Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 190

Whether Fearlessness Is Opposed to Fort.i.tude?

Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fort.i.tude.

For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fort.i.tude is hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to fort.i.tude.

Obj. 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed to fort.i.tude.

Obj. 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then fort.i.tude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness to be opposed to fort.i.tude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 123, A. 3), fort.i.tude is concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it belongs to fort.i.tude that man should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to fort.i.tude by excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to fear.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of fort.i.tude is to endure death without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the fearless man does not do.

Reply Obj. 2: Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean of fort.i.tude, wherefore it is opposed to fort.i.tude directly. But in respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues.

Reply Obj. 3: The vice of daring is opposed to fort.i.tude by excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fort.i.tude imposes the mean on each pa.s.sion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes in different respects.

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QUESTION 127

OF DARING*

[*Excessive daring or foolhardiness]

(In Two Articles)

We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether daring is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to fort.i.tude?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 1]

Whether Daring Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written (Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi) the G.o.dly preacher is denoted, that "he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men [*Vulg.: 'he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men']." But no vice redounds to a man's praise.

Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), "one should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been counseled." But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.

Obj. 3: Further, daring is a pa.s.sion caused by hope, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2) when we were treating of the pa.s.sions. But hope is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted a sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not on the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils." Now no man's fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring is a sin.

_I answer that,_ Daring, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 55), is a pa.s.sion. Now a pa.s.sion is sometimes moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by deficiency, and on this account the pa.s.sion is sinful. Again, the names of the pa.s.sions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess, thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is accounted a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fort.i.tude.

Reply Obj. 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 3). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4, 5, 6). Hence the names of certain pa.s.sions have to be applied to certain vices and virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the names of those pa.s.sions the object of which is an evil, as in the case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 2]

Whether Daring Is Opposed to Fort.i.tude?

Objection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fort.i.tude. For excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed to humility rather than to fort.i.tude.

Obj. 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to fort.i.tude but to justice.

Obj. 3: Further, fort.i.tude is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 3). Now since timidity is opposed to fort.i.tude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fort.i.tude, in the point of excessive daring, there will likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring.

But there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be accounted a vice in opposition to fort.i.tude.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fort.i.tude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 126, A. 2), it belongs to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies excess of pa.s.sion, and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of fort.i.tude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. 122, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species.

Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same virtue as presumption which is its cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition of daring depend on this.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of daring consists in a man taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the daring are precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is present," namely through fear.

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QUESTION 128

OF THE PARTS OF FORt.i.tUDE

We must now consider the parts of fort.i.tude; first we shall consider what are the parts of fort.i.tude; and secondly we shall treat of each part.

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ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 128, Art.]

Whether the Parts of Fort.i.tude Are Suitably a.s.signed?

Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fort.i.tude are unsuitably a.s.signed. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) a.s.signs four parts to fort.i.tude, namely _magnificence, confidence, patience,_ and _perseverance._ Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 5).

Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fort.i.tude.

Obj. 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fort.i.tude, but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fort.i.tude.

Obj. 3: Further, fort.i.tude makes a man behave aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fort.i.tude.

Obj. 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fort.i.tude. Therefore patience is the same as fort.i.tude and not a part thereof.

Obj. 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is written (Matt. 24:13): "He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance should not be accounted a part of fort.i.tude.