Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 193

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 6]

Whether Confidence Belongs to Magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity.

For a man may have a.s.surance not only in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Cor. 3:4, 5, "Such confidence we have, through Christ towards G.o.d, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." But this seems inconsistent with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.

Obj. 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to Isa. 12:2, "I will deal confidently and will not fear." But to be without fear seems more akin to fort.i.tude. Therefore confidence also belongs to fort.i.tude rather than to magnanimity.

Obj. 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is due to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we are the house of Christ, "if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end." Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).

_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to subst.i.tute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (ad 6) and in the prologue to this.

_I answer that,_ Confidence takes its name from "fides" (faith): and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, "Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee." Wherefore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about something, not only on account of another's statement, but also on account of something we observe in another, it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing something either in oneself--for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. Or in another, for instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help from him.

Now it has been stated above (A. 1, ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds "or scarcely anything." For it surpa.s.ses man to need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine a.s.sistance, secondly, even human a.s.sistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is [not] sufficient by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 4), when we were treating of the pa.s.sions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good.

But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is.

Since, however, fort.i.tude properly strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fort.i.tude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fort.i.tude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to fort.i.tude.

Reply Obj. 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fort.i.tude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as stated in the preceding Question.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 7]

Whether Security Belongs to Magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity.

For security, as stated above (Q. 128, ad 6), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But fort.i.tude does this most effectively.

Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fort.i.tude. But fort.i.tude does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case.

Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.

Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man "is said to be secure because he is without care." But this seems to be contrary to virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim.

2:15, "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto G.o.d."

Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all the virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14, 18, "If thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand ... being buried thou shalt sleep secure." Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.

_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "it belongs to magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune."

But a man's security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to magnanimity.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear makes a man take counsel," because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope.

Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards fort.i.tude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fort.i.tude.

It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of the pa.s.sion (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fort.i.tude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.

Reply Obj. 1: Fort.i.tude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the pa.s.sion. Wherefore security is not the same as fort.i.tude, but is a condition thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear: in this way it is a condition of fort.i.tude and of magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and partic.i.p.ation of, future happiness, as stated above (I-II, Q. 5, AA.

3, 7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's reward.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 129, Art. 8]

Whether Goods of Fortune Conduce to Magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): "virtue suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

Obj. 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising external things." Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.

Obj. 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune." Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him.

Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), magnanimity regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things.

For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the mult.i.tude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously.

Reply Obj. 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.

Reply Obj. 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it.

Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.

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QUESTION 130

OF PRESUMPTION (In Two Articles)

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether presumption is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 130, Art. 1]

Whether Presumption Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle says: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.: 'and stretching forth'] myself to those that are before." But it seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) "we should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal": and (Metaph. i) "that man should pursue divine things as far as possible." Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.