Under The Loving Care Of The Fatherly Leader Part 24

60. Kim Ik Hyon, Kim Ik Hyon, The Immortal Woman Revolutionary The Immortal Woman Revolutionary (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987). An editor's note says that Kim Jong-suk was "born into a patriotic and revolutionary peasant family on December 24, 1917, in h.o.e.ryong township, h.o.e.ryong County, North Hamgyong Province. ... Early in her life she lost her parents and her brothers beneath the bayonets of the j.a.panese imperialist aggressors. In the early 1930s, as a teenage girl, she embarked upon the road of revolution against the aggressors. She grew up as a member of the Young Communist League. ... In the spring of 1935 she met the great General Kim Il Sung, the peerless patriot and national hero, and this marked a milestone of decisive significance in her struggle and her life. Under the leadership of the great General Kim Il Sung she developed into an indomitable revolutionary and joined the Korean People's Revolutionary Army in September 1935. From that time she fought alongside the Comrade Commander and defended the headquarters of the revolution at the risk of her life." (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987). An editor's note says that Kim Jong-suk was "born into a patriotic and revolutionary peasant family on December 24, 1917, in h.o.e.ryong township, h.o.e.ryong County, North Hamgyong Province. ... Early in her life she lost her parents and her brothers beneath the bayonets of the j.a.panese imperialist aggressors. In the early 1930s, as a teenage girl, she embarked upon the road of revolution against the aggressors. She grew up as a member of the Young Communist League. ... In the spring of 1935 she met the great General Kim Il Sung, the peerless patriot and national hero, and this marked a milestone of decisive significance in her struggle and her life. Under the leadership of the great General Kim Il Sung she developed into an indomitable revolutionary and joined the Korean People's Revolutionary Army in September 1935. From that time she fought alongside the Comrade Commander and defended the headquarters of the revolution at the risk of her life."

61. The True Story of Kim Jong Il The True Story of Kim Jong Il (Seoul: The Inst.i.tute for South-North Korean Studies, 1993), pp. 2728. (Seoul: The Inst.i.tute for South-North Korean Studies, 1993), pp. 2728.

62. An official biography of Kim Jong-il tells of his first visit, with his parents, to Kim Il-sung's ancestral home at Mangyongdae, in the fall of 1945, after liberation: "You two had no wedding ceremony, so today's banquet is for your honour," Kim Bo Hyon said as he held his great-grandson on his lap " (Choe In Su, An official biography of Kim Jong-il tells of his first visit, with his parents, to Kim Il-sung's ancestral home at Mangyongdae, in the fall of 1945, after liberation: "You two had no wedding ceremony, so today's banquet is for your honour," Kim Bo Hyon said as he held his great-grandson on his lap " (Choe In Su, Kim Jong Il The People's Leader Kim Jong Il The People's Leader [Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1983], vol. I, p. 8). [Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1983], vol. I, p. 8).

63. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, p. 280. vol. 3, p. 280.

64. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 107. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 107.

65. Suh, Suh, Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung, p. 51. Suh adds that he found "no record of such a woman partisan in any of the Chinese or Korean sources." p. 51. Suh adds that he found "no record of such a woman partisan in any of the Chinese or Korean sources."

66. See Lim Un, See Lim Un, Founding of a Dynasty, Founding of a Dynasty, pp. pp. 47 4750. See also Yu Song-chol, "Transferred to the Position of Korean People's Army Operations Bureau Commander in 1948," See also Yu Song-chol, "Transferred to the Position of Korean People's Army Operations Bureau Commander in 1948," Hanguk Ilbo, Hanguk Ilbo, November 12, 1990 (translated in Seiler, November 12, 1990 (translated in Seiler, Kim Il-song 19411948). Kim Il-song 19411948). Yu, a comrade of Kim's in the 1940s, places the arrest in 1939. Yu, a comrade of Kim's in the 1940s, places the arrest in 1939.

67. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, p. 297. vol. 3, p. 297.

68. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 282. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 282.

69. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 279305. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 279305.

70. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 369370. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 369370.

71. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 394. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 394.

72. Chung Dong-joo, "Testimony on Gen. Kim Il Sung's Unit (3)." Chung Dong-joo, "Testimony on Gen. Kim Il Sung's Unit (3)."

73. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, pp. 402403. vol. 3, pp. 402403.

74. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 406411. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 406411.

75. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 53. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 53.

76. A resolution adopted by Korean partisans of the First Route Army of the Northeast Anti-j.a.panese United Army in .March 1940, at one of their last meetings, describes the situation as it was developing in the months before Kim's flight to the USSR: "The concentration and movement of a big company, as in the past, now provides an easy target for the j.a.panese punitive force; therefore, as a policy of the army, in the future the army should be divided into small units and should be scattered. Because of the j.a.panese punitive force's operation among the ma.s.ses, the people in the guerrilla districts have since winter become distrustful of our army" See "Item 62: Resolution," translated in Suh, A resolution adopted by Korean partisans of the First Route Army of the Northeast Anti-j.a.panese United Army in .March 1940, at one of their last meetings, describes the situation as it was developing in the months before Kim's flight to the USSR: "The concentration and movement of a big company, as in the past, now provides an easy target for the j.a.panese punitive force; therefore, as a policy of the army, in the future the army should be divided into small units and should be scattered. Because of the j.a.panese punitive force's operation among the ma.s.ses, the people in the guerrilla districts have since winter become distrustful of our army" See "Item 62: Resolution," translated in Suh, Doc.u.ments of Korean Communism, Doc.u.ments of Korean Communism, p. 471. p. 471.

77. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, preface. vol. 1, preface.

78. Suh, Suh, Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung, p. 54. p. 54.

79. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, p. 394. vol. 3, p. 394.

80. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 451. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 451.

81. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 356. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 356.

82. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 412415. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 412415.

4. Heaven and Earth the Wise Leader Tamed.

1. Since 1970 the 19411953 period has been examined in whole or in part by many authors, including: Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee ( Since 1970 the 19411953 period has been examined in whole or in part by many authors, including: Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee (Communism in Korea [see chap. 2, n. 28], and other works) and Dae-Sook Suh ( [see chap. 2, n. 28], and other works) and Dae-Sook Suh (Kim Il Sung [see chap. 2, n. 35], and other works), who are often categorized as taking an orthodox or traditional approach (or, in some critics' terms, an anti-communist, Cold War approach; historians' debates for decades have been fraught with ideology); Bruce c.u.mings (especially [see chap. 2, n. 35], and other works), who are often categorized as taking an orthodox or traditional approach (or, in some critics' terms, an anti-communist, Cold War approach; historians' debates for decades have been fraught with ideology); Bruce c.u.mings (especially Origins Origins I [see chap. 2, n. 25], and I [see chap. 2, n. 25], and Origins Origins II [see chap. 3, n. 43]) and several contributors to a volume edited by Frank Baldwin, II [see chap. 3, n. 43]) and several contributors to a volume edited by Frank Baldwin, Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945 Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945 (New York: Pantheon, 1973), scholars who have been labeled "left-revisionist" by some of their fellow historians; and Erik van Ree (New York: Pantheon, 1973), scholars who have been labeled "left-revisionist" by some of their fellow historians; and Erik van Ree (Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 [Oxford: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1989]), Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai [Oxford: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1989]), Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai (Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993]) and Kathryn Weathersby (various papers published by the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project), who have presented evidence made available from sources in the Soviet Union and China, and have taken stances that might be characterized variously as neo-orthodox or post-revisionist. The version presented in this chapter offers a brief, critical synthesis. For a fuller listing of contending historians and a useful effort to sort out their views, see James I. Matray's 1998 review essay "Korea's Part.i.tion: Soviet-American Pursuit of Reunification, 19451948," http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intre/korpart.htm. Matray applies the label "right revisionism" to the neo-orthodox works, even as he argues that Korean War scholars should "abandon the outdated a.n.a.lytical dichotomy of traditionalism versus revisionism and use new communist archival materials to provide a better understanding of the reasons for Korea's division and why two Koreas still exist today." [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993]) and Kathryn Weathersby (various papers published by the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project), who have presented evidence made available from sources in the Soviet Union and China, and have taken stances that might be characterized variously as neo-orthodox or post-revisionist. The version presented in this chapter offers a brief, critical synthesis. For a fuller listing of contending historians and a useful effort to sort out their views, see James I. Matray's 1998 review essay "Korea's Part.i.tion: Soviet-American Pursuit of Reunification, 19451948," http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intre/korpart.htm. Matray applies the label "right revisionism" to the neo-orthodox works, even as he argues that Korean War scholars should "abandon the outdated a.n.a.lytical dichotomy of traditionalism versus revisionism and use new communist archival materials to provide a better understanding of the reasons for Korea's division and why two Koreas still exist today."

2. This and other details of Kim's stay in the Soviet Union are taken from a remarkable nineteen-part series in the Seoul daily This and other details of Kim's stay in the Soviet Union are taken from a remarkable nineteen-part series in the Seoul daily Hanguk Ilbo Hanguk Ilbo beginning November 1, 1990. The series presents the reminiscences of Yu Song-chol, a former colleague of Kim Il-sung's who had been purged in 1959 and since then had lived in the Soviet Union, as told to Prof. Chay Pyung-gil of Yonsei University in Seoul. beginning November 1, 1990. The series presents the reminiscences of Yu Song-chol, a former colleague of Kim Il-sung's who had been purged in 1959 and since then had lived in the Soviet Union, as told to Prof. Chay Pyung-gil of Yonsei University in Seoul.

Installments of the series 'were 'were translated by Sydney A. Seiler. They form an appendix to his book, translated by Sydney A. Seiler. They form an appendix to his book, Kim Il-song 19411948 Kim Il-song 19411948 (see chap. 2, n. 18). Besides citing Yu's testimony, the valuable Seiler book marshals an (see chap. 2, n. 18). Besides citing Yu's testimony, the valuable Seiler book marshals an array array of additional primary sources to establish beyond question that Kim Il-sung did indeed live in the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1945 and served there as a Soviet Army officer- a point that had been questioned by some Western historians and obfuscated by Kim Il-sung and other North Korean sources. I am greatly indebted to Mr. Seiler for having provided, before publication, a copy of his Yonsei University thesis of the same t.i.tle, on which the book is based. of additional primary sources to establish beyond question that Kim Il-sung did indeed live in the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1945 and served there as a Soviet Army officer- a point that had been questioned by some Western historians and obfuscated by Kim Il-sung and other North Korean sources. I am greatly indebted to Mr. Seiler for having provided, before publication, a copy of his Yonsei University thesis of the same t.i.tle, on which the book is based.

In addition to Yu's recollections of the 19411948 period covered by the Seiler study, I make considerable use of the translated Yu testimony from the Seiler book's appendix for my treatment, in the following two chapters, of the Korean War and the purges that followed.

3. See McCormack, "Kim Country" (see chap. 3, n. See McCormack, "Kim Country" (see chap. 3, n. 44). 44). Kim Il-sung's unit history was eventually published as "Kanglian diyi lujun lueshi" (Brief History of the First Anti-j.a.panese United Army), in Zhongguo gongchandang lishi ziliaocungshu, ed., Kim Il-sung's unit history was eventually published as "Kanglian diyi lujun lueshi" (Brief History of the First Anti-j.a.panese United Army), in Zhongguo gongchandang lishi ziliaocungshu, ed., Dongbei kangri lianjun zilao Dongbei kangri lianjun zilao (Materials on the History of the North-Eastern Anti-j.a.panese Army), vol. 2 (Beijing, 1987), pp. 665679. McCormackreports that "the revelation of the authorship of these materials was made in various j.a.panese sources in 1991." (Materials on the History of the North-Eastern Anti-j.a.panese Army), vol. 2 (Beijing, 1987), pp. 665679. McCormackreports that "the revelation of the authorship of these materials was made in various j.a.panese sources in 1991."

Sydney A. Seiler (Kim Il-song 19411948, (Kim Il-song 19411948, p. 31) relates that Zhou had sought to keep the old Northeast Anti-j.a.panese United Army units intact under Chinese Communist Party command, even though operating from Soviet soil to launch actions against the j.a.panese across the border: "Yet the NEAJUA remnants p. 31) relates that Zhou had sought to keep the old Northeast Anti-j.a.panese United Army units intact under Chinese Communist Party command, even though operating from Soviet soil to launch actions against the j.a.panese across the border: "Yet the NEAJUA remnants 'were 'were essentially unable to survive, let alone operate, without Soviet a.s.sistance, and the Soviets essentially unable to survive, let alone operate, without Soviet a.s.sistance, and the Soviets 'were 'were reluctant to support such actions especially after entering a non-aggression treaty with j.a.pan in April 1941. An eventual compromise in which former units of the NEAJUA were allowed to operate under CCP directives but had to receive approval from the Soviets for all operations placed those units veritably under the 'domination and guidance of the Soviets.'" Seiler here cites Kim Chan-jong's interviews for the South Korean magazine reluctant to support such actions especially after entering a non-aggression treaty with j.a.pan in April 1941. An eventual compromise in which former units of the NEAJUA were allowed to operate under CCP directives but had to receive approval from the Soviets for all operations placed those units veritably under the 'domination and guidance of the Soviets.'" Seiler here cites Kim Chan-jong's interviews for the South Korean magazine Shindonga Shindonga (July 1992, p. 368) with Korean-Chinese who had been members of the Eighty-eighth Brigade. (July 1992, p. 368) with Korean-Chinese who had been members of the Eighty-eighth Brigade.

4. See Kim's memoirs, See Kim's memoirs, With the Century With the Century (see chap. 2, n. 2), vol. 2, pp. 4243, where Kim recalls criticizing, at a 1930 meeting, an anti-j.a.panese colleague's argument that "if the great powers help us, we will win our independence." Based on the historical record, Kim had a point. When j.a.pan had moved to dominate and take over Korea, no other great power-most disappointingly at the time, not even the United States-had stood in the (see chap. 2, n. 2), vol. 2, pp. 4243, where Kim recalls criticizing, at a 1930 meeting, an anti-j.a.panese colleague's argument that "if the great powers help us, we will win our independence." Based on the historical record, Kim had a point. When j.a.pan had moved to dominate and take over Korea, no other great power-most disappointingly at the time, not even the United States-had stood in the 'way, 'way, even though Korea's King Kojong sent a secret emissary to appeal to the nations a.s.sembled at the Second In ternational Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907. even though Korea's King Kojong sent a secret emissary to appeal to the nations a.s.sembled at the Second In ternational Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907.

In a later volume of memoirs, published posthumously, Kim did discuss having spent time at a "training base" in the Soviet Union, but in such a 'way 'way as to suggest he had been back and forth between there and a secret guerrilla base on .Mount Paektu in northern Korea. The Paektu "secret base" is where the official North Korean literature, since the 1980s, has claimed that Kim Jong-il was born. See Kim Il-sung, as to suggest he had been back and forth between there and a secret guerrilla base on .Mount Paektu in northern Korea. The Paektu "secret base" is where the official North Korean literature, since the 1980s, has claimed that Kim Jong-il was born. See Kim Il-sung, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 23, "Alliance with International Anti-Imperialism Camps, January 1941July 1942," sec. 9, "Nurturing the Root of the Revolution" (translated by Lee Wha Rang for vol. 23, "Alliance with International Anti-Imperialism Camps, January 1941July 1942," sec. 9, "Nurturing the Root of the Revolution" (translated by Lee Wha Rang for Korea Web Weekly, Korea Web Weekly, http://kimsoft.com/war/r-23-9.htm). http://kimsoft.com/war/r-23-9.htm).

5. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 1, 1990, translated in Seiler, November 1, 1990, translated in Seiler, Kim Il-song 1941-1948. Kim Il-song 1941-1948.

6. See Seiler, See Seiler, Kim Il-song 19411948, Kim Il-song 19411948, p. 40. p. 40.

7. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 13, 1990. Chay Pyung-gil, who compiled Yu's testimony, adds, "From the aspects of both character and physical strength, Kim Il-sung was a political soldier more than a professional career soldier. He had more of an interest in organizational matters than in guerrilla or conventional warfare training" ("Following the Conclusion of the Serialization 'Yu Song-ch'ol's Testimony, November 13, 1990. Chay Pyung-gil, who compiled Yu's testimony, adds, "From the aspects of both character and physical strength, Kim Il-sung was a political soldier more than a professional career soldier. He had more of an interest in organizational matters than in guerrilla or conventional warfare training" ("Following the Conclusion of the Serialization 'Yu Song-ch'ol's Testimony, " Hankuk Ilbo, " Hankuk Ilbo, December 1, 1990). December 1, 1990).

8. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 3, 1990. November 3, 1990.

9. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 4, 1990. November 4, 1990.

10. The quotation is from a War Department cable paraphrasing the views of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific theater, cited in Joseph C Goulden, The quotation is from a War Department cable paraphrasing the views of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific theater, cited in Joseph C Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: .McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 18. (New York: .McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 18.

11. Van Ree, Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, p. 65. The author a.s.serts that a Korean report of heavy fighting at the port of Unggi is not borne out in the Soviet literature. He adds, "I did not come across information on how many of those [4,717] casualties were wounded or died in Korea (as opposed to Manchuria). Perhaps the Red Army lost only very few men in Korea, so few that the 'heroics' of its Korean war are lost if the numbers become known. ... It was truly a micro-war, barely scratching Korea." p. 65. The author a.s.serts that a Korean report of heavy fighting at the port of Unggi is not borne out in the Soviet literature. He adds, "I did not come across information on how many of those [4,717] casualties were wounded or died in Korea (as opposed to Manchuria). Perhaps the Red Army lost only very few men in Korea, so few that the 'heroics' of its Korean war are lost if the numbers become known. ... It was truly a micro-war, barely scratching Korea."

12. Historian Kathryn Weathersby based on a.n.a.lysis of recently decla.s.sified Russian doc.u.ments, says Stalin mainly wished to ensure that the Korean peninsula would not be used as a staging ground for future aggression against the USSR and that a "friendly" government would be established there. See Weathersby "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 19451950: New Evidence from Russian Archives," Working Paper No. 8, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C, November 1993. Historian Kathryn Weathersby based on a.n.a.lysis of recently decla.s.sified Russian doc.u.ments, says Stalin mainly wished to ensure that the Korean peninsula would not be used as a staging ground for future aggression against the USSR and that a "friendly" government would be established there. See Weathersby "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 19451950: New Evidence from Russian Archives," Working Paper No. 8, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C, November 1993.

13. Van Ree acknowledges Van Ree acknowledges (Socialism in One Zone, (Socialism in One Zone, pp. 125128) that there were various reasons why it might have been difficult for the Soviet authorities to arrange deliveries, but a.s.serts that it was their refusal even to discuss the matter that showed, as early as October of 1945, a conscious Soviet policy of "closing off the northern zone." The Russians, he says, "wanted to put their zone into order and they did not want American lookers-on, or American interference in the economic process within their zone. In order to achieve that, they pp. 125128) that there were various reasons why it might have been difficult for the Soviet authorities to arrange deliveries, but a.s.serts that it was their refusal even to discuss the matter that showed, as early as October of 1945, a conscious Soviet policy of "closing off the northern zone." The Russians, he says, "wanted to put their zone into order and they did not want American lookers-on, or American interference in the economic process within their zone. In order to achieve that, they 'were 'were willing to give up ... the delivery of rice from the South." willing to give up ... the delivery of rice from the South."

14. O Yong-jin, a defector cited by Suh O Yong-jin, a defector cited by Suh (Kim Il Sung, (Kim Il Sung, p. 50), quoted Kim as having told him ruefully that the speedy j.a.panese surrender had spoiled a plan for his band of former guerrillas to parachute dramatically into Pyongyang. On the other hand, Seiler p. 50), quoted Kim as having told him ruefully that the speedy j.a.panese surrender had spoiled a plan for his band of former guerrillas to parachute dramatically into Pyongyang. On the other hand, Seiler (Kim Il-song 1941-1948, (Kim Il-song 1941-1948, p. p. 46) 46) says Stalin himself apparently refused to permit the Eighty-eighth to join in the fighting-perhaps thinking that having fought would ent.i.tle the Koreans to more say in the occupation government north of the 38th parallel than Soviet policy envisioned granting them. Seiler here cites Kim Chan-jong, "Bbalch'isan manga, kim il-song kwa 88 tong-nip yodan" [Funeral march of the partisans, Kim Il-song and the 88th Independent Brigade], says Stalin himself apparently refused to permit the Eighty-eighth to join in the fighting-perhaps thinking that having fought would ent.i.tle the Koreans to more say in the occupation government north of the 38th parallel than Soviet policy envisioned granting them. Seiler here cites Kim Chan-jong, "Bbalch'isan manga, kim il-song kwa 88 tong-nip yodan" [Funeral march of the partisans, Kim Il-song and the 88th Independent Brigade], Shindonga Shindonga (Seoul, July 1992): p. 381. Van Ree (Seoul, July 1992): p. 381. Van Ree (Socialism in One Zone, (Socialism in One Zone, p. p. 66) 66) conjectures that .Moscow wanted to use Kim's group to help administer the occupation zone, and on that account did not wish to risk their lives in battle. See footnote 83 on that page for van Ree's summary of sources that a.s.sert, vaguely, that Kim's men did partic.i.p.ate in the fighting. conjectures that .Moscow wanted to use Kim's group to help administer the occupation zone, and on that account did not wish to risk their lives in battle. See footnote 83 on that page for van Ree's summary of sources that a.s.sert, vaguely, that Kim's men did partic.i.p.ate in the fighting.

15. "Other, better-known or older Korean guerrillas such as Kim Chaek and Choe Yong-Gun trusted him and chose him as their leader. Chinese, Soviet and Korean anti-j.a.panese forces at the Khabarovsk camp in the Soviet Union reached a common view in appointing Kim leader of the 'Korean Task-force' "Other, better-known or older Korean guerrillas such as Kim Chaek and Choe Yong-Gun trusted him and chose him as their leader. Chinese, Soviet and Korean anti-j.a.panese forces at the Khabarovsk camp in the Soviet Union reached a common view in appointing Kim leader of the 'Korean Task-force' (Chaoxian gongzuotuan) (Chaoxian gongzuotuan) detachment sent in September 1945 to spearhead the process of takeover from j.a.pan" (McCormack, "Kim Country," citing Wada, pp. 330 ff). detachment sent in September 1945 to spearhead the process of takeover from j.a.pan" (McCormack, "Kim Country," citing Wada, pp. 330 ff).

Seiler reports (Kim Il-song 19411948, (Kim Il-song 19411948, pp. pp. 4647), 4647), based on testimony in based on testimony in JoongAng Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, August 19, 1991, "The Soviet Far East Command did dispatch one officer to the 88th Brigade to interview a handful of potential leaders from among the Koreans there. Toward the end of August 1945, Lt. Col. Grigori Konovich Mekrail, then a political officer with the Soviet Far East Command who would later serve with the 25th Army that occupied North Korea, was suddenly ordered by his headquarters to go to Pyongyang. On the way, he stopped in Khabarovsk to visit the members of the 88th Brigade. There, Mekrail claims to have met Kim Il-song and three or four other leaders among the Korean partisans. He had received orders from his headquarters to evaluate the partisans and attempt to select one among them to be a leader. Mekrail, playing down the significance of the meeting, emphasized, 'Prior to the meeting in Khabarovsk, I had not received any special mention of Kim Il-song by name.' " August 19, 1991, "The Soviet Far East Command did dispatch one officer to the 88th Brigade to interview a handful of potential leaders from among the Koreans there. Toward the end of August 1945, Lt. Col. Grigori Konovich Mekrail, then a political officer with the Soviet Far East Command who would later serve with the 25th Army that occupied North Korea, was suddenly ordered by his headquarters to go to Pyongyang. On the way, he stopped in Khabarovsk to visit the members of the 88th Brigade. There, Mekrail claims to have met Kim Il-song and three or four other leaders among the Korean partisans. He had received orders from his headquarters to evaluate the partisans and attempt to select one among them to be a leader. Mekrail, playing down the significance of the meeting, emphasized, 'Prior to the meeting in Khabarovsk, I had not received any special mention of Kim Il-song by name.' "

16. Hanguk Ilbo, Hanguk Ilbo, November 6, 1990. Seiler notes November 6, 1990. Seiler notes (Kim Il-song 19411948, (Kim Il-song 19411948, p. 58, n. 21) testimony by the Soviet-Korean interpreter for the Soviet officials who greeted the ship, Chong Sang-jin p. 58, n. 21) testimony by the Soviet-Korean interpreter for the Soviet officials who greeted the ship, Chong Sang-jin (JoongAng Ilbo, (JoongAng Ilbo, August 26, 1991), that Kim introduced himself by his birth name, Kim Song-ju, when he disembarked. August 26, 1991), that Kim introduced himself by his birth name, Kim Song-ju, when he disembarked.

17. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 7, 1990. November 7, 1990.

Lim Un says Kim's preliminary appointment was not police or garrison chief, but a position equally high or one step higher: deputy commander of the Pyongyang komendatura, komendatura, the chief political operative for the city (Lim Un, the chief political operative for the city (Lim Un, Founding of a Dynasty Founding of a Dynasty [see chap. 2, n. 59], pp. 124128). [see chap. 2, n. 59], pp. 124128). Komendatura, Komendatura, or bureaus of local commanders, as van Ree explains or bureaus of local commanders, as van Ree explains (Socialism in One Zone, (Socialism in One Zone, p. 85), p. 85), 'were 'were organized throughout northern Korea right after the Soviet troops arrived: "They safeguarded local order and took possession of j.a.panese military property and armaments. ... They organized throughout northern Korea right after the Soviet troops arrived: "They safeguarded local order and took possession of j.a.panese military property and armaments. ... They 'were 'were headed by a commander. His deputy was the chief of the Political Department. Another important official was the garrison chief" headed by a commander. His deputy was the chief of the Political Department. Another important official was the garrison chief"

18. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, p. 22. vol. 3, p. 22.

19. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 293302. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 293302.

20. Yu Song-chol's testimony, Yu Song-chol's testimony, Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 7, 1990. (See Seiler, November 7, 1990. (See Seiler, Kim Il-song 19411948, Kim Il-song 19411948, p. 55, for an account of the meeting based on additional testimony.) p. 55, for an account of the meeting based on additional testimony.) 21. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 7, 1990. November 7, 1990.

22. O Yong-jin, "An Eyewitness Report," Pusan, 1952, p. 143, cited in Scalapino and Lee, O Yong-jin, "An Eyewitness Report," Pusan, 1952, p. 143, cited in Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea Communism in Korea (see chap. 2, n. 28), p. 324. O is identified as personal secretary to Cho Man-shik. (see chap. 2, n. 28), p. 324. O is identified as personal secretary to Cho Man-shik.

23. Scalapino and Lee, Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 338. p. 338.

24. Baik Bong, Baik Bong, Kim Il Sung Biography (II): From Building Democratic Korea to Chullima Flight Kim Il Sung Biography (II): From Building Democratic Korea to Chullima Flight (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1970; hereinafter cited as Baik II), p. 53. (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1970; hereinafter cited as Baik II), p. 53.

Once he had taken office as premier, the regime arranged photo opportunities, including one in which the youthful leader, in shirtsleeves, wielded a shovel alongside a work team. "Let us work hard and complete the work as early as possible, so that someday we may have a good time together," he said to the workers. In another photo op, Kim, wearing traditional Korean garb, bent to join peasants transplanting rice plants. See Baik II, pp. 162, 203.

It was made known that Kim lived fairly simply and rejected elaborate special treatment: "Ryu Woon-hyung, invited to Kim Il Sung's private residence, looked at the furnishings and furniture with a look of disbelief. It was far removed from what he had imagined. It was clean but the furniture was too simple for the leader of a country. Presently, dinner was served. There 'were 'were no special dishes on table, an ordinary table without mother-of-pearl inlay" (Baik II, pp. 150151). no special dishes on table, an ordinary table without mother-of-pearl inlay" (Baik II, pp. 150151).

"[A]s he was about to enter [a coal-mining] village he suddenly stopped and his eyes followed the road ahead where there lay a long piece of white cloth, about 300 meters long. ... He was supposed to walk on the cloth, of course, but having declined all honours offered while going through hardships, he could not do it. He said to the Chairman of the Kangdong County Committee of the North Korean Workers' Party, who was on hand to greet him: 'Why do you do such a thing? This is no good. The cloth is to be worn by the people. It is not a thing on which I should walk. Please remove it quickly' .Moved deeply by his words, the villagers hung their heads. As the cotton cloth was removed, he started walking. The people, still feeling somewhat abashed, praised his lofty moral virtue and then gave him even more enthusiastic cheers" (Baik II, pp. 178179).

25. Seoul Shinmun, Seoul Shinmun, January 10, 1946, p. 2, as cited and translated in Baik Bong, January 10, 1946, p. 2, as cited and translated in Baik Bong, Kim Il Sung Biography (I): From Birth to Triumphant Return to Homeland Kim Il Sung Biography (I): From Birth to Triumphant Return to Homeland (Tokyo: Mi-raisha, 1969; hereinafter cited as Baik I), pp. 543544. Besides that on-the-scene reporter's guess of five-feet-six, the only other estimate of Kim Il-sung's height that I recall having seen is a description of him (Bruce c.u.mings, (Tokyo: Mi-raisha, 1969; hereinafter cited as Baik I), pp. 543544. Besides that on-the-scene reporter's guess of five-feet-six, the only other estimate of Kim Il-sung's height that I recall having seen is a description of him (Bruce c.u.mings, North Korea: Another Country North Korea: Another Country [New York: New Press, 2003], p. 155) as "standing over six feet." I would have to call that quite a stretch unless perhaps the Caucasians with whom Kim often stood to pose for photographs after liberation were not Russian officials, after all, but NBA basketball players. [New York: New Press, 2003], p. 155) as "standing over six feet." I would have to call that quite a stretch unless perhaps the Caucasians with whom Kim often stood to pose for photographs after liberation were not Russian officials, after all, but NBA basketball players.

26. Van Ree, Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, p. 117. p. 117.

27. Ibid., pp. 117121. Ibid., pp. 117121.

28. Ibid., pp. 129130. Ibid., pp. 129130.

29. See Suh, See Suh, Korean Communist Movement Korean Communist Movement (see chap. 2, n. 56), p. 306. (see chap. 2, n. 56), p. 306.

30. Van Ree, Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, pp. 130140. In the conclusion to his book the author adds (p. 276), "In terms of responsibility for the continuation of Korea's division in the two years after the Second World War, the Russians carry undoubtedly most of the blame, though the logical counterpart of this is that they were much less a threat to the other's zone than the Americans." pp. 130140. In the conclusion to his book the author adds (p. 276), "In terms of responsibility for the continuation of Korea's division in the two years after the Second World War, the Russians carry undoubtedly most of the blame, though the logical counterpart of this is that they were much less a threat to the other's zone than the Americans."

Kathryn Weathersby argues that, in the short run, publicly supporting trusteeship "was a perfect solution to .Moscow's dilemma regarding Korea. It allowed the Soviet Union to meet its security needs by maintaining control over the northern half of the peninsula and at the same time protect its position politically by posing as the true defender of the agreement on Korean unification. In the long run, however, this crude solution to the Korean question, which completely disregarded the strong desire of the Korean people for unity and independence, created such a volatile situation on the peninsula that .Moscow was eventually persuaded to risk supporting an attempt at reunification by military means-an outcome that had profoundly negative consequences for Soviet security interests" (Kathryn Weathersby, "Limits to Revisionist Interpretations: New Russian Archival Materials and Old American Debates"; for permission to cite her paper I am grateful to Dr. Weathersby, who, at the time she presented the paper, was with the Kennan Inst.i.tute for Advanced Russian Studies of Washington's Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where she was involved in the Cold War History Project).

31. Weathersby, ibid., argues that Korean division was "the product of American and Soviet strategies toward Korea that were unworkable and that ignored the fundamental aspirations of the Korean people. President Roosevelt's proposal for a joint trusteeship ignored Korean national sovereignty, the American occupation command's focus on thwarting leftists in Korea ignored the political desires of Koreans, and the Soviet Union's decision to protect its borders by maintaining the division of Korea ignored the most basic desire of the Korean people for national unity." Weathersby, ibid., argues that Korean division was "the product of American and Soviet strategies toward Korea that were unworkable and that ignored the fundamental aspirations of the Korean people. President Roosevelt's proposal for a joint trusteeship ignored Korean national sovereignty, the American occupation command's focus on thwarting leftists in Korea ignored the political desires of Koreans, and the Soviet Union's decision to protect its borders by maintaining the division of Korea ignored the most basic desire of the Korean people for national unity."

32. Scalapino and Lee, Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 340; c.u.mings, p. 340; c.u.mings, Origins Origins II (see chap. 3, n. 16), p. 488. A North Korean account says vaguely but chillingly that Cho and other "alien and accidental elements in the people's committees ... were completely eliminated" (Baik II, p. 102). II (see chap. 3, n. 16), p. 488. A North Korean account says vaguely but chillingly that Cho and other "alien and accidental elements in the people's committees ... were completely eliminated" (Baik II, p. 102).

33. The Soviet authorities had helped Kim by disarming this pro-China group upon its return to Korea, observes Suh The Soviet authorities had helped Kim by disarming this pro-China group upon its return to Korea, observes Suh (Kim Il Sung, (Kim Il Sung, p. 101). "Furthermore, any reference to their military hero Mu Chong as a leader in the North was immediately denounced as promotion of individual heroism by the Soviet-Koreans and the occupation forces." p. 101). "Furthermore, any reference to their military hero Mu Chong as a leader in the North was immediately denounced as promotion of individual heroism by the Soviet-Koreans and the occupation forces."

34. See van Ree, See van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, pp. 7681. "A Seoul-based People's Republic promised to make Syngman Rhee president over 'Russian' North Korea, from a comfortable position in 'American' South Korea," van Ree says on p. 81. "This plan from Pak Hon-yong was something which Stalin could never accept. Moscow was not, in any circ.u.mstances, prepared to sacrifice its northern zone, not even in favour of a united front initiative which might provide the southern communists with a more secure position in the political life of the capital." Van Ree adds (p. 131) that .Moscow "gave priority to northern consolidation over penetration of the South." pp. 7681. "A Seoul-based People's Republic promised to make Syngman Rhee president over 'Russian' North Korea, from a comfortable position in 'American' South Korea," van Ree says on p. 81. "This plan from Pak Hon-yong was something which Stalin could never accept. Moscow was not, in any circ.u.mstances, prepared to sacrifice its northern zone, not even in favour of a united front initiative which might provide the southern communists with a more secure position in the political life of the capital." Van Ree adds (p. 131) that .Moscow "gave priority to northern consolidation over penetration of the South."

35. Speech at the November 15, 1945, second meeting of the North Korean Bureau of the Korean Communist Party, quoted in van Ree, Speech at the November 15, 1945, second meeting of the North Korean Bureau of the Korean Communist Party, quoted in van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, p. 132. p. 132.

36. From a speech published in the 1963 edition of Kim's selected works and cited in Scalapino and Lee, From a speech published in the 1963 edition of Kim's selected works and cited in Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 339. p. 339.

37. Wayne Patterson and Hilary Conroy observe that "Wilsonian idealism, missionary support and American public opinion [favoring Korea against j.a.panese imperialism] stood in sharp contrast to government policy, which did not 'come around' until Pearl Harbor. The fact that it was not until World War II that the United States supported Korea lends credence to the view that this support came only because it coincided with the interests of the United States. While the United States was a Johnny-come-lately to the cause of Korean nationalism, the Soviets and the Chinese supported the Koreans and Korean nationalists to a greater extent than the United States had. This led, at least in part, to divided loyalties among Koreans when liberation came, after thirty-five years of colonial rule. The United States, which had not opposed j.a.pan in Korea, began by relying on the j.a.panese in Korea during the early months of the occupation. By contrast, the Soviet Union (in the north) did not. It is hardly surprising, then, that many Koreans, perhaps still hoping to depend on a stronger foreign power, began to look to the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc for support after the war" ("Duality and Dominance: A Century of Korean-American Relations," in Lee and Patterson, Wayne Patterson and Hilary Conroy observe that "Wilsonian idealism, missionary support and American public opinion [favoring Korea against j.a.panese imperialism] stood in sharp contrast to government policy, which did not 'come around' until Pearl Harbor. The fact that it was not until World War II that the United States supported Korea lends credence to the view that this support came only because it coincided with the interests of the United States. While the United States was a Johnny-come-lately to the cause of Korean nationalism, the Soviets and the Chinese supported the Koreans and Korean nationalists to a greater extent than the United States had. This led, at least in part, to divided loyalties among Koreans when liberation came, after thirty-five years of colonial rule. The United States, which had not opposed j.a.pan in Korea, began by relying on the j.a.panese in Korea during the early months of the occupation. By contrast, the Soviet Union (in the north) did not. It is hardly surprising, then, that many Koreans, perhaps still hoping to depend on a stronger foreign power, began to look to the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc for support after the war" ("Duality and Dominance: A Century of Korean-American Relations," in Lee and Patterson, One Hundred Years of Korean-American Relations, 18821982 One Hundred Years of Korean-American Relations, 18821982 [see chap. 2, n. 6], pp. 78). [see chap. 2, n. 6], pp. 78).

38. Yu Song-chol's testimony, Yu Song-chol's testimony, Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 7, 1990. November 7, 1990.

While scholars generally agree that Soviet help played a major role in Kim's rise, they disagree on just how great that role was. Suh says Col. Alexandre Ma-teevich Ignatiev "was the key person who maneuvered Kim Il Sung into power, sustained him there and supported him in the North" (Kim Il Sung, (Kim Il Sung, p. 62). p. 62).

A similar view more forcefully stated is that of Scalapino and Lee (Communism in Korea, (Communism in Korea, p. 381), who argue, "This obscure young man [Kim Il-sung] could not possibly have come to power without consistent Soviet support and backing. From this point of view, Kim was a puppet of a foreign power to an extent unmatched by any other individual's relationship to a foreign power during this period." p. 381), who argue, "This obscure young man [Kim Il-sung] could not possibly have come to power without consistent Soviet support and backing. From this point of view, Kim was a puppet of a foreign power to an extent unmatched by any other individual's relationship to a foreign power during this period."

c.u.mings (Origins (Origins I [see chap. 2, n. 25], p. 426) credits the Soviets with "creating" the regime. But he observes (p. 401) that "Kim's public emergence in the north ... may have been his own doing as much as that of the Soviets. He was in a position to confront and face down Korean opponents on the following bases: (1) his anti-j.a.panese record was known to all the parties concerned with Korean liberation ... ; (2) he had never been captured by the j.a.panese police and subjected to their methods of interrogation, and therefore, unlike most other Korean communists, there was no possibility of his apostasy or of his having turned in or named his comrades; (3) he had an armed force under his own control; and (4) more than most Korean leaders, he was vigorous and even charismatic and melded communism and nationalism in an appealing combination." I [see chap. 2, n. 25], p. 426) credits the Soviets with "creating" the regime. But he observes (p. 401) that "Kim's public emergence in the north ... may have been his own doing as much as that of the Soviets. He was in a position to confront and face down Korean opponents on the following bases: (1) his anti-j.a.panese record was known to all the parties concerned with Korean liberation ... ; (2) he had never been captured by the j.a.panese police and subjected to their methods of interrogation, and therefore, unlike most other Korean communists, there was no possibility of his apostasy or of his having turned in or named his comrades; (3) he had an armed force under his own control; and (4) more than most Korean leaders, he was vigorous and even charismatic and melded communism and nationalism in an appealing combination."

Sydney A. Seiler splits the difference, arguing that it was Kim Il-sung's "political adeptness and his usefulness to the Soviet Union, not his popularity as an anti-j.a.panese hero, his ability as a military strategist, or his charisma, that allowed him to consolidate and maintain power" (Seiler, Kim Il-song 1941-1948, Kim Il-song 1941-1948, p. 3). p. 3).

Van Ree (Socialism in One Zone, (Socialism in One Zone, p. 270) observes that "precisely those North Korean communists who were closest to the Russian authorities obtained predominant power in the party. This points at the essentially satellite status of North Korea from 1945 to 1948. The comparison of North Korea with Yugoslavia that some authors [Jon Halliday and Bruce c.u.mings] have made seems inappropriate because the partisan group around t.i.to had liberated Yugoslavia on its own, while Kim Il Sung had changed his partisan status for a Red Army uniform and it was the Red Army which liberated North Korea as it had liberated other Eastern European countries. Soviet policy in the early postwar period (19451947) was, incidentally, more dictatorial in North Korea than it generally was in Eastern Europe." (c.u.mings's verdict on van Ree's work based on a reading of the 1988 dissertation version: "a well-researched study that I believe overestimates Soviet influence in North Korea" p. 270) observes that "precisely those North Korean communists who were closest to the Russian authorities obtained predominant power in the party. This points at the essentially satellite status of North Korea from 1945 to 1948. The comparison of North Korea with Yugoslavia that some authors [Jon Halliday and Bruce c.u.mings] have made seems inappropriate because the partisan group around t.i.to had liberated Yugoslavia on its own, while Kim Il Sung had changed his partisan status for a Red Army uniform and it was the Red Army which liberated North Korea as it had liberated other Eastern European countries. Soviet policy in the early postwar period (19451947) was, incidentally, more dictatorial in North Korea than it generally was in Eastern Europe." (c.u.mings's verdict on van Ree's work based on a reading of the 1988 dissertation version: "a well-researched study that I believe overestimates Soviet influence in North Korea" [Origins [Origins II, p. 832, n. 1]). II, p. 832, n. 1]).

Goncharov, Lewis and Xue (Uncertain Partners, (Uncertain Partners, p. 131) say simply, "Throughout the early postwar years, Kim was wholly dependent on .Moscow, and North Korea can be justly called a Soviet satellite." p. 131) say simply, "Throughout the early postwar years, Kim was wholly dependent on .Moscow, and North Korea can be justly called a Soviet satellite."

In one example of the Russian evidence that has come to the surface, former Soviet occupation leaders interviewed by the South Korean newspaper Joong-Ang Ilbo Joong-Ang Ilbo in 1992 reported that Kim Il-sung and Pak Hon-yong made a secret visit to .Moscow in August 1946, during which Stalin reviewed the Soviet generals' elevation of Kim instead of Pak and gave Kim his personal stamp of approval. McCormack, "Kim Country," cites the j.a.panese translation of the interview text, "Stalin ga Kim Il Sung o mensetsu tesuto" (Stalin's interview test for Kim Il Sung), in 1992 reported that Kim Il-sung and Pak Hon-yong made a secret visit to .Moscow in August 1946, during which Stalin reviewed the Soviet generals' elevation of Kim instead of Pak and gave Kim his personal stamp of approval. McCormack, "Kim Country," cites the j.a.panese translation of the interview text, "Stalin ga Kim Il Sung o mensetsu tesuto" (Stalin's interview test for Kim Il Sung), This Is Yomiuri This Is Yomiuri (February 1992): pp. 8487. (February 1992): pp. 8487.

39. Suh, Suh, Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung, p. xii. p. xii.

40. Charles K Armstrong on p. Charles K Armstrong on p. 77 77 of of The North Korean Revolution The North Korean Revolution (see chap. 1, n. 8) says that "a careful reading of (see chap. 1, n. 8) says that "a careful reading of both both North Korean and Soviet sources reveals a dynamic interaction among the Soviet government, the Soviet occupation authorities, the North Korean leadership, and gra.s.s-roots demands for reform." North Korean and Soviet sources reveals a dynamic interaction among the Soviet government, the Soviet occupation authorities, the North Korean leadership, and gra.s.s-roots demands for reform."

41. Baik II, p. 123. Baik II, p. 123.

42. See Van Ree, See Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, pp. 152154; and Lee Wha Rang, "The March 1, 1946 Plot to a.s.sa.s.sinate Kim Il Sung," pp. 152154; and Lee Wha Rang, "The March 1, 1946 Plot to a.s.sa.s.sinate Kim Il Sung," Korea Web Weekly, Korea Web Weekly, http://kim-soft.com/2002/kis-4631.htm. The latter account (based on articles in the Seoul daily http://kim-soft.com/2002/kis-4631.htm. The latter account (based on articles in the Seoul daily JoongAng Ilbo) JoongAng Ilbo) says that a key figure in plotting both attacks, Kim Yong-ji, had fought in China for Korean independence and considered Kim Il-sung a Soviet puppet who stood in the way of independence. says that a key figure in plotting both attacks, Kim Yong-ji, had fought in China for Korean independence and considered Kim Il-sung a Soviet puppet who stood in the way of independence.

Baik II, p. 121, says Kim around that time sent propagandists to "crush the false rumors and counter-propaganda spread by landlords and other reactionaries. ... He also took steps to remove vicious landlords from their villages in order to put an end to resistance on the part of landlords, and prevent their reactionary influence from spreading to the still unawakened peasants."

43. Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, Two Koreas in Development Two Koreas in Development (see chap. 1, n. 2), p. 168. Scalapino and Lee say a conservative estimate would be eight hundred thousand. They observe that South Korea's population "increased by a phenomenal 22 percent between 1945 and 1947, and certainly a major factor in that increase was migration from North to South" (see chap. 1, n. 2), p. 168. Scalapino and Lee say a conservative estimate would be eight hundred thousand. They observe that South Korea's population "increased by a phenomenal 22 percent between 1945 and 1947, and certainly a major factor in that increase was migration from North to South" (Communism in Korea, (Communism in Korea, pt. I, p. 349 n.). pt. I, p. 349 n.).

c.u.mings (Origins (Origins I, pp. 425, 437) cites U.S. government figures indicating that dissatisfied peasants originally from the southern part of Korea who had been farming in .Manchuria or working in factories in North Korea formed the largest part of the migration, returning home in the winter of 19451946. A little later came the dispossessed landlords. Both groups together he likens to a "Trojan horse." He suggests they were loosed by the North "to polarize and radicalize southern politics." I, pp. 425, 437) cites U.S. government figures indicating that dissatisfied peasants originally from the southern part of Korea who had been farming in .Manchuria or working in factories in North Korea formed the largest part of the migration, returning home in the winter of 19451946. A little later came the dispossessed landlords. Both groups together he likens to a "Trojan horse." He suggests they were loosed by the North "to polarize and radicalize southern politics."

44. "Qualitative information on individual poor peasants demonstrates the extraordinary change in personal fortunes that came with Kim's open-door [to party membership] policy, a kind of instant upward mobility that made most of them grateful for his 'benevolence.' ... These cases delineate the microcosmic evidence of a thorough social revolution, a cla.s.s structure stood on its head. At anytime before 1945 it was virtually inconceivable for uneducated poor peasants to become county-level officials or officers in the army. ... Even something as fundamental as Korean marriage patterns began to change quickly It became important to marry a woman with the proper cla.s.s background, meaning poor peasant or worker, because this was a ticket to better life chances" (c.u.mings, "Qualitative information on individual poor peasants demonstrates the extraordinary change in personal fortunes that came with Kim's open-door [to party membership] policy, a kind of instant upward mobility that made most of them grateful for his 'benevolence.' ... These cases delineate the microcosmic evidence of a thorough social revolution, a cla.s.s structure stood on its head. At anytime before 1945 it was virtually inconceivable for uneducated poor peasants to become county-level officials or officers in the army. ... Even something as fundamental as Korean marriage patterns began to change quickly It became important to marry a woman with the proper cla.s.s background, meaning poor peasant or worker, because this was a ticket to better life chances" (c.u.mings, Origins Origins II, pp. 302303). II, pp. 302303).

Because "the majority of Korean experts and intellectuals" were among those who fled south, c.u.mings adds (p. 336), "[t]he regime was one of worker-peasants, most of them illiterate before 1945. The absence of expertise required an open-door policy toward intellectuals, who have never been denigrated in the DPRK the way they were in Mao's China."

c.u.mings a.s.serts that from this point cla.s.s struggle was the dominant element in North-South struggle: "After these reforms, unification of the peninsula could only occur in two ways: through a similar revolution in the south, or through a war that would be fought both for unification and the domination of cla.s.ses-that is, unification would occur through revolution or counterrevolution" (Origins (Origins I, p. 414). I, p. 414).

45. North Korea was dependent on the Soviet Union for technical and administrative expertise. j.a.panese colonial policy had limited the number of Koreans who were allowed to gain a higher education or management experience, and the politics of the occupation from 194548 prompted most northerners who possessed such skills to flee to the South. Consequently, the DPRK in its early years desperately needed persons who could run factories, railroads, telegraph stations, hospitals, schools, etc. Because of autarkic Soviet policies, Pyongyang could only turn to the USSR for such personnel" (Weathersby, "Limits to Revisionist Interpretations"). North Korea was dependent on the Soviet Union for technical and administrative expertise. j.a.panese colonial policy had limited the number of Koreans who were allowed to gain a higher education or management experience, and the politics of the occupation from 194548 prompted most northerners who possessed such skills to flee to the South. Consequently, the DPRK in its early years desperately needed persons who could run factories, railroads, telegraph stations, hospitals, schools, etc. Because of autarkic Soviet policies, Pyongyang could only turn to the USSR for such personnel" (Weathersby, "Limits to Revisionist Interpretations").

Seiler (Kim Il-song 19411948, (Kim Il-song 19411948, p. 63) observes that for the Soviet occupiers "[a] blatantly obtrusive posture in the occupation of North Korea was not necessary. Soviet-Koreans, many of whom retained their Soviet citizenship and [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] membership, p. 63) observes that for the Soviet occupiers "[a] blatantly obtrusive posture in the occupation of North Korea was not necessary. Soviet-Koreans, many of whom retained their Soviet citizenship and [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] membership, 'were 'were able to execute Soviet policy objectives with the legitimacy and respect indigenous officials would have been afforded." The term "Soviet-Koreans" here refers to ethnically Korean Soviet citizens who went (in most cases were sent) to North Korea. For an excellent account of their experience and contributions see Andrei Lankov, able to execute Soviet policy objectives with the legitimacy and respect indigenous officials would have been afforded." The term "Soviet-Koreans" here refers to ethnically Korean Soviet citizens who went (in most cases were sent) to North Korea. For an excellent account of their experience and contributions see Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 19451960 From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 19451960 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002), pp. 110135. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002), pp. 110135.

Balazs Szalontai of Central European University reports that Hungarian diplomats in Pyongyang found the North Korean judicial system quite similar to the one that had been established in Hungary after it became a Soviet satellite. But he argues: "Paradoxically, this dependence on Soviet expertise partly resulted from the nationalist stance of the Kim Il-sung regime. Although Pyongyang initially retained certain j.a.panese laws and many j.a.panese-trained judges, the purge of 'pro-j.a.panese elements' proved thorough enough. ... Thus it was quite understandable that the regime turned to the Soviets for legal expertise, though Korean traditions also influenced North Korea's const.i.tution, criminal code, and legal system." Balazs outlines a number of other compromises between the Soviet model and conflicting local needs in his paper, "The Dynamic of Repression: The Global Impact of the Stalinist .Model, 19441953," originally published in Russian History/Histoire Russe, Russian History/Histoire Russe, Nos. 24 (Summer-Fall-Winter 2002), pp. 415442. A copy is posted Nos. 24 (Summer-Fall-Winter 2002), pp. 415442. A copy is posted on Korea Web Weekly on Korea Web Weekly at http://www. kimsoft.com/2003/balaz.htm. at http://www. kimsoft.com/2003/balaz.htm.

46. Baik II, pp. 167168. Baik II, pp. 167168.

47. Baik II, pp. 204205; 198199. Baik II, pp. 204205; 198199.

48. In 1945, "the North had heavy industrial complexes and energy sources that were quite formidable. Furthermore this complex was barely touched by American bombing in World War II; in the last stages of the war the North Korean economy was stronger than j.a.pan's, with [so] much more energy output (double that in j.a.pan), that j.a.pan's atomic bomb project was moved to Korea to make use of these facilities" (c.u.mings, In 1945, "the North had heavy industrial complexes and energy sources that were quite formidable. Furthermore this complex was barely touched by American bombing in World War II; in the last stages of the war the North Korean economy was stronger than j.a.pan's, with [so] much more energy output (double that in j.a.pan), that j.a.pan's atomic bomb project was moved to Korea to make use of these facilities" (c.u.mings, Origins Origins II, p. 335). II, p. 335).

49. See Philip Deane, See Philip Deane, I Was a Captive in Korea I Was a Captive in Korea (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1953), p. 71. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1953), p. 71.

50. Van Ree, Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, Socialism in One Zone, p. 153. p. 153.

51. Scalapino and Lee, Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 384. p. 384.

52. According to Baik II, p. 127, the regime eschewed nationalization of the land in 1946 because Kim "clearly saw that the enthusiasm of the peasantry would reach a peak if their desire for land was met, so the thorough land reform was carried through on the principle that the land be distributed to the peasants." c.u.mings According to Baik II, p. 127, the regime eschewed nationalization of the land in 1946 because Kim "clearly saw that the enthusiasm of the peasantry would reach a peak if their desire for land was met, so the thorough land reform was carried through on the principle that the land be distributed to the peasants." c.u.mings (Origins (Origins II, p. 299) emphasizes that, while the regime followed the Soviet advisors' views on the surface and "never spoke publicly of socialism as a goal in the 1940s ... nonetheless the land could not be bought and sold, and village-level mutual aid and cooperation began quickly" II, p. 299) emphasizes that, while the regime followed the Soviet advisors' views on the surface and "never spoke publicly of socialism as a goal in the 1940s ... nonetheless the land could not be bought and sold, and village-level mutual aid and cooperation began quickly"

53. Against Against hangul's very hangul's very real advantages-relatively easy literacy campaigns, nationalistic appeal-must be weighed one severe disadvantage. Chinese characters remain the linguistic glue that binds other countries of East Asia-China, j.a.pan and South Korea-together. Not knowing them has the effect of isolating North Koreans even further from what is happening around them-a plus in terms of the Kim regime's control over its subjects, but surely a minus in terms of efforts, for example, to expand foreign trade and attract investment. real advantages-relatively easy literacy campaigns, nationalistic appeal-must be weighed one severe disadvantage. Chinese characters remain the linguistic glue that binds other countries of East Asia-China, j.a.pan and South Korea-together. Not knowing them has the effect of isolating North Koreans even further from what is happening around them-a plus in terms of the Kim regime's control over its subjects, but surely a minus in terms of efforts, for example, to expand foreign trade and attract investment.

54. Baik II, pp. 216219. Universal compulsory elementary education was fully in place by 1956. Ibid., p. 615. Baik II, pp. 216219. Universal compulsory elementary education was fully in place by 1956. Ibid., p. 615.