The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume II Part 13

'On the 20th we decided that if the Russians continued to advance, 20,000 troops should be concentrated at Quetta. We next gave instructions to Lord Dufferin with regard to what he was to say to the Amir of Afghanistan at the interview which was about to take place between them, and authorized him to renew our guarantee. There was either a regular or irregular Cabinet on March 24th. We decided that if the Russians advanced upon Herat, the advance should be treated as a _casus belli_, and orders to this effect were sent to Dufferin. At the meeting on April 2nd the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, a.s.sured the Amir in the presence of his Prime Minister, of Mr.

Durand, and of Captain Talbot, "that a Russian advance on Herat should be met by war all over the world."'

'On April 8th, in public durbar, the Amir, without contradiction from Lord Dufferin, said: "The British Government has declared it will a.s.sist me in repelling any foreign enemy."'

Sir Charles was now discussing by letter with Sir Frederick Roberts the proposals which were preferred by the Defence Committee in India for the defence of the North-West Frontier, with special emphasis on the further question whether there was any point at which England could strike at Russia. [Footnote: See Appendix following on this chapter, pp. 122, 123.]

Early in April sittings of the Housing Commission in Scotland occasioned Dilke's absence from a Cabinet at which important phases of the Central Asian question were discussed.

April 4th, 'Chamberlain wrote to me an account of all that pa.s.sed, pointing out that the Russian answer bade us "give up everything, and they offer us absolutely nothing by way of concession in return. This att.i.tude really leaves us no alternative. I am very uncomfortable about it, because the more I study the matter the more I think that the Russians are right both in form and in substance--i.e., they have the pretexts on their side, and they also have a strong argument in favour of their line, both on the matter of territorial right, and also on the ground that this line is the only one which insures any chance of permanent peace. But we cannot have the pill forced down our throats by Russia without inquiry, or discussion on equal terms.... Harcourt declares that we have 'closed the door of Peace and opened the door of War.' The only difference between us is that he is inclined to accept the alternative of the Russian zone which has been already refused, and as to which the present Note says in effect that, though they are ready to go back to this zone, yet it will be of no use, as they are determined in the end to stick to their line."'

'On Thursday, April 9th, there was a Cabinet, which I also missed, and which considered the conflict at Penjdeh.' [Footnote: On March 20th, General Komarof with a Russian force had attacked and routed an Afghan army in the valley of Penjdeh.]

Every day now had its Cabinet. On April 11th, 13th, and 14th evacuation of the Soudan was discussed, but Lord Hartington, by a threat of resignation, secured repeated postponements.

'This question was mixed up by some members of the Cabinet with that of Afghanistan, inasmuch as they said that we could not fight Russia in Afghanistan, and go on in the Soudan as well; upon which Mr.

Gladstone said of the Soudan, "I am not prepared to go on upon any terms, Russia or no Russia."

A new trouble was added when the Egyptian Government suppressed the _Bosph.o.r.e egyptien_, a local paper published in French, and closed the printing office. Against this the French protested, and in the course of the quarrel actually broke off diplomatic relations with the Egyptian Government, which, considering the relations between that Ministry and the protecting force of Great Britain, pushed unfriendliness very far.

Ultimately the _Bosph.o.r.e_ was allowed to appear and to print what it chose, until it died a natural death.

'On Monday, April 13th, came a proposal from the Russian Amba.s.sador, made through Lefevre and Brett, but which was really from Stead; Brett meaning Stead. Curiously enough, it was a proposal of Chamberlain's, of which he had previously told us, which had come back to him in this way. Chamberlain consulted me as to whether he should tell Mr. Gladstone that it was his, and I told him that I thought he had better not, as I thought it was more likely to be successful as coming from the Russian Amba.s.sador and Stead than as coming from him. It virtually amounted to the plan of Arbitration which was ultimately adopted, although as a fact the Arbitration never took place.'

'On Wednesday, 15th, there was an informal Cabinet, at which I was not present, because the Seats Bill was in Committee in the House at the same time. A form of words with regard to the Soudan was agreed upon which united Hartington with the others.'

'On Thursday, the 16th, Mr. Gladstone misinformed the House of Commons--the inevitable result from time to time of his habit of answering without notice questions upon dangerous subjects. A meeting had taken place between Lord Granville, Kimberley, and Philip Currie on our side, and Staal, the Russian Amba.s.sador, and Lessar, the Russian expert, at which Lord Granville showed that we meant to let Penjdeh go. Lessar paid a newspaper for its support by telling them. Mr. Gladstone was asked, and replied that he knew nothing about the matter, while he suggested that Penjdeh was not to be given up.'

'On the 18th the Queen agreed to retirement from the Soudan, with reservation of future liberty of action.' Whatever happened about Penjdeh, it was certain that resistance would be offered to Russia.

'On this day, Monday, April 20th, there was a Cabinet, at which it was decided to ask for eleven millions in the vote of credit. We then discussed Lumsden's despatch of explanation as to the Penjdeh incident, which we decided should be published. The vote of credit was really partly for Russia and partly for the Soudan, and a question arose whether it should be proposed as one or as two, and we decided for one. After which we went back again to the Budget, and the minority proposed a penny increase on the income tax as against the increase on beer, after which the Budget was adjourned to April 30th, it being decided then that the vote of credit should be taken first.'

'On April 20th I received from the Communalist General Cluseret a long letter in which he offered, on the ground of his profound sympathy, his services to England against Russia in the event of war--a doc.u.ment which would have done him little good had it seen the light when he afterwards stood successfully for my electoral division in the Var, at a time when French sympathy for Russia was predominant.

'On Tuesday, April 21st, after the Cabinet, I had told Mr. Gladstone that I could not agree to the increase of the taxation on beer, and Mr. Gladstone wrote to me twice on that day about the matter. I was not very sure of Harcourt standing by us, and knew that the pressure was great, inasmuch as, in addition to the two letters from Mr.

Gladstone, I received one from Edward Hamilton, also dated the 21st, in which he made the strongest appeal to me on personal grounds not to worry Mr. Gladstone by resignations. He said that Mr. Gladstone was overburdened, and that it would take very little to break him down. Edward Hamilton wrote: "It is a peculiarity of his ... that, while he can stand the strain of a grave political crisis such as a question involving peace or war, he succ.u.mbs to the strain of a personal question.... Mr. Gladstone, I know, feels that any secession, especially of one who has a reputation not confined to this country, would necessarily weaken greatly the Government, and from a national point of view this is of all times a moment when there ought to be a strong Government which can confront Europe and face the varied difficulties. No one would more gladly escape from office than Mr. G. himself; but the more attractive is the prospect of freedom, the less does he dare allow himself to contemplate it."'

Mr. Gladstone wrote saying that such a secession at such a time would be serious for the Government, but also, he thought, serious for the seceder, and Sir Charles replied:

Local Government Board, Whitehall, April 21st, 1885.

'I should always let the consideration of what was due to my friends weigh with me as much as any man, I feel sure, and I am also certain that considerations of personal loyalty to yourself are as strong with me now as they are with any member of the Cabinet. I should never let the other cla.s.s of considerations--i.e., those personal to myself--weigh with me at all. Because I am fond of work I am supposed to be ambitious; but I fancy few politicians are less so, and I do not mind unpopularity, which, after all, generally rights itself in the course of years. I knew that this matter would be a very serious one before I went into it, and I should not have said what I did had I not felt forced to do so.

'If others go with me, the extent of our unpopularity and consequent loss of future usefulness will depend on our own conduct, and if we do our duty by firmly supporting the Government through its foreign and general difficulties, I do not think that even the party will be ungenerous to us.'

But Sir Charles finally yielded, and drove a bargain.

'On April 24th I had decided at Chamberlain's strong wish to yield to Childers as to the beer duty; Childers promising in return to take the Princess Beatrice Committee of Inquiry demand upon himself.

'May 9th, the Queen now wished for immediate inquiry--that is, in other words, preferred the Parliament she knew to the new Parliament. The Government proposed "next year." It was agreed that the Government were to guide the Committee whenever it might sit, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be in the Chair.

'Mr. Gladstone wrote me a letter to ease off my surrender on beer duties, by pointing out the importance of the proposals which were being made to put realty in the same position as personalty as to Death Duties. "This must in all likelihood lead to a very serious struggle with the Tories, for it strikes at the very heart of cla.s.s-preference, which is the central point of what I call the lower and what is now the prevalent Toryism."'

In the great debate of April 27th, in which Mr. Gladstone proposed a vote of credit for eleven millions, of which six and a half were for war preparation in view of the collision between the Afghans and Russians at Penjdeh,

'Mr. Gladstone made perhaps the most remarkable speech that even he ever delivered, and I have his notes for it with a map I drew for him before he spoke, to show him the position of the various places.

[Footnote: On this speech see the _Life of Gladstone_, vol. iii., p.

184; _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., p. 440.] At this time I wrote to Hartington to suggest that if we were forced into war with Russia we should attack the Russians at Vladivostock, and the Intelligence Department wrote a memorandum upon the subject. I also sent round a paper pointing out that we should fight at the greatest advantage from a Pacific base, that the help of China would be of moment, and that Chinese troops drilled and officered by Englishmen would be irresistible; and Northbrook strongly backed me up. Lumsden was sending us most violent telegrams, and while I was preparing for war I was also asking for the recall of Lumsden in favour of Colonel Stewart. Lord Granville wrote: "Lumsden was a bad appointment, and I for a moment wished to recall him. But it would be condemned here as an immense knock-under." [Footnote: See the _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., pp. 441, 442.] I also suggested that the engineers for whom the Amir had asked should be carefully picked, and should have a private Indian allowance for keeping us informed of what pa.s.sed at Kabul, and Lord Granville conveyed the suggestion by telegraph to Lord Dufferin. (This was afterwards done.)'

Russia unexpectedly withdrew.

'On May 2nd there was a sudden Cabinet on the Russian acceptance of arbitration, Harcourt, Chamberlain, and Carlingford being absent.

Kimberley, the Chancellor, Northbrook, Derby, and I were for immediate acceptance of the offer; Hartington against; Lord Granville for amiably getting out of it; Trevelyan and Lefevre silent; Rosebery late. Mr. Gladstone at first sided with Lord Granville, then came half way to us, and then proposed that we should wait a bit till Condie Stephen reached us. I replied by showing that Condie Stephen was a Jingo, the friend of Drummond Wolff and of Bowles of _Vanity Fair_, and would make things worse.

Then Mr. Gladstone came completely to our side. Childers drew up in Cabinet the form for the declaration as to the Select Committee on the Civil List, and I agreed to it. I wrote what had pa.s.sed to Chamberlain, who was at Birmingham, and he replied on the next day that he trusted that the information about Russia would be immediately communicated to the House, and went on: "But, then, what becomes of the vote of credit and the Budget? It seems cheeky to ask for 6 1/2 millions of Preparations when the matter is practically settled."

'On May 7th the Herat boundary was discussed and a line settled, and it was decided that either the German Emperor or the King of Denmark should be named as the Arbitrator about Penjdeh.' Later, 'There was a meeting of the Commons Ministers to discuss the situation created by the refusal by Russia of the German Emperor as Arbitrator, the Queen having previously refused the King of Denmark. The Queen had ultimately to yield. But, as I have said, the arbitration, although agreed on, never took place at all.'

The demarcation of frontier for which Sir Charles had so long contended was carried through without any marked incident, largely owing to the skill of Sir J. West Ridgeway, who had succeeded Sir Peter Lumsden.

APPENDIX

The Memoir gives the following account of the proposals made for defence of the North-West Frontier in India in the spring of 1885, and some observations arising from them:

'The general idea was to hold the northern route by an entrenched position, and, as regards the southern or flank road, to fortify the mountains before Quetta. Roads and railways were to be made for concentration in the direction of Kandahar, and Sir Frederick Roberts afterwards very wisely noted, "It is impossible to threaten Russia's base, but we should do all in our power to keep it as far away as possible." Unfortunately, Sir Frederick Roberts afterwards forgot this, and suggested the possibility of advance upon Herat with the view to attack Russia at her Sarakhs base. The suggestions made in 1885 with regard to Kashmir and the Gromul Pa.s.s were acted upon in 1890. Sir Donald Stewart, however, went on to recommend a railway extension from Peshawur towards Kabul, and Sir Frederick Roberts, with greater judgment, on succeeding him, vetoed this scheme. Lord Kitchener revived it, but was not allowed to complete his work. Sir Donald Stewart's committee recommended the tunnel at the Khojak, which was carried out. Roberts reported against it, and he was right.

'On the whole, when Sir Frederick Roberts sent me his view on the defence proposals, I was struck with the contrast between the completeness of the manner in which a defence scheme for India has been considered, and the incompleteness, to say the least of it, of all strategic plans at home. Sir Charles Macgregor put on record at the same time his view that a mere offensive on the North-West Frontier of India would be folly, if not madness, and that it would be necessary also to undertake offensive operations against Russia.

Quite so, according to all rules of war, and if ultimate defeat is to be avoided. Unfortunately, however, it is not easy to attack Russia, and the proposals made by Sir Charles Macgregor would not bear investigation. Sir Frederick Roberts himself afterwards tried his hand at proposals of his own in a Memorandum ent.i.tled, "What are Russia's vulnerable points?" But I do not know that he was more successful, and I fear that his first question, "Has Russia any vulnerable points?" must, if we are looking to permanency, and not to merely temporary measures, be answered in the negative, except as regards Vladivostock--a case I put. After much correspondence with me on this last memorandum, Sir Frederick Roberts quoted me, without naming me, as having, to his regret, informed him that English public opinion would oppose a Turkish alliance, that a Turkish alliance would not be of much use if we could obtain it, and that apart even from these considerations we could not obtain it if we wished.'

The importance which Sir Charles attached to Vladivostock, as the vulnerable point at which Russia could be attacked in time of war, explains his regret when Port Hamilton, which threatened Vladivostock, was abandoned. [Footnote: See _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., p.

440; and _Europe and the Far East_, by Sir Robert K. Douglas, pp. 190, 248, 249.]

'May, 1885.--The Port Hamilton matter began about this time. We had seized it, and, as Northbrook and I agreed, "for naval reasons we ought to keep it." Northbrook also wrote that he was laying a cable from Shanghai to Port Hamilton, which he thought a most important precaution in time of war; but Port Hamilton was afterwards given up because the sailors found it dull--an insufficient reason.'

CHAPTER XL

REDISTRIBUTION: COERCION AND DEVOLUTION

1885

I.

The year 1885 saw the Seats Bill, with its numerous compromises in detail, pa.s.sed into law, but not without attendant difficulties.

'On Ash Wednesday, February 18th, I saw Sir Stafford Northcote, and settled with him, in view of the meeting of the House on the next day, the whole course of affairs for the 19th and 20th, under guise of discussing details of the Seats Bill. After we had parted, Northcote wrote to me that on consideration he had come to the conclusion that he must give notice of a vote of censure, but our amicable communication continued on the next day. "On consideration," with Northcote, always meant "After bullying by Randolph."'