The United States and Latin America Part 3

[33] Hall's "Journal," Vol. I, p. 194.

[34] Holstein, "Life of Bolivar." Boston, 1829.

[35] Hall's "Journal," Vol. II, p. 188.

[36] See the statement of Iturbide in regard to his political life published in the _Pamphleteer_, London, 1827.

CHAPTER II

THE RECOGNITION OF THE SPANISH-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

The struggle of the South American peoples for independence was viewed from the first with feelings of profound satisfaction and sympathy in the United States. From the commencement of the revolution South American vessels were admitted into the ports of the United States under whatever flag they bore. It does not appear that any formal declaration according belligerent rights to the said provinces was ever made, though a resolution to that effect was introduced into the House by committee as early as December 10, 1811.[37] Such formal action was apparently not deemed necessary and, as there was no Spanish minister resident in the United States at that time to protest, our ports were probably thrown open, as a matter of course.[38] The fact that they were accorded full belligerent rights from the first was afterwards stated by President Monroe in his annual messages of 1817 and 1818 and in his special message of March 8, 1822.[39]

At an early date of the revolution commissioners arrived in Washington seeking recognition of independence, and agents were forthwith dispatched to South America to obtain information in regard to the state of the revolutionary governments and to watch the movements of England and other European powers. Joel R. Poinsett was sent to Buenos Aires in 1811, and the following year Alexander Scott was sent to Venezuela.[40] In 1817 Caesar A. Rodney, Theodorick Bland, and John Graham were dispatched as special commissioners to South America. They proceeded to Buenos Aires, where they arrived in February, 1818, and remained until the last of April. Rodney and Graham then returned to the United States while Bland proceeded across the continent to Chile. Their reports were transmitted to Congress November 17, 1818.[41] In 1820 Messrs. J. B. Prevost and John M. Forbes were sent as commercial agents to Chile and Buenos Aires. Reports from them on the state of the revolutions were transmitted to Congress, March 8 and April 26, 1822.[42]

In the meantime a strong sentiment in favor of the recognition of South American independence had arisen in the United States. The struggling colonies found a ready champion in Henry Clay, who, for a period of ten years labored almost incessantly in their behalf, pleading for their recognition first with his own countrymen and then, as secretary of state under the Adams administration, with the governments of Europe.

His name became a household word in South America and his speeches were translated and read before the patriot armies.

In spite of the fact that our own political interests were so closely identified with the struggling republics, the President realized the necessity of following a neutral course, and in view of the aid the colonies were receiving from citizens of the United States, called upon Congress for the enactment of a more stringent neutrality law. Clay delivered a vigorous speech in opposition to this measure in January, 1817. His greatest effort in behalf of South America, however, was his speech of March 25, 1818, on the general appropriation bill. He moved an amendment appropriating $18,000 for the outfit and year's salary of a minister to the United Provinces of the Plate. Without waiting to hear the report of the three commissioners who had been sent to inquire into the state of the revolutionary governments, he urged that a minister be regularly accredited to Buenos Aires at once. In a speech, three hours in length, he concluded the arguments he had begun the day before.

Painting with even more than his usual fire and enthusiasm the beauties and resources of the Southern continent, he said:

Within this vast region, we behold the most sublime and interesting objects of creation; the loftiest mountains, the most majestic rivers in the world; the richest mines of the precious metals; and the choicest productions of the earth.

We behold there a spectacle still more interesting and sublime--the glorious spectacle of eighteen millions of people struggling to burst their chains and be free.[43]

He went on to say that in the establishment of the independence of the South American states the United States had the deepest interest. He had no hesitation in a.s.serting his firm belief that there was no question in the foreign policy of this country, which had ever arisen, or which he could conceive as ever occurring, in the decision of which we had so much at stake. This interest concerned our politics, our commerce, our navigation. There could be no doubt that Spanish America, once independent, whatever might be the form of the governments established in its several parts, those governments would be animated by an American feeling and guided by an American policy. They would obey the laws of the system of the new world, of which they would compose a part, in contradistinction to that of Europe.[44] The House turned a deaf ear to his brilliant rhetoric. The motion was defeated by a vote of 115 to 45, but Clay did not abandon the cause of South America.

Two years later he reopened the question in a direct attack on the policy of the administration, which greatly disturbed President Monroe.

On May 20, 1820, he again introduced a resolution declaring it expedient to send ministers to the "governments in South America which have established and are maintaining their independence of Spain." His arraignment of the administration became more violent than ever:

If Lord Castlereagh says we may recognize, we do; if not, we do not. A single expression of the British minister to the present secretary of state, then our minister abroad, I am ashamed to say, has molded the policy of our government toward South America.

A charge of dependence upon Great Britain in affairs of diplomacy was as effective a weapon then as it has been since in matters financial.

Clay's resolution pa.s.sed the House by a vote of 80 to 75, but still the executive arm of the government did not move. In 1817 and 1818 the question of South American independence was continually before the cabinet for discussion. President Monroe seemed strongly inclined toward recognition, but in this he was opposed by Adams and Calhoun, who were unwilling to act in the matter without some understanding with England, and if possible with France. Our relations with Spain in regard to the Indian troubles in Florida were in a very strained condition and any action taken at that time in recognition of South America would have involved us in war with Spain and almost inevitably with other European powers. The President, therefore, as a matter of expediency postponed the action which his sympathy prompted, and, in his annual message of November 16, 1818, expressed his satisfaction at the course the government had hitherto pursued and his intention of adhering to it for the time being.[45] Under the President's direction, however, efforts were made to secure the cooperation of Great Britain and France in promoting the independence of South America.[46]

In 1819 an amicable adjustment of our differences with Spain seemed to have been reached by the negotiation of a treaty providing for the cession of the Floridas to the United States and the settlement of long-standing claims of American citizens against Spain. An unforeseen difficulty arose, however, which proved embarra.s.sing to the administration. The Spanish monarch very shrewdly delayed ratifying the treaty for two years and thus practically tied the hands of the administration during that time as far as the South American question was concerned.

In spite of the awkward position in which the administration found itself, Clay, who was opposed to the treaty on account of its unwarranted surrender of our claims to Texas, continued to plead the cause of South America. Early in the year, 1821, a declaration of interest in the South American struggle, introduced by him, was carried by an overwhelming majority (134 to 12), but the administration held back another year until the _de facto_ independence of the colonies no longer admitted of reasonable doubt. Meanwhile the Florida treaty had been ratified. On March 8, 1822, President Monroe, in a special message to Congress, expressed the opinion that the time had come for recognition and asked for the appropriations necessary for carrying it into effect. The President's recommendation was received with approval, and in due course the sum of $100,000 was appropriated for "such missions to the independent nations on the American continent as the President of the United States may deem proper." In accordance with this act Mr. R. C. Anderson of Kentucky was appointed minister to Colombia, Mr. C. A. Rodney of New Jersey to the Argentine Republic, and Mr. H.

Allen of Vermont to Chile, in 1824, and Mr. Joel R. Poinsett of South Carolina to Mexico in 1826.

While the United States government was concerning itself with the political interests of the Spanish provinces, Great Britain was quietly reaping all the commercial advantages to be derived from the situation and was apparently well satisfied to let things follow the drift they had taken. By the destruction of the combined fleets of France and Spain at Trafalgar, in 1805, Nelson had won for Great Britain undisputed control of the Atlantic and laid open the route to South America. Ever since the _a.s.siento_ of 1713 had placed the slave trade in her hands, Great Britain had realized the possibilities of South American commerce, and the intercourse, which had been kept up with that country after the termination of the slave monopoly by smugglers, now that the danger was removed, became more regular and profitable. During the changes of ministry that followed the death of Pitt, the policy of England in regard to South America was weak and vacillating. We have already called attention to the political indecision that marked the attack upon the provinces of the Plate. With Napoleon's invasion of Spain and the national uprising it occasioned, British policy became once more intelligible. It was wisely deemed of more importance to spare the colonies and to win Spain over to the European alliance against Napoleon, than to take her colonies at the cost of driving her permanently into the arms of France. Meanwhile British commerce with the South American states was steadily growing and that too with the connivance of Spain.

At the close of the Napoleonic wars, Spain, fearing that England, through her desire to keep this trade, would secretly furnish aid to the colonies in their struggle for independence, proposed to the British government to bind itself to a strict neutrality. This England agreed to, and when the treaty was signed, there was, according to Canning, "a distinct understanding with Spain that our commercial intercourse with the colonies was not to be deemed a breach of its stipulations."[47]

Notwithstanding this tacit compact, British commerce suffered greatly at the hands of Spanish privateers and even Spanish war vessels. Numbers of British merchantmen were captured by Spanish ships, carried into the few ports left to Spain on the Main, and condemned as prizes for trading with the insurgent colonies. Thus at the time of the acknowledgment of South American independence by the United States, a long list of grievances had acc.u.mulated in the hands of the British amba.s.sador at Madrid, and in spite of urgent and repeated remonstrances, remained unredressed.

Canning was deterred from making final demands upon the government of Madrid by the consideration that he did not wish to hamper the const.i.tutional government of Spain, which had come into being by the revolution of March, 1820, and against which the other powers of Europe were preparing to act. The condition of affairs on the Spanish Main was, however, critical and demanded instant redress. He decided, therefore, to take matters into his own hands without hara.s.sing the government of Spain, and to dispatch a squadron to the West Indies to make reprisals.

In a memorandum to the cabinet on this subject, November 15, 1822, in which he outlines his policy, he commends the course of the United States in recognizing the _de facto_ independence of the colonies, claiming a right to trade with them and avenging the attempted interruption of that right by making reprisals, as a more straightforward and intelligible course than that of Great Britain, forbearing for the sake of Spain to recognize the colonies, trading with them in faith of the connivance of Spain and suffering depredations without taking redress. It was not necessary, he thought, to declare war against Spain, for "she has perhaps as little direct and available power over the colonies which she nominally retains as she has over those which have thrown off her yoke. Let us apply, therefore, a local remedy to a local grievance, and make the ships and harbors of Cuba, Porto Rico, and Porto Cabello answerable for the injuries which have been inflicted by those ships, and the perpetrators of which have found shelter in those harbors." In conclusion, he says that the tacit compact, which subsisted for years, by which Spain was to forbear from interrupting British trade with the South American colonies having been renounced by Spain, and the old colonial system having been revived in as full vigor as if she had still a practical hold over her colonies and a navy to enforce her pretensions, "no man will say that under such circ.u.mstances our recognition of those states can be indefinitely postponed."[48]

While Great Britain was thus considering the expediency of following the example of the United States in the recognition of Spain's revolted colonies, the powers of central Europe had taken upon them the task of solving the difficulties of that unfortunate country both at home and in America. The restored rule of the Bourbons in Spain had been far from satisfactory to the great ma.s.s of the people. In March, 1820, the army which Ferdinand had a.s.sembled at Cadiz to be sent against the rebellious colonies, suddenly turned against the government, refused to embark, and demanded the restoration of the const.i.tution of 1812. The action of the army was everywhere approved and sustained by the ma.s.s of the people, and the king was forced to proclaim the const.i.tution and to swear to uphold it. The March revolution in Spain was followed in July by a const.i.tutional movement in Naples, and in August of the same year by a similar movement in Portugal; while the next year saw the outbreak of the Greek struggle for independence. Thus in all three of the peninsulas of Southern Europe the people were struggling for the right of self-government. The movement in Greece was, it is true, of an altogether different character from the others, but it was a revolt against const.i.tuted authority and therefore incurred the ill-will of the so-called legitimists. The powers of Europe at once took alarm at the rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures for the suppression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise. The principle of joint intervention on the part of allied governments in the internal affairs of European states had been developed in the years immediately following the overthrow of Napoleon and was the outcome of the wholly anomalous condition in which he had left the politics of Europe. In the hands of Prince Metternich, the genius of reaction against French revolutionary ideas, this principle had become the most powerful weapon of absolutism and now threatened the subversion of popular inst.i.tutions throughout Europe.

The rapid development of this doctrine of intervention in the seven years immediately following the second fall of Napoleon not only seriously menaced the liberties of Europe, but also threatened to control the destiny of the new world. At the Congress of Vienna Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia had formed a close union and had signed the treaty upon which the peace of Europe rested for the next half century. The agreement made at Vienna was reaffirmed with some minor changes, after the second overthrow of Napoleon, at Paris, November 20, 1815. France was now practically excluded from the alliance. This treaty undertook especially to guard against any further disturbance of the peace of Europe by Napoleon or France. One of the most significant features of the treaty, or what was to prove so, was the agreement definitely laid down in the sixth article, providing for meetings of the powers at fixed periods.

The first conference held in accordance with this understanding was that at Aix-la-Chapelle in October, 1818. France was readmitted as a member of the alliance and her territory evacuated by the allied armies. The quintuple alliance thus formed declared that it had no other object than the maintenance of peace; that the repose of the world was its motive and its end. The language of the declaration had been in a large measure neutralized to suit the views of the British government. Lord Liverpool had said to Castlereagh before the meeting of the conference: "The Russian must be made to feel that we have a parliament and a public, to which we are responsible, and that we cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views of policy which are wholly incompatible with the spirit of our government." The members of the British cabinet, except Canning, did not object seriously to the system of congresses at fixed intervals, but to the declarations publicly set forth by them. Canning, on the other hand, objected to the declarations and to the conferences themselves, "meetings for the government of the world," as he somewhat contemptuously termed them.

It had been generally supposed that the question of the Spanish colonies would come up for discussion at Aix-la-Chapelle. Castlereagh a.s.sured the United States, through Bagot, the British minister at Washington, that while England would act with the allied powers at Aix-la-Chapelle in mediation between Spain and her colonies, her mediation would be limited entirely to the employment of her influence and good offices and that she would not take any measures that might a.s.sume a character of force.[49]

The revolutions that took place in Spain, Naples, and Portugal in 1820 presented an occasion for another meeting of the allies. In November the representatives of Austria, Russia, and Prussia met in conference at Troppau, and issued a circular setting forth what they had already done for Europe in overthrowing the military tyranny of Napoleon and expressing the determination "to put a curb on a force no less tyrannical and no less detestable, that of revolt and crime." The conference then adjourned to Laybach, where they could, with greater dispatch, order the movements they had decided to take against the revolutionists of Naples. Austria, being more intimately concerned with the political condition of the Italian peninsula than either of the other two powers, was entrusted with the task of suppressing the Neapolitan revolution. The Austrian army entered Naples March 23, 1821, overthrew the const.i.tutional government that had been inaugurated, and restored Ferdinand II to absolute power. The revolution which had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed by a detachment of the Austrian army.

England held aloof from all partic.i.p.ation in the proceedings at Troppau and Laybach--though Sir Charles Stuart was present to watch the proceedings. In a circular dispatch of January 21, 1821, the British government expressed its dissent from the principles set forth in the Troppau circular.

The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for October, 1822, at Verona. Here the affairs of Greece, Italy, and, in particular, Spain came up for consideration. At this Congress all five powers of the alliance were represented. France was uneasy about the condition of Spain, and England had to send a delegate out of self-defense, as her interests were largely involved. Castlereagh was preparing to depart for the congress, when his mind gave way under the stress of work and more remotely of dissipation, and he committed suicide. Canning then became secretary for foreign affairs, and Wellington was sent to Verona.

The congress which now a.s.sembled at Verona was devoted largely to a discussion of Spanish affairs. Wellington had been instructed to use all his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention in Spain.

When he found that the other powers were bent upon this step and that his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress. The four remaining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona, November 22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in the preamble, of the "Treaty of the Holy Alliance." This treaty of the Holy Alliance, signed at Paris, September 26, 1815, by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, is one of the most remarkable political doc.u.ments extant. It sprang from the erratic brain of the Czar Alexander under the influence of Madame Crudner, who was both an adventuress and a religious enthusiast. Its object was to uphold the divine right of kings and to counteract the spirit of French revolutionary ideas by introducing "the precepts of justice, of charity, and of peace" into the internal affairs of states and into their relations with one another. No one had taken it seriously except the Czar himself and it had been without influence upon the politics of Europe. The agreement reached at Verona gave retrospective importance to the Holy Alliance, and revived the name, so that it became the usual designation of the combined powers. The following alleged text of the secret treaty of Verona soon became current in the press of Europe and America. Although it has never been officially acknowledged and its authenticity has been called in question, it states pretty accurately the motives and aims of the powers. The first four articles are as follows:

The undersigned, specially authorized to make some additions to the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, after having exchanged their respective credentials, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. The high contracting parties being convinced that the system of representative government is equally incompatible with the monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually, and in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to _put an end_ to the system of _representative_ _governments_, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known.

ART. II. As it cannot be doubted that the _liberty of the press_ is the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress it not only in their own states, but also, in the rest of Europe.

ART. III. Convinced that the principles of religion contribute most powerfully to keep nations in the state of pa.s.sive obedience which they owe to their Princes, the high contracting parties declare it to be their intention to sustain, in their respective states, those measures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their own interests, so intimately connected with the preservation of the authority of Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering their thanks to the Pope, for what he has already done for them, and solicit his constant cooperation in their views of submitting the nations.

ART. IV. The situation of Spain and Portugal unites unhappily all the circ.u.mstances to which this treaty has particular reference. The high contracting parties, in confiding to France the care of putting an end to them, engage to a.s.sist her in the manner which may the least compromise them with their own people and the people of France, by means of a subsidy on the part of the two empires, of twenty millions of francs every year, from the date of the signature of this treaty to the end of the war.

Signed by Metternich for Austria, Chateaubriand for France, Bernstet for Prussia, and Nesselrode for Russia.[50]

Such was the code of absolutism against which England protested and against which President Monroe delivered his declaration.

The Congress broke up about the middle of December, and the following April, the Duc d'Angouleme led a French army across the Pyrenees. By October the const.i.tutional party had been overthrown and absolutism reigned supreme once more in western Europe. In England alone was there still any semblance of const.i.tutional government.

The Congress of Verona was the last of the joint-meetings of the powers for the discussion of the internal affairs of states. It marked the final withdrawal of England from the European alliance. Henceforth she took up a position distinctly hostile to the principles advocated by her former allies and her policy in relation to Spanish America practically coincided with that of the United States.

The great majority of the English people sympathized deeply with the const.i.tutional movement in Spain and were ready to take up arms in support of the Spanish people. The protest of England having been disregarded by the powers at Verona, it became necessary for the cabinet, in view of the preparations going on in France for the invasion of the Peninsula, to say what they contemplated doing. In February, 1823, Lord Liverpool circulated among his colleagues a minute prepared by Canning, which gave at length the reasons, military and other, why it would be unwise for England to undertake the defense of Spain. In the first place, the war against Spain was unpopular in France, and if Great Britain should take part in the war, the French government would avail itself of the fact to convert it into an English war and thus render it popular. Second, England would have to undertake the defense of Spain against invasion by land, and her naval superiority would not materially aid the Spaniards or baffle the French. Third, the continental powers were committed to the support of France. Fourth, there was a possibility that the invasion of Spain would be unsuccessful. Fifth, on the other hand, it might meet with success, in which event France might a.s.sist Spain to recover her American colonies.

Here, he says, England's naval superiority would tell, "and I should have no difficulty in deciding that we ought to prevent, by every means in our power, perhaps Spain from sending a single Spanish regiment to South America, after the supposed termination of the war in Spain, but certainly France from affording to Spain any aid or a.s.sistance for that purpose." Sixth, in case of the invasion of Portugal by France and Spain, he thought England would be in honor bound to defend her, in case she asked for aid. The military defense of Portugal would not be so difficult as a land war in Spain.[51]

In accordance with this determination Canning dispatched a letter to Sir Charles Stuart, British amba.s.sador at Paris, March 31, 1823, in which he spoke of recognition of the colonies as a matter to be determined by time and circ.u.mstances, and, disclaiming all designs on the part of the British government on the late Spanish provinces, intimated that England, although abstaining from interference in Spain, would not allow France to acquire any of the colonies by conquest or cession. To this note the French government made no reply and England took this silence as a tacit agreement not to interfere with the colonies. The British government continued, however, to watch closely the movements of France.[52]

As the invasion of Spain drew near to a successful termination, the British government had reason to suspect that the allied powers would next direct their attention to the Spanish colonies with a view to forcing them back to their allegiance or of otherwise disposing of them, that is, by cession to some other European power. It was already in contemplation to call another European congress for the discussion and settlement of this question. As this was a subject of vital interest to the United States, Canning invited the American minister, Mr. Rush, to a conference, August 16, 1823, in which he suggested the expediency of an understanding on this question between England and the United States. He communicated to Mr. Rush the substance of his dispatch of March 31 to Sir Charles Stuart. Mr. Rush said he understood the import of this note to be that England would not remain pa.s.sive to any attempt on the part of France to acquire territory in Spanish America. Mr. Canning then asked what the United States would say to going hand in hand with England in such a policy. Mr. Rush replied that his instructions did not authorize him to give an answer, but that he would communicate the suggestion informally to his government. At the same time he requested to be enlightened as to England's policy in the matter of recognizing the independence of the colonies. Mr. Canning replied that England had taken no steps in the matter of recognition whatever, but was considering the question of sending commissioners to the colonies to inquire into the condition of affairs. For the present these commissioners would be sent to Mexico alone.[53]

Mr. Stapleton in his "Life of Canning" simply says that as Mr. Rush was not authorized to enter into any formal agreement, Canning thought the delay of communicating with Washington would render such proceeding of no effect, and so the matter was dropped.[54] This, however, we learn from Mr. Rush's dispatches, is not the whole truth. Several communications pa.s.sed between them after the conversation above given, which throw a totally different light upon the affair.

In an unofficial and confidential letter to Mr. Rush, dated August 20, 1823, Canning asked again if the moment had not arrived when the two governments might come to an understanding in regard to the Spanish-American colonies. He stated the views of England as follows: (1) That the recovery of the colonies by Spain was hopeless; (2) That the question of their recognition as independent states was one of time and circ.u.mstances; (3) That England was not disposed, however, to throw any obstacle in the way of an arrangement between the colonies and the mother-country by amicable negotiation; (4) That she aimed at the possession of no portion of the colonies for herself; and (5) That she could not see the transfer of any portion of them to any other power with indifference. He added "that if the United States acceded to such views, a declaration to that effect on their part, concurrently with England, would be the most effectual and least offensive mode of making known their joint disapprobation of contrary projects; that it would at the same time put an end to all jealousies of Spain as to her remaining colonies, and to the agitation prevailing in the colonies themselves by showing that England and the United States were determined not to profit by encouraging it."[55]

Prior to the formal recognition of South America, the United States had repeatedly expressed the wish to proceed in the matter hand in hand with Great Britain,[56] but that act placed the United States on an altogether different footing from England. Canning seemed to forget in the wording of his proposal that the United States had already, in the most formal manner, acknowledged the independence of the Spanish colonies. In reply Mr. Rush reminded him of this fact and of the desire of the United States to see the colonies recognized by England. In other respects, he believed that the views unfolded by Mr. Canning in his note were shared by the United States, but he added that he had no authority to avow these principles publicly in the manner suggested.