The United States and Latin America Part 15

Dayton, the United States minister at Paris, that all that France wanted was that there should be a stable government in Mexico, not an anarchy with which other nations could have no relations.

That if the people of that country chose to establish a republic it was all well; France would make no objection. If they chose to establish a monarchy, as that was the form of government here, it would be charming (charmant), but they did not mean to do anything to induce such a course of action. That all the rumors that France intended to establish the Archduke Maximilian on the throne of Mexico were utterly without foundation.[213]

M. Thouvenel's disclaimer to the British government was equally emphatic.[214]

To return to the situation of affairs at Orizaba, the disagreement between the allies requires some explanation. The immediate cause of the rupture and of the withdrawal from the convention of London was the protection extended by the French agents to General Almonte, Padre Miranda, and other leading men of the reactionary or church party who had been banished from the country and who now from the French camp maintained an active correspondence with Marquez, Cobos, and other notorious chiefs of the armed bands then in open rebellion against the const.i.tuted government of the country. Almonte and his a.s.sociates openly favored the scheme of placing Maximilian on the throne.

The Mexican government demanded the removal of General Almonte and his a.s.sociates from the camp of the allies, and in this demand the British and Spanish representatives concurred. A somewhat stormy conference was held between the commissioners of the allied powers at Orizaba, April 2, 1862, at which the French agents virtually said that they did not regard the convention of London or the preliminaries of Soledad as binding upon them. Specifically then the two causes of the rupture were (1) the persistency of the French commissioners in opposing the removal of the Mexican exiles, and (2) their refusal to take part in the conferences which had been arranged by the convention of Soledad to be held with the Juarez government at Orizaba, April 15, 1862. The British government heartily approved of the action of its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, in breaking up the conference and putting an end to the joint action of the three powers.[215] The policy of Spain was completely in accord with that of England.

The French government was not satisfied with the convention of Soledad, but did not dispute its validity, and declared that if the negotiations should be broken off, its provisions in regard to the withdrawal of the troops from their vantage ground must be observed. The French government further a.s.sumed that, when negotiations with the Mexican government should be broken off, the allied forces would proceed to act jointly under the convention of London.[216] The British and Spanish governments, however, having become convinced of the duplicity of the French government in the matter, terminated the London convention without further discussion and ordered the immediate withdrawal of their forces and agents from Mexican territory.

The government of Louis Napoleon, thus left to its own devices by the withdrawal of Great Britain and Spain, and by the helpless condition, for the time being, to which the war of secession had reduced the government of the United States, greatly reinforced its Mexican expedition and placed General Forey in command. Soon after the withdrawal of the British and Spanish contingents, General Almonte inst.i.tuted a government in the territory occupied by the French and a.s.sumed the t.i.tle of "Supreme Chief of the Nation," but it soon became evident, as Mr. Dayton expressed it, that instead of the emperor having availed himself of the services of General Almonte, Almonte had availed himself of the services of the emperor. Accordingly, shortly after General Forey a.s.sumed command, he issued an order dissolving the ministry of Almonte, depriving him of his t.i.tle and limiting him thereafter "in the most exact manner to the instructions of the emperor, which are to proceed as far as possible, with other Mexican generals placed under the protection of our flag, to the organization of the Mexican army."

The misfortunes which had overtaken Mexico and the dangers that threatened the permanence of her republican inst.i.tutions, had now thoroughly alarmed her sister republics of Central and South America, and a correspondence began between them relative to organizing an international American conference to oppose European aggression.

During the remarkable series of events that took place in Mexico in the spring of 1862, Mr. Seward consistently held to the opinion well expressed in a dispatch to Mr. Dayton, June 21, 1862:

France has a right to make war against Mexico, and to determine for herself the cause. We have a right and interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she makes to raise up in Mexico an anti-republican and anti-American government, or to maintain such a government there. France has disclaimed such designs, and we, besides reposing faith in the a.s.surances given in a frank, honorable manner, would, in any case, be bound to wait for, and not antic.i.p.ate a violation of them.[217]

For some months the French troops gradually extended their military operations and occupied a greater extent of territory without, however, any material change in the situation. The Juarez government still held the capital. In the spring of 1863, however, military operations were pushed forward with greater activity, and in June, General Forey organized a junta of government composed of thirty-five Mexican citizens designated by decree of the French emperor's minister. The members of this supreme junta were to a.s.sociate with them two hundred and fifteen citizens of Mexico to form an a.s.sembly of two hundred and fifty notables. This a.s.sembly was to occupy itself with the form of the permanent government of Mexico. The junta appointed an executive body of three, of whom General Almonte was the head.

On the 10th of July, 1863, the capital of Mexico was occupied by the French army, and on the following day the a.s.sembly of Notables declared:

1. The Mexican nation adopts as its form of government a limited hereditary monarchy, with a Catholic prince.

2. The sovereign shall take the t.i.tle of Emperor of Mexico.

3. The imperial crown of Mexico is offered to his imperial and royal highness the Prince Ferdinand Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, for himself and his descendants.

4. If, under circ.u.mstances which cannot be foreseen, the Archduke of Austria, Ferdinand Maximilian, should not take possession of the throne which is offered to him, the Mexican nation relies on the good will of his majesty, Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, to indicate for it another Catholic prince.[218]

The crown of Mexico was formally offered to Maximilian by a deputation of Mexicans headed by Senor Estrada, October 3, 1863; but Maximilian replied that he could not accept the proffered throne until the whole nation should "confirm by a free manifestation of its will the wishes of the capital." This was a wise decision, had it been given in good faith and had it been wisely adhered to, but the sequel shows that the archduke was either not sincere in his protestations or else was woefully deceived by representations subsequently made to him. Six months later he accepted the crown without the question having been submitted to the wishes of any but a very small portion of the Mexican people.

In spite of the declaration of the Mexican a.s.sembly, which showed so unmistakably the hand of Napoleon, the French government continued to repudiate the designs imputed to it against the independence of Mexico, and Mr. Seward continued to express, officially at least, the satisfaction of the American government at the explanations vouchsafed by France. September 11, 1863, he stated the case as follows:

When France made war against Mexico, we asked of France explanations of her objects and purposes. She answered, that it was a war for the redress of grievances; that she did not intend to permanently occupy or dominate in Mexico, and that she should leave to the people of Mexico a free choice of inst.i.tutions of government. Under these circ.u.mstances the United States adopted, and they have since maintained entire neutrality between the belligerents, in harmony with the traditional policy in regard to foreign wars. The war has continued longer than was antic.i.p.ated. At different stages of it France has, in her intercourse with us, renewed the explanations before mentioned. The French army has now captured Pueblo and the capital, while the Mexican government, with its princ.i.p.al forces, is understood to have retired to San Luis Potosi, and a provisional government has been inst.i.tuted under French auspices in the city of Mexico, which being supported by arms, divides the actual dominion of the country with the Mexican government, also maintained by armed power. That provisional government has neither made nor sought to make any communication to the government of the United States, nor has it been in any way recognized by this government. France has made no communication to the United States concerning the provisional government which has been established in Mexico, nor has she announced any actual or intended departure from the policy in regard to that country which her before-mentioned explanations have authorized us to expect her to pursue.[219]

The probable acceptance of the crown by Maximilian was, however, the subject of frequent communications between the governments of France and the United States. In the course of a somewhat familiar conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French minister of state, in August, 1863, Mr. Dayton expressed the fear that in quitting Mexico France might leave a _puppet_ behind her. De Lhuys replied: "No; the strings would be too long to work."

The chances of Maximilian's success in Mexico had been from the first deliberately calculated on the basis of the probable success of the Southern Confederacy; and, therefore, the cause of the Juarez government and the cause of the Union were considered the same. The active sympathy of the Unionists with the Mexican republic made it difficult for the administration to maintain neutrality. This difficulty was further enhanced by the doubt entertained in the United States as to the intentions of France. In this connection Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Dayton, September 21, 1863, as follows:

The President thinks it desirable that you should seek an opportunity to mention these facts to Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, and to suggest to him that the interests of the United States, and, as it seems to us, the interests of France herself, require that a solution of the present complications in Mexico be made, as early as may be convenient, upon the basis of the unity and independence of Mexico.[220]

In reply, the French minister declared that the question of the establishment of Maximilian on the Mexican throne was to be decided by a majority vote of the entire nation; that the dangers of the government of the archduke would come princ.i.p.ally from the United States, and the sooner the United States showed itself satisfied, and manifested a willingness to enter into peaceful relations with that government, the sooner would France be ready to leave Mexico and the new government to take care of itself, which France would, in any event, do as soon as she with propriety could; but that she would not lead or tempt the archduke into difficulty, and then desert him before his government was settled.

He said that the early acknowledgment of that government by the United States would tend to shorten, or perhaps to end, all the troublesome complications of France in that country; that they would thereupon quit Mexico.[221]

To this communication, Mr. Seward replied that the French government had not been left uninformed of the opinion of the United States that the permanent establishment of a foreign and monarchical government in Mexico would be found neither easy nor desirable; that the United States could not antic.i.p.ate the action of the Mexican people; and that the United States still regarded Mexico as the scene of a war which had not yet ended in the subversion of the government long existing there, with which the United States remained in the relation of peace and friendship.[222]

Before formally accepting the crown, the archduke visited England with a view to securing a promise of recognition for his new position. He was, of course, to pa.s.s through Paris, and in view of his approaching visit, Mr. Dayton asked for instructions as to his conduct on the occasion. Mr.

Seward replied, February 27, 1864:

I have taken the President's direction upon the question. If the Archduke Maximilian appears in Paris only in his character as an imperial prince of the house of Hapsburg, you will be expected to be neither demonstrative nor reserved in your deportment toward him. If he appears there with any a.s.sumption of political authority or t.i.tle in Mexico, you will entirely refrain from intercourse with him.

Should your proceeding be a subject of inquiry or remark, you will be at liberty, in the exercise of your own discretion, to say that this government, in view of its rights and duties in the present conjuncture of its affairs, has prescribed fixed rules to be observed, not only by this department, but by its representatives in foreign countries.

We acknowledge revolutions only by direction of the President, upon full and mature consideration.[223]

The archduke visited London in company with his father-in-law, Leopold of Belgium. The British government declined to act on the subject at that juncture, "but gave them reason to hope that, so soon as the action in Mexico would appear to justify it, they would acknowledge him."[224]

Spain and Belgium were ready to follow in the wake of France.

About the time of this visit of Maximilian to England, Mr. McDougall, of California, introduced in the Senate a resolution declaring "that the movements of the government of France, and the threatened movement of an emperor, improvised by the Emperor of France, demand by this republic, if insisted upon, war." This resolution was not carried, but some days later, on the 4th of April, 1864, the House of Representatives pa.s.sed by a unanimous vote a resolution declaring its opposition to the recognition of a monarchy in Mexico. Mr. Seward, fearing a rupture with France on this account, took pains to inform the government of that country, through Mr. Dayton, that this action of the House was in no way binding on the executive, even if concurred in by the Senate.

The formal acceptance of the crown of Mexico by Maximilian took place April 10, 1864, at Miramar, the palace he had built near Trieste, in the presence of the Mexican deputation. The next day the Emperor and Empress of Mexico, as they styled themselves, set out for their new dominions by way of Rome, where they received the blessing of the Pope. Before leaving Europe Maximilian signed with the Emperor of the French a convention in the following terms:

The French troops in Mexico were to be reduced as soon as possible to 25,000 men.

The French troops were to evacuate Mexico in proportion as the Emperor of Mexico could organize troops to replace them.

The "foreign legion," composed of 8,000 men, was to remain in Mexico six years after all the other French troops should have been recalled.

The expenses of the French expedition to Mexico, to be paid by the Mexican government, were fixed at the sum of two hundred and seventy million francs for the whole duration of the expedition down to July 1, 1864. From July 1st all expenses of the Mexican army were to be met by Mexico.[225]

The resolution of the House referred to above came very near producing the rupture that Mr. Seward was striving to avert, or at least to postpone, during the continuance of the war of secession. When Mr.

Dayton visited M. Drouyn de Lhuys just after the resolution reached Europe, the remark which greeted Mr. Dayton when he entered the room was: "Do you bring us peace, or bring us war?" Mr. Dayton replied that he did not think France had a right to think that the United States was about to make war against her on account of anything contained in that resolution; that it embodied nothing more than the principles which the United States had constantly held out to France from the beginning.

The Confederate agents were taking advantage of the resolution to stir up trouble between the United States and France. In fact they had long caused reports to be spread in Europe, and had succeeded in gaining credence for them, to the effect that the United States government was only awaiting the termination of domestic troubles to drive the French from Mexico. The French naturally concluded that if they were to have trouble with the United States, it was safest for them to choose their own time.[226] Napoleon was all the while coquetting with the Confederate government, and holding above Mr. Seward's head a veiled threat of recognition of Confederate independence. The Confederate government quickly caught at the suggestion of an alliance between Maximilian and the South with the power of France to back them. A Confederate agent was actually accredited to the government of Maximilian, but did not reach his destination. Although Napoleon's calculations were based on the overthrow of the Union, and although he had a.s.sumed at the outset, with England and Spain, an att.i.tude decidedly unfriendly to the Federal government, nevertheless he was not willing to go the full length of recognizing the Confederacy as an independent power while the issue of the conflict was still in doubt.

In speaking of Slidell's movements in Europe and the encouragement given him in France, Mr. Bigelow wrote to Mr. Seward, February 14, 1865:

I am strongly impressed with the conviction that, but for the Mexican entanglement, the insurgents would receive very little further countenance from the imperial government, and that a reconciliation of the national policies of the two countries on that question would speedily dispose of all other sources of dissatisfaction.

As the war of secession seemed nearing its end, the French papers became uneasy in view of possible intervention in Mexico by the United States on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine. This principle of American diplomacy, which was likened to the sword of Damocles suspended over the head of Maximilian, was discussed in all its bearings on the present case by the journals of Europe.[227]

Throughout all this period of turmoil, the United States recognized no authority in Mexico but that of the Juarez government. In April, 1864, the French minister at Washington complained that serious complications with France were likely to arise out of grants of land made by "ex-President Juarez" in Sonora to emigrants from California. The French government regarded these grants as illegal and proposed to send forces there to prevent the parties from taking "illicit possession."

In May, 1864, the French government sought explanations in regard to a club formed in New Orleans, called the "D. M. D.," Defenders of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Seward replied that the object of the club, so far as the government had been able to ascertain, was to bring moral influences to bear upon the government of the United States in favor of a maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, but not to act in violation of the law, or of the well-understood governmental policy of neutrality in the war which existed between France and Mexico. Members of the a.s.sociation did, however, actually start on an expedition to Brownsville, but the steamer was taken possession of by United States officials. During the year 1864 constant complaint was made by the French government of shipments of arms to the Juarez government from California and from various points along the Rio Grande, particularly Brownsville, in violation of American neutrality.

Shortly after the surrender of General Lee, several Confederate officers of high position and influence went to Mexico and identified themselves with the government of Maximilian. Dr. Wm. M. Gwin, a former United States Senator from California, organized a plan for colonizing the states of northern Mexico with ex-Confederates. This scheme was the subject of several representations to the French government on the part of Mr. Seward. He reminded them that the sympathies of the American people were already considerably excited in favor of the republic of Mexico; that they were disposed to regard with impatience the continued intervention of France in that country; and that any favor shown to the proceedings of Dr. Gwin by the t.i.tular Emperor of Mexico or by the imperial government of France would tend greatly to increase the popular impatience. He further requested an a.s.surance that the pretenses of Dr.

Gwin and his a.s.sociates were dest.i.tute of any sanction from the Emperor of France.

Among the most prominent Confederates connected with this scheme were Matthew F. Maury, the distinguished geographer and naval officer, who became a naturalized Mexican citizen and was appointed Imperial Commissioner of Immigration and an honorary councillor of state; and General John B. Magruder, who was charged with the supervision of the survey of lands for colonization. It was hoped that the prominence of these men and the high rank they had held under the Confederate government would, in the general uncertainty that prevailed as to the treatment of the South by the victorious Union party, induce many persons to emigrate to Mexico. Maximilian issued a special decree, September 5, 1865, regarding colonization with a view to inducing Southern planters to emigrate to Mexico with their slaves--the latter to be reduced to a state of _peonage_, regular slavery being prohibited by the laws of the empire. This scheme was altogether impracticable.

In July, 1865, Maximilian finally made an effort to secure recognition of his government by the United States. On the 17th of July, the Marquis de Montholon, the French minister at Washington, called at the department of state and informed Mr. Seward that a special agent had arrived at Washington, bearing a letter signed by Maximilian and addressed to the President of the United States, a copy of which the marquis presented to the secretary of state. On the 18th, Mr. Seward delivered back the copy of the letter to the Marquis de Montholon, and said that, as the United States were on friendly relations with the republican government of Mexico, the President declined to receive the letter or to hold any intercourse with the agent who brought it. The French government expressed to its representative at Washington its annoyance and embarra.s.sment at this step, and said that Maximilian should have taken measures to learn the disposition of the United States before sending the agent.[228]

Mr. Tucker, in his book on the Monroe Doctrine, makes the statement that Mr. Bigelow, who succeeded Mr. Dayton as minister to France, announced to the French government that the United States would recognize the empire of Maximilian upon the immediate withdrawal of the French troops from the territory of Mexico, but that this statement, made upon the envoy's own authority, was disavowed by the President. This is hardly a correct version of the case. It seems that Mr. Bigelow, in the course of a conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, asked him, "in his own name, and without prejudicing the opinion of his government, if he did not think that the recognition of Maximilian by the United States would facilitate and hasten the recall of the French troops."[229]

On the 3rd of October, 1865, Maximilian issued a decree at the city of Mexico, the first article of which declared:

All persons belonging to armed bands or corps, not legally authorized, whether they proclaim or not any political principles, and whatever be the number of those who compose the said bands, their organization, character and denomination shall be tried militarily by the courts-martial; and if found guilty even of the only fact of belonging to the band, they shall be condemned to capital punishment, within the twenty-four hours following the sentence.[230]

The United States, through Mr. Bigelow, protested to France against this decree, as repugnant to the sentiments of modern civilization and the instincts of humanity. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied with a touch of sarcasm: