The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 23

18. But Jaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul) has another purport, on account of the question and answer; and thus some also (read in their text).

Whether the pa.s.sage under discussion is concerned with the individual soul or with Brahman, is, in the opinion of the teacher Jaimini, no matter for dispute, since the reference to the individual soul has a different purport, i.e. aims at intimating Brahman. He founds this his opinion on a question and a reply met with in the text. After Ajata/s/atru has taught Balaki, by waking the sleeping man, that the soul is different from the vital air, he asks the following question, 'Balaki, where did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence came he thus back?' This question clearly refers to something different from the individual soul. And so likewise does the reply, 'When sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one with that pra/n/a alone;' and, 'From that Self all pra/n/as proceed, each towards its place, from the pra/n/as the G.o.ds, from the G.o.ds the worlds.'--Now it is the general Vedanta doctrine that at the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with the highest Brahman, and that from the highest Brahman the whole world proceeds, inclusive of pra/n/a, and so on. When Scripture therefore represents as the object of knowledge that in which there takes place the deep sleep of the soul, characterised by absence of consciousness and utter tranquillity, i.e. a state devoid of all those specific cognitions which are produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul, and from which the soul returns when the sleep is broken; we understand that the highest Self is meant.--Moreover, the Vajasaneyi/s/akha, which likewise contains the colloquy of Balaki and Ajata/s/atru, clearly refers to the individual soul by means of the term, 'the person consisting of cognition' (vij/n/anamaya), and distinguishes from it the highest Self ('Where was then the person consisting of cognition? and from whence did he thus come back?' B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 16); and later on, in the reply to the above question, declares that 'the person consisting of cognition lies in the ether within the heart.' Now we know that the word 'ether'

may be used to denote the highest Self, as, for instance, in the pa.s.sage about the small ether within the lotus of the heart (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1). Further on the B/ri/. Up. says, 'All the Selfs came forth from that Self;' by which statement of the coming forth of all the conditioned Selfs it intimates that the highest Self is the one general cause.--The doctrine conveyed by the rousing of the sleeping person, viz. that the individual soul is different from the vital air, furnishes at the same time a further argument against the opinion that the pa.s.sage under discussion refers to the vital air.

19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the highest Self) on account of the connected meaning of the sentences.

We read in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka, in the Maitreyi-brahma/n/a the following pa.s.sage, 'Verily, a husband is not dear that you may love the husband, &c. &c.; verily, everything is not dear that you may love everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear.

Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked, O Maitreyi! When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6).--Here the doubt arises whether that which is represented as the object to be seen, to be heard, and so on, is the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the highest Self.--But whence the doubt?--Because, we reply, the Self is, on the one hand, by the mention of dear things such as husband and so on, indicated as the enjoyer whence it appears that the pa.s.sage refers to the individual soul; and because, on the other hand, the declaration that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known points to the highest Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that the pa.s.sage refers to the individual soul, on account of the strength of the initial statement. The text declares at the outset that all the objects of enjoyment found in this world, such as husband, wife, riches, and so on, are dear on account of the Self, and thereby gives us to understand that the enjoying (i.e. the individual) Self is meant; if thereupon it refers to the Self as the object of sight and so on, what other Self should it mean than the same individual Self?--A subsequent pa.s.sage also (viz. 'Thus does this great Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise from out of these elements, and vanish again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge'), which describes how the great Being under discussion rises, as the Self of knowledge, from the elements, shows that the object of sight is no other than the cognitional Self, i.e. the individual soul. The concluding clause finally, 'How, O beloved, should he know the knower?' shows, by means of the term 'knower,' which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is meant. The declaration that through the cognition of the Self everything becomes known must therefore not be interpreted in the literal sense, but must be taken to mean that the world of objects of enjoyment is known through its relation to the enjoying soul.

To this we make the following reply.--The pa.s.sage makes a statement about the highest Self, on account of the connected meaning of the entire section. If we consider the different pa.s.sages in their mutual connexion, we find that they all refer to the highest Self. After Maitreyi has heard from Yaj/n/avalkya that there is no hope of immortality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in the words, 'What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal?

What my Lord knoweth tell that to me;' and thereupon Yaj/n/avalkya expounds to her the knowledge of the Self. Now Scripture as well as Sm/ri/ti declares that immortality is not to be reached but through the knowledge of the highest Self.--The statement further that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known can be taken in its direct literal sense only if by the Self we understand the highest cause. And to take it in a non-literal sense (as the purvapakshin proposes) is inadmissible, on account of the explanation given of that statement in a subsequent pa.s.sage, viz. 'Whosoever looks for the Brahman cla.s.s elsewhere than in the Self, is abandoned by the Brahman cla.s.s.'

Here it is said that whoever erroneously views this world with its Brahmans and so on, as having an independent existence apart from the Self, is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an erroneous view; whereby the view that there exists any difference is refuted. And the immediately subsequent clause, 'This everything is the Self,' gives us to understand that the entire aggregate of existing things is non-different from the Self; a doctrine further confirmed by the similes of the drum and so on.--By explaining further that the Self about which he had been speaking is the cause of the universe of names, forms, and works ('There has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have as /Ri/gveda,' &c.) Yaj/n/avalkya again shows that it is the highest Self.--To the same conclusion he leads us by declaring, in the paragraph which treats of the natural centres of things, that the Self is the centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind, that it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a ma.s.s of knowledge.--From all this it follows that what the text represents as the object of sight and so on is the highest Self.

We now turn to the remark made by the purvapakshin that the pa.s.sage teaches the individual soul to be the object of sight, because it is, in the early part of the chapter denoted as something dear.

20. (The circ.u.mstance of the soul being represented as the object of sight) indicates the fulfilment of the promissory statement; so a/s/marathya thinks.

The fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight that Self which is denoted as something, dear indicates the fulfilment of the promise made in the pa.s.sages, 'When the Self is known all this is known,' 'All this is that Self.' For if the individual soul were different from the highest Self, the knowledge of the latter would not imply the knowledge of the former, and thus the promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything is to be known would not be fulfilled. Hence the initial statement aims at representing the individual Self and the highest Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise made.--This is the opinion of the teacher a/s/marathya[243].

21. (The initial statement identifies the individual soul and the highest Self) because the soul when it will depart (from the body) is such (i.e. one with the highest Self); thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.

The individual soul which is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and mind (mano-buddhi), attains through the instrumentality of knowledge, meditation, and so on, a state of complete serenity, and thus enables itself, when pa.s.sing at some future time out of the body, to become one with the highest Self; hence the initial statement in which it is represented as non-different from the highest Self. This is the opinion of the teacher Au/d/ulomi.--Thus Scripture says, 'That serene being arising from this body appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).--In another place Scripture intimates, by means of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the individual soul, 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8). I.e. as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes united with the highest person. That the latter half of the pa.s.sage has the meaning here a.s.signed to it, follows from the parallelism which we must a.s.sume to exist between the two members of the comparison[244].

22. (The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) exists in the condition (of the individual soul); so Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks.

Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the individual soul, therefore, the teacher Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks, the initial statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is possible. That the highest Self only is that which appears as the individual soul, is evident from the Brahma/n/a-pa.s.sage, 'Let me enter into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms,' and similar pa.s.sages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, 'The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names' (Taitt. ar. III, 12, 7)[245]. And where Scripture relates the creation of fire and the other elements, it does not at the same time relate a separate creation of the individual soul; we have therefore no right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self, different from the latter.--In the opinion of the teacher Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual soul, not anything else. a/s/marathya, although meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates by the expression, 'On account of the fulfilment of the promise'--which declares a certain mutual dependence--that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul[246]. The opinion of Au/d/ulomi again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition[247]. Of these three opinions we conclude that the one held by Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what all the Vedanta-texts (so, for instance, the pa.s.sage, 'That art thou') aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna immortality can be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul; while it would be impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture speaks in some places as a.n.a.logous to the issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.

The last three Sutras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish replies to the second of the purvapakshin's arguments, viz. that the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka pa.s.sage represents as the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements. 'There is an indication of the fulfilment of the promise; so a/s/marathya thinks.' The promise is made in the two pa.s.sages, 'When the Self is known, all this is known,' and 'All this is that Self.' That the Self is everything, is proved by the declaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from one being, and is merged in one being[248]; and by its being demonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that effect and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is, then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements; thus the teacher a/s/marathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one everything becomes known is capable of fulfilment.--'Because the soul when it will depart is such; thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.' The statement as to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the soul when--after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on--it will depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self.

This is Au/d/ulomi's opinion.--'Because it exists in the condition of the soul; thus Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna opines.' Because the highest Self itself is that which appears as the individual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the teacher Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna.

But, an objection may be raised, the pa.s.sage, 'Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge,' intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its ident.i.ty with the highest Self!--By no means, we reply. The pa.s.sage means to say only that on the soul departing from the body all specific cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For an objection being raised--in the pa.s.sage, 'Here thou hast bewildered me, Sir, when thou sayest that having departed there is no more knowledge'. Scripture itself explains that what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self, 'I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is imperishable, and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place non-connexion with the matras.' That means: The eternally unchanging Self, which is one ma.s.s of knowledge, cannot possibly perish; but by means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the matras, i.e. the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience. When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition, which depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, that 'When he has departed there is no more knowledge.'

The third argument also of the purvapakshin, viz. that the word 'knower'--which occurs in the concluding pa.s.sage, 'How should he know the knower?'--denotes an agent, and therefore refers to the individual soul as the object of sight, is to be refuted according to the view of Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna.--Moreover, the text after having enumerated--in the pa.s.sage, 'For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other,' &c.--all the kinds of specific cognition which belong to the sphere of Nescience declares--in the subsequent pa.s.sage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?'--that in the sphere of true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is absent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence of objects the knower might not know himself, Yaj/n/avalkya goes on, 'How, O beloved, should he know himself, the knower?' As thus the latter pa.s.sage evidently aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we have to conclude that the word 'knower' is here used to denote that being which is knowledge, i.e. the Self.--That the view of Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is so, all the adherents of the Vedanta must admit that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and form as presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation from Scripture; compare, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is no other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23); 'There is nothing that sees but it' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11).--It is likewise confirmed by Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, 'Vasudeva is all this' (Bha. Gi. VII, 19); 'Know me, O Bharata, to be the soul in all bodies' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 2); 'He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike within all creatures'

(Bha. Gi. XIII, 27).--The same conclusion is supported by those pa.s.sages which deny all difference; compare, for instance, 'If he thinks, that is one and I another; he does not know' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'From death to death he goes who sees here any diversity' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19).

And, again, by those pa.s.sages which negative all change on the part of the Self; compare, for instance, 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 24).--Moreover, if the doctrine of general ident.i.ty were not true, those who are desirous of release could not be in the possession of irrefutable knowledge, and there would be no possibility of any matter being well settled; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and Scripture speaks of those, 'Who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the Vedanta' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6). Compare also the pa.s.sage, 'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that unity?' (I/s/. Up. 7.)--And Sm/ri/ti also represents the mind of him who contemplates the Self as steady (Bha. Gi. II, 54).

As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selfs, and to maintain that the individual soul is different from the highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor does the pa.s.sage, 'He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul)[249]. And that n.o.body else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent pa.s.sage, viz. 'Having sent forth he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only entered into the created beings.--Those who insist on the distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the Vedanta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which is the door to perfect beat.i.tude, and groundlessly a.s.sume release to be something effected, and therefore non-eternal[250]. (And if they attempt to show that moksha, although effected, is eternal) they involve themselves in a conflict with sound logic.

23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the ill.u.s.trative instances.

It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to be enquired into because it is the cause of an increase of happiness, so Brahman has to be enquired into because it is the cause of absolute beat.i.tude. And Brahman has been defined as that from which there proceed the origination, sustentation, and retractation of this world. Now as this definition comprises alike the relation of substantial causality in which clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden ornaments and earthen pots, and the relation of operative causality in which the potter and the goldsmith stand to the things mentioned; a doubt arises to which of these two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.

The purvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is the operative cause of the world only, because Scripture declares his creative energy to be preceded by reflection. Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 3; 4: 'He reflected, he created pra/n/a.' For observation shows that the action of operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, and moreover that the result of some activity is brought about by the concurrence of several factors[251]. It is therefore appropriate that we should view the prime creator in the same light. The circ.u.mstance of his being known as 'the Lord' furnishes another argument. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are known only as operative causes, and the highest Lord also must on that account be viewed as an operative cause only.--Further, the effect of the creator's activity, viz. this world, is seen to consist of parts, to be non-intelligent and impure; we therefore must a.s.sume that its cause also is of the same nature; for it is a matter of general observation that cause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman does not resemble the world in nature, we know from many scriptural pa.s.sages, such as 'It is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but to admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material cause of the world of impure nature, such as is known from Sm/ri/ti[252], and to limit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to operative causality.

To this we make the following reply.--Brahman is to be acknowledged as the material cause as well as the operative cause; because this latter view does not conflict with the promissory statements and the ill.u.s.trative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the following one, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived, perceived; that which is not known, known?' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This pa.s.sage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause, since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is different from the house he has built.--The ill.u.s.trative example referred to is the one mentioned (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4), 'My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e.

the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely;' which pa.s.sage again has reference to the material cause. The text adds a few more ill.u.s.trative instances of similar nature, 'As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known.'--Similar promissory statements are made in other places also, for instance, 'What is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3.) An ill.u.s.trative instance also is given in the same place, 'As plants grow on the earth' (I, 1, 7).--Compare also the promissory statement in B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6, 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known;' and the ill.u.s.trative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), 'Now as the sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum.'--Similar promissory statements and ill.u.s.trative instances which are to be found in all Vedanta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also in the pa.s.sage, 'That from whence (yata/h/) these beings are born,' has to be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings, according to the grammatical rule, Pa/n/. I, 4, 30.--That Brahman is at the same time the operative cause of the world, we have to conclude from the circ.u.mstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinarily material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths; but outside Brahman as material cause there is no other operative cause to which the material cause could look; for Scripture says that previously to creation Brahman was one without a second.--The absence of a guiding principle other than the material cause can moreover be established by means of the argument made use of in the Sutra, viz. accordance with the promissory statements and the ill.u.s.trative examples. If there were admitted a guiding principle different from the material cause, it would follow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and thereby the promissory statements as well as the ill.u.s.trative instances would be stultified.--The Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no other ruling principle, and the material cause because there is no other substance from which the world could originate.

24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the Self).

The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected likewise shows that it is the operative as well as the material cause. Pa.s.sages like 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'He thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' show, in the first place, that the Self is the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by the Self's reflection; and, in the second place, that it is the material cause also, since the words 'May I be many' intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying itself has the inward Self for its object.

25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution of the world) being directly declared (to have Brahman for their material cause).

This Sutra supplies a further argument for Brahman's being the general material cause.--Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the world is directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their material cause, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether and return into the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). That that from which some other thing springs and into which it returns is the material cause of that other thing is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the material cause of rice, barley, and the like.--The word 'directly' (in the Sutra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that all this sprang from the ether only.--Observation further teaches that effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material causes.

26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making itself; (which is possible) owing to modification.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that Scripture--in the pa.s.sage, 'That made itself its Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 7)--represents the Self as the object of action as well as the agent.--But how can the Self which as agent was in full existence previously to the action be made out to be at the same time that which is effected by the action?--Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full existence previously to the action, modifies itself into something special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal substances, such as clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of modification, changed into their products.--The word 'itself' in the pa.s.sage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative cause but the Self.

The word 'pari/n/amat' (in the Sutra) may also be taken as const.i.tuting a separate Sutra by itself, the sense of which would be: Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also, that the sacred text speaks of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect as co-ordinated, viz. in the pa.s.sage, 'It became sat and tyat, defined and undefined' (Taitt. Up. II, 6).

27. And because Brahman is called the source.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is spoken of in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare, for instance, 'The maker, the Lord, the person who has his source in Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); and 'That which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu.

Up. I, 1, 6). For that the word 'source' denotes the material cause is well known from the use of ordinary language; the earth, for instance, is called the yoni of trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word yoni means not source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the mantra, 'A yoni, O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon' (/Ri/k.

Sa/m/h. I, 104, 1). But that in the pa.s.sage quoted it means 'source'

follows from a complementary pa.s.sage, 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads,' &c.--It is thus proved that Brahman is the material cause of the world.--Of the objection, finally, that in ordinary life the activity of operative causal agents only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, we dispose by the remark that, as the matter in hand is not one which can be known through inferential reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it.

For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on Scripture altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that Scripture teaches that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the same time the material cause, we have already explained. The subject will, moreover, be discussed more fully later on.

28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta) are explained, are explained.

The doctrine according to which the pradhana is the cause of the world has, in the Sutras beginning with I, 1, 5, been again and again brought forward and refuted. The chief reason for the special attention given to that doctrine is that the Vedanta-texts contain some pa.s.sages which, to people deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain inferential marks pointing to it. The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedanta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sutras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhana doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also are referred to in some Vedic pa.s.sages. Hence the Sutrakara formally extends, in the above Sutra, the refutation already accomplished of the pradhana doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in detail after their great protagonist, the pradhana doctrine, has been so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded on any scriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly contradicted by various Vedic pa.s.sages.--The repet.i.tion of the phrase 'are explained' is meant to intimate that the end of the adhyaya has been reached.

Notes:

[Footnote 228: The Great one is the technical [email protected] for buddhi, avyakta is a common designation of pradhana or prak/ri/ti, and purusha is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance, [email protected] Kar.

2, 3.]

[Footnote 229: Sa/m/kalpavikalparupamanana/s/aktya haira/n/yagarbhi buddhir manas tasya/h/ vyash/t/imana/h/su samash/t/itaya vyaptim aha mahan iti. Sa/m/kalpadi/s/kt.i.taya tarhi sa/m/dehatmatva/m/ tatraha matir iti. Mahatvam upapadayati brahmeti. Bhogyajatadharatvam aha pur iti.

Ni/sk/ayatmakatvam aha buddhir iti. Kirti/s/aktimattvam aha khyatir iti.

Niyamana/s/aktimatvam aha i/s/vara iti. Loke yat prak/ri/sh/t/a/m/ j/n/anam tatosnatirekam aha praj/n/eti. Tatphalam api tato narthantaravishayam ity aha sa/m/vid iti. /K/itpradhanatvam aha /k/itir iti. J/n/atasarvartba.n.u.sa/m/dhana/s/aktim aha sm/ri/tis /k/eti. ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 230: Nanu na bija/s/aktir vidyaya dahyate vastutvad atmavan nety aha avidyeti. Ke/k/it tu pratijivam avidya/s/aktibhedam i/kkh/anti tan na avyaktavyak/ri/tadi/s/abdayas tasya bhedakabhavad ekatvexpi sva/s/aktya vi/k/itrakaryakaratvad ity aha avyakteti. Na /k/a tasya jiva/s/rayatva/m/ jiva/s/abdava/k/yasya kalpitatvad avidyarupatvat ta/kkh/abdalakshyasya brahmavyatirekad ity aha parame/s/vareti.

Mayavidyayor bhedad i/s/varasya maya/s/rayatva/m/ jivanam avidya/s/rayateti vadanta/m/ pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino maya paratantra tathaishapity artha/h/. Prat.i.tau tasya/s/ /k/etanapeksham aha mahasuptir iti. ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 231: Sutradvayasya v/ri/ttik/ri/dvyakhyanam utthapayati. Go.

an. a/k/aryade/s/iyamatam utthapayati. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 232: The commentators give different explanations of the Sattamatra of the text.--Sattamatre sattvapradhanaprak/ri/ter adyapari/n/ame. Go. an.--Bhogapavargapurusharthasya maha/kkh/abditabuddhikaryatvat purushapeks.h.i.taphalakara/n/a/m/ sad u/k/yate tatra bhavapratyayos'pi svarupartho na samanyava/k/i karyanumeya/m/ mahan na pratyaksham iti matra/s/abda/h/. ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 233: As the meaning of the word aja is going to be discussed, and as the author of the Sutras and /S/[email protected] seem to disagree as to its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in this place.--/S/[email protected] reads--and explains,--in the mantra, sarupa/h/ (not sarupam) and bhuktabhogam, not bhuktabhogyam.]

[Footnote 234: Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the views of the Sutra writer and /S/[email protected] Govindananda notes that according to the Bhashyak/ri/t aja means simply maya--which interpretation is based on prakara/n/a--while, according to the Sutra-k/ri/t, who explains aja on the ground of the Chandogya-pa.s.sage treating of the three primary elements, aja denotes the aggregate of those three elements const.i.tuting an avantaraprak/ri/ti.--On /S/'s explanation the term aja presents no difficulties, for maya is aja, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Sutra writer, however, aja cannot mean unborn, since the three primary elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the ru/dh/i signification of aja, according to which it means she-goat. But how can the avantara-prak/ri/ti be called a she-goat? To this question the next Sutra replies.]

[Footnote 235: Indication (laksha/n/a, which consists in this case in five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be a.s.sumed in interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct meaning.]