Bush At War Part 12

Powell said that Jesse Jackson, black leader and perennial presidential candidate who had involved himself in hostage and peace negotiations in Syria, Kuwait and Yugoslavia, had announced that he would not go to Afghanistan, which was a break, given what they were planning to do there.

Powell was still working Uzbekistan, but whatever he offered, it was dismissed as not enough, not in the ballpark. The Uzbeks wanted immediate membership in NATO for starters - something the U.S. could not grant and a sensitive issue with the Russians to say the least. As Powell put it, the Uzbeks wanted a bilateral treaty of mutual defense, love, cooperation and economic support. They wanted some proof that the love would be permanent, a kind of "Will You Be There Tomorrow?" declaration. He was drafting an agreement.

Powell would deal with the Uzbek foreign minister and the military, and then the matter would go to Karimov, who would sit on it, if only to prove he was the sole decision-maker.

Why would the Uzbeks go along? They had bad relations with the Russians and their att.i.tude seemed to be anything-but-the-Russians, though at the same time they seemed to fear alienating the Russians. They wanted bragging rights that they were permanent friends of the United States. Americans were rich and the Uzbeks wanted things like $50 million in loans from the U.S. Export-Import Bank. Lastly, they had their own fundamentalist rebellion with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which wanted to overthrow Karimov. The IMU had a safe operating haven in Afghanistan, so Karimov would be delighted to have the Taliban deposed. Though the dance would continue, Powell said the Uzbeks were now fine on the CSAR.

On Pakistan, his other major account, the secretary said, "Musharraf has the situation under control." Anti-U.S. protests had been drawing smaller crowds than expected, but a government-declared "Solidarity Day," designed to stir up nationalist sentiments, had also attracted meager crowds.

There was major concern about the U.S. Emba.s.sy in Indonesia, fear of a backlash to any U.S. military action in Afghanistan.

Hadley said, "We got through the anniversary of the Intifada 2 but it wasn't pretty." Six Palestinians had been killed and dozens wounded during weekend protests marking the anniversary of the latest chapter in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

"We need to identify what the Pentagon wants from countries," Powell said. Rumsfeld had insisted he be involved in or approve all discussions with the State Department on such issues.

"How do we warn Americans not to go to Afghanistan right now?" Bush asked.

"We got the warnings out," Powell said.

Rumsfeld reported that a U.S. team had arrived in Uzbekistan to evaluate their airfields. "The CSAR in the south is okay. We're not able to use Special Forces in the north. We're going to more fully develop the idea in the south."

"We may be able to have an option to do it in the north later," Powell interjected.

"Let's push hard," Bush told them. He was frustrated. The attack plan was looking Clintonesque. "Let's not give up on the northern piece, let's develop an option for Special Forces in the north. Let's not give it up!"

Rumsfeld had some dreary news. "The target list cannot impose much damage on the people we want to impose it on."

Most of the targets, he said, were Taliban military - early warning radar, airfields, their few aircraft. They were going to hit the mostly empty al Qaeda camps. Of the hundreds of targets, 50 or 60 might include different aim points in just one camp, such as the large Tarnak Farms complex south of Kandahar. They were static targets. "We still need to work targets. We might want to emphasize that our first action is heavily intelligence gathering and humanitarian aid," Rumsfeld said. He worried about inflated expectations. But then he corrected himself, "We want to avoid discussing our military action." Maybe silence was best.

General Myers reinforced the point. During the Cold War and even the 1991 Gulf War, the military had geared itself to attack fixed targets such as communications centers, early warning radar, the command and control, the military a.s.sets - aircraft, tanks, storage and weapons depots, even the economic infrastructure such as power plants and bridges. "We've got a military that does great against fixed targets. We don't do so well against mobile targets. You're not going to topple a regime with this target list," he said.

Rice thought, It is true they weren't going to topple the regime without ground troops. That was the real problem, but she was confident they would find a way.

Eighteen days after September 11, they were developing a response, an action, but not a strategy. It was Powell's worst nightmare - bomb and hope. Vietnam kept flooding back.

"We've got to manage our expectations," the president said. "We've got to think through it on Monday. We need to be able to define success after the first round of action." They could not look weak.

"We might be able to do that on the talk shows tomorrow," Rumsfeld said.

"We need to," Bush interjected. "It's part of the credibility of our overall effort. Conventional warfare is not going to win this, this is a guerrilla struggle."

That was the problem. The United States had never figured out how to win a guerrilla war. The discussion was almost exclusively about aerial bombing. There was one team of 10 CIA people on the ground, Jawbreaker, and no prospects of getting Special Forces in anytime soon.

Myers turned to some things that were working. "AID is coordinating the humanitarian a.s.sistance with Franks. We've got CAPs up, we've got AWACS up." Combat Air Patrol and Airborne Warning and Control System planes were being deployed for reconnaissance and potential intercepts. "Deputies need to push it country by country, what we want from various countries."

The president said that since the Africans wanted to help, "Maybe we should ask them to help defend our emba.s.sies."

The emphasis on such a side issue revealed how far they were from solving the main ones.

ANDY CARD AND Bush had regular private side conversations about the progress of the war planning.

"You're a little too interested in the tactics," Card teased at one point. Bush seemed too interested in what types of planes were doing what, whether Special Forces could get into the north, etc. "That's interesting but that's not the mission," Card cautioned.

He was just 10 months younger than Bush, and they both knew about the 1960s and 1970s - Vietnam. Both had somewhat the same experience. "Don't be a general, be a president," Card told Bush.

Yes, Bush said, there was a fine line between micromanaging combat and setting the broad goals. But so much hinged on the small issues.

"You have to win," Card said, "but you have to let the generals win. If you put constraints on the generals that impact their ability to win the war - "

Oh, no, Bush promised, he was not going to do that. "I am not going to be a general."

Yet Card saw that it was a balancing act. The president had to be familiar enough with the details, sufficiently immersed in the tactics, so that he never appeared ignorant in public. That would be a true disaster. At the same time, both Bush and Card had to avoid getting overly involved in the details of military tactics.

THE PRINc.i.p.aLS MET on Sunday, September 30, without the president.

After a brief discussion of the NATO resolution invoking Article 5, declaring that the attacks on the United States on September 11 were an attack on all NATO countries, Rumsfeld turned to the idea of a white paper. Powell had floated the idea three days earlier when he had told National Public Radio, "The information will be coming out."

"I think the precedent is bad of having to go out and make your case publicly," Rumsfeld said, "because we may not have enough information to make our case next time, and it may impair our ability to preempt against the threat that may be coming at us." Preemption was going to be necessary, and probably sooner rather than later. It was one of the first mentions of the concept, which would grow in importance over the year.

Rumsfeld continued with the white paper. One of his favorite lines was that first reports are always wrong. "If we use the paper we've got to take out all the excess verbiage. If it's put out, it shouldn't be the president, the secretary of state. b.u.mp it down," he added with disdain, "someplace down to the FBI or CIA. Treat it as an early report. Have a frontispiece on it that urges caution. Are we going to have to make our case every time?"

"It's not much of a precedent," Powell countered. "There's a lot of evidence. Most of it's factual. You can say up front it's preliminary. We've been asked by some of our closest allies for some of this information. We've been working on it for a while, this isn't a rush job." Being conciliatory, Powell added, "Everything you suggest is acceptable. We ought to be able to do it. The allies expect it, it enhances our case and it's going to be to our benefit."

Rumsfeld and Powell went back and forth at each other in a way they would not have if Bush were present. Rumsfeld's real worry was that they might release a white paper and face a negative reaction - the pundits and foreign affairs experts declaring that it wasn't a very good or convincing case. What would they do then? Not attack?

"It's largely a historical case," Rice said. "It's pretty well established in what has happened in prior actions that al Qaeda has taken. There were people indicted after all, you've got bills of particulars. I'm not so concerned about this."

Undeterred, Rumsfeld asked, "Why not use the briefing that Paul Wolfowitz used?" His deputy had gone to Europe to brief NATO defense ministers on some evidence pointing to bin Laden.

"Paul's briefing was part of the problem," Powell said. "It didn't give enough detail."

"Look," Card said, "add a caveat up front that says we don't think we really need to do this. That'll help you counter the precedent."

"Push it "into my channel," Tenet said. "People need more detail."

Myers reported that search and rescue out of Uzbekistan would take longer than the initial estimate of four days. The a.s.sessment team had sent word that the airstrip could only accommodate the smaller, more maneuverable C-17 transport planes, not the large C-5 transports. Presently, the airfield could handle only one C-17 at a time, pushing the estimate of CSAR capability to 12 days. Basing out of Tajikistan above northeastern Afghanistan was an alternative, but that too presented problems - high mountains would have to be navigated to enter Afghan territory. The Soviets had lost a lot of force coming down that way. would take longer than the initial estimate of four days. The a.s.sessment team had sent word that the airstrip could only accommodate the smaller, more maneuverable C-17 transport planes, not the large C-5 transports. Presently, the airfield could handle only one C-17 at a time, pushing the estimate of CSAR capability to 12 days. Basing out of Tajikistan above northeastern Afghanistan was an alternative, but that too presented problems - high mountains would have to be navigated to enter Afghan territory. The Soviets had lost a lot of force coming down that way.

"I'm concerned about going through the Russians to the Tajiks," Rumsfeld said.

"We're not doing that," Rice replied. "I'm less concerned. All we need is for the Russians to say yes and they've said they'll say yes. We'll deal with them directly." They could not allow the northern strategy to fall apart, because they didn't have a southern strategy. It was the northern strategy or nothing.

"The Tajiks have offered anything we need, and they haven't asked for a thing," Myers said. Franks's Central Command was sending a liaison team to go up to talk to the Russians about CSAR from Russia. Putin had told the president they would allow CSAR. "They're going to go up and talk to them tomorrow," Myers said. "We got small numbers of U.S. military to go in with the CIA and with the Northern Alliance. We don't have any ability to do special operations in the north at this point even if we got some permission to do some Special Forces in the north. Of course we couldn't start anything until the CSAR was in place, so let's talk about getting the CSAR in place."

"It won't be until mid-month," Rumsfeld said, at least two weeks away.

"Why do we need the CSAR?" Powell asked.

"For the bombers and TAG air," Myers replied, referring to both higher-flying bombers and lower-flying tactical aircraft.

Rice believed that there were only a few ways to make a really big mistake in this operation. A captured pilot was one of them. It wasn't just Carter's hostages in Iran or Reagan's in Lebanon, it was that bin Laden or al Qaeda with hostages would change the terms of the debate, give them immense leverage. that bin Laden or al Qaeda with hostages would change the terms of the debate, give them immense leverage.

Rumsfeld was unhappy with the targets. "For this value of targets," he said, "I wouldn't go in without CSAR." To lose a pilot for these low-value fixed and mud-hut-type targets made no sense. For a really high-value target, yes, he might consider the risk. Not these.

"CSAR may delay air operations up to 12 days if we can't mitigate this in some sense," Rice said. She knew that was not going to be acceptable to the president.

"We're trying to see if we can get into working 24 hours a day to fly airplanes into Uzbekistan. We're also looking at Dushanbe [in Tajikistan], but that's uncomfortable," Myers said.

"How about the south?" Rice asked.

"The CSAR is okay," Myers said. "It's going to go out of Oman, either airborne or on call. Also we're looking for a forward refueling point over Pakistan. We want to be un.o.btrusive." He added what they wanted to hear, "We'll solve it."

"It's going to be in place by when?" Rice asked. The president wanted the strikes in six days, Sat.u.r.day.

It would not inhibit our Sat.u.r.day strikes, Myers said. But that meant air operations only in the south and no Special Forces in either the north or south. It was a quarter loaf. He said they were going to move the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier without its regular strike aircraft but with Special Operations Forces on board to take up station off the coast of Pakistan. "That will give us some capability," Myers said, meaning Special Forces in the south.

The Kitty Hawk was in j.a.pan. Powell, who knew how long it rook to move an aircraft carrier, elicited from Myers that it would not be on station until October 11, nearly two weeks away.

Rice turned to the allies who were clamoring to partic.i.p.ate.

Getting as many of them invested with military forces in the war was essential. The coalition had to have teeth. She did not want to leave them all dressed up with no place to go. "The Aussies, the French, the Canadians, the Germans want to help," she said. "Anything they can do to help. The Aussies have Special Forces in Tampa," Franks's headquarters. "We ought to try and use them."

"We'll prepare a paper on this," Rumsfeld said, stalling.

Powell smiled at Rice as if to say, See what I have to deal with.

Rumsfeld recovered. "We want to include them if we can."

But Rumsfeld didn't want other forces included for cosmetic purposes. Some German battalion or a French frigate could get in the way of his operation. The coalition had to fit the conflict and not the other way around. They could not invent roles. Maybe they didn't need a French frigate.

Tenet turned to Germany. It was now apparent that the September 11 plot, at least parts of it, had been hatched in Hamburg cells that included the lead hijacker, Mohamed Atta. "The best thing the Germans can do is to get their act together on their own internal terrorist problems and the groups that we know are there," he said. He was worried about more German-based plots.

Responding to Rice and showing more sympathy, Myers said, "We'll put together a paper on what we plan to ask them to do. We'll prepare it - we're going to try to be forward-leaning. We understand it's a political issue."

For Card, it didn't add up. "I still worry that the president's timeline expectations are off from what I'm hearing here," he said.

"I know," General Myers said.

"We need to explain to the president that it's going to be eight to 10 days before air operations can go in the north," Rice said. Did it make sense then to go to just the south?

"We could bomb Tuesday without CSAR," Powell said. "When would CSAR be ready?"

Myers said they planned to be ready by Thursday and therefore they could bomb in the north on Sat.u.r.day, October 6. That was six days away, better than Rice's various estimates.

The president had to understand that if they started now in the south, there would be a large time gap before they could begin bombing in the north, Rice said. "We need some clarity."

Hadley asked if they wanted to go in with a major delegation to the Uzbeks.

"Not now," said Powell. If the issue was Special Forces on the ground, they still had to wait. "We can't do Special Forces operations out of Uzbekistan until we get CSAR. Once we get the CSAR in, then let's look, really look at the whole situation. Let's not go in heavy now."

"Let's look again at [the] Tajiks because that may be the only way we can get it done," Rice said. "We may, at the end of the day, not be able to rely on the Uzbeks." It wasn't at all clear the Uzbeks would allow Special Forces operations out of their territory. It was one thing to allow search and rescue. It was another to allow Special Operations Forces, clear offensive operations.

Rice thought back to when she had been the Stanford University provost, and the Army Corps of Engineers had given a briefing on earthquake preparedness. During a disaster, the briefer had said, the first thing you have to do is determine "the enabling condition" - the thing on which progress hinged the most. It might be clearing the roads or providing medical a.s.sistance. Well, the princ.i.p.als had finally figured out that their "enabling condition" was Uzbekistan. Without it, no bombing in the north. Bombing in the south, where there was no significant opposition ground force, made no sense.

Powell attempted to summarize. It was a remarkable statement, focusing on his own role and denigrating the military, whether intentionally or not.

"Phase 1 is diplomacy.

"Phase 2A is getting Tenet on the ground" - the CIA paramilitary teams.

"Phase 2B is some military operations. We may have to do it without CSAR. Go after some targets that won't get us in trouble with either the Arabs or the Europeans. Do it in the south, it helps George get some things going.

"Phase 3 do an audible," meaning change signals at the last second like a quarterback at the line of scrimmage. "Go for targets of opportunity. And Special Forces may not get in place for a while. That's just the way we are." second like a quarterback at the line of scrimmage. "Go for targets of opportunity. And Special Forces may not get in place for a while. That's just the way we are."

In Powell's a.n.a.lysis, military operations were only a part of the three phases - 2B - and the operations had to be designed to avoid diplomatic problems with the Arabs or Europeans.

Rumsfeld could have exploded. He said nothing.

Whether the others agreed with Powell's framework, what he said had a certain realism to it. Hadley saw the process as makeshift, "Come as you are." They were making it up as they went.

Tenet said, "We have to avoid looking like a U.S. invasion. That message is even more important in the south, to get the Pashtuns to rise. The northerners are getting a lot already - they're getting a lot of money." He knew the critical importance of money.

"Do we have enough weapons in the north?" Rice asked.

"We got an a.s.sessment from the field," Tenet replied. "We have to look at it."

"How do we deal with actions by al Qaeda? We need to think about the unconventional, how they will respond to what we are doing," Card said.

None of them really had any idea, neither conventional nor unconventional. They were underprepared for what had happened on September 11, and uncertain about the path ahead.

Rice said that the president needed more information. He was also hanging out there, just like they were. "What's the first 24, 48, 72 hours of this operation going to look like? We need to get back to the president on that. It needs to be briefed to this group." The military plan needed to be briefed. But first they had to figure out what it was going to be.

After the meeting, Rice spoke to Powell.

Is it not, she asked smiling, the secretary of state's concern to arrange for the allies to a.s.sist? I'm just doing your job.

Powell laughed.

RICE BRIEFED THE president. It's coming along, she told him, but we aren't there.

What's the problem?

She summarized, focusing especially on the Combat Search and Rescue. "You might want to press about that on Monday."

Rice was sympathetic to Rumsfeld and the Pentagon. It was a tough nut. The military could not just show up and start bombing. They had to have bases. After September 11, all the necessary countries had given permission for overflight rights. That was the easy part. When it got down to can we run elite commando Special Operations Forces out of your territory, it got hard. There was also the absence of good targets, and a president who was determined that bombing not just be for show faced a bit of a catch-22. The Pentagon could not say what the first 24 or 48 hours would look like until they had the basing rights lined up. It didn't just look dreary, Rice thought, it was dreary.

IN THE NORTHEASTERN corner of Afghanistan, CIA team leader Gary dispatched several of his men to the Takar region, the front between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban forces. They went north, a good 60 miles to the east of Konduz. They found the Northern Alliance forces disciplined, their clothing and weapons clean. But the safeties were on the rifles, a signal that this was not a hot combat zone. The troops lined up in formations and conducted drills. There was a command structure. But there were not enough troops or heavy weapons to move against the Taliban, who were dug in on the other side. Like World War I trench warfare, the military situation was static.

Gary knew that CIA headquarters believed that the Taliban would be a tenacious enemy in a fight and that any U.S. strike would bring out its sympathizers in Afghanistan and in the region, especially Pakistan. They would rally around Mullah Omar.