Twenty Years of Congress Volume I Part 41

THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES.

It would be but poor compliment to the soldiers of the Union to withhold just recognition of the brave opponents who met them on so many hard-fought fields. Nor is there any disposition among loyal men to stint the praise which is always due to courage.

Never perhaps was an army organized with fighting qualities superior to those of the army put into the field by the Confederacy. They fought with an absolute conviction, however erroneous, that their cause was just; and their arms were nerved by the feeling which their leaders had instilled deeply into their minds, that they were contending against an intolerable tyranny and protecting the sacredness of home. In a war purely defensive, as was that of the Confederacy, an army such as they raised and maintained can baffle the efforts of vastly superior numbers. The Confederates found from their own experience how changed was the task when they a.s.sumed the offensive and ventured to leave their own territory, with their perfect knowledge of its topography and with a surrounding population of sympathizers and helpers. In their first attempt at invasion they did not get beyond cannon-sound of the Potomac, and in the second they were turned back by the result of the first battle.

These facts do not impeach the prowess of the Confederate soldiery, but they ill.u.s.trate the task imposed on the Army of the Union and they suggest the vast difference in the responsibilities which the invading and the defensive forces were called upon to meet.

For so large an army as the Government of the Union was compelled to raise, volunteering could not be relied upon as a steady resource for recruitment. Great as was the ardor among the loyal people at the beginning of the struggle, it was soon found, as it has always been found in other nations, that unaided patriotism could not supply the heavy demands constantly made to repair the waste from the casualties of war and from the ravages of disease. The Act of Congress of March 3, 1863, provided for the enrolment of all able- bodied male citizens between the ages of twenty and forty-five years, while the Act of February 24, 1864, granted freedom to all male slaves between the ages of twenty and forty-five who might enlist in the Northern armies. Reward was made to go with duty, and by the Act of July 4, 1864, Congress ameliorated the rigors of the conscription by paying to each drafted man a bounty for one years' service, at the same time doubling and trebling the amount for two and three years' service respectively. The Secretary of War was by the same law directed to discharge from service at the request of parents all persons under the age of eighteen years who might have enlisted in the army, and it was made an offense punishable with loss of commission for any officer knowingly to enlist a person less than sixteen years of age. Conscription laws have been unpopular in all countries, and though resisted among us on one occasion with riot, they were upheld with strong courage by the ma.s.s of the loyal people. Representatives in Congress who had voted for the enactments were returned by large majorities, and Mr. Lincoln was re-elected with an overwhelming expression of popular favor at the very time when he was directing the enforcement of the draft. The vote of 1864 was perhaps the most significant exhibition of patriotism made during the war, and had an extraordinary influence in discouraging those who were directing the fortunes of the Confederacy.

In the Loyal States the Government called for more than 2,750,000 men at various time throughout the war. In the South nearly every white person capable of bearing arms rendered at one time or another service in the army. A leading military authority of England, speaking of the strength of the armies of the United States and of the Confederacy, says, "The total number of men called under arms by the Government of the United States between April, 1861, and April, 1865, amounted to 2,759,049, of whom 2,656,053 were actually embodied in the armies. If to these be added the 1,100,000 men embodied by the Southern States during the same time, the total armed forces reach the enormous amount of nearly 4,000,000, drawn from a population of only 32,000,000 of all ages. Before this vast aggregate, the celebrated uprising of the French nation in 1793, or the recent efforts of France and Germany in the war of 1870-71, sink into insignificance. And within three years the whole of these vast forces were peaceably disbanded and the army had shrunk to a normal strength of only 30,000 men."

Germany with a population of 41,000,000 can in time of war furnish an army of 1,250,000 men. France with a population of 36,000,000 claims that she can set more than 1,500,000 men afield. With a population of less than 25,000,0000 from which to levy troops, the Government of the United States had when the war closed more than 1,000,000 men upon the muster-rolls of the army to be paid off and discharged. Of this vast force probably not more than forty per cent. were available for operations on the field. The wounded, the sick, those upon furlough, upon detail in other service, upon military service elsewhere than in the field, together with those in military parlance absent or "not accounted for," would, it is estimated, be equal to sixty per cent. of the entire army.

AREA OF THE WAR AND ITS COST.

The area over which the armies of the Union were called to operate was 800,000 square miles in extent,--as large as the German Empire, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Holland combined. Those who led in the secession movement relied confidently upon the impossibility of overcoming a population inhabiting so great an expanse of territory. Their judgment was confirmed by that of the best military critics of Europe who looked pityingly upon the folly of the United States for undertaking a task which after years of suffering and great loss of life could end only in defeat, with hopeless bankruptcy for the surviving remnant of the Republic. Could the Government have had the advantage of a small area for its military operations, its power to overcome the rebellion would have been greatly enhanced, and an army not exceeding half of that which was raised could have vindicated the authority of the flag and maintained the integrity of the Union. The National expenditures would have been decreased in even greater ratio, for aside from reducing the number of troops, the enormous cost involved in transportation would have been lessened by hundreds of millions of dollars in the four years of the war.

Another cause of increased expenditure was the haste necessarily attendant upon all the military preparations of the Government.

Armies were to be created from the basis of an organization hardly greater than would serve as a police force for the Republic. When Fort Sumter was fired upon, the Army of the United States, rank and file, scarcely exceeded sixteen thousand men. The Government was compelled to equip its vast forces from stores of which hardly a nucleus existed. Arms, ammunition, military supplies, were all to be instantly gathered. The growth of the great host, its equipment, its marshaling, its prodigious strength, are among the marvels and the glories of our history. To admit that mistakes were made is only to say that the work was in human hands. Criticism may well be drowned in the acclaim of success. No National emergency has ever been met with greater courage, promptness, or skill.

The loss to the country and the expenditures from its Treasury could not be estimated when the war closed. We knew that a half- million citizens of the Republic had laid down their lives--three hundred thousand in defending the Union, two hundred thousand in attempting to destroy it. We knew the enormous amounts which had been paid in supporting our armies. But we were not wholly prepared for the millions that must be paid in satisfaction of claims which there had been no mode of reckoning. Nor had there been any standard by which an estimate could be made of the sums required by the pensions which the grat.i.tude and the justice of the Government would be called upon to grant. It was soon apparent that the need of relief was proportional to the magnitude of the struggle, and the Government prepared to respond with a munificence never paralleled.

THE CHARACTER OF EDWIN M. STANTON.

Nine months after the outbreak of hostilities the organization and equipment of the National forces were placed under the direction of Edwin M. Stanton as Secretary of War. Outside of his professional reputation, which was high, Mr. Stanton had been known to the public by his service in the Cabinet of Mr. Buchanan during the last three months of his Administration. In that position he had undoubtedly exhibited zeal and fidelity in the cause of the Union. He was a member of the Democratic party, a thorough believer in its principles, and a hearty opponent of Mr. Lincoln in the contest of 1860. In speech and writing he referred to Mr. Lincoln's supporters in the extreme partisan phrase of the day,--as "Black Republicans." He had no sympathy with Mr. Lincoln's views on the subject of slavery, and was openly hostile to any revival of the doctrine of Protection.

If Mr. Buchanan had been governed by the views of Mr. Stanton he would undoubtedly have vetoed the Morrill Tariff bill, and thus an unintended injury would have been inflicted upon the reviving credit of the nation. A citizen of the District of Columbia, Mr. Stanton was not called upon to make a personal record in the Presidential election of 1860, but his sympathies were well understood to be with the supporters of Breckinridge.

With these political principles and affiliations, Mr. Stanton was not even considered in connection with the original organization of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet. But the fact of his being a Democrat was now in his favor, for Mr. Lincoln was anxious to signify by some decisive expression, his appreciation of the patriotism which had induced so large a proportion of the Democratic party to lay aside prejudice and unite in support of his Administration. He had a high estimate of Mr. Stanton's capacity, derived from personal intercourse in a professional engagement some three years before.

He had learned something of his powers of endurance, of his trained habits of thought, of his systematic method of labor, and he had confidence that at forty-seven years of age, with vigorous health and a robust const.i.tution, Mr. Stanton could endure the strain which the increasing labor of the War Department would impose.

His nomination was confirmed without delay, and the whole country received his appointment with profound satisfaction.

No Cabinet minister in our history has been so intemperately denounced, so extravagantly eulogized. The crowning fact in his favor is that through all the mutations of his stormy career he was trusted and loved by Mr. Lincoln to the end of his days. He was at all times and under all circ.u.mstances absolutely free from corruption, and was savagely hostile to every man in the military service who was even suspected of irregularity or wrong. He possessed the executive faculty in the highest degree. He was prompt, punctual, methodical, rapid, clear, explicit in all his work. He imparted energy to every branch of the service, and his vigorous determination was felt on the most distant field of the war as a present and inspiring force.

Mr. Stanton had faults. He was subject to unaccountable and violent prejudice, and under its sway he was capable of harsh injustice.

Many officers of merit and of spotless fame fell under his displeasure and were deeply wronged by him. General Stone was perhaps the most conspicuous example of the extremity of outrage to which the Secretary's temper could carry him. He was lacking in magnanimity.

Even when intellectually convinced of an error, he was reluctant to acknowledge it. He had none of that grace which turns an enemy to a friend by healing the wounds which have been unjustly inflicted.

While oppressing many who were under his control, he had the keenest appreciation of power, and to men who were wielding great influence he exhibited the most deferential consideration. He had a quick insight into character, and at a glance could tell a man who would resist and resent from one who would silently submit. He was ambitious to the point of uncontrollable greed for fame, and by this quality was subject to its counterpart of jealousy, and to an envy of the increasing reputation of others. It was a sore trial to him that after his able and persistent organization of all the elements of victory, the share of credit which justly belonged to him, was lost sight of in the glory which surrounded the hero of a successful battle.

But his weaknesses did not obscure the loftiness of his character.

The capricious malignity and brutal injustice of the Great Frederick might as well be cited against the acknowledged grandeur of his career, as an indictment be brought against Stanton's fame on his personal defects, glaring and even exasperating as they were. To the Nation's trust he was sublimely true. To him was committed, in a larger degree than to any other man except the President alone, the successful prosecution of the war and the consequent preservation of the Union. Against those qualities which made him so many enemies, against those insulting displays of temper which wounded so many proud spirits helplessly subject to him for the time, against those acts of rank injustice which, in the judgment of his most partial eulogist, will always mar his fame, must be remembered his absolute consecration to all that he was and of all he could hope to be, to the cause of his country. For more than three years, of unceasing and immeasurable responsibility, he stood at his post, by day and by night, never flagging in zeal, never doubting in faith. Even his burly frame and rugged strength were overborne by the weight of his cares and by the strain upon his nerves, but not until his work was finished, not until the great salvation had come. Persecution and obloquy have followed him into the grave, but an impartial verdict must be that he was inspired with the devotion of a martyr, and that he wore out his life in a service of priceless value to all the generations of his countrymen.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Relation with Great Britain.--Close of the Year 1860.--Prince of Wales's Visit to the United States.--Exchange of Congratulatory Notes.--Dawn of the Rebellion.--Lord Lyons's Dispatch.--Mr. Seward's Views.--Lord John Russell's Threats.--Condition of Affairs at Mr.

Lincoln's Inauguration.--Unfriendly Manifestations by Great Britain.

--Recognizes Belligerency of Southern States.--Discourtesy to American Minister.--England and France make Propositions to the Confederate States.--Unfriendly in their Character to the United States.--Full Details given.--Motives inquired into.--Trent Affair.

--Lord John Russell.--Lord Lyons.--Mr. Seward.--Mason and Slidell released.--Doubtful Grounds a.s.signed.--Greater Wrongs against us by Great Britain.--Queen Victoria's Friendship.--Isolation of United States.--Foreign Aid to Confederates on the Sea.--Details given.-- So-called Neutrality.--French Attempt to establish an Empire in Mexico.--Lord Palmerston in 1848, in 1859, in 1861.--Conclusive Observations.

At the close of the year 1860 the long series of irritating and dangerous questions which had disturbed the relations of the United States and Great Britain, from the time of the Declaration of Independence, had reached final and friendly solution. The fact gave unalloyed satisfaction to the American people and to their Government. Mr. Buchanan was able to say in his message of December, in language which Lord Lyons truly described as "the most cordial which has appeared in any President's message since the foundation of the Republic,"--

"Our relations with Great Britain are of the most friendly character.

Since the commencement of my Administration the two dangerous questions arising from the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and from the right of search claimed by the British Government have been amicably and honorably adjusted. The discordant constructions of the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty, which at different periods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this government. The only question of any importance which still remains open is the disputed t.i.tle between the two governments to the Island of San Juan in the vicinity of Washington Territory." It was obvious that neither government looked forward to any trouble from this source.

To give manifestation of the cordiality with which our friendship was reciprocated, Her Majesty had selected this auspicious year for a visit of her son, the Prince of Wales, to this country. His Royal Highness was received everywhere by the government and the people with genuine and even enthusiastic hospitality, and at the termination of his visit Lord Lyons was instructed to express the thanks of Her Majesty.

"One of the main objects," His Lordship wrote to Secretary Ca.s.s on the 8th of December, 1860, "which Her Majesty had in view in sanctioning the visit of His Royal Highness was to prove to the President and citizens of the United States the sincerity of those sentiments of esteem and regard which Her Majesty and all cla.s.ses of her subjects entertain for the kindred race which occupies so distinguished a position in the community of nations. Her Majesty has seen with the greatest satisfaction that her feelings and those of her people in this respect have been met with the warmest sympathy in the great American Union; and Her Majesty trusts that the feelings of confidence and affection, of which late events have proved beyond all question the existence, will long continue to prevail between the two countries to their mutual advantage and to the general interests of civilization and humanity. I am commanded to state to the President that the Queen would be gratified by his making known generally to the citizens of the United States her grateful sense of the kindness with which they received her son, who has returned to England deeply impressed with all he saw during his progress through the States, and more especially so with the friendly and cordial good will manifested towards him on every occasion by all cla.s.ses of the community."

Mr. William Henry Trescott, then a.s.sistant Secretary of State, replied to Lord Lyons's note without delay, writing on the 11th of December: "I am instructed by the President to express the gratification with which he has learned how correctly Her Majesty has appreciated the spirit in which His Royal Highness was received throughout the Republic, and the cordial manifestation of that spirit by the people of the United States which accompanied him in every step of his progress. Her Majesty has justly recognized that the visit of her son aroused the kind and generous sympathies of our citizens, and, if I may so speak, has created an almost personal interest in the fortunes of the Royalty which he so well represents.

The President trusts that this sympathy and interest towards the future representative of the Sovereignty of Great Britain are at once an evidence and a guaranty of that consciousness of common interest and mutual regard which have bound in the past, and will in the future bind together more strongly than treaties, the feelings and the fortunes of the two nations which represent the enterprise, the civilization, and the const.i.tutional liberty of the same great race. I have also been instructed to make this correspondence public, that the citizens of the United States may have the satisfaction of knowing how strongly and properly Her Majesty has appreciated the cordial warmth of their welcome to His Royal Highness."

VISIT OF THE PRINCE OF WALES.

Time was soon to test "the sincerity of those sentiments of esteem and regard which Her Majesty and all cla.s.ses of her subjects entertain for the kindred race which occupies so distinguished a position in the community of nations." Within a few days after the exchange of this correspondence it became the duty of Lord Lyons to announce to his government that the domestic differences "in the great American Union" were deepening into so fierce a feud that from different motives both General Ca.s.s the Secretary of State, to whom his letter had been addressed, and Mr. Trescott the a.s.sistant Secretary of State, by whom it had been answered, had resigned, and that the United States, one "of the two great nations which represent the enterprise, the civilization, and the const.i.tutional liberty of the same great race," was about to confront the gravest danger that can threaten national existence.

The State of South Carolina pa.s.sed its Ordinance of Secession December 17, 1860. From that date until the surrender of Fort Sumter, April 14, 1861, many of the most patriotic and able statesmen of the country and a large majority of the people of the North hoped that some reasonable and peaceful adjustment of the difficulties would be found. The new Administration had every right to expect that foreign powers would maintain the utmost reserve, both in opinion and in action, until it could have a fair opportunity to decide upon a policy. The great need of the new President was time. Both he and his advisers felt that every day's delay was a substantial gain, and that the maintenance of the _status quo_, with no fresh outbreak at home and no unfriendly expression aborad, was of incalculable advantage to the cause of the Union.

Amid the varying and contradictory impressions of the hour, Lord Lyons had reported events as they occurred, with singular fairness and accuracy. Just one month before Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, on the 4th of February, 1861, His Lordship wrote to Lord John Russell, at that time Her Majesty's Minister of Foreign Affairs: "Mr. Seward's real view of the state of the country appears to be that if bloodshed can be avoided until the new government is installed, the seceding States will in no long time return to the Confederation. He seems to think that in a few months the evils and hardships produced by secession will become intolerably grievous to the Southern States, that they will be completely re-a.s.sured as to the intentions of the Administration, and that the conservative element which is now kept under the surface by the violent pressure of the Secessionists will emerge with irresistible force. From all these causes he confidently expects that when elections for the State Legislatures are held in the Southern States in November next, the Union party will have a clear majority and will bring the seceding States back into the Confederation. He then hopes to place himself at the head of a strong Union party having extensive ramifications both in the North and in the South, and to make 'Union or Disunion, not Freedom or Slavery,' the watchwords of political parties." It can scarcely escape notice how significant, even at this early period, is the use in this dispatch of the word "confederation" as applied to the United States,--a use never before made of it in diplomatic communication since the establishment of the Const.i.tution, and indicating, only too clearly, the view to be taken by the British Government of the relation of the States to the Union.

Whatever may have been the estimate at home of the policy attributed to Mr. Seward, it was certainly one which would commend itself to the sympathy of a friendly nation, and one, to the success of which no neutral power would hesitate to contribute all the aid it could rightfully render. The dispatch of Lord Lyons was received in London on the 18th of February, and on the 20th Lord John Russell replied as follows: "The success or failure of Mr. Seward's plans to prevent a disruption of the North-American Union is a matter of deep interest to Her Majesty's Government, but they can only expect and hope. They are not called upon nor would they be acting prudently were they to obtrude their advice on the dissentient parties in the United States. Supposing however that Mr. Lincoln, acting under bad advice, should endeavor to provide excitement for the public mind by raising questions with Great Britain, Her Majesty's Government feel no hesitation as to the policy they would pursue. They would in the first place be very forbearing. They would show by their acts how highly they value the relations of peace and amity with the United States. But they would take care to let the government which multiplied provocations and sought for quarrels understand that their forbearance sprung from the consciousness of strength and not from the timidity of weakness.

They would warn a government which was making political capital out of bl.u.s.tering demonstrations that our patience might be tried too far."

THREATS FROM LORD JOHN RUSSELL.

It is impossible to mistake the spirit or the temper of this dispatch. It is difficult to account for the manifest irritation of its tone except upon the ground that Lord John Russell saw in a possible reconciliation, between North and South, something that threatened the interest or jarred upon the sympathy of the British Government. It was at least sufficient and ominous warning of what the United States might expect from "the confidence and affection"

which had only a few weeks before been outpoured so lavishly by Her Majesty's Government. The fact is worthy of emphasis that since the cordial interchange of notes touching the visit of the Prince of Wales there had not been a single word of unkindness in the correspondence of the two governments. But our embarra.s.sments had been steadily deepening, and according to many precedents in the career of that ill.u.s.trious statesman, Lord John seems to have considered the period of our distress a fitting time to a.s.sert that "British forbearance springs from the consciousness of strength and not from the timidity of weakness."

On the 4th of March, 1861, the administration of Mr. Lincoln a.s.sumed the responsibility of government. At that date the organization of the Southern Confederacy had not been perfected. Four States which ultimately joined it had not yet seceded from the Union.

There had been no overt act of violence. The Administration still believed in the possibility of a peaceful settlement. But on the 12th of April Fort Sumter was attacked. On the 14th it was surrendered. On the 15th the President issued his Proclamation calling out seventy-five thousand militia and summoning Congress to meet on the 4th of July. On the 17th the President of the Confederacy authorized the issue of letters of marque. On the 19th the President of the United States proclaimed a blockade of the Southern ports and declared that privateers with letters of marque from the Southern Confederacy would be treated as pirates.

This condition of affairs rendered the relation of foreign powers to the Union and to the Confederacy at once urgent and critical.

It is true that Fort Sumter had surrendered to a warlike demonstration, but fortunately no blood had been shed. It is true that letters of marque had been authorized, but none had been actually issued.

It is true that a blockade had been proclaimed, but some time must elapse before it could be practically enforced. All that can be said is that the rebellion had organized itself with promptness and courage for a conflict. There was still a pause. Neither party thoroughly realized the horror of the work before them, though every day made it more clearly apparent. Until then the United States was the only organized government on our soil known to England, and with it she had for three-quarters of a century maintained commercial and political relations which had grown closer and more friendly every year. The vital element of that government was Union. Whatever might be the complicated relations of their domestic law, to the world and to themselves the United States of America was the indivisible government. This instinct of union had gathered them together as colonies, had formed them into an imperfect confederation, had matured them under a National Const.i.tution. It gave them their vigor at home, their power and influence abroad. To destroy their union was to resolve them into worse than colonial disintegration.

But the separation of the States was more than the dissolution of the Union. For, treating with all due respect the conviction of the Southern States as to the violation of their const.i.tutional rights, no fair-minded man can deny that the central idea of the secession movement was the establishment of a great slave-holding empire around the Gulf of Mexico. It was a bold and imperial conception. With an abounding soil, with millions of trained and patient laborers, with a proud and martial people, with leaders used to power and skilled in government, controlling some of the greatest and most necessary of the commercial staples of the world, the haughty oligarchy of the South would have founded a slave republic which, in its successful development, would have changed the future of this continent and of the world. When English statesmen were called upon to deal with such a crisis, the United States had a right to expect, if not active sympathy, at least that neutrality which would confine itself within the strict limit of international obligation, and would not withhold friendly wishes for the preservation of the Union.

RELATIONS OF ENGLAND AND THE UNION.

England had tested slowly but surely the worth of the American Union. As the United States had extended its territory, had developed in wealth, had increased in population, richer and richer had become the returns to England's merchants and manufacturers; question after question of angry controversy had been amicably settled by the conviction of mutual, growing, and peaceful interests.

And while it had become a rhetorical truism with English historians and statesmen, that relations with the independent Republic were stronger, safer, and more valuable than those of the old colonial connection, her own principles of const.i.tutional liberty were re- invigorated by the skill and the breadth with which they were applied and administered by her own children in a new country.

England could not but know that all this was due to the Union,-- the Union which had concentrated the weakness of scattered States into a government that protected the citizen and welcomed the immigrant, which carried law and liberty to the pioneer on the remotest border, which had made of provincial villages centres of wealth and civilization that would not have discredited the capitals of older nations, and which above all had created a Federal representative government whose successful working might teach England herself how to hold together the ample colonies that still formed the outposts of her Empire.

More than all, a Cabinet, every member of which by personal relation of tradition connection belonged to the great liberal party that felt the achievement of Emanc.i.p.ation to be a part of its historic glory, should have realized that no diminution of a rival, no monopoly of commerce, could bring to England any compensation for the establishment of a slave-holding empire upon the central waters of the world.

With this natural expectation the Government in less than sixty days after Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, sent its minister to London, confident that he would at least be allowed to present to the British Government for friendly consideration, the condition and policy of the Republic before any positive action should disturb the apparently amicable relations of the two countries. Mr. Charles Francis Adams, who was selected for this important duty, was instructed to explain to the British Government that the peculiar relation of the States to the Federal Government, and the reticence and reservations consequent upon a change of administration, had hitherto restrained the action of the President in the formation and declaration of his policy; that without foreign interference the condition of affairs still afforded reasonable hope of a satisfactory solution; and especially that it was necessary, if there existed a sincere desire to avoid wrong and injury to the United States, for foreign powers to abstain from any act of pretended neutrality which would give material advantage or moral encouragement to the organized forces of the rebellion.

Before Mr. Adams could cross the Atlantic the British Government, although aware of his mission and its object, decided upon its own course, in concerted action with France, and without reference to the views or wishes or interest of the United States. On the day before Mr. Adams's arrival in England, as if to give him offensive warning how little his representations would be regarded, Her Majesty's Government issued a proclamation recognizing the confederated Southern States as belligerents. It is entirely unnecessary to discuss the question of the right to recognize belligerency. The great powers of Europe had the same right to recognize the Southern Confederacy as a belligerent that they had to recognize it as an established nationality, and with the same consequences,--all dependent upon whether the fact so recognized were indeed a fact.

But the recognition of belligerency or independence may be the means to achieve a result, and not simply an impartial acquiescence in a result already achieved. The question therefore was not whether foreign powers had a right to recognize, but whether the time and method of such recognition were not distinctly hostile,-- whether they were not the efficient and coldly calculated means to strengthen the hands of the Rebellion.