Bush At War Part 10

"Look," Rice said, "we're going to stick to what you asked from the Taliban in your speech the other night. If the Afghan people want to overthrow the Taliban, that's fine. But what we've asked from the Taliban are the things we asked in the president's speech about al Qaeda."

"Yep," the president said, "we've got to stick to what we've asked."

"We've got to emphasize what the president demanded," Powell said. "If we make overthrowing the Taliban government the goal, then we'd need a new campaign plan and there'll be an issue about how the Pakistanis will react." The secretary of state, uncomfortable with wanton regime change, added, "So the president's statement was, Fine, that's where we ought to stay."

"If they reject our demands and they harbor al Qaeda - as they're doing - and we don't respond, then it suggests we're not serious," Rumsfeld interjected. The "as they're doing" was pointed. Rumsfeld wanted a hard line. How long could an ultimatum remain on the table? He didn't want the Taliban hiding behind some fiction. They were harboring bin Laden and his network. The president had said those who harbored terrorists would pay.

"That's right, Don," Rice said. "But we're not there yet."

She reminded the group where they stood. "Our message at this point is still comply with what the president asked for or you will share the al Qaeda fate."

The problem was that bin Laden and the network were virtually untouched in their sanctuary 15 days after the attacks.

For many days the war cabinet had been dancing around the basic question: How long could they wait after September 11 before the U.S. started going "kinetic," as they often termed it, against al Qaeda in a visible way? The public was patient, at least it seemed patient, but everyone wanted action. A full military operation - air and boots - would be the essential demonstration of seriousness - to bin Laden, America and the world. The president took the floor.

"Anybody doubt that we should start this Monday or Tuesday of next week?" he inquired. This was what he would later maintain was intentional provocation.

His words lingered in the room. Monday? Tuesday? He was pushing hard, almost growling Ggrrrhhh!

Powell was a little surprised. He as well as anybody knew how long it took to move forces and get fully prepared for a large-scale military operation. The buildup of forces in 1990-91 before the Gulf War had taken five and a half months before the bombing commenced. Armitage believed that Defense was remarkably ill prepared now. He had gone so far as to express the view privately that Rumsfeld was selling the Old Man - his term for the president - a bill of goods about when they would be ready and how much they could actually deliver.

"If the military is ready," Powell told the president and the others, "then we ought to go." He stressed the "if."

Tenet wanted more time - to get more teams in, work with the tribals, spread some more of the covert action cash around, more fully a.s.sess the needs of the tribals, develop a system of shipping in weapons, start the Special Forces teams in. Now with the prospect of military action only five or six days away, Tenet told the president, "The more time I have, the better for me, but I'm ready if it's next week."

Powell said, "Whenever we go we've got to let people know - got to have a notification plan about world leaders and others so that they don't read about it in the newspapers." He didn't want another set of diplomatic messes to clean up on top of the war.

Rice, Hadley, Powell and Armitage agreed to work out a notification plan for calling key foreign leaders at various stages, in some cases only hours before a military strike would begin.

"We need an a.s.sessment of how locked down we are," Tenet said, "because once we start there's liable to be a response and we've got to be ready." U.S. military action might unleash a retaliatory terrorist attack.

"I agree, George," the president said, "you're exactly right. We need that a.s.sessment. And we need it in the next several days." Bush added that the targets in Afghanistan were going to be the air defense systems, military airfields, runways and other fixed military targets. "And what comes next will require an a.s.sessment of our folks, both what's happening on the ground and what we see. Defense and CIA need to continue to develop targets." Then he threw out another idea he had not even shared with Rice, another provocation. "And boots on the ground may or may not be simultaneous."

That was a potentially significant change, because the implied promise in the president's decision on the military strike was that the air action and ground troops would be at the same time - no Clinton-like cruise missiles into tents.

But it was becoming clear that they had a problem about the necessary basing structure for simultaneous action.

"Are we ready to begin next week?" Bush pressed.

"The CINC will be ready by then," Shelton said. "But the issue is CSAR." He was referring to Combat Search and Rescue, the helicopter teams that were supposed to be in the vicinity of combat operations, standing by to rescue downed pilots and crews. The CSAR for bombing runs in the south could possibly be based secretly in Pakistan or the Gulf States. None of the "Stans" to the north - Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan - had yet agreed to allow the CSAR necessary for bombing the north.

It was bedrock doctrine with Shelton and most military officers that combat operations could not commence without full search and rescue. The CSAR was the lifeline for those who flew combat missions and there was a presumption that the military bra.s.s would go all out to ensure it was in place. This was not only because of the lives of the pilots and crew. Any downed airman behind enemy lines is a potential hostage. Anyone who had lived through hostage crises, from the 52 Americans held in Tehran during 1979-80 to those held in Lebanon in the mid-1980s, knew the potential impact of American hostages on foreign policy.

The political impact of hostages could be even greater. The Iranian hostage crisis had crippled the presidency of Jimmy Carter and certainly was a factor in his defeat for a second term. The pictures of the wreckage in the Iranian desert had become symbols of Carter's impotence. In the mid-1980s, President Reagan's overemotional engagement with the fate of half a dozen American citizens held hostage in Lebanon had launched the dubious scheme to trade U.S. military arms for the American hostages, and the Iran-Contra scandal.

Shelton said he and others were still working the Combat Search and Rescue.

"Let me know on Friday," the president said. The Pentagon had two days.

Rumsfeld had not directly answered the president's question about starting military action next week. Instead he went at it obliquely, raising one of his favorite issues, worrying that the focus of the war was too narrow still and might be perceived to be too Afghanistan-driven. "You know," he said, "some special operations somewhere else in the world at the same time would be important. We should do something on the ground - Special Forces in Afghanistan - but if it's not available you know, we can do it somewhere else." His teams might go into any number of terrorist havens to disrupt or sabotage terrorist groups. about starting military action next week. Instead he went at it obliquely, raising one of his favorite issues, worrying that the focus of the war was too narrow still and might be perceived to be too Afghanistan-driven. "You know," he said, "some special operations somewhere else in the world at the same time would be important. We should do something on the ground - Special Forces in Afghanistan - but if it's not available you know, we can do it somewhere else." His teams might go into any number of terrorist havens to disrupt or sabotage terrorist groups.

Some of the others thought he was eager to get the military into the action someplace.

"I agree," the president said comfortingly. "We can't wait forever, but we also can't rush. We can manage if there are not boots on the ground." Bush said they would be showing their will because the first air strike would be followed by a second and a third. It was going to be a continuous bombardment.

"Well," Rumsfeld said, "if we don't get new targets, the second strike, the following strikes, will be small."

Rice understood Rumsfeld's frustration. It wasn't as if they had big electrical power grids to go after. Afghanistan was in the 15th century. Wipe out the first target set and they'd be left pounding sand.

"Look," the president countered, "our strategy is to create chaos, to create a vacuum, to get the bad guys moving. We get 'em moving, we can see them, we can hit them."

"Well you know," Rumsfeld replied, "our military buildup has already had that effect." The al Qaeda camps were empty, the terrorists scattered.

They turned to homeland defense and the vulnerabilities of pipelines and harbors. The deeper they went into the issue of defending the country, the more the number of soft spots grew. Nothing was safe.

"There's no question that we need to be concerned about homeland defense," Bush said, "but we can't let our concerns about that prevent us from taking action.

"We've got then basically the same strategy we had before," the president said in summary. "Let's not have any blinking. At Friday's [NSC meeting] give me your final a.s.sessment and let me know where we are. I want a briefing Friday on making sure we're b.u.t.toned up." He wanted them all thinking about what to do "in the event that there are strikes here."

Cheney had spent time at the CIA trying to figure out how substantial the agency's contacts were in the south. For the moment, the strategy was built around winning over some southern tribals. But the deeper he dug and the more questions he asked, the thinner it looked. The contacts were not that good and were not with the key tribes. The CIA was using information from British maps which were decades old.

Since the Northern Alliance was the more powerful ally, with real fighters on the ground, perhaps they needed to tilt the strategy to the north, not the south. That would mean going after the Taliban in a serious way, rather than attempting to divide them. Maybe they should just try to decapitate the Taliban leadership, he said.

ABOUT 3 A.M. Washington time on September 27 - noon in the Panjshir Valley in Afghanistan - Jawbreaker team leader Gary sat down with General Mohammed Fahim, commander of the Northern Alliance forces, and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the Alliance foreign minister. He put $1 million on the table, explaining that they could use it as they saw fit. Fahim said he had some 10,000 fighters, though many were poorly equipped.

"The president is interested in our mission," Gary said. "He wants you to know the U.S. forces are coming and we want your cooperation and he's taking a personal interest in this." He had secure communications set up with Washington, and exaggerating, he said, "Everything that I write back home [the president] sees. So this is important." Without exaggerating, he added, "This is the world stage."

"We welcome you guys," Fahim said. "We'll do whatever we can." But he had questions. "When does the war start? When do you guys come? When is the U.S. really going to start to attack?"

"I don't know," Gary said. "But it will be soon. We have to be ready. Forces have to be deployed. We have to get things together. You're going to be impressed. You have never seen anything like what we're going to deliver onto the enemy."

IN WASHINGTON, RICE began September 27, Thursday, with deep concerns, not only about what they might be able to deliver onto the enemy, but when. From her soundings of some of the princ.i.p.als it was clear that there was queasiness. When the president had said he wanted a decision on Friday, tomorrow, everyone had seemed to salute, Yes, sir. But she knew there were doubts.

Rice had arranged to go with Cheney to Langley later that day for a briefing at CIA headquarters on the Northern Alliance. Much was riding on the Alliance.

Tenet and some of his experts showed them TOP SECRET maps of Afghanistan with little colored pins designating Alliance positions and forces. The Alliance had between 10,000 and 30,000 fighters. Rice thought that was a huge range, and not the 20,000 number that had been floated.

There were gaps, significant gaps, the CIA experts acknowledged. But Jawbreaker was now on the ground with the Alliance, and more teams would be going in to answer their questions. There was no reliable way to determine the hard-core fighters without an on-the-ground look by the CIA paramilitary and operations experts. They would be able to tell quickly. Reports from the first team would be coming in soon.

Rice could see that the CIA was organized, and the years of covert work and funding had obviously paid off.

The south, the Taliban stronghold, was another story. The CIA had only about 12 sources. There was little evidence of opposition fighters.

Cheney and Rice went up to tour the new center that was being set up to track terrorism operations.

"The president's on the phone for you," Rice was told.

"Where are you?" Bush asked.

"I'm out at the agency," she said. She was getting briefed on the Northern Alliance.

"When will you be back?" he asked with some urgency.

"As soon as you would like me to be," she laughed.

"What am I going to hear tomorrow?"

Rice said she wasn't sure, but she would find out. There were people all around in the operations center. "Let me call you when I get in the car."

It was about 6:45 P.M., still rush hour, when Rice reached the president by secure phone from her car.

Am I going to hear what I think I'm going to hear tomorrow? he asked.

You know, Mr. President, they are doing what they can to get ready, she said. But you have to remember that this is hard.

"Why? That's not acceptable," Bush roared.

Rice began to explain that they faced a circular problem. Without intelligence, they couldn't identify targets effectively and precisely. Getting intelligence was a problem because they had not been able to get enough people on the ground. Their conversation was cut off when the secure phone went dead.

They hooked up again but it was a bad connection.

"I'm coming to the White House," Rice said. "I'll come see you as soon as I get there."

The president wanted to talk.

What is the story? What is going on?

Mr. President, she said, your time expectations and those of the military probably are not in sync. They might not be quite ready.

The phone was in and out.

"Mr. President, I'm at E Street. I'll call you."

When she got to the White House, Rice sprinted to her office. The telephone stalker was already on the secure phone. She repeated what she had told him from the car, that the military was not fully ready.

"That's unacceptable!" Bush said again. "Why is that?"

Rice said she would come up to the residence and explain in more detail. She went up and laid out the multiple problems. It was a tough nut for the Pentagon - no infrastructure in the region to speak of, no bases, weak on-the-ground intelligence at this point, scarce targets, the weather starting to get bad. Another problem, as Bush knew, was that the Combat Search and Rescue for the pilots was not in place. I think the key on Friday is to try to figure out the way forward, not to try to make a decision, Rice advised. speak of, no bases, weak on-the-ground intelligence at this point, scarce targets, the weather starting to get bad. Another problem, as Bush knew, was that the Combat Search and Rescue for the pilots was not in place. I think the key on Friday is to try to figure out the way forward, not to try to make a decision, Rice advised.

The president later recalled this sequence of events. "I'm ready to go," he said. "Sometimes that's the way I am - fiery. On the other hand [Rice's] job is to bear the brunt of some of the fire, so that it - take the edge off a little bit. And she's good at that." It was just in his nature to be fiery, he said.

"I was growing a little impatient. I can be an impatient person. Plus, I feel comfortable being - one of the things, I can be totally unscripted or unrehea.r.s.ed with Condi. That's the nature of her job, is to absorb my - is to help, you know, kind of say, well, Mr. President I appreciate that point of view, and I think you probably ought to think this way a little bit."

After she returned from the residence, Rice called Rumsfeld.

"Don," she carefully warned, "I think tomorrow you need to be able to tell the president what the real timeline looks like, because I think his expectations are not in line with what you're going to be able to say. I think he will be all right with that, but it is important that he really now have a clear view of how long we're talking about."

"I'll be ready to do that," Rumsfeld replied.

THE PRINc.i.p.aLS MET without the president later that evening. Cheney said he had talked to the emir in Qatar.

"I've been active," Powell said. "I've demarched him twice." That meant it was a diplomatic warning. "We're working that issue."

Cheney said, "The president wants to avoid putting any artificial constraints or timelines on our military action. Let's do it right. Let's not do something stupid for PR purposes."

Rice agreed.

"You know," Cheney said, "air operations without boots on the ground could look weak." At the same time, they didn't want to force "our guys" to do something for the public relations impact. "Do it because it's smart."

"We talked about seeing if there are any plans for special operations outside of Afghanistan," Powell said.

"Yeah," Rumsfeld replied, "I'm looking at that."

With all of Rumsfeld's pressing, he had nothing from Defense to show in the way of plans.

Powell said his people had had a second meeting with the Uzbeks to get permission to use their territory. They had a question: "What do we do if your action puts us at risk?"

It was a good question, but it went unanswered.

Powell also said they were about to get agreement on a United Nations Security Council resolution that would essentially adopt the president's Executive Order on freezing terrorist a.s.sets worldwide. It would be very good to go global with the war on financial a.s.sets.

Powell also reported that there was going to be a meeting the next day in Germany of those countries donating money for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. This had to be a visible part of the coalition's strategy, an incentive for the Afghan people to liberate themselves. They had to know there was a pot of money to help rebuild their country if they were prepared to do what needed to be done.

Rumsfeld said General Franks was willing to accept liaison officers from coalition governments at his headquarters in Tampa, Florida.

The others seemed to agree that it was a first step in getting coalition members to contribute forces. Franks could see what was being offered and what really might be useful.

Shelton said, "We're going to have a couple of C-17s after next week ready to air-drop rations, radios, blankets, and we're going to do it in conjunction with our military campaign."

"A major humanitarian effort is required," Rice said. "We need to develop a humanitarian campaign and get in the swing next week." She seemed frustrated. The princ.i.p.als, other than Powell, seemed more interested in war than the humanitarian a.s.sistance the president had emphasized. "We need to clarify out of our president's mouth that there is going to be a major effort to help the Afghan people."

"I'm still worried about the CSAR piece," Shelton said, referring to the search and rescue. "Franks says special operations will be ready within 10 days from go." But without basing rights in the region, the special ops teams could not go anywhere. It looked like boots on the ground was going to have to wait.

"Look," Rice said, "we need to close on Special Operations Forces and CSAR. What have we got? What are we going to do?" She went on for some time.

They turned to another headache. Al-Jazeera, the Arab television station based in Qatar, had opened the floodgates to bin Laden propaganda, broadcasting his full statements, which were being picked up by the American television networks, if only in part.

They were conflicted because they wanted some things from Qatar, but at the same time, they didn't like the freedom being granted Al-Jazeera.

"On the Uzbeks," Cheney said impatiently, "our delegation isn't senior enough. We need a swing through the area with a high-level person." John R. Bolton, the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, was dealing with the Uzbeks. "The president can call, we need a presidential call to Karimov. We need someone to go in and settle it."

It was a shot at Powell, who was in charge of the Uzbek account.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, was the day the president had set for the decision on whether to commence bombing early the next week.

John McLaughlin was slated to deliver the President's Daily Brief of intelligence to Bush, taking Tenet's place for a day. McLaughlin had an incredible memory and was famous for being able to digest a lot of material and present the high points.

A year earlier when Governor Bush was the Republican presidential nominee, McLaughlin had been dispatched to Texas to give the routine hour-long briefing to the candidate. He had asked to start with a joke. "Only if it's good," Bush had replied.