The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume II Part 12

Have tried Lord G. and Lord Northbrook. No results!

So things must take their chance. There ought to have been a Cabinet to-morrow; but suppose it is not possible.

R.B.

Please return enclosed. Will send you a copy later. Have you any suggestion to make?

You will see that W. proposes to keep this secret. Not possible for long in this Office.

_Sir Charles Dilke to Mr. Brett._

Telegraph to _Mr. G. and Hartington to come up to-day_, and call a Cabinet for to-morrow at 11 a.m. Make Hamilton telegraph to all Ministers at once. I'm prepared to take it on myself if you like, but you can send this to Chamberlain if he agrees.

I agree certainly.--J. C.

Local Government Board,

February 5th, 1885.

It is absurd not to make them come up _to-day_ in face of Wolseley's "_It is most essential that I shall have the earliest possible decision._"] Only three subjects were discussed: Khartoum, secrecy, and the question of the Italians as against the Turks in the Red Sea.'

On February 7th, 'The next matter was Wolseley, who had confused us by greatly varying his statements.... Next came a proposal that Gordon should be bought from the Mahdi.'

'On February 9th Mr. Gladstone mentioned his intention to bring in Rosebery and Lefevre as members of the Cabinet. It was decided that the Italians should be allowed to go to Ka.s.sala--a decision which was afterwards reversed. The French views on Egyptian finance were named, the despatch of Indian troops to Suakim again discussed.

Wolseley having asked that General Greaves should be sent to Suakim, Childers said that the Queen and Duke of Cambridge had stopped that officer's promotion because he "belonged to the Ashantee gang"

(Wolseley's friends), and that the Duke had now complained that he did not know him. Chamberlain proposed that we should invite the Canadian Government to send a force to Suakim; and, finally, Childers was allowed to mention finance, which had been the object for which the Cabinet was called.

'On February 10th I wrote to Chamberlain that Rosebery and Lefevre would help the Cabinet with the public, but would weaken us in the Cabinet.

'On February 11th there was another Cabinet, five members being absent--namely, the Chancellor, Carlingford, Spencer, Chamberlain, and Trevelyan--owing to the suddenness of the call. It was on the Suakim command, Mr. Gladstone being very obstinate for Greaves, as against Graham with Greaves for Chief of Staff--a compromise. I supported Hartington--I do not know why--and we beat Mr. Gladstone by 5 to 4. Both officers were inferior men, and Graham did but badly. Probably Greaves would have done no better....

'Mr. Gladstone complained that he and Hartington had received at Carnforth on the 5th a disagreeable telegram _en clair_ from the Queen, and Mr. Gladstone was very anxious to know whether the Tories had found it out, asking anxiously, "What are the station-master's politics?"

'February 13th ... I was with Harcourt when Rosebery came to be sworn in, so I took the opportunity of making Rosebery help us to make Lord Derby uncomfortable for proposing to refuse the troops offered by the colony of New South Wales.

'We began to discuss our Soudan policy with some anxiety.

'Courtney and Morley had insisted in private letters that we should only rescue, and not attack the rebels, and the _Times_ agreed with them--unless we intended to stay in the country and establish a Government. Wolseley's policy would be represented as one of "smash and retire," and it was for this reason that Chamberlain pressed negotiations with the Mahdi, as he thought we should be stronger if we could show that the Mahdi had rejected a fair offer. It was on February 13th that Hartington most strongly pressed his proposal for the Suakim railroad, and invited me to be a member of a Cabinet Committee to consider the proposal.'

'On Monday, February 16th, the first matter discussed was the Russian answer as regards Egyptian finance. The Soudan was put off till the next day, Chamberlain making a strong speech first upon our policy. Hartington asked for five million, to include the cost of his Suakim-Berber railway, and for leave to call out reserves.

'On February 19th I had an interview with Mr. Gladstone, and found him anxious to be turned out on the vote of censure. Indeed, he was longing for it, in the firm belief that, if turned out, he would come back after the dissolution in November, while, if not turned out, he would be more likely to be beaten.

'On February 20th the subjects discussed were Egypt (Finance and Suez Ca.n.a.l) and the sending a colonial force to Suakim. Chamberlain had developed to Childers at the same meeting a proposal that Hartington should form a Ministry to carry on the Soudan War, with the loyal support of those of us who went out with Mr. Gladstone.

'On February 25th, Goschen having asked for a.s.surances as to the Berber railway, Chamberlain wrote to me saying that if Hartington gave them, it might be a sufficient cause for our resignation, as we were not prepared to commit the country to establishing settled government in any part of the Soudan. Chamberlain proposed that we should resign before the division, and that the Government being beaten, there should then be brought about the establishment of what he called the combination or patriotic Government, which meant a Hartington administration. I, on the whole, preferred to go on as we were, so I stopped a box of Hartington's which was going round the Cabinet, and proposed an alteration of form which prevented Chamberlain going out on these a.s.surances.

'During the debate I went away to dine, and, not having heard the middle of Harcourt's speech, asked Chamberlain whether Harcourt had tried to answer any of Goschen's questions, to which Chamberlain answered, "Not one. He asked questions in turn," which is a good description of Harcourt's style. I then wrote on a slip of paper, "Forster is taking notes"; and Chamberlain replied, "Forster-- against slavery, against Zebehr, [Footnote: Zebehr was arrested in Cairo on the ground of treasonable correspondence with the Mahdi, and interned at Gibraltar, but later was allowed to return to Cairo.

He died in January, 1903.] and of course generally in favour of a crusade," a note which is also characteristic--of both these men.

'At four o'clock in the morning of February 28th, when we got our majority of 14, after the first division, Mr. Gladstone, who wanted to go out, said to Childers and myself, "That will do." This was indeed a Delphic utterance.'

Sir Charles himself spoke, at Mr. Gladstone's request, at great length in the third day's debate on February 26th, but it was 'only a debating speech.'

'After we had had a sleep, we met in Cabinet on Sat.u.r.day, February 28th. Lord Granville and Childers now anxious to go. Harcourt, who had at night been against going, was now anxious to go. This was a curious and interesting Cabinet. Lord Granville and Lord Derby, who were at loggerheads both with Bismarck and with their colleagues, were strong that we should resign, and they got some support from Chamberlain, Northbrook, Childers, and Hartington. Lefevre, [Footnote: Lord Eversley, then Mr. Shaw Lefevre, had joined the Cabinet after the news from Khartoum. Lord Rosebery had accepted the Privy Seal. Lord Eversley says that on February 28th opinions were evenly divided, but that one member refused to express an opinion on the ground of his recent admission. See, too, _Life of Granville_, vol. ii., pp. 421-422.] who had only just come in, and Trevelyan were strong for staying in, as was Carlingford; but the other members of the Cabinet either wobbled backwards and forwards, or did not care. At last it was decided by the casting vote of Mr.

Gladstone, if one may use the phrase when there was no actual voting, that we should try to go on at present so as to carry the Seats Bill ourselves.

'We then turned to the Berber railway, and decided that it should be a temporary or contractor's line made only so far as might be necessary for purely military reasons. We then decided that Wolseley should not be allowed to make himself Governor-General of the Soudan.

'After the Cabinet Chamberlain and I continued our discussion as to his strong wish to resign. I told him that I wanted to finish the Seats Bill, that I thought Lord Salisbury might refuse or make conditions with regard to coming in, that Mr. Gladstone would not lead in opposition, and that we should seem to be driving him into complete retirement, and I asked whether we were justified in running away.'

Meantime the financial business of the year had to go on, and part of it was a demand for increased naval expenditure, to which, as has been seen already, Mr. Gladstone was opposed.

'The Navy Estimates were first discussed, and then the Army, and a sum asked for for the fortification of coaling-stations was refused, and also a sum asked for for defending the home merchant ports. We all of us were guilty of unwise haste on this occasion, for the demand was right; but the chief blame must fall rather on Childers, Hartington, and the others who had been at the War Office than upon those who sinned in ignorance.'

This decision against naval expenditure was a cause of embarra.s.sment to the Government in the country, for a strong 'big navy' campaign followed. The real question at issue in the Cabinet became that of taxation. On March 2nd, and again in April, Sir Charles 'warned Mr.

Gladstone against Childers's proposed Budget'--the rock on which they finally made shipwreck. 'Mr. Gladstone replied: "The subject of your note has weighed heavily on my mind, and I shall endeavour to be prepared for our meeting." I now sent him a memorandum after consultation with Chamberlain.'

What Sir Charles wrote in 1885 is nowadays matter of common argument; it was novel then in the mouth of a practical politician:

'I stated at length that, as head of the Poor Law department, I ought to have knowledge of the pressure of taxation upon the incomes of the poor. As Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Cla.s.ses, I had had to hear a great deal of evidence upon the subject of the income of the working cla.s.ses, and as Chairman of the recent Conference on Industrial Remuneration had had special opportunities of further examining the question. It was my opinion that the position of the agricultural labourers had declined, and that the Whig or Conservative minority on my Commission, represented by Mr. Goschen and Lord Brownlow, admitted this contention of mine as regarded the south of England. The labourers of the south were unable to procure milk, and relied largely on beer as an article of food. Their wages had but slightly increased in the twenty years since 1865, and had decreased considerably since 1879. Food had slightly risen in price, clothes were nominally cheaper, but the same amount of wear for the money was not obtainable, and house rent (where house rent was paid by the labourers) had greatly risen. An enormous proportion of the income of the rich escaped taxation: fifty millions a year of their foreign income at the least. The uncertainty of employment placed the labourer even lower as a partaker in the income of the country than the statisticians placed him. The calculations of employers, upon which the estimates of statisticians were based, were founded upon the higher earnings of the best workers; and when the matter was examined, it was found that variation of wages, loss of time, and failure of work, much lowered the average earnings. The taxation of the working cla.s.ses rose to a higher percentage than that of the upper and middle cla.s.ses. Mr. Dudley Baxter, who was a Conservative, had admitted this, and had advocated a reduction in the tobacco duty and the malt tax. Since that time the tobacco duty had been raised, and the duties pressing upon beer had been rather raised than lowered.'

Sir Charles's insistence upon this matter is all the more notable because foreign complications were rapidly acc.u.mulating, and they were of a gravity which might well have seemed to dwarf all questions of the incidence of taxation.

There were not only the difficulties with Germany. There was also the Soudan, where a large body of British troops was engaged, in a country the perils of which England had now to realize.

'On March 7th there was a Cabinet as to the Suakim-Berber railway.

Northbrook and I, soon joined by Harcourt and Chamberlain, were in favour of stopping our impossible campaign. I argued that when we decided to destroy the power of the Mahdi, it was on Wolseley's telling us that he hoped possibly to take Khartoum at once. For some weeks after that he had intended to take Berber. Then he had told us that he at least could occupy Abu Hamed. Now he was in full retreat, and both his lines of supply--namely, that up the Nile and that from Suakim--seemed equally difficult. The Chancellor wrote on a slip of paper for me: "We seem to be fighting three enemies at once. (1) The Mahdi; (2) certain of our people here; (3) Wolseley." Nothing was settled, and we pa.s.sed on to Egyptian finance.'

March 11th, 'In the evening a despatch was circulated in which Wolseley said: "Please tell Lord Granville that I cannot wait any longer, and I must issue proclamation, and will do so on my own authority if I do not receive answer to this by the 14th. I hope I may be allowed to issue it as Governor-General."

'I at once wrote, "I understood that we had _decided_ that he was not to be Governor-General, and that the proclamation should not be issued in the terms proposed"; on which Lord Granville wrote, "Yes.

Cabinet to-morrow.--G."

'On Thursday, March 12th, the first matter discussed was that of the arrest of Zebehr. Then came Wolseley's proclamation, which was vetoed. We decided that he should not be allowed to make himself Governor-General of the Soudan.'

It now seemed more than likely that the British Government would have work on its hands which would render the employment of an army in the Soudan very undesirable; for more serious than the Mahdi's movements on the Nile, more serious than the operations of German Admirals in the Pacific, was the menace of a Russian advance upon Afghanistan.

Arrangements had been made for the demarcation of the Afghan frontier which Sir Charles had persistently urged. A British Commissioner had been appointed in July, 1884, but at the end of the following November Russia was still parleying on questions of detail. These, however, seemed to have been at length resolved; and in January, 1885, the British Commissioner was waiting in the neighbourhood of Herat for the Russian Commissioners to join in the work of fixing the boundaries. But the Russians did not appear; they were, says Sir Charles, 'intriguing at Penjdeh, and preparing for the blow which later on they struck against the Afghans.' The Amir evidently felt this, for he renewed the proposal that he should pay a state visit to the Viceroy, and on January 23rd Dilke wrote to Grant Duff that this had been accepted.

February 4th, 'On this day I received a letter from Sir Robert Sandeman at Quetta, in which he thanked me for the a.s.sistance that I had given him in the retention of Sibi, Pishin, and the Khojak. "It was greatly due to your support of my representations on the subject that our influence on this frontier is at present all-powerful."'

On February 5th, a few hours after the fall of Khartoum was published,

'there was a meeting of Ministers as to Central Asia. We decided on a reply to Russia drawn up by myself and Kimberley, Lord Granville and Northbrook somewhat dissenting, and Fitzmaurice and Philip Currie taking no part.

'On February 18th we had a meeting of the Central Asia Committee at the Foreign Office with regard to the Russian advance in the direction of Penjdeh, Lord Granville, Hartington, Northbrook, Kimberley, myself, Fitzmaurice, and Currie. We ordered Sir Peter Lumsden' (Chief of the Boundary Commission), 'in the event of a Russian advance on Herat, to throw himself and escort into that city, and to aid the Afghan defence.'

On March 12th, after deciding to limit Lord Wolseley's schemes in the Soudan, 'we took a decision that war preparations against Russia should be made in India.'