Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 191

Obj. 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of fort.i.tude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fort.i.tude, and these are, "courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore it seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fort.i.tude is incomplete.

Obj. 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of fort.i.tude. The first is _civic_ fort.i.tude, which produces brave deeds through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is _military_ fort.i.tude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the third is the fort.i.tude which produces brave deeds resulting from pa.s.sion, especially anger; the fourth is the fort.i.tude which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the fifth is the fort.i.tude which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fort.i.tude are not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fort.i.tude are unfitting.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fort.i.tude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter.

However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts a.s.signed to it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fort.i.tude; and potential parts, because what fort.i.tude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fort.i.tude as secondary virtues to the princ.i.p.al virtue. As stated above (Q. 123, AA. 3, 6), the act of fort.i.tude is twofold, aggression and endurance.

Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions _confidence,_ of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much a.s.sured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings." The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect Tully mentions _magnificence,_ which he describes as being "the discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and n.o.ble purpose of mind,"

so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined to the proper matter of fort.i.tude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them there can be no fort.i.tude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct from fort.i.tude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to princ.i.p.al: thus _magnificence_ is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and _magnanimity,_ which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fort.i.tude, viz. endurance.

The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions _patience,_ which he describes as "the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to Heb. 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds." In this respect he mentions _perseverance,_ which accordingly he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter of fort.i.tude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from fort.i.tude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to princ.i.p.al.

Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fort.i.tude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.

Reply Obj. 2: Hope whereby one confides in G.o.d is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3).

But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fort.i.tude, man hopes in himself, yet under G.o.d withal.

Reply Obj. 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection with fort.i.tude by reason of the imminent danger.

Reply Obj. 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which fort.i.tude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fort.i.tude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part thereof.

Reply Obj. 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circ.u.mstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fort.i.tude in the sense stated in the body of the Article.

Reply Obj. 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely _confidence, magnificence, forbearance,_ which he puts in the place of patience, and _firmness,_ which he subst.i.tutes for perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely _magnanimity_ and _security,_ are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence.

But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything presupposes an appet.i.te stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above (I-II, Q. 40, A. 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for.

A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the cert.i.tude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated above, (I-II, Q. 40, A. 4, ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind.

For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.

Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions _perseverance_ and _magnificence,_ and with Macrobius, _magnanimity. Strength of will_ is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that "strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be endured"--i.e. good courage seems to be the same as a.s.surance, for he defines it as "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue."

Besides magnificence he mentions _andragathia_, i.e. manly goodness which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to _andragathia_, strenuousness: wherefore he says that _andragathia_ is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.

Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four princ.i.p.al parts mentioned by Tully.

Reply Obj. 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fort.i.tude, they differ as to motive, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fort.i.tude.

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QUESTION 129

OF MAGNANIMITY*

[*Not in the ordinary restricted sense but as explained by the author]

(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider each of the parts of fort.i.tude, including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the exception of confidence, for which we shall subst.i.tute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance.

As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?

(2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is a special virtue?

(5) Whether it is a part of fort.i.tude?

(6) Of its relation to confidence;

(7) Of its relation to a.s.surance;

(8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 1]

Whether Magnanimity Is About Honors?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since "magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes the irascible part, as appears from _De Anima_ iii, 42, where the Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appet.i.te are desire and mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity is not about honors.

Obj. 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be about either pa.s.sions or operations. Now it is not about operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about pa.s.sions. But honor is not a pa.s.sion. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.

Obj. 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "magnanimity is about honor and dishonor."

_I answer that,_ Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about which is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing.

The things which come into man's use are external things, and among these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person's virtue, as stated above (Q. 103, AA. 1, 2); and because it is offered to G.o.d and to the best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about honors.

Reply Obj. 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something great or difficult.

Reply Obj. 2: Although honor is neither a pa.s.sion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a pa.s.sion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the pa.s.sions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even so, we have stated (Q. 123, AA. 4, 5) with regard to fort.i.tude that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring.

Reply Obj. 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 2]

Whether Magnanimity Is Essentially About Great Honors?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated above (A. 1). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.

Obj. 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honor.

Obj. 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor, and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great honors.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is about great honors.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in _De Coelo_ i, 116. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3.