The United States and Latin America Part 4

As soon as Rush's first dispatch was received President Monroe realized fully the magnitude of the issue presented by the proposal of an Anglo-American alliance. Before submitting the matter to his cabinet he transmitted copies of the dispatch to ex-Presidents Jefferson and Madison and the following interesting correspondence took place. In his letter to Jefferson of October 17th, the President said:

I transmit to you two despatches which were receiv'd from Mr. Rush, while I was lately in Washington, which involve interests of the highest importance. They contain two letters from Mr. Canning, suggesting designs of the holy alliance, against the Independence of So. America, & proposing a co-operation, between G. Britain & the U States, in support of it, against the members of that alliance. The project aims, in the first instance, at a mere expression of opinion, somewhat in the abstract, but which, it is expected by Mr. Canning, will have a great political effect, by defeating the combination. By Mr. Rush's answers, which are also enclosed, you will see the light in which he views the subject, & the extent to which he may have gone. Many important considerations are involved in this proposition.

1st Shall we entangle ourselves, at all, in European politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, against others, presuming that a concert, by agreement, of the kind proposed, may lead to that result? 2d If a case can exist in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is not the present instance, precisely that case? 3d Has not the epoch arriv'd when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the U States, & in consequence, either in favor of Despotism or of liberty & may it not be presum'd that, aware of that necessity, her government has seiz'd on the present occurrence, as that, which it deems, the most suitable, to announce & mark the commenc'ment of that career.

My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British govt. & to make it known, that we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with them, they would extend it to us. I am sensible however of the extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to have yours, & Mr. Madison's opinions on it.[57]

Jefferson's reply dated Monticello, October 24th, displays not only a profound insight into the international situation, but a wide vision of the possibilities involved. He said:

The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compa.s.s and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circ.u.mstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emanc.i.p.ate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will prevent instead of provoking war. With Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not undertake such a war. For how would they propose to get at either enemy without superior fleets? Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations, by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance, calling itself Holy.[58]

Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the wisdom of accepting the British proposal of some form of joint action, but he went even further and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the American republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late invasion of Spain and of any interference with the Greeks, who were then struggling for independence from Turkey.[59] Monroe, it appears, was strongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took a different view of the situation. From the diary of John Quincy Adams, Monroe's secretary of state, it appears that almost the whole of November was taken up by cabinet discussions on Canning's proposals and on Russia's aggressions in the northwest. Adams stoutly opposed any alliance or joint declaration with Great Britain. The composition of the President's message remained in doubt until the 21st, when the more conservative views of Adams were, according to his own statement of the case, adopted. He advocated an independent course of action on the part of the United States, without direct reference to Canning's proposals, though substantially in accord with them. Adams defined his position as follows: "The ground that I wish to take is that of earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that."[60] Adams's dissent from Monroe's position was, it is claimed, due partly to the influence of Clay, who advocated a Pan American system, partly to the fact that the proposed cooperation with Great Britain would bind the United States not to acquire some of the coveted parts of the Spanish possessions, and partly to the fear that the United States as the ally of Great Britain would be compelled to play a secondary part. He probably carried his point by showing that the same ends could be accomplished by an independent declaration, since it was evident that the sea power of Great Britain would be used to prevent the reconquest of South America by the European powers. Monroe, as we have seen, thought that the exigencies of the situation justified a departure from the sound maxim of political isolation, and in this opinion he was supported by his two predecessors in the presidency.

The opinions of Monroe, Jefferson, and Madison in favor of an alliance with Great Britain and a broad declaration against the intervention of the great powers in the affairs of weaker states in any part of the world, have been severely criticised by some historians and ridiculed by others, but time and circ.u.mstances often bring about a complete change in our point of view. Since our entrance into the great world conflict several writers have raised the question as to whether the three elder statesmen were not right and Adams and Clay wrong.[61] If the United States and England had come out in favor of a general declaration against intervention in the concerns of small states and established it as a world-wide principle, the course of human history during the next century might have been very different, but Adams's diary does not tell the whole story. On his own statement of the case he might be justly censured by posterity for persuading the President to take a narrow American view of a question which was world-wide in its bearing. An important element in the situation, however, was Canning's change of att.i.tude between the time of his conference with Rush in August and the formulation of the President's message. Two days after the delivery of his now famous message Monroe wrote to Jefferson in explanation of the form the declaration had taken: "Mr. Canning's zeal has much abated of late." It appears from Rush's correspondence that the only thing which stood in the way of joint action by the two powers was Canning's unwillingness to extend immediate recognition to the South American republics. On August 27th, Rush stated to Canning that it would greatly facilitate joint action if England would acknowledge at once the full independence of the South American colonies. In communicating the account of this interview to his government Mr. Rush concluded:

Should I be asked by Mr. Canning, whether, in case the recognition be made by Great Britain without more delay, I am on my part prepared to make a declaration, in the name of my government, that it will not remain inactive under an attack upon the independence of those states by the Holy Alliance, the present determination of my judgment is that I will make such a declaration explicitly, and avow it before the world.[62]

About three weeks later Canning, who was growing restless at the delay in hearing from Washington, again urged Rush to act without waiting for specific instructions from his government. He tried to show that the proposed joint declaration would not conflict with the American policy of avoiding entangling alliances, for the question at issue was American as much as European, if not more. Rush then indicated his willingness to act provided England would "immediately and unequivocally acknowledge the independence of the new states." Canning did not care to extend full recognition to the South American states until he could do so without giving unnecessary offense to Spain and the allies, and he asked if Mr.

Rush could not give his a.s.sent to the proposal on a promise of future recognition. Mr. Rush refused to accede to anything but immediate acknowledgment of independence and so the matter ended.[63] As Canning could not come to a formal understanding with the United States, he determined to make a frank avowal of the views of the British cabinet to France and to this end he had an interview with Prince Polignac, the French amba.s.sador at London, October 9, 1823, in which he declared that Great Britain had no desire to hasten recognition, but that any foreign interference, by force, or by menace, would be a motive for immediate recognition; that England "could not go into a joint deliberation upon the subject of Spanish America upon an equal footing with other powers, whose opinions were less formed upon that question." This declaration drew from Polignac the admission that he considered the reduction of the colonies by Spain as hopeless and that France "abjured in any case, any design of acting against the colonies by force of arms."[64] This admission was a distinct victory for Canning, in that it prepared the way for ultimate recognition by England, and an account of the interview was communicated without delay to the allied courts. The interview was not communicated to Rush until the latter part of November, and therefore had no influence upon the formation of Monroe's message of December 2.[65]

Before the close of the year the British government appointed consuls to the South American states, and about the time of their departure, an invitation was sent to the courts of St. Petersburg, Paris, and Vienna to a conference to be held at Paris to "aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of the revolted colonies." A copy of this invitation was also handed to the British amba.s.sador at Madrid, but in such a form as to leave him in doubt as to whether his government was invited to the conference or not.[66] While the discussion as to the proposed conference was going on and before Canning had announced what action his government would take in the matter, President Monroe's message arrived in Europe.

Spanish America was not the only part of the western continent threatened at this time by European aggression. On the 4th of September, 1821, the emperor of Russia had issued an ukase, in which he claimed the northwestern coast of North America down to the 51st degree.

This claim was incompatible with the pretensions of both England and the United States, and was stoutly opposed by them. This was a part of the territory known as the Oregon country, which continued in dispute between England and the United States until 1846. In July, 1823, Adams declared to Baron Tuyll, the Russian minister to the United States, "that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should a.s.sume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments." This language was incorporated substantially in the President's message.

The Monroe Doctrine is comprised in two widely separated paragraphs that occur in the message of December 2, 1823. The first, relating to Russia's encroachments on the northwest coast, and occurring near the beginning of the message, was an a.s.sertion to the effect that the American continents had a.s.sumed an independent condition and were no longer open to European colonization. This may be regarded as a statement of fact. No part of the continent at that time remained unclaimed. The second paragraph relating to Spanish America and occurring near the close of the message, was a declaration against the extension to the American continents of the system of intervention adopted by the Holy Alliance for the suppression of popular government in Europe.

The language used by President Monroe is as follows:

1. At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by His Imperial Majesty to the government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The government of the United States has been desirous by this friendly proceeding of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the emperor and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for a.s.serting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have a.s.sumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.[67]

2. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.[68]

The President's message reached England while the discussion in regard to the proposed congress at Paris was still going on. It was received with enthusiasm by the liberal members of Parliament. Lord Brougham said:

The question with regard to South America is now, I believe, disposed of, or nearly so; for an event has recently happened than which none has ever dispersed greater joy, exultation, and grat.i.tude over all the free men of Europe; that event, which is decisive on the subject, is the language held with respect to Spanish America in the message of the President of the United States.

Sir James Mackintosh said:

This coincidence of the two great English commonwealths (for so I delight to call them; and I heartily pray that they may be forever united in the cause of justice and liberty) cannot be contemplated without the utmost pleasure by every enlightened citizen of the earth.[69]

They evidently had reference to the second clause alone, the one relating to Spanish America. The other clause, the one against European colonization in America, seems not to have attracted much attention.

Canning, however, saw the bearing of it and objected to the principle it set forth, which was directed against England as much as against the allies. He was evidently a little taken aback at the turn his proposal had taken. The President's message really settled the question before Canning had announced what action his government would take. Some little chagrin is apparent in the tone of his letter to Sir William a Court, British minister at Madrid, December 21, 1823.

While I was yet hesitating [he says], what shape to give to the declaration and protest which ultimately was conveyed in my conference with P. de Polignac, and while I was more doubtful as to the effect of that protest and declaration, I sounded Mr. Rush (the American minister here) as to his powers and disposition to join in any step which we might take to prevent a hostile enterprise on the part of the European powers against Spanish America. He had no powers; but he would have taken upon himself to join with us if we would have begun by recognizing the Spanish-American states.

This we could not do, and so we went on without. But I have no doubt that his report to his government of this _sounding_, which he probably represented as an overture, had a great share in producing the explicit declaration of the President.[70]

The conference with Prince Polignac here referred to was that of October 9th quoted above. It was not until after the receipt of President Monroe's message in Europe that Canning framed his answer to the Spanish communication informing him of the proposed meeting in Paris for the discussion of the South American question. In that reply he stated to the Spanish government very fully his views upon the question at issue.

He said that while England did not wish to precede Spain in the matter of recognition, yet she reserved to herself the privilege of recognizing the colonies when she deemed it best for her interests and right to them. He said that these views had been communicated fully from time to time to the powers invited to the congress and he concluded with the statement: "It does not appear to the British cabinet at all necessary to declare that opinion anew, even if it were perfectly clear (from the tenor of M. Ofalia's instruction) that Great Britain was in fact included in the invitation to the conference at Paris."[71]

While Canning and Monroe acted independently of each other, the expression that each gave to the views of his government was rendered more emphatic and of more effect by the knowledge of the other's att.i.tude in the matter. Another point to be noted is that Monroe's message was made public, while Canning's answer was for some time known only to the diplomatic corps.

The determination of both England and the United States to oppose the intervention of the allies in South America had the desired effect.

Conferences in answer to the invitation of Spain were held in Paris, but they were partic.i.p.ated in only by the ordinary representatives of the powers invited, resident in that capital, and their only result was to advise Spain not to listen to the counsels of England.

All further discussion that took place between England and Spain in reference to recognition of the colonies by Great Britain was confined to the status of the revolutionary governments, and upon this point their views were so divergent that Canning finally announced to the Spanish government that, "His Majesty would, at his own time, take such steps as he might think proper in respect to the several states of Spanish America without further reference to the court of Madrid; but at the same time without any feeling of alienation towards that court, or of hostility towards the real interests of Spain."[72]

The French troops continuing to occupy Spain after the time stipulated by treaty, Canning sought an explanation from France, but without satisfactory results. He therefore determined at a cabinet meeting held December 14, 1824, to recognize Mexico and Colombia forthwith. On January 1, 1825, after the ministers had left England with instructions and full powers, the fact of recognition was communicated officially to the diplomatic corps and two days later it was made public. That this recognition was a retaliatory measure to compensate England for the French occupation of Spain was understood at the time and was distinctly avowed by Canning two years later.[73] In a speech delivered December 12, 1826, in defense of his position in not having arrested the French invasion of Spain, he said:

I looked another way--I sought for compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that, if France had Spain, it should not be Spain _with the Indies_. I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old.

In spite of the great indebtedness of South America to Canning, this boast falls somewhat flat when we remember that the Spanish colonies had won their independence by their own valor and had been recognized as independent governments by the United States two years before Great Britain acted in the matter.

Mr. Stapleton, Canning's private secretary and biographer, says that the recognition of Spanish-American independence was, perhaps, the most important measure adopted by the British cabinet while Canning was at the head of the foreign office. He sums up the reasons and results of the act as follows:

First, it was a measure essentially advantageous to British interests; being especially calculated to benefit our commerce. Next, it enabled this country to remain at peace, since it compensated us for the continued occupation of Spain by a French force, a disparagement to which, otherwise, it would not have become us to submit. Lastly, it maintained the balance between conflicting principles; since it gave just so much of a triumph to popular rights and privileges, as was sufficient to soothe the irritation felt by their advocates at the victory, which absolute principles had obtained by the overthrow of the const.i.tutions of Spain, Portugal, and Naples; and it dealt a death-blow to the Holy Alliance, by disabusing its members of the strange fancy, with which they were prepossessed, that the differences between them and the British ministers (where they did differ) were merely feints on the part of the latter to avoid a conflict with public opinion.[74]

The United States government did not relax its efforts in behalf of the South American states with the recognition of England, but continued to exert itself in order to secure the acknowledgment of their independence by the other powers of Europe, particularly Spain.[75] Mr. Clay tried to get the other members of the alliance, especially the emperor of Russia, to use their good offices with Spain for the purpose of inducing her to recognize her late colonies, but the emperor of Russia, the head of the alliance, continued to preach to Spain "not only no recognition of their independence, but active war for their subjugation." To the request of the United States he replied that, out of respect for "the indisputable t.i.tles of sovereignty," he could not prejudge or antic.i.p.ate the determination of the king of Spain.[76] It was some ten years before Spain could be persuaded to renounce her ancient claims.

FOOTNOTES:

[37] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. III, p. 538.

[38] Wharton's Digest, Sec. 69, and Moore's Digest of Int. Law, Vol. I, p. 177.

[39] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, pp. 13, 58, and 116.

[40] Lyman, "Diplomacy of the United States." 2 Vols. Boston, 1828, Vol.

II, p. 432. Romero, "Mexico and the United States."

[41] Given in full in Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 217-270.

[42] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. IV, pp. 818-851.

[43] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 139.

[44] Benton's "Abridgment," Vol. VI, p. 142.

[45] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 44.

[46] "Adams's Diary," September, 1817, to December, 1818. "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, pp. 404 and 458.

[47] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 10.

[48] Stapleton, "Official Correspondence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 48 ff.

[49] Bagot to Castlereagh, October 31, 1818. Mem. of a Conversation with Adams. "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII, p. 66.

[50] For the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laybach, and Verona, see "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII; "Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III; "Political Life and Official Correspondence of Canning"; Chateaubriand's "Congres de Verone," and W. A. Phillips, "The Confederation of Europe. 1813-1823." The text of the treaty of Verona is published in Niles' Register, August 2, 1823, Vol. 24, p. 347, and in Elliot's "American Diplomatic Code," Vol. II, p. 179.