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53. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 211. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 211.
54. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 207208. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 207208.
55. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 248. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 248.
56. See Suh, See Suh, The Korean Communist Movement 1918-1948 The Korean Communist Movement 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 263. Kim in his memoirs seems to suggest that his Chinese-language abilities contributed to his career in the anti-j.a.panese movement in .Manchuria. That does indeed seem to have been the case, as we shall see in the next chapter. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 263. Kim in his memoirs seems to suggest that his Chinese-language abilities contributed to his career in the anti-j.a.panese movement in .Manchuria. That does indeed seem to have been the case, as we shall see in the next chapter.
57. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, pp. 208210. vol. 1, pp. 208210.
58. Letter from Dr. Won Tai Sohn comprising written answers to the author's questions, January 1995. Kim himself in Letter from Dr. Won Tai Sohn comprising written answers to the author's questions, January 1995. Kim himself in With the Century With the Century wrote simply that he lived with friends in Jilin, not mentioning the .Methodist dormitory. wrote simply that he lived with friends in Jilin, not mentioning the .Methodist dormitory.
59. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, pp. 213226. Previous North Korean biographical works claimed Kim read vol. 1, pp. 213226. Previous North Korean biographical works claimed Kim read Das Kapital Das Kapital in 1927. Outside biographers, however, had noted that this was highly unlikely, since neither the Korean nor the Chinese translation was published until after World War II. See Lim Un, in 1927. Outside biographers, however, had noted that this was highly unlikely, since neither the Korean nor the Chinese translation was published until after World War II. See Lim Un, The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea - -An Authentic Biography of Kim Il-song (Tokyo: Jiyu-sha, 1982). Like many points in Kim's memoirs (and whether true or not), the explanation that a friend read Marx's magnum opus in j.a.panese and told him about it seems to be an adjustment that responds directly to the outside biographers' challenge. (Tokyo: Jiyu-sha, 1982). Like many points in Kim's memoirs (and whether true or not), the explanation that a friend read Marx's magnum opus in j.a.panese and told him about it seems to be an adjustment that responds directly to the outside biographers' challenge.
60. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, pp. 240245. vol. 1, pp. 240245.
61. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 227239. "Literary works play a great role in the formation of the world view of people, so every time I meet writers, I tell them to produce many revolutionary stories and novels," Kim wrote (vol. 1, p. 215). Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 227239. "Literary works play a great role in the formation of the world view of people, so every time I meet writers, I tell them to produce many revolutionary stories and novels," Kim wrote (vol. 1, p. 215).
62. Mark O'Neill, "N. Korea's Dead Dictator Remembered as Star Pupil According to Chinese Teacher's Daughter" (Reuters dispatch from Beijing), Mark O'Neill, "N. Korea's Dead Dictator Remembered as Star Pupil According to Chinese Teacher's Daughter" (Reuters dispatch from Beijing), Korea Times, Korea Times, September 10, 1994. September 10, 1994.
63. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, p. 236. vol. 1, p. 236.
64. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 222224. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 222224.
65. See Scalapino and Lee, See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, pt. I, p. 19. pt. I, p. 19.
66. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 2, p. 12. vol. 2, p. 12.
67. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 267. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 267.
68. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 281292. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 281292.
69. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 293306. Dr. Won Tai Sohn told me in a letter (January 1995) that he had been present, seated in the front row, at An Chang-ho's lecture. He vouched for Kim's account: "Still vivid in my memory is the scene of Kim Song-ju [Kim Il-sung's name at the time] asking the speaker questions as well as the scene of Ri Kwan-Rin, a heroine of the Independence Army, rushing toward the policemen on the stage to stop them when they were arresting An Chang-Ho," Sohn told me. "Actually I was arrested too because I was trying to climb on the stage to release An Chang-ho." Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 293306. Dr. Won Tai Sohn told me in a letter (January 1995) that he had been present, seated in the front row, at An Chang-ho's lecture. He vouched for Kim's account: "Still vivid in my memory is the scene of Kim Song-ju [Kim Il-sung's name at the time] asking the speaker questions as well as the scene of Ri Kwan-Rin, a heroine of the Independence Army, rushing toward the policemen on the stage to stop them when they were arresting An Chang-Ho," Sohn told me. "Actually I was arrested too because I was trying to climb on the stage to release An Chang-ho."
70. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, pp. 309315. vol. 1, pp. 309315.
71. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 315317. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 315317.
72. Letter to the author from Dr. Won Tai Sohn, January 1995. Also see Kim, Letter to the author from Dr. Won Tai Sohn, January 1995. Also see Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, p. 21. vol. 1, p. 21.
73. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 2, p. 8. vol. 2, p. 8.
74. Letter to the author from Dr. Won Tai Sohn, January 1995. Also see Geraldine Brooks, "Two Old Friends: One Became A Doctor, the Other a Dictator," Letter to the author from Dr. Won Tai Sohn, January 1995. Also see Geraldine Brooks, "Two Old Friends: One Became A Doctor, the Other a Dictator," Asian Wall Street Journal, Asian Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1994. September 19, 1994.
Dr. Sohn, who knew Kim in his middle-school days in the Chinese city of Jilin, told me, "Had I written about my days in Jilin, I would have written just the same as he did." But Dr. Sohn also told me he had not replied to my letter of inquiry immediately but first had taken it along on a trip to Pyongyang. Although I do not doubt his basic story, I can't help wondering whether he perhaps received help in the preparation of his literary-sounding accounts from some of the people involved with researching, ghostwriting or polishing Kim's memoirs. The physician eventually published a book of his own. It is glowing, indeed almost worshipful, in its account of Kim, as the University of Pennsylvania's G. Cameron Hurst III and Bradley University's In Kwan Hw.a.n.g noted in forewords they contributed. See Won Tai Sohn, Kim Il Sung and Korea's Struggle: An Unconventional Firsthand History Kim Il Sung and Korea's Struggle: An Unconventional Firsthand History (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Company, 2003). (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Company, 2003).
75. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 2, p. 8. vol. 2, p. 8.
76. Letter from Dr. Sohn to author, January 1995. Letter from Dr. Sohn to author, January 1995.
Kim also played the guitar, according to a reference in his memoirs: "Once I went to Ryang Song Ryang's house and played the guitar there. I did not do it because I was merry or free from anxiety. Frankly speaking, I felt gloomy at that time" (With the Century, (With the Century, vol. 3, p. 314). vol. 3, p. 314).
77. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 2, p. 10. vol. 2, p. 10.
78. Letter to the author, January 1995. Letter to the author, January 1995.
79. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, pp. 245246. vol. 1, pp. 245246.
80. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 11. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 11.
81. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 254257. Kim gave the founding date as August 28, 1927. In a typical boast, he wrote that this organization "played the vanguard role in the Korean revolution." Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 254257. Kim gave the founding date as August 28, 1927. In a typical boast, he wrote that this organization "played the vanguard role in the Korean revolution."
82. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 354357. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 354357.
83. Letter to the author from Dr. Won Tai Sohn, January 1995; Geraldine Brooks, Letter to the author from Dr. Won Tai Sohn, January 1995; Geraldine Brooks, Asian Wall Street Journal, Asian Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1994. Kim, September 19, 1994. Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 1, pp. 359367; vol. 2, pp. 48. vol. 1, pp. 359367; vol. 2, pp. 48.
3. On Long Marches Through Blizzards.
1. "Some time near the beginning of the century there seems to have existed in Korea a legendary patriotic national hero named Kim Il-song who fought courageously against the j.a.panese and so won the admiration and respect of the Korean people. The true ident.i.ty of this "Some time near the beginning of the century there seems to have existed in Korea a legendary patriotic national hero named Kim Il-song who fought courageously against the j.a.panese and so won the admiration and respect of the Korean people. The true ident.i.ty of this legendary legendary Kim Il-song is not known. ... [T]he lack of uniformity in the tales of the legendary Kim suggests strongly that this Kim Kim Il-song is not known. ... [T]he lack of uniformity in the tales of the legendary Kim suggests strongly that this Kim is is only a legend. These tales, without concrete evidence, have led some to discredit the legend as a fiction designed to belittle the North Korean premier. The only a legend. These tales, without concrete evidence, have led some to discredit the legend as a fiction designed to belittle the North Korean premier. The legend, legend, however, does exist, and while the originator of the legend cannot be identified, there are many Korean revolutionaries, Nationalist and Communist, who, by deliberate adoption of the name, contributed to the legend" (Suh, however, does exist, and while the originator of the legend cannot be identified, there are many Korean revolutionaries, Nationalist and Communist, who, by deliberate adoption of the name, contributed to the legend" (Suh, Korean Communist Movement Korean Communist Movement [see chap. 2, n. 56], pp. 256257). [see chap. 2, n. 56], pp. 256257).
Note that in scholarly literature the last syllable of Kim's name is often transcribed as "song," with a diacritical mark over the vowel, in accordance with the McCune-Reischauer system of Romanization. In the Seoul dialect, at least, to my ear the syllable as p.r.o.nounced by native Koreans does sound more like the English "song" than "sung." Confusing Westerners further, in a transcription system recently adopted by South Korea the syllable would be spelled "seong." Fortunately for people who can read Korean, the marvelously rational and compact hangul hangul writing system gives a phonetically precise rendering of any syllable at a single glance. writing system gives a phonetically precise rendering of any syllable at a single glance.
2. Kim, Kim, With the Century With the Century (see chap. 2, n. 2), vol. 2, pp. 2324. (see chap. 2, n. 2), vol. 2, pp. 2324.
3. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 136137. In his memoirs he overcomes his earlier reluctance to reveal any affinity for things foreign when he acknowledges that learning Chinese stood him in good stead in later life. "If my father had not made me learn Chinese at an early age I might have had to face a great language barrier at every step of my life for the quarter of a century I spent in China," he writes. Because he was able to dress in Chinese clothing and speak fluent Chinese, "the j.a.panese detectives, who were said to have a hound's sense of smelling, and the Manchukuo police did not suspect me to be a Korean when I was walking in the street" (vol. 1, pp. 6364). Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 136137. In his memoirs he overcomes his earlier reluctance to reveal any affinity for things foreign when he acknowledges that learning Chinese stood him in good stead in later life. "If my father had not made me learn Chinese at an early age I might have had to face a great language barrier at every step of my life for the quarter of a century I spent in China," he writes. Because he was able to dress in Chinese clothing and speak fluent Chinese, "the j.a.panese detectives, who were said to have a hound's sense of smelling, and the Manchukuo police did not suspect me to be a Korean when I was walking in the street" (vol. 1, pp. 6364).
4. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 159160. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 159160.
5. Suh reports in Suh reports in The Korean Communist Movement The Korean Communist Movement (see chap. 2, n. 56), p. 259, that (see chap. 2, n. 56), p. 259, that Chokki Chokki (Red Flag), organ of a communist group in .Manchuria, carried an article in its .March 1930 issue mourning the death of a Kim Il-sung. (Red Flag), organ of a communist group in .Manchuria, carried an article in its .March 1930 issue mourning the death of a Kim Il-sung.
6. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 2, pp. 107108. vol. 2, pp. 107108.
7. The Kim Il-sung who became North Korea's leader "undoubtedly received or inherited some of the credit due to other revolutionaries, but the rumors around his name are the consequence of his own success. Prior to his accession and consolidation of power in the North, Kim Il-song, with his own record, was well known to the Koreans as well as to the Chinese and, of course, was well known to the j.a.panese police. ... He is certainly not a nonent.i.ty who inherited everything from the legendary patriot or from the revolutionaries named Kim Il-song" (Suh, The Kim Il-sung who became North Korea's leader "undoubtedly received or inherited some of the credit due to other revolutionaries, but the rumors around his name are the consequence of his own success. Prior to his accession and consolidation of power in the North, Kim Il-song, with his own record, was well known to the Koreans as well as to the Chinese and, of course, was well known to the j.a.panese police. ... He is certainly not a nonent.i.ty who inherited everything from the legendary patriot or from the revolutionaries named Kim Il-song" (Suh, Korean Communist Movement, Korean Communist Movement, pp. 260261). pp. 260261).
8. As recently as January 2000, the South s Unification Ministry aroused controversy in Seoul by describing Kim as an "independence fighter." Some critics questioned this "policy change" (Kim Ji-ho, "New Unification Ministry Publication Calls Kim Il-sung Independence Fighter," As recently as January 2000, the South s Unification Ministry aroused controversy in Seoul by describing Kim as an "independence fighter." Some critics questioned this "policy change" (Kim Ji-ho, "New Unification Ministry Publication Calls Kim Il-sung Independence Fighter," Korea Herald, Korea Herald, January 13, 2000). In fact, however, South Korea's government-funded Naewoe Press, affiliated with the organization then known as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, had published an essentially accurate account of Kim's life as early as 1978, including the information that he "became a leading member of the [Chinese Communist] Party's anti-j.a.panese guerrilla forces in the latter part of the 1930s." See "Kim Il-sung," January 13, 2000). In fact, however, South Korea's government-funded Naewoe Press, affiliated with the organization then known as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, had published an essentially accurate account of Kim's life as early as 1978, including the information that he "became a leading member of the [Chinese Communist] Party's anti-j.a.panese guerrilla forces in the latter part of the 1930s." See "Kim Il-sung," Vantage Point Vantage Point (May 1978): p. 19. It might surprise some foreigners interested in Korea to realize that such accurate information had issued from the KCIA, whose reputation was so universally sinister that the government thought it wise to change its name (to Agency for National Security Planning, or NSP) after the 1987 revival of democratic elections. The reputation of the KCIA's professional a.n.a.lysts of North Korean affairs was tarnished by a.s.sociation with the organization's dominant group, secret police who carried out internal political repression of dissidents on behalf of South Korea's military-backed rulers. The a.n.a.lysts' reputations also were not helped by the work of government propagandists who were less than eager to let the facts get in the way of antiNorth Korea broadsides. Further, the South Korean military rulers from time to time concocted imminent threats of Northern invasion, claiming to base their warnings on "intelligence reports." The situation in some (May 1978): p. 19. It might surprise some foreigners interested in Korea to realize that such accurate information had issued from the KCIA, whose reputation was so universally sinister that the government thought it wise to change its name (to Agency for National Security Planning, or NSP) after the 1987 revival of democratic elections. The reputation of the KCIA's professional a.n.a.lysts of North Korean affairs was tarnished by a.s.sociation with the organization's dominant group, secret police who carried out internal political repression of dissidents on behalf of South Korea's military-backed rulers. The a.n.a.lysts' reputations also were not helped by the work of government propagandists who were less than eager to let the facts get in the way of antiNorth Korea broadsides. Further, the South Korean military rulers from time to time concocted imminent threats of Northern invasion, claiming to base their warnings on "intelligence reports." The situation in some 'ways 'ways parallels that of the American CIA, whose conscientious professional a.n.a.lysts also suffered in reputation during much of the same period due to the unlawful exploits of some of the true "spooks" in their agency. parallels that of the American CIA, whose conscientious professional a.n.a.lysts also suffered in reputation during much of the same period due to the unlawful exploits of some of the true "spooks" in their agency.
The author has reviewed much of the output of Naewoe Press's monthly Vantage Point Vantage Point from its first volume in 1978. I find much of the information presented even decades ago to be consistent with the best information available today. True, some contributors reveal very strong unscholarly biases against the North, strong enough to affect the credibility of their conclusions and in some cases their information. But more often than not the South Korean and Korean-American contributors to from its first volume in 1978. I find much of the information presented even decades ago to be consistent with the best information available today. True, some contributors reveal very strong unscholarly biases against the North, strong enough to affect the credibility of their conclusions and in some cases their information. But more often than not the South Korean and Korean-American contributors to Vantage Point Vantage Point appear to have struggled against great difficulties to get the basic information right. This stands to reason. For South Korea, after all, accurate information about the North was a matter of life or death. appear to have struggled against great difficulties to get the basic information right. This stands to reason. For South Korea, after all, accurate information about the North was a matter of life or death.
Nonetheless, despite such long-ago efforts by South Korean government-affiliated professional a.n.a.lysts to set the record straight, the scenario that casts Kim Il-sung as an impostor still has credibility among some anti-communist zealots and just plain sloppy researchers, not only in South Korea but abroad. Thus it was considered news in 1994 when Naewoe Press published A Bird's Eye View of North Korea, A Bird's Eye View of North Korea, which implicitly repudiated the theory. See "NK's Kim Acknowledged as Independence Fighter," which implicitly repudiated the theory. See "NK's Kim Acknowledged as Independence Fighter," Korea Times, Korea Times, May 1, 1994. May 1, 1994.
9. Scalapino and Lee (see chap. 2, n. 28), pt. 1, pp. 66136. Scalapino and Lee (see chap. 2, n. 28), pt. 1, pp. 66136.
10. For a provocative a.n.a.lysis of this political culture focusing on South Korea, see Gregory Henderson's cla.s.sic For a provocative a.n.a.lysis of this political culture focusing on South Korea, see Gregory Henderson's cla.s.sic Korea: The Politics of the Vortex Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, .Ma.s.s.: Harvard University Press, 1968). (Cambridge, .Ma.s.s.: Harvard University Press, 1968).
11. See Scalapino and Lee (see chap. 2, n. 28), pt. I, p. 190. See Scalapino and Lee (see chap. 2, n. 28), pt. I, p. 190.
A high Comintern official explained, "Over the years ... factional disputes have taken place in many Parties. There are Parties which have achieved a certain amount of notoriety in this respect such as the American and Polish Parties, but the Korean factions hold the record" (Otto Kuusinen, "O koreiskom kom-munisticheskom dvizhenii," Revolyusionyyi vostok, Revolyusionyyi vostok, nos. 1112 [1931]: p. 108, translated in Glenn Paige and Dong Jun Lee, "The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., nos. 1112 [1931]: p. 108, translated in Glenn Paige and Dong Jun Lee, "The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., North Korea Today North Korea Today [New York: Praeger, 1963], p. 20). [New York: Praeger, 1963], p. 20).
12. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 2, p. 69. Outside scholars have long written of Kim's membership in the CCP, but prior to publication of his memoirs he and his propagandists for decades seem to have tried to disguise the fact by simply ignoring it-presumably for fear that Koreans' knowledge that the Great Leader had taken orders from a foreign party would detract from his all-important nationalist credentials. vol. 2, p. 69. Outside scholars have long written of Kim's membership in the CCP, but prior to publication of his memoirs he and his propagandists for decades seem to have tried to disguise the fact by simply ignoring it-presumably for fear that Koreans' knowledge that the Great Leader had taken orders from a foreign party would detract from his all-important nationalist credentials.
13. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 128. Kim is careful to emphasize that he retained his independence despite having gone on the Soviet payroll. Later he turned down an offer of a Soviet scholarship, he says, because to "eat Russian bread" might make him "pro-Russian" (vol. 2, p. 175). Ibid., vol. 2, p. 128. Kim is careful to emphasize that he retained his independence despite having gone on the Soviet payroll. Later he turned down an offer of a Soviet scholarship, he says, because to "eat Russian bread" might make him "pro-Russian" (vol. 2, p. 175).
14. Some biographers suggest that it was his mother's remarriage or other relationship with a man that caused her to move to Antu instead of going back to Korea, where her relatives and those of her late husband lived. See Lim Un, Some biographers suggest that it was his mother's remarriage or other relationship with a man that caused her to move to Antu instead of going back to Korea, where her relatives and those of her late husband lived. See Lim Un, Founding of a Dynasty Founding of a Dynasty (see chap. 2, n. 59), p. 257, where Lim discusses the claims of biographer Yi Myong-yong. Yi is quoted as reporting that Kim himself, around the time of his father's death, had become the foster son of a Chinese named Moo. (see chap. 2, n. 59), p. 257, where Lim discusses the claims of biographer Yi Myong-yong. Yi is quoted as reporting that Kim himself, around the time of his father's death, had become the foster son of a Chinese named Moo.
15. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 2, p. 252. vol. 2, p. 252.
16. Kim offers a complicated explanation of why he fought under a Chinese nationalist commander: Chinese units Kim offers a complicated explanation of why he fought under a Chinese nationalist commander: Chinese units 'were 'were terrorizing and killing Koreans, having branded them as j.a.pan's agents in .Manchuria. Korean communist guerrilla groups " terrorizing and killing Koreans, having branded them as j.a.pan's agents in .Manchuria. Korean communist guerrilla groups "were small in size; there small in size; there 'were 'were only a few dozen guerrillas in each county," says Kim. "They only a few dozen guerrillas in each county," says Kim. "They 'were 'were in danger of being annihilated if captured by the Chinese nationalist units, so they could not expand their ranks." To ensure that his own tiny guerrilla band could survive and grow, Kim offered to subordinate it to a Chinese commander as a "special Korean detachment." The commander accepted-and promptly appointed Kim propaganda chief of the larger, nationalist unit. The irony of a communist running propaganda for anti-communists is not lost on Kim. "This was a ridiculous development, and not something we had desired, but it was a step up the ladder we had to climb," he writes in danger of being annihilated if captured by the Chinese nationalist units, so they could not expand their ranks." To ensure that his own tiny guerrilla band could survive and grow, Kim offered to subordinate it to a Chinese commander as a "special Korean detachment." The commander accepted-and promptly appointed Kim propaganda chief of the larger, nationalist unit. The irony of a communist running propaganda for anti-communists is not lost on Kim. "This was a ridiculous development, and not something we had desired, but it was a step up the ladder we had to climb," he writes (With the Century, (With the Century, vol. 2, p. 294). vol. 2, p. 294).
17. "Here again Kim [in the official hagiography] emerges as a ready-made leader. ... There are reports that after the Manchurian Incident, students from various schools in Kirin [Jilin], including Yuwen Middle School, did form a small guerrilla band of twenty or thirty students, led by a Kirin college student named Chong Su-yong, but no Kim Song-ju (Kim Il-song) was reported. The earliest record of Kim's military activities is not until early 1935" (Suh, "Here again Kim [in the official hagiography] emerges as a ready-made leader. ... There are reports that after the Manchurian Incident, students from various schools in Kirin [Jilin], including Yuwen Middle School, did form a small guerrilla band of twenty or thirty students, led by a Kirin college student named Chong Su-yong, but no Kim Song-ju (Kim Il-song) was reported. The earliest record of Kim's military activities is not until early 1935" (Suh, Korean Communist Movement, Korean Communist Movement, p. 268). p. 268).
Suh adds (p. 281), "The earliest record thus far available of Kim Il-song's military activities in Manchuria ... shows that in December 1935 Kim was commander of a small guerrilla company in Weiho, a town midway between Harbin and Chiamussu. Thus it is perhaps safe to a.s.sume that he did begin his activities one or two years earlier than 1935. The earliest j.a.panese police report of the military activities of a person named Kim Il-song (unmistakably the North Korean premier) is in May 1935; the report states that Kim was leader of the Third Detachment, the First Company, the Second Army of the NEPRA [Northeast People's Revolutionary Army], operating primarily in the Chientao [Jiandao] region. Ch'oe Hyon related that he first met Kim Il-song in September 1933, which coincides with the general rise of the Chinese Communist guerrillas in Manchuria. Im Ch'un-ch'u related that Kim began his guerrilla activities with Yi Yong-pae, Kim Ch'ol-he and others but fought in a company commanded by Yang Song-yong as early as the spring of 1932. Yang Song-yong was a Korean who commanded a small detachment of the Second Company of the Second Division of the Second Army. This generally coincides with the fact that Kim fought under the Second Army, but it also confirms that he was a relatively minor figure if he fought under or with Yang Song-yong."
18. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 2, pp. 324326. vol. 2, pp. 324326.
19. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 358. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 358.
20. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 419424. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 419424.
21. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 206212. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 206212.
22. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 332334. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 332334.
23. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 431435. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 431435.
24. 24. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 435436. 24. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 435436.
25. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 8392. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 8392.
26. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 12. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 12.
27. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 13. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 13.
28. Chung Dong-joo, "Two of Kim Il-sung Unit's .Members Talk After 50 Years," Chung Dong-joo, "Two of Kim Il-sung Unit's .Members Talk After 50 Years," Wolgan JoongAng Wolgan JoongAng (Seoul) (October 1993): pp. 650667, this portion translated as "Testimony on Kim Il Sung's Unit (2)," (Seoul) (October 1993): pp. 650667, this portion translated as "Testimony on Kim Il Sung's Unit (2)," People's Korea People's Korea (Tokyo), January 29, 1994. (Tokyo), January 29, 1994.
29. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 2, pp. 436453. vol. 2, pp. 436453.
30. See Scalapino and Lee, See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, pp. 160161. pp. 160161.
31. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, pp. 38. vol. 3, pp. 38.
32. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1013. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 1013.
33. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 3031. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 3031.
34. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 2957. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 2957.
35. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 6566. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 6566.
36. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 2957. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 2957.
37. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 5883. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 5883.
38. Ibid., vol. 3, chap. 8, sec. 4, pp. 202221. Ibid., vol. 3, chap. 8, sec. 4, pp. 202221.
39. Scalapino and Lee, in Scalapino and Lee, in Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 35, quoting a 1928 j.a.panese report, describe the different styles of the Korean communists in .Manchuria and the Soviet Union's Irkutsk around 1921: "Manchurian forces adhered to strict military discipline, in the fashion of the j.a.panese army, but the Irkutsk forces called each other p. 35, quoting a 1928 j.a.panese report, describe the different styles of the Korean communists in .Manchuria and the Soviet Union's Irkutsk around 1921: "Manchurian forces adhered to strict military discipline, in the fashion of the j.a.panese army, but the Irkutsk forces called each other tovarich tovarich [comrade] and made 'no distinction between superior and subordinate.'" This was long before Kim became involved, but the reference at least suggests the tradition in which he would be trained. [comrade] and made 'no distinction between superior and subordinate.'" This was long before Kim became involved, but the reference at least suggests the tradition in which he would be trained.
40. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, pp. 84108. vol. 3, pp. 84108.
41. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 231232. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 231232.
42. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 233255. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 233255.
43. Bruce c.u.mings reports that the fame of Kim's unit had spread even to the Soviet Union. An adulatory article in the journal Bruce c.u.mings reports that the fame of Kim's unit had spread even to the Soviet Union. An adulatory article in the journal Tikhii Okean Tikhii Okean (Pacific Ocean) in 1937 said, "The men in this detachment are very brave. All the most dangerous operations are carried out by this detachment. Its actions are usually well planned, quick and precise. Two heavy machine guns in the possession of the detachment make it possible to withstand serious encounters with the j.a.panese troops" (Pacific Ocean) in 1937 said, "The men in this detachment are very brave. All the most dangerous operations are carried out by this detachment. Its actions are usually well planned, quick and precise. Two heavy machine guns in the possession of the detachment make it possible to withstand serious encounters with the j.a.panese troops" (The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 19451947, (The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 19451947, cited hereinafter as cited hereinafter as Origins Origins II [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981], p. 37). II [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981], p. 37).
44. Haruki Wada, Haruki Wada, Kin Nissei to Manshu konichi senso Kin Nissei to Manshu konichi senso (Kim Il-sung and the Manchurian resistance war against j.a.pan) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1992), p. 140, cited in Gavan McCormack, "Kim Country: Hard Times in North Korea," (Kim Il-sung and the Manchurian resistance war against j.a.pan) (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1992), p. 140, cited in Gavan McCormack, "Kim Country: Hard Times in North Korea," New Left Review New Left Review (MarchApril 1993). (MarchApril 1993).
Seiler (Kim Il-song 19411948, (Kim Il-song 19411948, p. 25 [see chap. 2, n. 18]) writes that Kim's Chinese Communist mentor, Wei Zhengmin, "attended the 7th Congress of the Communist International in 1935 and reported on the situation in the region, going into detail on armed activities by Koreans in the region, particularly those of Kim. This is believed by some to have been Moscow's first knowledge of Kim as an anti-j.a.panese partisan." Seiler here cites testimony by So Yong-gyu, former high-level cadre of the Workers' Party of Korea, in the Seoul daily p. 25 [see chap. 2, n. 18]) writes that Kim's Chinese Communist mentor, Wei Zhengmin, "attended the 7th Congress of the Communist International in 1935 and reported on the situation in the region, going into detail on armed activities by Koreans in the region, particularly those of Kim. This is believed by some to have been Moscow's first knowledge of Kim as an anti-j.a.panese partisan." Seiler here cites testimony by So Yong-gyu, former high-level cadre of the Workers' Party of Korea, in the Seoul daily JoongAng Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, August 19, 1991. August 19, 1991.
45. Chung Dong-joo, "Unit's .Members Talk," in Chung Dong-joo, "Unit's .Members Talk," in Wolgan JoongAng; Wolgan JoongAng; this portion translated as "Testimony on General Kim's Unit (3)," this portion translated as "Testimony on General Kim's Unit (3)," People's Korea People's Korea (Tokyo), 5 February 1994. (Tokyo), 5 February 1994.
46. "Item 52: Declaration of the Establishment of the Northeast Anti-j.a.panese United Army," translated in Dae-Sook Suh, "Item 52: Declaration of the Establishment of the Northeast Anti-j.a.panese United Army," translated in Dae-Sook Suh, Doc.u.ments of Korean Communism 19181948 Doc.u.ments of Korean Communism 19181948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 441 441443.
47. Suh, Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (see chap. 2, n. 35), pp. (see chap. 2, n. 35), pp. 46, 46, 52. 52.
McCormack, "Kim Country," relates, based on Wada, Kin Nissei, Kin Nissei, p. 306, that Kim was known to the j.a.panese "on their October 1940 'wanted' list as 'the tiger' (' p. 306, that Kim was known to the j.a.panese "on their October 1940 'wanted' list as 'the tiger' ('tora), while other guerrilla leaders were known as 'bear,' lion,' bull,' roe deer,' 'cat,' 'horse. "
48. "Item 55: Threatening Notes," translated in Suh, "Item 55: Threatening Notes," translated in Suh, Doc.u.ments of Korean Communism, Doc.u.ments of Korean Communism, pp. 449451. pp. 449451.
49. Suh (in Suh (in Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung, pp. 3839) cites such press reports in stating that Kim often provisioned his unit by taking hostages, sometimes by offering to protect opium and ginseng farmers in exchange for portions of their crops. pp. 3839) cites such press reports in stating that Kim often provisioned his unit by taking hostages, sometimes by offering to protect opium and ginseng farmers in exchange for portions of their crops.
50. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, p. 386. vol. 3, p. 386.
51. Chung Dong-joo, "Testimony on General Kim's Unit (3)." Chung Dong-joo, "Testimony on General Kim's Unit (3)."
52. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 2, p. 99. vol. 2, p. 99.
53. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 125132. Elsewhere Kim describes Han as a hard-working member of the propaganda squad of the communist youth organization he helped to found. "She, as a member of the Ryugil a.s.sociation of Korean Students, had fallen under our influence during art performances and at the gatherings where impressions on books were swapped. ... A pupil of Jilin Girls' Middle School, she was good-natured but reticent and usually pa.s.sed unnoticed. However, she carried out every task given her, be it difficult or irksome, for the sake of the revolution. ... She was known as a girl orator for the fiery speeches she made in Korean and Chinese to hundreds of people in the streets" (vol. 1, p. 288). Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 125132. Elsewhere Kim describes Han as a hard-working member of the propaganda squad of the communist youth organization he helped to found. "She, as a member of the Ryugil a.s.sociation of Korean Students, had fallen under our influence during art performances and at the gatherings where impressions on books were swapped. ... A pupil of Jilin Girls' Middle School, she was good-natured but reticent and usually pa.s.sed unnoticed. However, she carried out every task given her, be it difficult or irksome, for the sake of the revolution. ... She was known as a girl orator for the fiery speeches she made in Korean and Chinese to hundreds of people in the streets" (vol. 1, p. 288).
54. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 120121. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 120121.
55. "Declaration of the Establishment of the United Army" pp. 441443. "Declaration of the Establishment of the United Army" pp. 441443.
56. The guerrillas also used weapons captured from the j.a.panese, so "it was very hard to distinguish a Korean unit from a j.a.panese one," Choi Jin-sok said. Chung Dong-joo, "Testimony on Gen. Kim Il Sung's Unit (2)." The guerrillas also used weapons captured from the j.a.panese, so "it was very hard to distinguish a Korean unit from a j.a.panese one," Choi Jin-sok said. Chung Dong-joo, "Testimony on Gen. Kim Il Sung's Unit (2)."
57. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, pp. 170171. vol. 3, pp. 170171.
58. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 188202. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 188202.
59. Choi Jin-sok, quoted in "Testimony on Gen. Kim Il Sung's Unit (2)." Choi Jin-sok, quoted in "Testimony on Gen. Kim Il Sung's Unit (2)."