The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 24

[Footnote 236: That pa/nk/ajana/h/ is only one word appears from its having only one accent, viz. the udatta on the last syllable, which udatta becomes anudatta according to the rules laid down in the Bhashika Sutra for the accentuation of the /S/atapatha-brahma/n/a.]

[Footnote 237: So in the Madhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the Ka/n/va recension has not the clause 'the food of food.']

[Footnote 238: This in answer to the Sankhya who objects to jana when applied to the prana, &c. being interpreted with the help of laksha/n/a; while if referred to the pradhana, &c. it may be explained to have a direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika interpretation (the pradhana being jana because it produces, the mahat &c. being jana because they are produced). The Vedntin points out that the compound pa/nk/ajana/h/ has its own ru/dh/i-meaning, just as a/s/vakar/n/a, literally horse-ear, which conventionally denotes a certain plant.]

[Footnote 239: We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that the yupa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.]

[Footnote 240: Option being possible only in the case of things to be accomplished, i.e. actions.]

[Footnote 241: According to Go. an. in the pa.s.sage, 'That made itself its Self' (II, 7); according to an. Giri in the pa.s.sage, 'He created all' (II, 6).]

[Footnote 242: By the Brahma/n/as being meant all those Brahma/n/as who are not at the same time wandering mendicants.]

[Footnote 243: The comment of the Bhamati on the Sutra runs as follows: As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire, because they partic.i.p.ate in the nature of the fire; and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other; so the individual souls also--which are effects of Brahman--are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and somehow non-different.--The technical name of the doctrine here represented by a/s/marathya is bhedabhedavada.]

[Footnote 244: Bhamati: The individual soul is absolutely different from the highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself by means of knowledge and meditation it may pa.s.s out of the body and become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pa/nk/aratrikas: 'Up to the moment of emanc.i.p.ation being reached the soul and the highest Self are different. But the emanc.i.p.ated soul is no longer different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference.'--The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au/d/ulomi is satyabhedavada.]

[Footnote 245: Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, 1, 11.]

[Footnote 246: And not the relation of absolute ident.i.ty.]

[Footnote 247: I.e. upon the state of emanc.i.p.ation and its absence.]

[Footnote 248: Upapadita/m/ /k/eti, sarvasyatmamatratvam iti /s/esha/h/.

Upapadanaprakara/m/ su/k/ayati eketi. Sa yathardrendhanagner ityadinaikaprasavatvam, yatha sarvasam apam ityadina /k/aikapralayatva/m/ sarvasyoktam. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 249: So according to Go. an. and an. Gi., although their interpretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekam of the text.--Ka/mk/id evaikam iti jivasthanad anyam ity artha/h/. Go.

an.--Jivabhavena pratibimbadharatiriktam ity artha/h/. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 250: While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.]

[Footnote 251: I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause are separate things.]

[Footnote 252: Viz. the [email protected]/ri/ti.]

SECOND ADHYaYA.

FIRST PaDA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. If it be objected that (from the doctrine expounded hitherto) there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis; we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other Sm/ri/tis.

It has been shown in the first adhyaya that the omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four cla.s.ses of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has further been proved, by a demonstration of the connected meaning of all the Vedanta-texts, that the Lord is the Self of all of us. Moreover, the doctrines of the pradhana, and so on, being the cause of this world have been refuted as not being scriptural.--The purport of the second adhyaya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on Sm/ri/ti and Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the pradhana, &c. have only fallacious arguments to lean upon, and that the different Vedanta-texts do not contradict one another with regard to the mode of creation and similar topics.--The first point is to refute the objections based on Sm/ri/ti.

Your doctrine (the purvapakshin says) that the omniscient Brahman only is the cause of this world cannot be maintained, 'because there results from it the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis.' Such Sm/ri/tis are the one called Tantra which was composed by a /ri/shi and is accepted by authoritative persons, and other Sm/ri/tis based on it[253]; for all of which there would be no room if your interpretation of the Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the non-intelligent pradhana is the independent cause of the world. There is indeed room (a raison d'etre) for Sm/ri/tis like the Manu-sm/ri/ti, which give information about matters connected with the whole body of religious duty, characterised by injunction[254] and comprising the agnihotra and similar performances. They tell us at what time and with what rites the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how the Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to take place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They further lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, of the four castes and a/s/ramas[255]. The Kapila Sm/ri/ti, on the other hand, and similar books are not concerned with things to be done, but were composed with exclusive reference to perfect knowledge as the means of final release. If then no room were left for them in that connexion also, they would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain the Vedanta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict with the Sm/ri/tis mentioned[256].--But how, somebody may ask the purvapakshin, can the eventual fault of there being left no room for certain Sm/ri/tis be used as an objection against that sense of /S/ruti which--from various reasons as detailed under I, 1 and ff.--has been ascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world?--Our objection, the purvapakshin replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent thought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are unable to ascertain by themselves the sense of /S/ruti, they naturally rely on Sm/ri/tis, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive at the sense of /S/ruti with their a.s.sistance; while, owing to their esteem for the authors of the Sm/ri/tis, they have no trust in our explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila Sm/ri/ti declares to have been /ri/shi-like and un.o.bstructed, and moreover there is the following /S/ruti-pa.s.sage, 'It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the son, the /ri/shi, kapila[257], whom he wishes to look on while he is born' (/S/ve. Up. V, 2). Hence their opinion cannot be a.s.sumed to be erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore attempt to explain the Vedanta-texts in conformity with the Sm/ri/tis.

This objection we dispose of by the remark, 'It is not so because therefrom would result the fault of want of room for other Sm/ri/tis.'--If you object to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world on the ground that it would render certain Sm/ri/tis purposeless, you thereby render purposeless other Sm/ri/tis which declare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter Sm/ri/ti-texts we will quote in what follows. In one pa.s.sage the highest Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, 'That which is subtle and not to be known;' the text then goes on, 'That is the internal Self of the creatures, their soul,' and after that remarks 'From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three gu/n/as, O best of Brahma/n/as.' And in another place it is said that 'the Unevolved is dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brahma/n/a.'--Thus we read also in the Pura/n/a, 'Hear thence this short statement: The ancient Naraya/n/a is all this; he produces the creation at the due time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again.' And so in the Bhagavadgita also (VII, 6), 'I am the origin and the place of reabsorption of the whole world.' And apastamba too says with reference to the highest Self, 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable' (Dharma Sutra I, 8, 23, 2). In this way Sm/ri/ti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient as well as the material cause of the world. As the purvapakshin opposes us on the ground of Sm/ri/ti, we reply to him on the ground of Sm/ri/ti only; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Now it has been shown already that the /S/ruti-texts aim at conveying the doctrine that the Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Sm/ri/tis conflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which maintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Sm/ri/tis which follow /S/ruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others are to be disregarded; according to the Sutra met with in the chapter treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3, 3), 'Where there is contradiction (between /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti) (Sm/ri/ti) is to be disregarded; in case of there being no (contradiction) (Sm/ri/ti is to be recognised) as there is inference (of Sm/ri/ti being founded on /S/ruti).'--Nor can we a.s.sume that some persons are able to perceive supersensuous matters without /S/ruti, as there exists no efficient cause for such perception. Nor, again, can it be said that such perception may be a.s.sumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed supernatural powers, and consequently un.o.bstructed power of cognition.

For the possession of supernatural powers itself depends on the performance of religious duty, and religious duty is that which is characterised by injunction[258]; hence the sense of injunctions (i.e.

of the Veda) which is established first must not be fancifully interpreted in reference to the dicta of men 'established' (i.e. made perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) afterwards only.

Moreover, even if those 'perfect' men were accepted as authorities to be appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have, in all those cases where the Sm/ri/tis contradict each other in the manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to /S/ruti.--As to men dest.i.tute of the power of independent judgment, we are not justified in a.s.suming that they will without any reason attach themselves to some particular Sm/ri/ti; for if men's inclinations were so altogether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the Sm/ri/tis, and the distinction founded on some of them following /S/ruti and others not.--The scriptural pa.s.sage which the purvapakshin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i.e. of some Kapila) as are contrary to Scripture; for that pa.s.sage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname Vasudeva. That pa.s.sage, moreover, serves another purpose, (viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means, (viz. the supereminence of Kapila's knowledge.) On the other hand, we have a /S/ruti-pa.s.sage which proclaims the excellence of Manu[259], viz.

'Whatever Manu said is medicine' (Taitt. Sa/m/h. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything ('he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self, he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-luminousness,' i.e. becomes Brahman, Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Mahabharata also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, 'There are many persons, O King, according to the [email protected] and Yoga philosophers;' that opinion is controverted 'just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal person raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there is one universal Self, 'He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will and liking.' And Scripture also declares that there is one universal Self, 'When to a man who understands the Self has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity?' (i/s/. Up 7); and other similar pa.s.sages. All which proves that the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not only by the a.s.sumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition.

Hence the circ.u.mstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room for certain Sm/ri/tis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection.--An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the following Sutra.

2. And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects of the pradhana, according to the [email protected] system).

The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its modifications which the ([email protected]) Sm/ri/ti a.s.sumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Sm/ri/ti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense--Sm/ri/ti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural pa.s.sages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1.

But if that part of Sm/ri/ti which is concerned with the effects (i.e.

the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise. This is what the Sutra means to say.--We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circ.u.mstance of there being no room left for certain Sm/ri/tis does not const.i.tute a valid objection to our doctrine.--The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the [email protected] doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.

3. Thereby the Yoga (Sm/ri/ti) is refuted.

This Sutra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the [email protected]/ri/ti the Yoga-sm/ri/ti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also a.s.sumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.--But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sutra does.)--We reply that here an additional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon[260].' In the /S/veta/s/vatara Upanishad, moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with the a.s.sumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, 8).

Further, we find very many pa.s.sages in the Veda which (without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;'

'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-/s/astra itself the pa.s.sage, 'Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the /s/astra at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the entire Yoga-sm/ri/ti will have to be accepted as un.o.bjectionable, just as the Sm/ri/ti referring to the ash/t/akas[261].--To this we reply that the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed against the [email protected]) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-sm/ri/ti being authoritative, the disagreement (between Sm/ri/ti and /S/ruti) on other topics remains as shown above.--Although[262] there are many Sm/ri/tis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the [email protected] and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic pa.s.sage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by [email protected] and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (/S/ve.

Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last pa.s.sage might be set up for the [email protected] and Yoga-sm/ri/tis in their entirety) we refute by the remark that the highest beat.i.tude (the highest aim of man) is not to be attained by the knowledge of the [email protected]/ri/ti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the highest beat.i.tude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death pa.s.ses only the man who knows him; there is no other path to go' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). And the [email protected] and Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the pa.s.sage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by [email protected] and Yoga') the terms '[email protected]' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from proximity[263]. We willingly allow room for those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities the [email protected] are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person (purusha) is essentially pure; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural pa.s.sages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrajaka with discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c.

(Jabala Upan. IV).

The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all argumentative Sm/ri/tis. If it be said that those Sm/ri/tis also a.s.sist, by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain all the same that the truth can be known from the Vedanta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural pa.s.sages such as 'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br.

III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads'

(B/ri/. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.

4. (Brahman can) not (be the cause of the world) on account of the difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such, (i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.

The objections, founded on Sm/ri/ti, against the doctrine of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.--But (to raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious duty (dharma).--(To this the purvapakshin replies), The a.n.a.logy between Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be known through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties, i.e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing, and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural pa.s.sages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them accord with one, so /S/ruti, if in conflict with other means of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter.

Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than /S/ruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates in a perception (viz. the intuition--sakshatkara--of Brahman), and as such must be a.s.sumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like dharma)[264]. Moreover, the scriptural pa.s.sage, 'He is to be heard, to be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of the difference of nature of this (effect).'--The Vedantic opinion that the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedantin considers as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure, consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is gold the material cause of earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character. The difference in character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief, despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various character such as heaven, h.e.l.l, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).--But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his master.--This a.n.a.logy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for nor against any other being. For the [email protected] are of opinion that the intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking in or giving out anything[265], and are non-active. Hence that only which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor[266] is there anything to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are of an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.--Here somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I a.s.sume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of the modification[267]. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent).--This reasoning--the purvapakshin replies--if valid might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between Brahman and the world which is due to the circ.u.mstance of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the objector does not even remove the first-named difference; as is declared in the latter part of the Sutra, 'And its being such we learn from Scripture.' For the a.s.sumption of the intellectuality of the entire world--which is supported neither by perception nor by inference, &c.--must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other texts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature,' i.e. of a nature different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural pa.s.sage, 'It became that which is knowledge and that which is devoid of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain cla.s.s of beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intelligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman.--But--somebody might again object--the sacred texts themselves sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent beings. The following pa.s.sages, for instance, attribute intelligence to the elements. 'The earth spoke;' 'The waters spoke' (/S/at. Br. VI, 1, 3, 2; 4); and, again, 'Fire thought;' 'Water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, 'These pra/n/as when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, 'They said to Speech: Do thou sing out for us' (B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 2).--To this objection the purvapakshin replies in the following Sutra.

5. But (there takes place) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of the difference and the connexion.

The word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are not ent.i.tled to base the a.s.sumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an intellectual nature on such pa.s.sages as 'the earth spoke,' &c. because 'there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence, the scriptural pa.s.sages denote not the mere material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth, &c., on the one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so?

'On account of the difference and the connexion.' The difference is the one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand, and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent beings; that difference would not be possible if all beings were intelligent. Moreover, the Kaus.h.i.takins in their account of the dispute of the pra/n/as make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order to include the superintending intelligent beings. They say, 'The deities contending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these deities having recognised the pre-eminence in pra/n/a' (Kau. Up. II, 14).--And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavadas, Itihasas, Pura/n/as, &c. all declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with everything. Moreover, such scriptural pa.s.sages as 'Agni having become Speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. ar. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the pa.s.sages supplementary to the quarrel of the pra/n/as we read in one place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they went to Praj.a.pati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of presence and absence, each of them, as Praj.a.pati had advised, departing from the body for some time ('They went to their father Praj.a.pati and said,' &c,; Ch. Up. V, 1, 7); and in another place it is said that they made an offering to pra/n/a (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 13), &c.; all of them proceedings which are a.n.a.logous to those of men, &c., and therefore strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending deities. In the case of such pa.s.sages as, 'Fire thought,' we must a.s.sume that the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is connected with its effects as a superintending principle.--From all this it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence cannot have it for its material cause.

To this objection raised by the purvapakshin the next Sutra replies.

6. But it is seen.

The word 'but' discards the purvapaksha.

Your a.s.sertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on account of the difference of its character is not founded on an absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to be intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate, and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are produced.--But--to state an objection--the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent bodies only of scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung.--Even thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of nature--due to the cause pa.s.sing over into the effect--between the bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is, on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two) would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men and hair as well as in that of scorpions and cow-dung there is one characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature; we reply that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz. that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).--He, moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must a.s.sert that he understands by difference of attributes either the non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other) characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of intelligence. The first a.s.sertion would lead to the negation of the relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause (for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be distinguished). The second a.s.sertion is open to the charge of running counter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found likewise in ether and so on. For the third a.s.sertion the requisite proving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general a.s.sertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an effect of Brahman? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things has Brahman for its material cause. And that all such a.s.sertions are contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the world. It has indeed been maintained by the purvapakshin that the other means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman, on account of its being an accomplished ent.i.ty (not something to be accomplished as religious duties are); but such an a.s.sertion is entirely gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of perception; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but, like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O dearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation sprang?' (/Ri/g-v. Sa/m/h. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings (i/s/vara)[268] of extraordinary power and wisdom.

There are also the following Sm/ri/ti pa.s.sages to the same effect: 'Do not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable[269];'

'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions of the G.o.ds know my origin, not the great /ri/shis. For I myself am in every way the origin of the G.o.ds and great /ri/shis' (Bha. Gi. X, 2).--And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural pa.s.sage enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the sacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be allowed its place, we reply that the pa.s.sage must not deceitfully be taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world; that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from Brahman, according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, &c.[270] The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).--He[271], moreover, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world would a.s.sume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would find room for the other scriptural pa.s.sage quoted above ('He became knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i.e. the ), would not be able to make anything of the pa.s.sage, for it distinctly teaches that the highest cause const.i.tutes the Self of the entire world.