The United States and Latin America Part 14

Two days after the signing of this Doyle convention the Spanish minister in Mexico also signed a convention on behalf of some Philippine missionaries, known as the "Padre Moran" convention, on almost the same basis as the British. The consolidated fund in this case was $983,000, the sinking fund five per cent., and the interest three per cent.

The interest was paid on both funds in almost the whole amount, but the sinking fund was not kept up. Succeeding agreements were made in 1858, in 1859, and in 1860, by which the custom-house a.s.signments to satisfy both conventions (British and Spanish) were raised from twelve per cent.

in 1851, to twenty-nine per cent. in 1860.[194]

It will thus be seen that the British and Spanish claims were perfectly legitimate. The French claims, however, were of a somewhat different character. During Miramon's administration arrangements were made through the agency of Jecker, a Swiss banker, by which $750,000 were to be raised through an issue of $15,000,000 of bonds. These bonds fell into the hands of Jecker's French creditors and were pressed by the French government, which thus demanded the repayment of twenty times the original sum advanced. A claim was made also for $12,000,000 for torts on French subjects.[195]

When the Liberal party came into power again in 1860, they were unable to meet the situation and showed a disposition to question the obligatory force of engagements entered into by their various revolutionary predecessors. The British government had undertaken to provide against this contingency upon the occasion of extending recognition to the Juarez administration. Under date of March 30, 1861, Lord John Russell wrote to Sir Charles Wyke, recently appointed minister to Mexico, as follows:

The instructions addressed to Mr. Mathew, both before and since the final triumph of the Liberal party, made the recognition by Great Britain of the const.i.tutional government contingent upon the acknowledgment by that government of the liability of Mexico for the claims of British subjects who, either in their persons or in their property, for a long series of years, can be proved to have suffered wrong at the hands of successive governments in Mexico.[196]

And further on in the same communication the att.i.tude of the British government is expressed yet more strongly:

Her majesty's government will not admit as an excuse for hesitation in this respect the plea that the robbery was committed by the late government. For, as regards this, as indeed all other claims, her majesty's government cannot admit that the party who committed the wrong is alone responsible. Great Britain does not recognize any party as const.i.tuting the republic in its dealing with foreign nations, but holds the entire republic, by whatever party the government of it may from time to time be administered, to be responsible for wrongs done to British subjects by any party or persons at any time administering the powers of government.

Mexico, however, was slow to admit this principle of international law.

In a letter to Lord John Russell, June 25, 1861, and in other communications, Sir Charles Wyke urged the necessity of a naval demonstration against Mexico. His plan was to take possession of the custom-houses of Vera Cruz, Tampico, and Matamoros on the Atlantic, and of one or two on the Pacific, lower the duties so as to attract the great bulk of trade from other ports, and pay themselves by the percentage to which they were ent.i.tled by treaty stipulation.

On the 17th of July, 1861, President Juarez brought matters to a crisis by the publication of a decree, the first article of which declared that "all payments are suspended for two years, including the a.s.signments for the loan made in London and for the foreign conventions."[197]

On the 23rd, Sir Charles Wyke, the British minister, demanded the repeal of this law within forty-eight hours. On the 24th, the French minister demanded its repeal within twenty-four hours. These demands were not complied with and diplomatic relations were immediately broken off by the British and French representatives.

The Spanish government had acted somewhat in advance of the other governments and was already preparing to back its claims by an armed expedition against Mexico. The rupture with the British and French governments very naturally pointed to joint action with Spain as the best means of securing their interests. The United States government, which had just entered upon one of the greatest struggles of modern times and had its hands practically tied as far as Mexico was concerned, regarded the contemplated intervention of European powers in Mexico with grave apprehension, not to say suspicion. So great was the uneasiness occasioned in the United States by the measures in contemplation and so strong was the desire to ward off the threatened danger to republican inst.i.tutions on this continent, that Mr. Seward authorized (September 2, 1861) the negotiation of a treaty with Mexico for the a.s.sumption by the United States of the payment of the interest, at three per cent., upon the funded debt of Mexico (the princ.i.p.al of which was about $62,000,000) for the term of five years from the date of the decree of the Mexican government suspending such payment, "provided that the government of Mexico will pledge to the United States its faith for the reimburs.e.m.e.nt of the money so to be paid, with six per cent.

interest thereon, to be secured by a specific lien upon all the public lands and mineral rights in the several Mexican states of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa, the property so pledged to become absolute in the United States at the expiration of the term of six years from the time when the treaty shall go into effect, if such reimburs.e.m.e.nt shall not have been made before that time."[198] All this, of course, was subject to the confirmation of the Senate.

This step was communicated informally to the British and French governments, and the validity of the convention was to be conditioned upon those governments engaging not to take any measures against Mexico to enforce the payment of the interest of the loan until time should have been given to submit the convention to the ratification of the United States Senate at its approaching session. It was also to be a condition that, if the convention should be ratified, Great Britain and France should engage, on their part, not to make any demand upon Mexico for the interest, except upon its failing to be punctually paid by the United States.[199]

Grave objections to Mr. Seward's plan of paying the interest on the Mexican debt were entertained both in Paris and in London. The French minister of state, M. Thouvenel, said to the British minister at Paris:

It might not be possible to prevent the United States offering money to Mexico, or to prevent Mexico receiving money from the United States, but neither England nor France ought in any way to recognize the transaction.[200]

Lord Lyons declared to Mr. Seward:

That her majesty's government were as apprehensive as Mr.

Seward himself could be, of an attempt to build upon a foundation of debts due, and injuries inflicted, by Mexico, a pretension to establish a new government in that country.

Her majesty's government thought, however, that the most effectual mode of guarding against this danger would be for Great Britain, the United States, and France to join Spain in a course of action, the objects and limits of which should be distinctly defined beforehand. This certainly appeared more prudent than to allow Spain to act alone now, and afterwards to oppose the results of her operations, if she should go too far.[201]

The British government avoided beforehand the necessity of a point-blank refusal of the plan of Mr. Seward, in case the treaty should go through, by declaring that the interest on the funded debt was not the only cause of complaint, but that there remained over and above that the outrages perpetrated upon British subjects still unredressed.

Mr. Charles Francis Adams, the United States minister to England, did not approve the plan of guaranteeing the Mexican interest, and in his dispatch to Mr. Seward of November 1, 1861, he expressed his opinion rather more frankly than is usual for a minister to do in discussing an instruction from the state department.

You will permit me here, however, to make a single remark in this connection upon the importance of appearing to divest the United States of any personal and selfish interest in the action it may think proper to adopt. The view customarily taken in Europe is that their government is disposed to resist all foreign intervention in Mexico, not upon any principle, but simply because it is itself expecting, in due course of time, to absorb the whole country for its own benefit. Hence any proposal like that which I had the honor to receive, based upon the mortgage of portions of Mexican territory as security for engagements entered into by the United States, naturally becomes the ground of an outcry that this is but the preliminary to an entry for inevitable foreclosure. And then follows the argument that if this process be legitimate in one case, why not equally in all. As against Great Britain and France, it would be difficult to oppose to this the abstract principle contained in what has been denominated the Monroe Doctrine, however just in substance.[202]

While Mr. Corwin was still in negotiation with the Mexican government in reference to some method of releasing Mexico from her complications with the allied governments of Europe, the United States Senate, in reply to two successive messages of the President, pa.s.sed a resolution, February 25, 1862, declaring the opinion "that it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty that will require the United States to a.s.sume any portion of the principle or interest of the debt of Mexico, or that will require the concurrence of European powers." This effectually put an end to Mr. Seward's plan.

Meanwhile Sir Charles Wyke had reopened negotiations with the Mexican government and negotiated a treaty which might have satisfied British claims, but the treaty was thrown out by the Mexican congress by a large majority, and also disapproved by the British government in view of an agreement entered into with France and Spain unknown to Sir Charles Wyke.[203]

The agreement referred to was the convention signed at London, October 31, 1861, between Spain, France, and Great Britain, in reference to the situation of affairs in Mexico and looking to armed intervention for the purpose of securing their rights. The preamble of the convention recites that the three contracting parties "being placed by the arbitrary and vexatious conduct of the authorities of the republic of Mexico under the necessity of exacting from those authorities a more efficient protection for the persons and property of their subjects, as well as the performance of the obligations contracted toward them by the republic of Mexico, have arranged to conclude a convention between each other for the purpose of combining their common action." The most important article of the convention in view of its subsequent violation by the Emperor Napoleon, was the second, which declared that:

The high contracting parties bind themselves not to seek for themselves, in the employment of coercive measures foreseen by the present convention, any acquisition of territory, or any peculiar advantage, and not to exercise in the subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to impair the right of the Mexican nation to choose and freely to const.i.tute the form of its own government.

The fourth article, recognizing that the United States also had claims against Mexico, provided:

that immediately after the signing of the present convention, a copy of it shall be communicated to the government of the United States, that that government shall be invited to accede to it.... But, as the high contracting parties would expose themselves, in making any delay in carrying into effect articles one and two of the present convention, to fail in the end which they wish to attain, they have agreed not to defer, with a view of obtaining the accession of the government of the United States, the commencement of the above-mentioned operations beyond the period at which their combined forces may be united in the vicinity of Vera Cruz.[204]

The advisability of inviting the cooperation of the United States had been the subject of considerable discussion and difference of opinion among the three European governments. England and France had urged the cooperation of the United States, while Spain had opposed it.

In compliance with the fourth article the convention was submitted to the government of the United States by a note dated November 30, 1861, signed jointly by the representatives of Spain, France, and Great Britain at Washington.

Mr. Seward's reply conveying the declination of the United States to the invitation to cooperate with the three allied European powers in the demonstration against Mexico was dated December 4, 1861. After reviewing the substance of the convention, he said:

First. As the undersigned has heretofore had the honor to inform each of the plenipotentiaries now addressed, the President does not feel himself at liberty to question, and he does not question, that the sovereigns represented have undoubted right to decide for themselves the fact whether they have sustained grievances, and to resort to war against Mexico for the redress thereof, and have a right also to levy the war severally or jointly.

In the second place, Mr. Seward expressed the satisfaction of his government that the allied powers had clearly repudiated in the convention all idea of carrying on the war for their own ambitious ends and all intention of exercising in the subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to impair the right of the Mexican people to choose and freely to const.i.tute the form of their own government.

It is true, as the high contracting parties a.s.sume, that the United States have, on their part, claims to urge against Mexico. Upon due consideration, however, the President is of opinion that it would be inexpedient to seek satisfaction of their claims at this time through an act of accession to the convention. Among the reasons for this decision which the undersigned is authorized to a.s.sign, are, first, that the United States, so far as it is practicable, prefer to adhere to a traditional policy recommended to them by the father of their country and confirmed by a happy experience, which forbids them from making alliances with foreign nations; second, Mexico being a neighbor of the United States on this continent, and possessing a system of government similar to our own in many of its important features, the United States habitually cherish a decided good-will toward that republic, and a lively interest in its security, prosperity, and welfare. Animated by these sentiments, the United States do not feel inclined to resort to forcible remedies for their claims at the present moment, when the government of Mexico is deeply disturbed by factions within, and exposed to war with foreign nations. And of course, the same sentiments render them still more disinclined to allied war against Mexico, than to war to be waged against her by themselves alone.

In conclusion, Mr. Seward referred to the fact that the United States government had authorized their representative in Mexico to enter into a treaty conceding to the Mexican government material aid, which might, he hoped, enable that government to satisfy the just claims and demands of the allied sovereigns and so to avert the war which they have agreed among each other to levy against Mexico.[205]

As already related, the efforts of the executive in this direction were not approved by the Senate and the negotiations in regard to guaranteeing the interest on the Mexican loan were broken off. The treaty negotiated by Mr. Corwin was in fact never submitted to the Senate, for by the time it was ready the French forces occupied a part of Mexican territory, and it was feared that a loan to Mexico under such conditions would be considered a breach of neutrality.

In pursuance of the London convention, Vera Cruz was occupied in the early part of 1862 by a Spanish force of 6,000 men under command of Marshal Prim; a French force of 2,500, which was largely reinforced soon afterward; and a force of 700 British marines.

The first intimation of the real purposes of the Emperor Louis Napoleon was given in the letter of instructions of M. Thouvenel to the admiral commanding the French expedition to Mexico, dated November 11, 1861. He said that in case of the withdrawal of the Mexican forces from the coast into the interior of the country, an advance upon the capital might become necessary. He reminded the admiral of the self-abnegatory character of the second article of the convention, but continued:

There are, however, certain hypotheses which present themselves to our foresight and which it was our duty to examine. It might happen that the pressure of the allied forces upon the soil of Mexico might induce the sane portion of the people, tired of anarchy, anxious for order and repose, to attempt an effort to const.i.tute in the country a government presenting the guarantees of strength and stability which have been wanting to all those which have succeeded each other since the emanc.i.p.ation.

To such efforts the admiral was expressly told that he was not to refuse his encouragement.[206]

In view of this order, the British government at once instructed its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, that, while there was nothing to be said against the reasoning of the French government in reference to the probable necessity of marching against the city of Mexico, he was to decline to take part in the advance into the interior, and that the fact, that the whole available British force was only 700 marines, would be sufficient reason for declining.[207]

The seriousness of the situation was fully appreciated by the United States government. Shortly after the occupation of Vera Cruz by the Spanish forces and the announcement of the outfit of a French force to follow up the advantage, Mr. Charles Francis Adams wrote to his government from London:

It is no longer concealed that the intention is to advance to the capital, and to establish a firm government, _with the consent of the people_, at that place. But who are meant by that term does not appear. This issue is by no means palatable to the government here, though it is difficult to imagine that they could have been blind to it. Feeble murmurs of discontent are heard, but they will scarcely be likely to count for much in the face of the obligation under which the action of the emperor in the Trent case has placed them. The military occupation will go on, and will not cease with the limits now a.s.signed to it. It is not difficult to understand the nature of the fulcrum thus obtained for operations in a new and a different quarter, should the occasion be made to use it. The expedition to the city of Mexico may not stop until it shows itself in the heart of the Louisiana purchase.[208]

About this time reports began to be circulated that the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria would be invited by a large body of Mexicans to place himself on the throne of Mexico, and that the Mexican people would gladly hail such a change. To whatever extent such reports might be credited, the United States could not call into question the good faith of the parties to the London convention. The British government, as the issue showed, acted with perfect sincerity in the matter; and the Spanish government, whatever may have been its original intentions, followed the lead of Great Britain. When the reports in regard to Maximilian were first circulated, the British government declared to its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, that:

If the Mexican people, by a spontaneous movement, place the Austrian Archduke on the throne of Mexico, there is nothing in the convention to prevent it. On the other hand, we could be no parties to a forcible intervention for this purpose.

The Mexicans must consult their own interests.[209]

At the time, however, the att.i.tude of the British government was not at all understood. Mr. Adams wrote:

Great Britain occupies the post of holding the door, whilst her two a.s.sociates, with her knowledge, go in, fully prepared, if they can, to perpetrate the act which she, at the outset, made them denounce, at the same time that she disavowed every idea of being made to partic.i.p.ate in it.[210]

In the face of armed invasion, the Mexican government a.s.sumed a more reasonable att.i.tude, and on the 19th day of February, 1862, the plenipotentiaries of Spain, Great Britain, and France signed, at Soledad, with the secretary of state of the Mexican government a preliminary agreement or convention, in which they recognized the const.i.tutional government as then organized. Declaring that they had "no designs against the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the Mexican republic," they agreed to open negotiations for the settlement of all the demands which they had to make at Orizaba. During the negotiations the forces of the allies were to be allowed to leave the unhealthy locality of Vera Cruz and occupy the three towns of Cordova, Orizaba, and Tehuacan, with their natural approaches. In the event of negotiations being broken off, the allies agreed to abandon the towns above named before reopening hostilities.[211]

The convention of Soledad proved, however, of short duration. On the 9th of April, 1862, the representatives of the allies announced in a formal note to the Mexican government, "that not having been able to agree about the interpretation which ought to be given in the present circ.u.mstances to the convention of the 31st of October, 1861 (the convention of London), they have resolved to adopt for the future an entirely separate and independent line of action. In consequence, the commander of the Spanish forces will immediately take the necessary measures to reimbark his troops. The French army will concentrate in Paso Aucho as soon as the Spanish troops have pa.s.sed from this position, that is to say, probably about the 20th of April, thereupon beginning their operations."[212] According to instructions already alluded to, the British force, which was limited to 700 marines, had declined to advance into the interior, and hence was not present when the breach occurred.

In spite of all appearances to the contrary, the French government still persisted in disavowing to the United States government, in the most emphatic terms, all designs upon the independence of the Mexican republic. Even after the rupture at Orizaba, M. Thouvenel a.s.sured Mr.