Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 192

Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the pa.s.sions, because the pa.s.sions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4).

Now as regards the pa.s.sions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the pa.s.sions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects of the pa.s.sions. The pa.s.sions themselves have no great power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appet.i.te, which is the seat of the pa.s.sions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these pa.s.sions regard only that which is great in such pa.s.sions: thus fort.i.tude is about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some pa.s.sions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those pa.s.sions: such are the love or desire of money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in those pa.s.sions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely "magnificence."

In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes, which are _philotimia_, i.e. love of honor, and _aphilotimia_, i.e.

without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there is _magnanimity._ Wherefore we must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.

Reply Obj. 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.

Reply Obj. 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things existing outside the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by G.o.d. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 3]

Whether Magnanimity Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater extreme: because the "magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the greatest things" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). But one may have a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, "Virtue is a good quality of the mind," as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4). But magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of "a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm." Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since "the magnanimous deems himself worthy of great things, and despises others," according to _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Q. 113]

towards many; fourthly, he is unable to a.s.sociate with others; fifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc.

15:18): "Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas' companions, and the greatness of courage (_animi magnitudinem_) with which they fought for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword." Now, only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man's proper good.

Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others, as stated above (A. 1; I-II, Q. 11, A. 2, Obj. 3). Therefore magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), "the magnanimous in point of quant.i.ty goes to extremes," in so far as he tends to what is greatest, "but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the mean," because he tends to the greatest things according to reason, for "he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth"

(Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpa.s.s his deserts.

Reply Obj. 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men. On the other hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto.

Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his state.

Reply Obj. 3: The movements of the body are differentiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement.

Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found naturally.

Reply Obj. 4: There is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of G.o.d; and something defective which accrues to him through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from G.o.d: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from G.o.d's gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of G.o.d's gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. 14:4): "In his sight a vile person is contemned [*Douay: 'The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,' etc.]," which indicates the contempt of magnanimity, "but he honoreth them that fear the Lord,"

which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed according to different considerations.

Reply Obj. 5: These properties in so far as they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of grat.i.tude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence, and una.s.suming towards the middle cla.s.s." In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot a.s.sociate with others: this means that he is not at home with others than his friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of mind. But he a.s.sociates with all, both great and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 4]

Whether Magnanimity Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 3) that "whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous." Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it is stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3 that "it belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof" (which is an act of prudence), "nor to act unjustly" (which is an act of justice), "that he is ready to do favors" (which is an act of charity), "that he gives his services readily" (which is an act of liberality), that "he is truthful" (which is an act of truthfulness), and that "he is not given to complaining" (which is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, according to the saying of Isa. 61:10, "He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation," and afterwards he adds, "and as a bride adorned with her jewels." But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from the other virtues.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 2), it belongs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above (AA. 1, 2): and honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.

Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above (Q. 103, A. 1, ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy of great honors.

Reply Obj. 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence, and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. On the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.

Reply Obj. 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain l.u.s.ter or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 5]

Whether Magnanimity Is a Part of Fort.i.tude?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fort.i.tude.

For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be the same as fort.i.tude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "If magnanimity, which is also called fort.i.tude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great a.s.surance": and Tully says (De Offic. i): "If a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from deception." Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fort.i.tude.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a magnanimous man is not _philokindynos_, that is, a lover of danger.

But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fort.i.tude so as to be called a part thereof.

Obj. 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for, whereas fort.i.tude regards the great in things to be feared or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important virtue than fort.i.tude. Therefore it is not a part thereof.

_On the contrary,_ Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fort.i.tude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, A. 3), a princ.i.p.al virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a princ.i.p.al matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because "a firm standing is necessary in every virtue," according to _Ethic._ ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more princ.i.p.al is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.

Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein fort.i.tude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fort.i.tude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fort.i.tude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to princ.i.p.al.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1, 3), "to lack evil is looked upon as a good," wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fort.i.tude, and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fort.i.tude and magnanimity may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fort.i.tude.

Reply Obj. 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks "many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to danger, since he does something great in the act of fort.i.tude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not _mikrokindynos_, i.e.

endangering himself for small things, but _megalokindynos_, i.e.

endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat.

Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."

Reply Obj. 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed to surpa.s.s the ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of fort.i.tude takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil, evil is of more import in this particular respect.

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