The Works of Robert G. Ingersoll Volume XI Part 4

"When the wrongful refusal is because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, Congress can interfere and provide for the punishment of any individual guilty of such refusal."

That is the key that unlocks the whole question. Congress has power--full, complete, and ample,--to protect all citizens from unjust discrimination, and from being deprived of equal privileges on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. And this language is just as applicable to the 13th and 14th, as to the 15th Amendment. If a citizen is denied the accommodations of a public inn, or a seat in a railway car, on account of race or color, or deprived of liberty on account of race or color, the Const.i.tution has been violated, and the citizen thus discriminated against or thus deprived of liberty, is ent.i.tled to redress in a Federal Court.

It is held by the Supreme Court that the word "State" does not apply to the "people" of the State--that it applies only to the agents of the people of the State. And yet, the word "State," as used in the Const.i.tution, has been held to include not only the persons in office, but the people who elected them--not only the agents, but the princ.i.p.als. In the Const.i.tution it is provided that "no State shall coin money; and no State shall emit bills of credit." According to this decision, any person in any State, unless prevented by State authority, has the right to coin money and to emit bills of credit, and Congress has no power to legislate upon the subject--provided he does not counterfeit any of the coins or current money of the United States.

Congress would have to deal--not with the individuals, but with the State; and unless the State had pa.s.sed some act allowing persons to coin money, or emit bills of credit, Congress could do nothing. Yet, long ago, Congress pa.s.sed a statute preventing any person in any State from coining money. No matter if a citizen should coin it of pure gold, of the requisite fineness and weight, and not in the likeness of United States coins, he would be a criminal. We have a silver dollar, coined by the Government, worth eighty-five cents; and yet, if any person, in any State, should coin what he called a dollar, not like our money, but with a dollar's worth of silver in it, he would be guilty of a crime.

It may be said that the Const.i.tution provides that Congress shall have power to coin money, and provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States; in other words, that the Const.i.tution gives power to Congress to coin money and denies it to the States, not only, but gives Congress the power to legislate against counterfeiting. So, in the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, power is given to Congress, and power is denied to the States, not only, but Congress is expressly authorized to enforce the amendments by appropriate legislation. Certainly the power is as broad in the one case as in the other; and in both cases, individuals can be reached as well as States.

So the Const.i.tution provides that:

"Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among the several States."

Under this clause Congress deals directly with individuals. The States are not engaged in commerce, but the people are; and Congress makes rules and regulations for the government of the people so engaged.

The Const.i.tution also provides that:

"Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes."

It was held in the case of _The United States vs. Holliday_, 3 Wall., 407, that:

"Commerce with the Indian tribes means commerce with the individuals composing those tribes."

And under this clause it has been further decided that Congress has the power to regulate commerce not only between white people and Indian tribes, but between Indian tribes; and not only that, but between individual Indians. _Worcester vs. The State, 6 Pet., 575; The United States vs. 4.3 Gallons, 93 U. S., 188; The United States vs. Shawmux, 2 Saw., 304._

Now, if the word "tribe" includes individual Indians, may not the word "State" include citizens?

In this decision it is admitted by the Supreme Court that where a subject is submitted to the general legislative power of Congress, then Congress has plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject. Let us apply these words to the 13th Amendment. In this very decision I find that the 13th Amendment:

"By its own unaided force and effect, abolished slavery and established universal freedom."

The Court admits that:

"Legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and circ.u.mstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit."

The Court further admits:

"And such legislation may be primary and direct in its character."

And then gives the reason:

"For the amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States."

I now ask, has that subject--that is to say, Liberty,--been submitted to the general legislative power of Congress? The 13th Amendment provides that Congress shall have power to enforce that amendment by appropriate legislation.

In construing the 13th and 14th Amendments and the Civil Rights Act, it seems to me that the Supreme Court has forgotten the principle of construction that has been laid down so often by courts, and that is this: that in construing statutes, courts may look to the history and condition of the country as circ.u.mstances from which to gather the intention of the Legislature. So it seems to me that the Court failed to remember the rule laid down by Story in the case of _Prigg vs. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,_ 16 Pet., 611, a rule laid down in the interest of slavery--laid down for the purpose of depriving human beings of their liberty:

"Perhaps the safest rule of interpretation, after all, will be found to be to look to the nature and objects of the particular powers, duties and rights with all the lights and aids of contemporary history, and to give to the words of each just such operation and force consistent with their legitimate meaning, as may fairly secure and attain the ends proposed."

It must be admitted that certain rights were conferred by the 13th Amendment. Surely certain rights were conferred by the 14th Amendment; and these rights should be protected and upheld by the Federal Government. And it was held in the case last cited, that:

"If by one mode of interpretation the right must become shadowy and unsubstantial, and without any remedial power adequate to the end, and by another mode it will attain its just end and secure its manifest purpose--it would seem, upon principles of reasoning absolutely irresistable, that the latter ought to prevail. No court of justice can be authorized so as to construe any clauses of the Const.i.tution as to defeat its obvious ends, when another construction, equally accordant with the words and sense thereof, will enforce and protect them."

In the present case, the Supreme Court holds, that Congress can not legislate upon this subject until the State has pa.s.sed some law contrary to the Const.i.tution.

I call attention in reply to this, to the case of _Hall vs. De Cuir,_ 95 U. S., 486. The State of Louisiana, in 1869, acting in the spirit of these amendments to the Const.i.tution, pa.s.sed a law requiring that all persons engaged within that State in the business of common carriers of pa.s.sengers, should make no discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Under this law, Mrs. De Cuir, a colored woman, took pa.s.sage on a steamer, buying a ticket from New Orleans to Hermitage--the entire trip being within the limits of the State. The captain of the boat refused to give her equal accommodations with other pa.s.sengers--the refusal being on the ground of her color. She commenced suit against the captain in the State Court of Louisiana, and recovered judgment for one thousand dollars. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of that State, and the judgment of the lower court was sustained.

Thereupon, the captain died, and the case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States by his administrator, on the ground that a Federal question was involved.

You will see that this was a case where the State had acted, and had acted exactly in accordance with the const.i.tutional amendments, and had by law provided that the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States--residing in the State of Louisiana--should not be abridged, and that no distinction should be made on account of race or color. But in that case the Supreme Court of the United States solemnly decided that the legislation of the State was void--that the State of Louisiana had no right to interfere--no right, by law, to protect a citizen of the United States from being discriminated against under such circ.u.mstances.

You will remember that the plaintiff, Mrs. De Cuir, was to be carried from New Orleans to Hermitage, and that both places were within the State of Louisiana. Notwithstanding this, the Supreme Court held:

"That if the public good required such legislation, it must come from Congress and not from the State."

What reason do you suppose was given? It was this: The Const.i.tution gives to Congress power to regulate commerce between the States; and it appeared from the evidence given in that case, that the boat plied between the ports of New Orleans and Vicksburg. Consequently, it was engaged in interstate commerce. Therefore, it was under the protection of Congress; and being under the protection of Congress, the State had no authority to protect its citizens by a law in perfect harmony with the Const.i.tution of the United States, while such citizens were within the limits of Louisiana. The Supreme Court scorns the protection of a State!

In the case recently decided, and about which we are talking to-night, the Supreme Court decides exactly the other way. It decides that if the public good requires such legislation, it must come from the States, and not from Congress; that Congress cannot act until the State has acted, and until the State has acted wrong, and that Congress can then only act for the purpose of "correcting" such State action. The decision in _Hall vs. De Cuir_ was rendered in 1877. The Civil Rights Act was then in force, and applied to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, and provided expressly that:

"All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be ent.i.tled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, privileges, and facilities of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public amus.e.m.e.nt, without regard to race or color."

And yet the Supreme Court said:

"No carrier of pa.s.sengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself, or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a State line his pa.s.sengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the other to be kept separate."

What right had the other State to pa.s.s a law that pa.s.sengers should be kept separate, on account of race or color? How could such a law have been const.i.tutional? The Civil Rights Act applied to all States, and to both sides of the lines between all States, and produced absolute uniformity--and did not put the captain to the trouble of dividing his pa.s.sengers. The Court further said:

"Uniformity in the regulations by which the carrier is to be governed from one end to the other of his route, is a necessity in his business."

The uniformity had been guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act, and the statute of the State of Louisiana was in exact conformity with the 14th Amendment and the Civil Rights Act. The Court also said:

"And to secure uniformity, Congress, which is untrammeled by State lines, has been invested with the exclusive power of determining what such regulations shall be."

Yes. Congress has been invested with such power, and Congress has used it in pa.s.sing the Civil Rights Act--and yet, under these circ.u.mstances, the Court proceeds to imagine the difficulty that a captain would have in dividing his pa.s.sengers as he crosses a State line, keeping them apart until he reaches the line of another State, and then bringing them together, and so going on through the process of dispersing and huddling, to the end of his unfortunate route.

It is held by the Supreme Court, that uniformity of duties is essential to the carrier, and so essential, that Congress has control of the whole matter. If uniformity is so desirable for the carrier that Congress takes control, then uniformity as to the rights of pa.s.sengers is equally desirable; and under the 13th and 14th Amendments, Congress has the exclusive power to state what the rights, privileges and immunities of pa.s.sengers shall be. So that, in 1877, the Supreme Court decided that the _States could not_ legislate; and in 1883, that _Congress could not_, unless the State had. If Congress controls interstate commerce upon the navigable waters, it also controls interstate commerce upon the railways. And if Congress has exclusive jurisdiction in the one case, it has in the other. And if it has exclusive jurisdiction, it does not have to wait until States take action. If it does not have to wait until States take action, then the Civil Rights Act, in so far as it refers to the rights of pa.s.sengers going from one State to another, must be const.i.tutional.

It must be remembered, in this discussion, that the 8th Section of the Const.i.tution conferred upon Congress the power:

"To make all laws that may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Const.i.tution in the Government of the United States."

So the 2nd Section of the 13th Article provides:

"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

The same language is used in the 14th and 15th Amendments.

"This clause does not limit--it enlarges--the powers vested in the General Government. It is an additional power--not a restriction on those already granted. It does not impair the right of the Legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures to carry into execution the const.i.tutional powers of the Government. A sound construction of the Const.i.tution must allow to the National Legislature that discretion with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties a.s.signed to it in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate--let it be within the scope of the Const.i.tution, and all means which are appropriate--which are plainly adapted to that end--are const.i.tutional."

This is the language of Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of _M'Caulay, vs. The State_, 4 Wheaton, 316.