The Works of Robert G. Ingersoll Volume XI Part 3

Surely the question of citizenship is "national in its character."

Surely the question as to what are the rights, privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States is "national in its character."

Unless the declarations and definitions, the patriotic paragraphs, and the legal principles made, given, uttered and defined by the Supreme Court are but a judicial jugglery of words, the Civil Rights Act is upheld by the intent, spirit and language of the 14th Amendment.

It was found that the 13th Amendment did not protect the negro. Then the 14th was adopted. Still the colored citizen was trodden under foot. Then the 15th was adopted. The 13th made him free, and, in my judgment, made him a citizen, and clothed him with all the rights of a citizen. That was denied, and then the 14th declared that he was a citizen. In my judgment, that gave him the right to vote. But that was denied--then the 15th was adopted, declaring that his right to vote should never be denied.

The 13th Amendment made all free. It broke the chains, pulled up the whipping-posts, overturned the auction-blocks, gave the colored mother her child, put the shield of the Const.i.tution over the cradle, destroyed all forms of involuntary servitude, and in the azure heaven of our flag it put the Northern Star.

The 14th Amendment made us all citizens. It is a contract between the Republic and each individual--a contract by which the Nation agrees to protect the citizen, and the citizen agrees to defend the Nation. This amendment placed the crown of sovereignty on every brow.

The 15th Amendment secured the citizen in his right to vote, in his right to make and execute the laws, and put these rights above the power of any State. This amendment placed the ballot--the sceptre of authority--in every sovereign hand.

We are told by the Supreme Court, in the case under discussion, that:

"We must not forget that the province and scope of the 13th and 14th Amendments are different;" that the 13th Amendment "simply abolished slavery," and that the 14th Amendment "prohibited the States from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; from depriving them of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; and from denying to any the equal protection of the laws."

We are told that:

"The amendments are different, and the powers of Congress under them are different. What Congress has power to do under one it may not have power to do under the other." That "under the 13th Amendment it has only to do with slavery and its incidents;" but that "under the 14th Amendment it has power to counteract and render nugatory all State laws or proceedings which have the effect to abridge any of the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, or to deprive them of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, or to deny to any of them the equal protection of the laws."

Did not Congress have that power under the 13th Amendment? Could the States, in spite of the 13th Amendment, deprive free men of life or property without due process of law? Does the Supreme Court wish to be understood, that until the 14th Amendment was adopted the States had the right to rob and kill free men? Yet, in its effort to narrow and belittle the 13th Amendment, it has been driven to this absurdity. Did not Congress, under the 13th Amendment, have power to destroy slavery and involuntary servitude? Did not Congress, under that amendment, have the power to protect the lives, liberty and property of free men? And did not Congress have the power "to render nugatory all State laws and proceedings under which free men were to be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law"?

If Congress was not clothed with such power by the 13th Amendment, what was the object of that amendment? Was that amendment a mere opinion, or a prophecy, or the expression of a hope?

The 14th Amendment provides that:

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws."

We are told by the Supreme Court that Congress has no right to enforce the 14th Amendment by direct legislation, but that the legislation under that amendment can only be of a "corrective" character--such as may be necessary or proper for counteracting and redressing the effect of unconst.i.tutional laws pa.s.sed by the States. In other words, that Congress has no duty to perform, except to counteract the effect of unconst.i.tutional laws by corrective legislation.

The Supreme Court has also decided, in the present case, that Congress has no right to legislate for the purpose of enforcing these clauses until the States shall have taken action. What action can the State take? If a State pa.s.ses laws contrary to these provisions or clauses, they are void. If a State pa.s.ses laws in conformity to these provisions, certainly Congress is not called on to legislate. Under what circ.u.mstances, then, can Congress be called upon to act by way of "corrective" legislation, as to these particular clauses? What can Congress do? Suppose the State pa.s.ses no law upon the subject, but allows citizens of the State--managers of railways, and keepers of public inns, to discriminate between their pa.s.sengers and guests on account of race or color--what then?

Again, what is the difference between a State that has no law on the subject, and a State that has pa.s.sed an unconst.i.tutional law? In other words, what is the difference between no law and a void law? If the "corrective" legislation of Congress is not needed where the State has pa.s.sed an unconst.i.tutional law, is it needed where the State has pa.s.sed no law? What is there in either case to correct? Surely it requires no particular legislation on the part of Congress to kill a law that never had life.

The States are prohibited by the Const.i.tution from making any regulations of foreign commerce. Consequently, all regulations made by the States are null and void, no matter what the motive of the States may have been, and it requires no law of Congress to annul such laws or regulations. This was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, long ago, in what are known as _The License Cases_. The opinion may be found in the 5th of Howard, 583.

"The nullity of any act inconsistent with the Const.i.tution, is produced by the declaration that the Const.i.tution is supreme."

This was decided by the Supreme Court, the opinion having been delivered by Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of _Gibbons vs. Ogden_, 9 Wheat, 210.

The same doctrine was held in the case of _Henderson et al., vs. Mayor of New York, et al._, 92 U. S. 272--the opinion of the Court being delivered by Justice Miller.

So it was held in the case of _The Board of Liquidation vs. McComb_--2 Otto, 541.

"That an unconst.i.tutional law will be treated by the courts as null and void"--citing _Osborn vs. The Bank of the United States_, 9 Wheaton, 859, and _Davis vs. Gray_, 16 Wallace, 220.

Now, if the legislation of Congress must be "corrective," then I ask, corrective of what? Certainly not of unconst.i.tutional and void laws.

That which is void, cannot be corrected. That which is unconst.i.tutional is not the subject of correction. Congress either has the right to legislate directly, or not at all; because indirect or corrective legislation can apply only, according to the Supreme Court, to unconst.i.tutional and void laws that have been pa.s.sed by a Stale; and as such laws cannot be "corrected," the doctrine of "corrective legislation" dies an extremely natural death.

A State can do one of three things: 1. It can pa.s.s an unconst.i.tutional law; 2. It can pa.s.s a const.i.tutional law; 3. It can fail to pa.s.s any law. The unconst.i.tutional law, being void, cannot be corrected. The const.i.tutional law does not need correction. And where no law has been pa.s.sed, correction is impossible.

The Supreme Court insists that Congress can not take action until the State does. A State that fails to pa.s.s any law on the subject, has not taken action. This leaves the person whose immunities and privileges have been invaded, with no redress except such as he may find in the State Courts in a suit at law; and if the State Court takes the same view that is apparently taken by the Supreme Court in this case,--namely, that it is a "social question," one not to be regulated by law, and not covered in any way by the Const.i.tution--then, discrimination can be made against citizens by landlords and railway conductors, and they are left absolutely without remedy.

The Supreme Court asks, in this decision,

"Can the act of a mere individual--the owner of the inn, or public conveyance, or place of amus.e.m.e.nt, refusing the accommodation, be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, or only as inflicting an ordinary civil injury properly cognizable by the laws of the State, and presumably subject to redress by those laws, until the contrary appears?"

How is "the contrary to appear"? Suppose a person denied equal privileges upon the railway on account of race and color, brings suit and is defeated? And suppose the highest tribunal of the State holds that the question is of a "social" character--what then? If, to use the language of the Supreme Court, it is "an ordinary civil injury, imposing no badge of slavery or servitude," then, no Federal question is involved.

Why did not the Supreme Court tell us what may be done when "the contrary appears"? Nothing is clearer than the intention of the Supreme Court in this case--and that is, to decide that denying to a man equal accommodations at public inns on account of race or color, is not an abridgment of a privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States, and that such person, so denied, is not in a condition of involuntary servitude, or denied the equal protection of the laws. In other words--that it is a "social question."

I have been told by one who heard the decision when it was read from the bench, that the following phrase was in the opinion:

"_There are certain physiological differences of race that cannot be ignored_."

That phrase is a lamp, in the light of which the whole decision should be read.

Suppose that in one of the Southern States, the negroes being in a decided majority and having entire control, had drawn the color line, had insisted that:

"There were certain physiological differences between the races that could not be ignored," and had refused to allow white people to enter their hotels, to ride in the best cars, or to occupy the aristocratic portion of a theatre; and suppose that a white man, thrust from the hotels, denied the entrance to cars, had brought his suit in the Federal Court. Does any one believe that the Supreme Court would have intimated to that man that "there is only a social question involved,--a question with which the Const.i.tution and laws have nothing to do, and that he must depend for his remedy upon the authors of the injury"? Would a white man, under such circ.u.mstances, feel that he was in a condition of involuntary servitude? Would he feel that he was treated like an underling, like a menial, like a serf? Would he feel that he was under the protection of the laws, shielded like other men by the Const.i.tution?

Of course, the argument of color is just as strong on one side as on the other. The white man says to the black, "You are not my equal because you are black;" and the black man can with the same propriety, reply, "You are not my equal because you are white." The difference is just as great in the one case as in the other. The pretext that this question involves, in the remotest degree, a social question, is cruel, shallow, and absurd.

The Supreme Court, some time ago, held that the 4th Section of the Civil Rights Act was const.i.tutional. That section declares that:

"No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or maybe prescribed by law, shall be disqualified for service as grand or pet.i.t juror in any court of the United States or of any State, on account of color or previous condition of servitude."

It also provides that:

"If any officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors, shall exclude, or fail to summon, any citizen in the case aforesaid, he shall, on conviction, be guilty of misdemeanor and be fined not more than five hundred dollars."

In the case known as _Ex-parte vs. Virginia_--found in 100 U. S. 339--it was held that an indictment against a State officer, under this section, for excluding persons of color from the jury, could be sustained. Now, let it be remembered, there was no law of the State of Virginia, by virtue of which a man was disqualified from sitting on the jury by reason of race or color. The officer did exclude, and did fail to summon, a citizen on account of race or color or previous condition of servitude. And the Supreme Court held:

"That whether the Statute-book of the State actually laid down any such rule of disqualification or not, the State, through its officer, enforced such rule; and that it was against such State action, through its officers and agents, that the last clause of the section was directed."

The Court further held that:

"This aspect of the law was deemed sufficient to divest it of any unconst.i.tutional character."

In other words, the Supreme Court held that the officer was an agent of the State, although acting contrary to the statute of the State; and that, consequently, such officer, acting outside of law, was amenable to the Civil Rights Act, under the 14th Amendment, that referred only to States. The question arises: Is a State responsible for the action of its agent when acting contrary to law? In other words: Is the princ.i.p.al bound by the acts of his agent, that act not being within the scope of his authority? Is a State liable--or is the Government liable--for the act of any officer, that act not being authorized by law?

It has been decided a thousand times, that a State is not liable for the torts and trespa.s.ses of its officers. How then can the agent, acting outside of his authority, be prosecuted under a law deriving its entire validity from a const.i.tutional amendment applying only to States? Does an officer, by acting contrary to State law, become so like a State that the word State, used in the Const.i.tution, includes him?

So it was held in the case of _Neal vs. Delaware_,--103 U. S., 307,--that an officer acting contrary to the laws of the State--in defiance of those laws--would be amenable to the Civil Rights Act, pa.s.sed under an amendment to the Const.i.tution now held applicable only to States.

It is admitted, and expressly decided in the case of _The U. S. vs.

Reese et al._, (already quoted) that when the wrongful refusal at an election is because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, Congress can interfere and provide for the punishment of any individual guilty of such refusal, no matter whether such individual acted under or against the authority of the State.

With this statement I most heartily agree. I agree that: