The Philosophy of Spinoza Part 18

x.x.x. Self-exaltation is joy with the accompanying idea of some action we have done, which we imagine people praise.

x.x.xI. _Shame_ is sorrow, with the accompanying idea of some action which we imagine people blame.

_Explanation._--A difference, however, is here to be observed between shame and modesty. Shame is sorrow which follows a deed of which we are ashamed. Modesty is the dread or fear of shame, which keeps a man from committing any disgraceful act. To modesty is usually opposed impudence, which indeed is not an emotion, as I shall show in the proper place; but the names of emotions, as I have already said, are matters rather of custom than indications of the nature of the emotions. I have thus discharged the task which I set myself of explaining the emotions of joy and sorrow. I will advance now to those which I ascribe to desire.

x.x.xII. _Regret_ is the desire or longing to possess something, the emotion being strengthened by the memory of the object itself, and at the same time being restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the desired object.

_Explanation._--Whenever we recollect a thing, as we have often said, we are thereby necessarily disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were present before us. But this disposition or effort, while we are awake, is generally restrained by the images of things which exclude the existence of the thing which we recollect. Whenever, therefore, we recollect a thing which affects us with any kind of joy, we thereby endeavor to contemplate it with the same emotion of joy as if it were present,--an attempt which is, however, immediately restrained by the memory of that which excludes the existence of the thing. Regret, therefore, is really a sorrow which is opposed to the joy which arises from the absence of what we hate. But because the name _regret_ seems to connect this emotion with desire, I therefore ascribe it to desire.

x.x.xIII. _Emulation_ is the desire which is begotten in us of a thing because we imagine that other persons have the same desire.

_Explanation._--He who seeks flight because others seek it, he who fears because he sees others fear, or even he who withdraws his hand and moves his body as if his hand were burning because he sees that another person has burnt his hand, such as these, I say, although they may indeed imitate the emotion of another, are not said to emulate it; not because we have recognized one cause for emulation and another for imitation, but because it has been the custom to call that man only emulous who imitates what we think n.o.ble, useful, or pleasant.

x.x.xIV. _Thankfulness_ or _grat.i.tude_ is the desire or endeavor of love with which we strive to do good to others who, from a similar emotion of love, have done good to us.

x.x.xV. _Benevolence_ is the desire to do good to those whom we pity.

x.x.xVI. _Anger_ is the desire by which we are impelled, through hatred, to injure those whom we hate.

x.x.xVII. _Vengeance_ is the desire which, springing from mutual hatred, urges us to injure those who, from a similar emotion, have injured us.

x.x.xVIII. _Cruelty_ or _ferocity_ is the desire by which a man is impelled to injure any one whom we love or pity.

_Explanation._--To cruelty is opposed mercy, which is not a pa.s.sion, but a power of the mind by which a man restrains anger and vengeance.

x.x.xIX. _Fear_ is the desire of avoiding the greater of two dreaded evils by the less.

XL. _Audacity_ is the desire by which we are impelled to do something which is accompanied with a danger which our equals fear to meet.

XLI. A person is said to be _pusillanimous_ whose desire is restrained by the fear of a danger which his equals dare to meet.

_Explanation._--Pusillanimity, therefore, is nothing but the dread of some evil which most persons do not usually fear, and therefore I do not ascribe it to the emotions of desire. I wished, notwithstanding, to explain it here, because in so far as we attend to desire, pusillanimity is the true opposite of the emotion of audacity.

XLII. _Consternation_ is affirmed of the man whose desire of avoiding evil is restrained by astonishment at the evil which he fears.

_Explanation._--Consternation is therefore a kind of pusillanimity. But because consternation springs from a double fear, it may be more aptly defined as that dread which holds a man stupefied or vacillating, so that he cannot remove an evil. I say _stupefied_, in so far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be restrained by his astonishment. I say also _vacillating_, in so far as we conceive the same desire to be restrained by the fear of another evil which equally tortures him, so that he does not know which of the two evils to avoid.

XLIII. _Courtesy_ or _moderation_ is the desire of doing those things which please men and omitting those which displease them.

XLIV. _Ambition_ is the immoderate desire of glory.

_Explanation._--Ambition is a desire which increases and strengthens all the emotions, and that is the reason why it can hardly be kept under control. For so long as a man is possessed by any desire, he is necessarily at the same time possessed by this. _Every n.o.ble man_, says Cicero, _is led by glory, and even the philosophers who write books about despising glory place their names on the t.i.tle-page_.

XLV. _Luxuriousness_ is the immoderate desire or love of good living.

XLVI. _Drunkenness_ is the immoderate desire and love of drinking.

XLVII. _Avarice_ is the immoderate desire and love of riches.

XLVIII. _l.u.s.t_ is the immoderate desire and love of s.e.xual intercourse.

_Explanation._--This desire of s.e.xual intercourse is usually called l.u.s.t, whether it be held within bounds or not. I may add that the five last-mentioned emotions have no contraries, for moderation is a kind of ambition, and I have already observed that temperance, sobriety, and chast.i.ty show a power and not a pa.s.sion of the mind. Even supposing that an avaricious, ambitious, or timid man refrains from an excess of eating, drinking, or s.e.xual intercourse, avarice, ambition, and fear are not therefore the opposites of voluptuousness, drunkenness, or l.u.s.t. For the avaricious man generally desires to swallow as much meat and drink as he can, provided only it belong to another person. The ambitious man, too, if he hopes he can keep it a secret, will restrain himself in nothing, and if he lives amongst drunkards and libertines, will be more inclined to their vices just because he is ambitious. The timid man, too, does what he does not will; and although, in order to avoid death, he may throw his riches into the sea, he remains avaricious; nor does the lascivious man cease to be lascivious because he is sorry that he cannot gratify his desire. Absolutely, therefore, these emotions have reference not so much to the acts themselves of eating and drinking as to the appet.i.te and love itself. Consequently nothing can be opposed to these emotions but n.o.bility of soul and strength of mind, as we shall see afterwards.

The definitions of jealousy and the other vacillations of the mind I pa.s.s over in silence, both because they are compounded of the emotions which we have already defined, and also because many of them have no names,--a fact which shows that, for the purposes of life, it is sufficient to know these combinations generally. Moreover, it follows from the definitions of the emotions which we have explained that, they all arise from desire, joy, or sorrow, or rather that there are none but these three, which pa.s.s under names varying as their relations and external signs vary. If, therefore, we attend to these primitive emotions and to what has been said above about the nature of the mind, we shall be able here to define the emotions in so far as they are related to the mind alone.

_General definition of the emotions._--Emotion, which is called _animi pathema_, is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater or less power of existence than before; and this increase of power being given, the mind itself is determined to one particular thought rather than to another.

_Explanation._--I say, in the first place, that an emotion or pa.s.sion of the mind _is a confused idea_. For we have shown that the mind suffers only in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. I say again, _by which the mind affirms of its body, or any part of it, a greater or less power of existence than before_. For all ideas which we possess of bodies indicate the actual const.i.tution of our body rather than the nature of the external body; but this idea, which const.i.tutes the form of an emotion, must indicate or express the const.i.tution of the body, or of some part of it; which const.i.tution the body or any part of it possesses from the fact that its power of action or force of existence is increased or diminished, helped or limited. But it is to be observed, that when I say _a greater or less power of existence than before_, I do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past const.i.tution of the body, but that the idea which const.i.tutes the form of emotion affirms something of the body which actually involves more or less reality than before. Moreover, since the essence of the mind consists in its affirmation of the actual existence of its body, and since we understand by perfection the essence itself of the thing, it follows that the mind pa.s.ses to a greater or less perfection when it is able to affirm of its body, or some part of it, something which involves a greater or less reality than before. When, therefore, I have said that the mind's power of thought is increased or diminished, I have wished to be understood as meaning nothing else than that the mind has formed an idea of its body, or some part of its body, which expresses more or less reality than it had hitherto affirmed of the body. For the value of ideas and the actual power of thought are measured by the value of the object. Finally, I added, _which being given, the mind itself is determined to one particular thought rather than to another_, that I might also express the nature of desire in addition to that of joy and sorrow, which is explained by the first part of the definition.

I have now, I think, explained the princ.i.p.al emotions and vacillations of the mind which are compounded of the three primary emotions, desire, joy, and sorrow, and have set them forth through their first causes.

From what has been said it is plain that we are disturbed by external causes in a number of ways, and that, like the waves of the sea agitated by contrary winds, we fluctuate in our ignorance of our future and destiny. I have said, however, that I have only explained the princ.i.p.al mental complications, and not all which may exist. For by the same method which we have pursued above it would be easy to show that love unites itself to repentance, scorn, shame, etc.; but I think it has already been made clear to all that the emotions can be combined in so many ways, and that so many variations can arise, that no limits can be a.s.signed to their number. It is sufficient for my purpose to have enumerated only those which are of consequence; the rest, of which I have taken no notice, being more curious than important.

There is one constantly recurring characteristic of love which I have yet to notice, and that is, that while we are enjoying the thing which we desired, the body acquires from that fruition a new disposition by which it is otherwise determined, and the images of other things are excited in it, and the mind begins to imagine and to desire other things. For example, when we imagine anything which usually delights our taste, we desire to enjoy it by eating it. But whilst we enjoy it the stomach becomes full, and the const.i.tution of the body becomes altered.

If, therefore, the body being now otherwise disposed, the image of the food, in consequence of its being present, and therefore also the effort or desire to eat it, become more intense, then this new disposition of the body will oppose this effort or desire, and consequently the presence of the food which we desired will become hateful to us, and this hatefulness is what we call loathing or disgust.

As for the external modifications of the body which are observed in the emotions, such as trembling, paleness, sobbing, laughter, and the like, I have neglected to notice them, because they belong to the body alone without any relationship to the mind.

FOOTNOTES:

[26] Hence it follows that the mind is subject to pa.s.sions in proportion to the number of inadequate ideas which it has, and that it acts in proportion to the number of adequate ideas which it has.

[27] This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of any given thing affirms and does not deny the existence of the thing; that is to say, it posits the essence of the thing and does not negate it. So long, therefore, as we attend only to the thing itself, and not to external causes, we shall discover nothing in it which can destroy it.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMOTIONS

_The a.s.sociation of the Emotions_

If the human body has at any time been simultaneously affected by two bodies, whenever the mind afterwards imagines one of them, it will immediately remember the other. But the imaginations of the mind indicate rather the modifications of our body than the nature of external bodies, and therefore if the body, and consequently the mind, has been at any time, simultaneously affected by two emotions, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of them, it will also be affected by the other.

Let the mind be supposed to be affected at the same time by two emotions, its power of action not being increased or diminished by one, while it is increased or diminished by the other. From the preceding proposition it is plain that when the mind is afterwards affected by the first emotion through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) of itself neither increases nor diminishes the mind's power of thinking, it will at the same time be affected by the other emotion, which does increase or diminish that power, that is to say, it will be affected with joy or sorrow; and thus the thing itself will be the cause of joy or of sorrow, not of itself, but accidentally. In the same way it can easily be shown that the same thing may accidentally be the cause of desire.

The fact that we have contemplated a thing with an emotion of joy or sorrow, of which it is not the efficient cause, is a sufficient reason for being able to love or hate it.

We now understand why we love or hate certain things from no cause which is known to us, but merely from sympathy or antipathy, as they say. To this cla.s.s, too, are to be referred those objects which affect us with joy or sorrow solely because they are somewhat like objects which usually affect us with those emotions. I know indeed that the writers who first introduced the words "Sympathy" and "Antipathy" desired thereby to signify certain hidden qualities of things, but nevertheless I believe that we shall be permitted to understand by those names qualities which are plain and well known.

Anything may be accidentally the cause either of hope or fear. Things which are accidentally the causes either of hope or fear are called good or evil omens. In so far as the omens are the cause of hope and fear are they the cause of joy or of sorrow, and consequently so far do we love them or hate them, and endeavor to use them as means to obtain those things for which we hope, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of fear. Our natural const.i.tution, too, is such that we easily believe the things we hope for, and believe with difficulty those we fear, and we think too much of the former and too little of the latter. Thus have superst.i.tions arisen, by which men are everywhere disquieted. I do not consider it worth while to go any further, and to explain here all those vacillations of mind which arise from hope and fear, since it follows from the definition alone of these emotions that hope cannot exist without fear, nor fear without hope.

If we imagine a certain thing to possess something which resembles an object which usually affects the mind with joy or sorrow, although the quality in which the thing resembles the object is not the efficient cause of these emotions, we shall nevertheless, by virtue of the resemblance alone, love or hate the thing.

If we have been affected with joy or sorrow by any one who belongs to a cla.s.s or nation different from our own, and if our joy or sorrow is accompanied with the idea of this person as its cause, under the common name of his cla.s.s or nation, we shall not love or hate him merely, but the whole of the cla.s.s or nation to which he belongs.

_The Imitation and Reciprocation of the Emotions_