.sion by which it pa.s.ses to a less perfection. The emotion of joy, related at the same time both to the mind and the body, I call _pleasurable excitement_ (_t.i.tillatio_) or _cheerfulness_; that of sorrow I call _pain_ or _melancholy_. It is, however, to be observed that pleasurable excitement and pain are related to a man when one of his parts is affected more than the others; cheerfulness and melancholy, on the other hand, when all parts are equally affected. What the nature of desire is I have explained; and besides these three--joy, sorrow, and desire--I know of no other primary emotion, the others springing from these.

_Definitions of the Princ.i.p.al Emotions_

I.--_Desire_ is the essence itself of man in so far as it is conceived as determined to any action by any one of his modifications.