Bush At War Part 11

McLaughlin told of visiting Russia undercover, going out as a tourist and stopping where the first shot had been fired in the Russian Revolution. The guide had said, "That one shot was the most powerful shot ever fired. It went off and went for 70 years of straight destruction."

Bush had chuckled. McLaughlin had hardly begun his briefing when Bush started asking questions. The briefing lasted four hours. McLaughlin found Bush a good listener and unintimidating. Back at the agency he told them, "If this guy is elected, the briefer better be ready to be interactive."

In the Oval Office Friday morning, McLaughlin reviewed the threats. There seemed to be many plots afoot; al Qaeda had bigger attacks in mind.

"Why do you think nothing's happened?" Bush asked. There was all this chatter, SIGINT, warnings.

"Security matters," McLaughlin replied. "What we are doing matters." Pulling people off the streets, freezing the money, so the guy who was going to buy the forged pa.s.sports for the team couldn't get them. Also, McLaughlin said, the president's decision authorizing the CIA to go on the offensive - to shift the balance of their efforts from defense to offense - was already making a difference.

"When do you think we should start military action?" Bush asked, instinctively lowering his voice.

;- "Mr. President," McLaughlin said, "that's your call. I can only give you my personal opinion."

"That's all I'm looking for."

"Well, based on what I see now and where we are, I would give us a couple more weeks to work with these tribals to get a.s.sessment of their needs, a system of getting weaponry to them, start bringing in Special Forces. I'd give us another couple of weeks."

"Thank you," said the president.

WHEN THE NSC gathered later that morning Rice was worried that it was not going to be a happy meeting.

"We need to rea.s.sess the timing and strategy for military operations," the president said right off. "Wednesday, I said a decision would be made on Friday" - that day. "We may need more time," he said.

Rice was a bit surprised that he was taking some of the pressure off.

"I'm prepared to talk about that," Rumsfeld said, but he waited for his turn.

Tenet offered a view somewhat different from his deputy McLaughlin's. "Next week we need to do something," he said. "People in the region are on the fence. Action next week would help." He cited the divisions in the Pakistan intelligence service, the ISI. "Some favor UBL, some oppose UBL." The head of the service was clearly a fan of Mullah Omar and the Taliban. "An attack next week makes sense. I'd want to hear the b.u.t.ton-down plan because there will be retaliation, there's a lot of threat warnings coming in from overseas." They were systematically checking the Taliban military capabilities with overhead satellites.

"There was a letter bomb to our emba.s.sy in Chile," Powell said. The large package, addressed to the U.S. amba.s.sador and delivered by a Chilean letter carrier, had contained enough explosives to injure seriously whoever opened it. Guards at the heavily fortified emba.s.sy compound, considered one of the world's safest, had notified the police and a bomb squad moved in. "We got an intelligence tip and we detonated it," reported Powell. No one had claimed responsibility, and it didn't appear to be linked to September 11.

They turned to the terrorist problems in Indonesia and the Philippines where there were substantial al Qaeda pockets. What was the ability of the U.S. to encourage the governments there to do more and better counterterrorism? The picture was unclear.

"We've put together an announcement for the president in connection with the humanitarian effort that would accompany our operations. We've also got an AID map which we've given to the Pentagon about where there is the greatest need for humanitarian airdrops," Powell offered. AID is the Agency for International Development, which coordinates U.S. government aid programs abroad.

Hundreds of lives could be on the line, and the potential suffering of tens of thousands could be alleviated if the airdrops got through.

Uzbekistan had decided to accept a 15-man a.s.sessment team from the U.S. military that would come in to look at the possibility and feasibility of running the Combat Search and Rescue out of its territory. There was some thought also of getting the Uzbeks to allow Special Forces teams to operate there. The Uzbeks wanted security guarantees. They were worried about defending their border.

The secretary said he needed a clear statement of what others, including the diplomatic posts, could say about what we were going to do.

"And what people can do to help," the president interjected.

Hadley said they were already working it and would have a draft out that day.

Rumsfeld said he would check with Franks that afternoon to see where they were. "There's an Uzbek airport eight to 10 miles from the main airport. We're going to send in our a.s.sessment team, we're going to see if the airstrip can accommodate C-5s," the giant transport airplanes. "Our guys will be on the ground in 24 hours and a.s.sess whether the field is adequate for our needs. If the runways are okay, we can bring in the CSAR. If the runways are not, we need to look and see if we can get them to let us use the main airport. So we're into an operational phase with the Uzbeks."

"If the Uzbeks say no," the president inquired, "what's the plan?"

"If we have no CSAR in the north you can't have air operations in the north," Rumsfeld replied, "just in the south." He was holding to the military's demand that operations could not run without search and rescue in place in the general vicinity of air strikes.

Tenet's main action was in the north. He had little to none in the south. Now it looked like the bombing was going to have the exact opposite emphasis - none in the north, only in the south. It would be a total mismatch.

"What about CSAR by Russia?" the president asked. Putin had made the offer.

"We need some coordination there," Rumsfeld said.

"How about CSAR from Tajikistan?" Rice asked.

"We'll talk to Franks about that," Rumsfeld said. "If we get this working, we can have CSAR in four to five days."

Bombing in the north was hanging on that thread.

Rumsfeld summed up, "The CSAR is prepositioned at Ram-stein" - the U.S. air base in Germany. "The Uzbeks have not okayed the Special Forces. Oman is going to give us CSAR in the south, and we're looking at Special Forces options in the south. The three we're looking at now are high-risk."

The defense secretary finally gave his answer: "If we get our a.s.sessment done in Uzbekistan in 24 hours and the airfield's okay, then in five days we could be ready to go, so that would make it Thursday at the earliest. Sat.u.r.day would be more likely."

"You could start in the south and do the north later," Bush said. "Are we ready to go in the south?"

Rumsfeld turned to the target list - a total of 700 overall.

"How many of those are in the south?" Bush asked.

"We'll find out today," Rumsfeld said, deflecting. They were not broken down by north and south.

Rumsfeld then raised one of the president's favorite topics. He said they had two C-17s ready to go that would provide 37,000 meal rations for Afghans. "It'll be close proximity with the strike, maybe one day later."

Shelton said, "We'll be prepared by Monday to do it concurrent with the strike," meaning they could have bombs and rations dropping at the same time.

"We're going to have PSYOP drops," Rumsfeld said. He was referring to so-called psychological operations. Leaflets would be dropped explaining that the United States was there to liberate the Afghan people from the invading bin Laden and al Qaeda, that this was not a war against Islam. On special operations in the north, he reminded them, "We don't have any basing."

The best target that was developing was in the north around Kabul. From intelligence it looked like a place where al Qaeda could be making chemical or biological weapons. (Later U.S. intelligence discovered it was a plant that made agricultural fertilizer.) Special operations early were not possible, Rumsfeld said. "Can't do it in the north, haven't really got good targets yet in the south." Boots on the ground early was not going to happen.

"Look," the president said, indicating that he was resigned to the military judgment, "we can do special operations later. Are there any coordination problems?"

"We're working with State on the clearances that we need and that cooperation's been good. Our linkage with the intelligence community is good," Rumsfeld replied.

Cheney was looking concerned. "I worry about the connections between what we're doing here and the defense of the U.S. homeland." The vice president was seized with the possibility of another attack and the possibility of retaliation when they unleashed the military.

"d.i.c.k," Bush said, "I couldn't agree more."

"We're getting a briefing on that today," Rice said.

"I'm worried about the BW threat," Cheney said, biological warfare.

Several of those present wondered if the vice president knew something, or if he had connected things they had missed. He was a thorough reader of intelligence reports and connector of dots. But there seemed to be nothing specific.

Turning back to Afghanistan, General Myers said, "We're ready to put Special Forces on the ground with CIA forces."

"This is the first time we've ever done it?" Bush asked.

"We haven't done this for some time," Myers replied. In the Balkans, the military and the CIA had conducted secret operations to apprehend Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWC). In those operations, the CIA would gather the intelligence and the military Special Operations Forces would act. Now the plan was for the CIA and the Special Forces to work hand in hand. That would be breaking a lot of new ground. "We're not really experienced at it," Myers admitted. "We're going to start small and get larger."

They turned to rules of engagement - the specific instructions that would be given to the U.S. forces describing the circ.u.mstances under which they would be allowed to attack, drop bombs or shoot. How much freedom of action should the forces be given? What efforts should they make to prevent attacks on noncombatants?

In the end they agreed on rules that would allow only low collateral damage. General Franks would have to come back for permission to strike a target if moderate or high collateral damage was expected. The exception, however, was that if the CIA had bin Laden or al Qaeda leadership in its crosshairs, they could shoot the Predator without seeking approval. Tenet had that authority in the new intelligence order that Bush had signed, but Tenet had indicated he would go through Franks.

Myers reminded them that they were 10 days from having the necessary basing for Special Forces.

The group then examined the possibility of using an aircraft carrier, stationed off Pakistan, as a stepping-stone.

"This meeting this afternoon is very important," Bush said, referring to a homeland security meeting that would include others. "We're going to have to ask, Are we doing everything we can do?"

"Have to have no signals out of the meetings on timing," Rumsfeld said. There could be no leaks about when the military action might start. "If you want to b.u.t.ton up," he added, "b.u.t.ton up now so that it doesn't become a signal."

The president was a jumble of emotions as he attempted a summary. "I don't want any politics into this," he said. "I don't want public affairs to drive military operations. But the angst will build up in the country. We'll try to handle it next week. We'll use figures on what we've done on the war on terror. We're not going to rush into military operations, but press Tommy hard to get ready. We'll have to do something. We'll learn about the Uzbeks over the weekend. We'll a.s.sess it on Monday, and the targets have to conform to our objectives. Military, air defense, self-defense, al Qaeda targets."

"When we hit, we'll a.s.sume something's coming back at us," Powell said, "and the country will get concerned again."

"We will be meeting like this for some time," Bush said. "It's best if everyone else goes back to normal." He reminded them that they, the war cabinet, were still on alert, had to be ready to meet or act at any time. "What we do in Afghanistan is an important part of our effort. It's important to be serious and that'll be a signal to other countries about how serious we are on terror." He mentioned Syria and Iran - longtime sponsors of terrorism.

"Many believe Saddam is involved," he said. "That's not an issue for now. If we catch him being involved, we'll act. He probably was behind this in the end."

With that the president left the meeting. Rice walked back up to the Oval Office with him.

"I thought that was a really good meeting," she said. "I wasn't sure it was going to be such a good meeting."

The president laughed. "They'll get to work," he said, "and we can take the temperature again on Monday."

The president commented later on why he had backed off. ''That's the Rice influence there, you know. Who says she isn't powerful? I'm a realistic person, and again, there is a balance between pushing people and then forcing an operation." He also said he knew then that they could start within a week to 10 days.

"One of the interesting things about being the president is you don't see much mail, curiously enough. The only thing I can tell you is that I rely on my instincts. I just knew that at some point in time, the American people were going to say, Where is he? What are you doing? Where's your leadership? Where is the United States? You're all-powerful, do something." He felt it was his job to educate the public about the nature of the war. "I guess that, plus my instincts about angst, is a reaction to watching the people get disa.s.sociated from the commander in chief in Vietnam."

The former Texas Air National Guard F-102 pilot said, "My feeling was that it was a war that was never properly explained, and that the government micromanaged the war. I remember my pilot friends telling me that over Thud Ridge" - the notorious path that American fighter jets took to Hanoi - "they could only fly a certain time, and the enemy knew when they were coming."

IN THE LATE morning the president met with King Abdullah of Jordan. Jordan was providing fantastic intelligence cooperation and receiving millions in CIA covert action funds to a.s.sist in the roundup of suspected terrorists. Bush's private comments to the king reflected his dual impulses.

"Our nation is still somewhat sad," the president told the king, "but we're angry. There's a certain level of blood l.u.s.t, but we won't let it drive our reaction." He noted that the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI, would soon have to start purging its pro-Taliban elements. "We're steady, clear-eyed and patient," Bush said, "but pretty soon we'll have to start displaying scalps."

At 1:05 P.M. the expanded NSC met again.

"The purpose is to focus on what we're doing to prepare for a further attack," Bush said.

Ashcroft said, "We're thinking about a national neighborhood watch system." Citizens would call in or report strange behavior or suspected terrorists.

"Make sure you don't launch an anti-Arab backlash in this country," the president said. Three Arab men talking might trigger reports.

"We want to convey the message that you're likely to be detected if you're doing something wrong," Ashcroft said.

"Disruption is our goal," Tenet said. "We want to change the profile of what we do to provide security at critical points. To throw them off, to frustrate their planning, show a different security profile. Something they haven't seen before, haven't planned against, can't count on. Because the goal is disruption."

Searching everyone from clergymen to elderly ladies at airport security could send a message to terrorists - no matter how you dress or how unlikely a suspect you may appear, no one is immune from scrutiny.

THE BUSHES HAD invited some of their East Texas friends to the White House for the September 29-30 weekend. Mrs. Bush was going to take the women to the Kennedy Center and the men were going to play poker at the White House. But the threats to the White House were too numerous, and Bush called to cancel. "The president has hundreds of threats a month," President Bush said later, "and it ratcheted way up" after September 11. The weekend get-together was postponed to late October.

They had several ways of dealing with threats, and one was denial. The president said his wife never created a second front at home and never complained. "She knew about the threats," he said, but never asked questions like "How can you stay here?" or "How can you ask me to stay here in the midst of this threat?" She had also never asked, "Why did you get me into this mess?" according to the president. "She understands that she has got a function - her job is to help a.s.sure the American people."

During my interview with the president in Crawford in August 2002, however, it became apparent that the war had taken more of an emotional toll on the Bushes than they had let on.

When Mrs. Bush joined us late in the interview, the president turned to her and explained how he had told me, "You never panicked, you never questioned about why we never left the White House. You never were worried."

Mrs. Bush had a substantially different version. "I was just very apprehensive," she said, grasping her hands tightly in her lap. "There was just so much uncertainty a.s.sociated with everything that happened, every step, every - you know, obviously, starting with September 11th and the way people felt. You know, I worried, I'm sure, that there would be some sort of strike back immediately. I think that was the scary part. Certainly, that was, I guess, what was showing up in the threat a.s.sessments enough then.

"I was nervous, I was anxious," she added carefully.

"Well, I never knew it," the president said. "I think I was paying attention to you then," he added, laughing.

"I didn't ever talk about it that much," Mrs. Bush said. "I woke up in the middle of the night. I know you did. I mean, I'd wake up in the middle of the night and know he was awake."

"I don't remember that. Was I some?" he inquired, looking at her.

She nodded a strong affirmative.

"Yes," the president conceded.

"You had to," I interjected.

"Yes," he said. "Right after the attacks, I mean, I was emotional."

How many nights?

"It wasn't a lot," the president replied.

Of course he was waking up at night. A significant portion of Washington was waking as the Combat Air Patrol could be heard droning overhead all night with a distinctive, distant roar. I was waking up and I didn't live at Ground Zero. Bush turned to his wife, "If you were nervous .. ."

"Well," she said, "I didn't say that to you."

"That's true, you didn't," he said.

"I mean, I wouldn't have said that," she replied, knowing part of her job was to rea.s.sure.

The Bushes had another way of dealing with the threat environment. "I guess in some ways there was sort of a fatalism about it, and if it happened, it happened," Mrs. Bush said, and the president added, "If it's meant to be, it's going to happen. And therefore there's no need to try to hide from a terrorist."

ON THAT SAt.u.r.dAY, September 29, the president and his wife were at Camp David. He met in the morning with the NSC by secure video.

"We need to focus on the overseas threat," Tenet said as the meeting got underway. Al Qaeda wasn't just after the American homeland. They wanted to hit military bases or emba.s.sies abroad. There were hundreds of good targets, and the U.S. needed to lock them down.

Powell said, "We've got the U.N. resolution. That's a good thing." The United Nations Security Council had pa.s.sed a U.S.-proposed resolution that called for member countries to cut financial, political and military ties with terrorist groups and freeze a.s.sets. He said the Spanish were now willing to commit troops, and some African nations were agreeing to take steps.