Twenty Years of Congress Volume I Part 42

Events proved that if the English Government had postponed this action until the Government of the United States had been allowed a frank discussion of its policy, no possible injury to English interests could have resulted. It was but a very short time before the rebellion a.s.sumed proportions that led to the recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent by the civil, judicial, and military authorities of the Union; a recognition by foreign powers would then have been simply an act of impartial neutrality. But, declared with such precipitancy, recognition could be regarded only as an act of unfriendliness to the United States. The proof of this is inherent in the case:--

1. The purpose of the secession, openly avowed from the beginning, was the dissolution of the Union and the establishment of an independent slave-empire; and the joint recognition was a declaration that such a result, fraught with ruin to us, was not antagonistic to the feelings or to the supposed interests of Europe, and that both the commercial ambition of England and the military aspirations of France in Mexico hoped to find profit in the event.

ENGLAND'S RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY.

2. This recognition of belligerency in defiance of the known wishes and interests of the United States, accompanied by the discourteous refusal to allow a few hours' delay for the reception of the American minister, was a significant warning to the seceded States that no respect due to the old Union would long delay the establishment of new relations, and that they should put forth all their energies before the embarra.s.sed Administration could concentrate its efforts in defense of the National life.

3. The recognition of the belligerent flag of the Southern Confederacy, with the equal right to supplies and hospitality, guarantied by such recognition, gave to the insurgents facilities and opportunities which were energetically used, and led to consequences which belong to a later period of this history, but the injury and error of which were emphatically rebuked by a judgment of the most important tribunal that has ever been a.s.sembled to interpret and administer international law.

The demand which naturally followed for a rigid enforcement of the blockade, imposed a heavy burden upon the Government of the United States just at the time when it was least prepared to a.s.sume such a burden. Apologists for the unfriendly course of England interpose the plea that the declaration of blockade by the United States was in fact a prior recognition of Southern belligerency. But it must be remembered that when the United States proposed to avoid this technical argument by closing the insurgent ports instead of blockading them, Mr. Seward was informed by Lord Lyons, acting in concert with the French minister, that Her Majesty's Government "would consider a decree closing the ports of the South actually in possession of the insurgent or Confederate States, as null and void, and that they would not submit to measures on the high seas in pursuance of such decree." Bitterly might Mr. Seward announce the fact which has sunk deep into the American heart: "It is indeed manifest in the tone of the speeches, as well as in the general tenor of popular discussion, that neither the responsible ministers nor the House of Commons nor the active portion of the people of Great Britain sympathize with this government, and hope, or even wish, for its success in suppressing the insurrection; and that on the contrary the whole British nation, speaking practically, desire and expect the dismemberment of the Republic."

This very decided step towards a hostile policy was soon followed by another even more significant. On the 9th of May, 1861, only a few days before the Proclamation of Her Britannic Majesty, recognizing the belligerency of the Southern Confederacy and thus developing itself as a part of a concerted and systematic policy, Lord Cowley, the British Amba.s.sador at Paris, wrote to Lord John Russell: "I called this afternoon on M. Thouvenel, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of obtaining his answer to the proposals contained in your Lordship's dispatch of the 6th inst.

relative to the measures which should be pursued by the Maritime Powers of Europe for the protection of neutral property in presence of the events which are pa.s.sing in the American States. M. Thouvenel said the Imperial Government concurred entirely in the views of Her Majesty's Government in endeavoring to _obtain of the belligerents_ a _formal_ recognition of the second, third, and fourth articles of the Declaration of Paris. Count de Flahault (French Amba.s.sador in London) would receive instructions to make this known officially to your Lordship. With regard to the manner in which this endeavor should be made, M. Thouvenel said that he thought a communication should be addressed to both parties _in as nearly as possible the same language_, the consuls being made the organs of communication with the Southern States."

Communicating this intelligence to Lord Lyons in a dispatch dated May 18, 1861, Lord John Russell added these instructions: "Your Lordship may therefore be prepared to find your French colleague ready to take the same line with yourself in his communications with the Government of the United States. I need not tell your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government would very gladly see a practice which is calculated to lead to great irregularities and to increase the calamities of war renounced by _both_ the contending parties in America as it has been renounced by almost _every other nation_ in the world. . . . You will take such measures as you shall judge most expedient to transmit to Her Majesty's consul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of my previous dispatch to you of this day's date, to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of the so-styled Confederate States."

The ident.i.ty of the address and the equality upon which both the belligerents were invited to do what had been done by "almost every other _nation_ of the world" need not be emphasized.

ACTION OF CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT.

On July 5, 1861, Lord Lyons instructed Mr. Bunch, the British Consul at Charleston, South Carolina:--

"The course of events having invested the States a.s.suming the t.i.tle of Confederate States of America with the character of belligerents, it has become necessary for Her Majesty's Government to obtain from the existing government in those States securities concerning the proper treatment of neutrals. I am authorized by Lord John Russell to confide the negotiation on this matter to you, and I have great satisfaction in doing so. In order to make you acquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government, I transmit to you a duplicate of a dispatch to me in which they are fully stated." His Lordship then proceeded to instruct the consul as to the manner in which it might be best to conduct the negotiation, the object being to avoid as far as possible a direct official communication with the authorities of the Confederate States. Instructions to the same purport were addressed by the French Government to their consul at Charleston.

What then was the point of the negotiations committed to these consuls? It will be found in the dispatch from Lord John Russell, communicated by his order to Mr. Bunch. It was the accession of the United States and of the Confederate States to the Declaration of Paris of April 16, 1856. That Declaration was signed by the Ministers of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey. It adopted as article of Maritime Law the following points:--

"1. Privateering is and remains abolished.

"2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the exception of contraband of war.

"3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.

"4. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective,--that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy."

The Powers signing the Declaration engaged to bring it to the knowledge of those Powers which had not taken part in that Congress of Paris, and to invite them to accede to it; and they agreed that "the present Declaration is not and shall not be binding except between those Powers which have acceded or shall accede to it."

It was accepted by all the European and South American Powers.

The United States, Mexico, and the Oriental Powers did not join in the general acceptance.

The English and French consuls in Charleston, having received these instructions, sought and found an intermediary whose position and diplomatic experience would satisfy the requirements. This agent accepted the trust on two conditions,--one, that he should be furnished with the instructions as proof to the Confederate Government of the genuineness of the negotiation, the other, that the answer of the Confederate Government should be received in whatever shape that government should think proper to frame it. The negotiations in Richmond which had by this time become the seat of the Insurgent Government were speedily concluded, and on the 13th of August, 1861, the Confederate Government pa.s.sed the following resolution:--

"WHEREAS the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, in a conference held at Paris on the 16th of April, 1856, made certain declarations concerning Maritime Law, to serve as uniform rules for their guidance in all cases arising out of the principles thus proclaimed;

"AND WHEREAS it being desirable not only to attain certainty and uniformity as far as may be practicable in maritime law, but also to maintain whatever is just and proper in the established usages of nations, the Confederate States of America deem it important to declare the principles by which they will be governed in their intercourse with the rest of mankind: Now therefore be it

"_Resolved_, by the Congress of the Confederate States of America,

"1st, That we maintain the right of privateering as it has been long established by the practice and recognized by the law of nations.

"2d, That the neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the exception of contraband of war.

"3d, That neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.

"4th, Blockades in order to be binding must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy."

ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE CONFEDERACY.

"These resolutions," says Mr. Bunch to Lord Lyons on Aug. 16, 1861, "were pa.s.sed on the 13th inst., approved on the same day by the President, and I have the honor to enclose herewith to your Lordship the copy of them which has been sent to Mr. ---- by the Secretary of State to be delivered to M. de Belligny and myself." On Aug.

30, 1861, Lord Lyons wrote to Lord John Russell: "I have received, just in time to have the enclosed copy made for your Lordship, a dispatch from Mr. Consul Bunch reporting the proceedings taken by him in conjunction with his French colleague M. de Belligny to obtain the adherence of the so-called Confederate States to the last three articles of the Declaration of Paris;" and a few days later he says, "I am confirmed in the opinion that the negotiation, which was difficult and delicate, was managed with great tact and judgment by the two consuls."

Upon the discovery of this "difficult and delicate negotiation,"

Mr. Seward demanded the removal of Mr. Bunch. Lord John Russell replied to Mr. Adams Sept. 9, 1861, "The undersigned will without hesitation state to Mr. Adams that in pursuance of an agreement between the British and French Government, Mr. Bunch was instructed to communicate to the persons exercising authority in the so-called Confederate States the desire of those governments that the second, third, and fourth articles of the Declaration of Paris should be observed by those States in the prosecution of the hostilities in which they were engaged. Mr. Adams will observe that the commerce of Great Britain and France is deeply interested in the maintenance of the articles providing that the flag covers the goods, and that the goods of a neutral taken on board a belligerent ship are not liable to confiscation. Mr. Bunch, therefore, in what he has done in this matter, has acted in obedience to the instructions of his government, who accept the responsibility of his proceedings so far as they are known to the Foreign Department, and who cannot remove him from his office for having obeyed instructions."

Here then was a complete official negotiation with the Confederate States. Mr. Montagu Bernard, in his ingenious and learned work, _The Neutrality of Great Britain during the American War_, conceals the true character of the work in which the British Government had been engaged: "The history of an unofficial application made to the Confederate States on the same subject is told in the two following dispatches. It will be seen that the channel of communication was a private person instructed by the British and French consuls, who had been themselves instructed by the ministers of their respective governments at Washington." The presence of a private intermediary at one point cannot break the chain of official communication if the communications are themselves official.

For certain purposes the governments of England and France consulted and determined upon a specific line of policy. That policy was communicated in regular official instructions to their minister in Washington. The Ministers were to select the instruments to carry it out, and the persons selected were the official consular representatives of France and England, who although residing at the South held their _exequatures_ from the United-States Government.

They were instructed to make a political application to the government of the Confederacy, and Lord John Russell could not disguise that government under the mask of "the persons exercising authority in the so-called Confederate States." Their application was received by the Confederate Government through their agent just as it would have been received through the mail addressed to the Secretary of State. Their application was officially acted upon by the Confederate Congress, and the result contained in an official doc.u.ment was transmitted to them, and forwarded by them to their immediate official superiors in Washington, who recognized it as a successful result of "a difficult and delicate negotiation." It was then sent to the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries, and the responsibility of the act was fully and finally a.s.sumed by those ministers.

Nor can it be justified as an application to a belligerent, informing him that in the exercise of belligerent rights England and France would expect a strict conformity to International Law. The four articles of the Treaty of Paris were not provisions of International Law. They were explicit modifications of that law as it had long existed, and the Declaration itself stated that it was not to bind any of the Powers which had not agreed expressly to accept it. It was therefore an invitation, not to a belligerent but to the Southern Confederacy, to accept and thus become a part to an international compact to which in the very nature of things there could be no parties save those whose acceptance const.i.tuted an international obligation. It has never yet been claimed that a mere insurgent belligerent, however strong, occupied such position. If instead of declaring by resolution that the second, third, and fourth articles of the Declaration of Paris were principles which by their own voluntary action they would adopt as rules for their own government, the Confederate States had, with an astute policy which the invitation itself seems intended to suggest, demanded that they should be allowed to accept the Declaration in the same method in which it had been accepted "by every other nation," it is difficult to see how their demand could have been refused; and if it has been admitted, what would have been wanting to perfect the recognition of the independence of the Southern Confederacy?

THE PARIS CONVENTION.

The motive of England and France in this extraordinary negotiation with the Confederacy is plain. The right of privateering was not left untouched except with deep design. By securing the a.s.sent of the Confederacy to the other three articles of the Paris Convention, safety was a.s.sured to British and French cargoes under the American flag, while every American cargo was at risk unless protected by a Foreign flag--generally the flag of England. It would have been impossible to invent a process more gainful to British commerce, more harmful to American commerce. While the British and French consuls were conducting this negotiation with the Confederate States, the British and French ministers were conducting another to the same purport with the United States. Finally Mr. Seward offered to waive the point made by Secretary Marcy many years before at the date of the Declaration, and to accept the four articles of the Paris Convention, pure and simple. But his could not be done, because the Confederate States had not accepted the first article abolishing privateering and her privateers must therefore be recognized. England and France used this fact as a pretext for absolutely declining to permit the accession of the United States, one of the great maritime powers of the world, to a treaty which was proclaimed to be a wise and humane improvement of the old and harsh law of nations, and to which in former years the United States had been most earnestly invited to give her a.s.sent. This course throws a flood of light on the clandestine correspondence with the Confederacy, and plainly exposes the reasons why it was desired that the right of privateering should be left open to the Confederates.

Through that instrumentality great harm could be inflicted on the United States and at the same time England could be guarded against a cotton famine. To accomplish these ends she negotiated what was little less than a hostile treaty with an Insurgent Government.

This action was initiated before a single battle was fought, and was evidently intended as encouragement and inspiration to the Confederates to persist in their revolutionary proceedings against the Government of the United States. Any reasonable man, looking at the condition of affairs, could not doubt that the public recognition of the independence of the Confederacy by England and France, was a foregone and rapidly approaching conclusion.

With this condition of affairs leading necessarily to a more p.r.o.nounced unfriendliness, an incident occurred towards the close of the year which seriously threatened a final breach of amicable relations. On the 9th of November, 1861, Captain Wilkes of the United-States steamer _San Jacinto_, seized the persons of James M. Mason and John Slidell, ministers from the Southern Confederacy, and their secretaries, on board the British mail-steamer _Trent_ on her way from Havana to Kingston. Messrs. Mason and Slidell were accredited by the Executive of the Southern Confederacy to the Governments of England and France. Their avowed object was to obtain the recognition by those governments of the independence of the new Southern Republic, and their success would have been a most dangerous if not a fatal blow to the cause of the Union. But they were not by any recognized principle of international law contraband of war, and they were proceeding from a neutral port to a neutral port in a neutral vessel. The action of the officer who seized them was not authorized by any instructions, and the seizure was itself in violation of those principles of maritime law for which the United States had steadily and consistently contended from the establishment of its national life. The difficulty of adjustment lay not in the temper or conviction of either government, but in the pa.s.sionate and very natural excitement of popular feeling in both countries. In the United States there was universal and enthusiastic approval of the act of Captain Wilkes. In England there was an equally vehement demand for immediate and signal reparation.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL AND LORD LYONS.

Lord John Russell, after reciting the facts, instructed Lord Lyons in a dispatch of Nov. 30, 1861: "Her Majesty's Government therefore trust that when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that government will of its own accord offer to the British Government such redress as alone would satisfy the British nation; namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your Lordship in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed.

Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward you will propose them to him." In a dispatch of the same date Lord John Russell says to Lord Lyons: "In my previous dispatch of this date I have instructed you by command of Her Majesty to make certain demands of the Government of the United States. Should Mr. Seward ask for delay in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If at the end of that time no answer is given, or if any other answer is given except that of compliance with the demands of Her Majesty's Government, your Lordship is instructed to leave Washington with all the members of your Legation, bringing with you the archives of the Legation, and to repair immediately to London. If however you should be of opinion that the requirements of Her Majesty's Government are substantially complied with you may report the facts to Her Majesty's Government for their consideration, and remain at your post until you receive further orders." The communication of this peremptory limitation of time for a reply would have been an offensive threat; but it was a private instruction to guide the discretion of the minister, not to be used if the condition of things upon its arrival promised an amicable solution. It must also in justice be remembered that excited feeling had been shown by different departments of our own Government as well as by the press and the people. The House of Representatives had unanimously adopted a resolution thanking Captain Wilkes "for his brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct;" and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Gideon Welles, had publicly and officially approved his action.

The spirit in which Lord Lyons would receive his instructions was indicated in advance by his own dispatch to Lord John Russell of Nov. 19, 1861: "I have accordingly deemed it right to maintain the most complete reserve on the subject. To conceal the distress which I feel would be impossible, nor would it if possible be desirable; but I have expressed no opinion on the questions of international law involved; I have hazarded no conjecture as to the course which will be taken by Her Majesty's Government. On the one hand I dare not run the risk of compromising the honor and inviolability of the British flag by asking for a measure of reparation which may prove to be inadequate. On the other hand I am scarcely less unwilling to incur the danger of rendering a satisfactory settlement of the question more difficult by making a demand which may turn out to be unnecessarily great. In the present imperfect state of my information I feel that the only proper and prudent course is to wait for the orders which your Lordship will give, with a complete knowledge of the whole case.

I am unwilling moreover to deprive any explanation or reparation which the United-States Government may think it right to offer, of the grace of being made spontaneously. I know too that a demand from me would very much increase the main difficulty which the government would feel in yielding to any disposition which they may have to make amends to Great Britain. The American people would more easily tolerate a spontaneous offer of reparation made by its government from a sense of justice than a compliance with a demand for satisfaction from a foreign minister."

In accordance with the sentiments thus expressed, Lord Lyons, interpreting his discretion liberally and even generously, called upon Mr. Seward on the 19th of December, 1861, and the following is his official account of the interview: "The Messenger Seymour delivered to me at half-past eleven o'clock last night your Lordship's dispatch of the 30th ultimo, specifying the reparation required by Her Majesty's Government for the seizure of Mr. Mason and Mr.

Slidell and their secretaries on board the royal mail-steamer _Trent_. I waited on Mr. Seward this afternoon at the State Department, and acquainted him in general terms with the tenor of that dispatch. I stated in particular, as nearly as possible in your Lordship's words, that the only redress which could satisfy Her Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's people would be the immediate delivery of the prisoners to me in order that they might be placed under British protection, and moreover a suitable apology for the aggression which had been committed. I added that Her Majesty's Government hoped that the Government of the United States would of its own accord offer this reparation; that it was in order to facilitate such an arrangement that I had come to him without any written demand, or even any written paper at all, in my hand; that if there was a prospect of attaining this object I was willing to be guided by him as to the conduct on my part which would render its attainment most easy. Mr. Seward received my communication seriously and with dignity, but without any manifestation of dissatisfaction. Some further conversation ensued in consequence of questions put by him with a view to ascertain the exact character of the dispatch. At the conclusion he asked me to give him to- morrow to consider the question and to communicate with the President.

On the day after he should, he said, be ready to express an opinion with respect to the communication I had made. In the mean time he begged me to be a.s.sured that he was very sensible of the friendly and conciliatory manner in which I had made it."

SECRETARY SEWARD AND LORD LYONS.

On the 26th of December Mr. Seward transmitted to Lord Lyons the reply of the United States to the demand of the British Government.

In forwarding it to his Government Lord Lyons said: "Before transmitting to me the note of which a copy enclosed in my immediately preceding dispatch of to-day's date, Mr. Seward sent for me to the State Department, and said with some emotion that he thought that it was due to the great kindness and consideration which I had manifested throughout in dealing with the affair of the _Trent_, that he should tell me with his own lips that he had been able to effect a satisfactory settlement of it. He had now however been authorized to address to me a note which would be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government. In answer to inquiries from me Mr. Seward said that of course he understood Her Majesty's Government to leave it open to the Government of Washington to present the case in the form which would be most acceptable to the American people, but that the note was intended to be and was a compliance with the terms proposed by Her Majesty's Government. He would add that the friendly spirit and discretion which I had manifested in the whole matter from the day on which the intelligence of the seizure reached Washington up to the present moment had more than any thing else contributed to the satisfactory settlement of the question."

In his reply Mr. Seward took the ground that we had the right to detain the British vessel and to search for contraband persons and dispatches, and moreover that the persons named and their dispatches were contraband. But he found good reason for surrendering the Confederate envoys in the fact that Captain Wilkes had neglected to bring the _Trent_ into a Prize Court and to submit the whole transaction to Judicial examination. Mr. Seward certainly strained the argument of Mr. Madison as Secretary of State in 1804 to a most extraordinary degree when he apparently made it cover the ground that we would quietly have submitted to British right of search if the "Floating Judgment-seat" could have been subst.i.tuted by a British Prize Court. The seizure of the _Trent_ would not have been made more acceptable to the English Government by transferring her to the jurisdiction of an American Prize-Court, unless indeed that Court should have decided, as it most probably would have decided, that the seizure was illegal. Measuring the English demand not by the peremptory words of Lord John Russell but by the kindly phrase in which Lord Lyons in a personal interview verbally communicated them, Mr. Seward felt justified in saying that "the claim of the British Government is not made in a discourteous manner." Mr. Seward did not know that at the very moment he was writing these conciliatory words, British troops were on their way to the Dominion of Canada to menace the United States, and that British cannon were shotted for our destruction.

Lord John Russell, however much he might differ from Mr. Seward's argument, found ample satisfaction to the British Government in his conclusion. He said in reply: "Her Majesty's Government having carefully taken into their consideration the liberation of the prisoners, the delivery of them into your hands, and the explanations to which I have just referred, have arrived at the conclusion that they const.i.tute the reparation which Her Majesty and the British nation had a right to expect." And thus, by the delivery of the prisoners in the form and at the place least calculated to excite or wound the susceptibilities of the American people, this dangerous question was settled. It is only to be regretted that the spirit and discretion exhibited by the eminent diplomatist who represented England here with such wisdom and good temper, had not been adopted at an earlier date and more steadily maintained by the British Government. It would have prevented much angry controversy, much bitter feeling; it would have averted events and consequences which still shadow with distrust a national friendship that ought to be cordial and constant.