The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume I Part 59

Going over this diary in 1900, it is a curious reflection that the immense weight gained by Sir Edward Grey in the period between 1890 and 1900 was similar to that which Lord Derby had enjoyed at the earlier period. Each of them in his time appeared to express, though far from old, the lifelong judgment of a Nestor. Each of them extorted from the hearer or reader the feeling: "What this man says is unanswerable. It is the dispa.s.sionate utterance of one who knows everything, and has thought it out in the simplest but the most convincing form." Lord Derby could sum up a discussion better, probably, than anyone has ever done, unless it is Sir Edward Grey. Sir Edward Grey's summing up of a discussion on a difficult problem, such as that presented by the Chinese question, 1897-1900, was better than was to be expected from anyone else, unless it had been the Lord Stanley of, say, thirty-five years before.'

On May 27th

'I dined at Marlborough House at a dinner to meet a little tin soldier cousin in white epaulettes, who was over from Germany ... and (the German Amba.s.sador) Count Munster told me that the French had hoisted their flag on a reef, as he said, within cannon-shot of Jersey, as to the British or neutral nature of which there had long been a dispute between the two Governments.' [Footnote: The Memoir has a note upon this episode of the Ecrehous Books, which led to the publication of Parliamentary papers in June of that year:

'The rocks were not within three miles of the coast of Jersey at low- water mark, and this was the limit of the reservation of the Jersey oyster fishery, and it was upon this fact that the French went. It afterwards appeared that the French flag never had been hoisted on the rocks, but only on a boat which came thither for the purpose of fishing, so that the whole matter was somewhat of a storm in a teacup.

It raised, however, another question. The Convention of 1839, which defined the limits of the oyster fishery between Jersey and France, also defined the limits of the exclusive French rights of fishery on all other parts of the coast of the British islands; and some day an Irish Parliament may find interest in Sir Edward Hertslet's "Memorandum as to the French right of fishery upon the coast of Ireland, printed for the Foreign Office on the 5th June, 1883."']

'On May 28th there was a Levee, at which d'Aunay, of the French Emba.s.sy, told me that the act of the fishermen at Ecrehous was disavowed by France. "But," he added, "there is perhaps some Challemel in it," an admission which rather weakened the other statement, and it again struck me that it was a pity we had been so rude to Challemel when he was Amba.s.sador.'

Relations with France were going from bad to worse. Not only were they strained by the breach of 1882 over Egypt, but French colonizing aspirations had created trouble in Madagascar. The understanding between the two Great Powers that an "identic att.i.tude" in regard to the Hova people was to be maintained was broken down by France, which under various pretexts intervened by force in Madagascar, claiming a protectorate over certain narrow strips of territory on the north-west coast. This claim was denounced by Lord Granville. Yet 'on October 27th, 1882, there was a dinner at Lord Granville's, at which I met Hartington, Kimberley, and Northbrook.' This meeting of the heads of the military and foreign services discussed the affairs of the Congo, and also Madagascar; 'it was decided against my strong opposition to put no difficulties in the way of the French. 'At this time the growing tension was disagreeably felt, and Sir Charles learnt a month later that the Cabinet of November 28th, 1882, 'had been much frightened at the prospect of trouble with France.'

At this time an Emba.s.sy from Madagascar was in Paris to protest against the oppressive policy pursued. An ultimatum was presented which left the envoys no option but to depart, and they came with their bitter complaint to London, where Sir Charles Dilke very warmly espoused their cause:

'At this moment, December 1st, 1882, I was having difficulties with Lord Granville about Madagascar, as I was seeing much of the Malagasy envoys, and was very friendly to them; whereas Lord Granville was frightened of the French. A deputation came to us, got up by Chesson, Secretary of the Aborigines' Protection Society, and introduced by Forster; it suggested American arbitration, and Lord Granville threw much cold water upon the scheme.'

A few days later he adds:

'I was still at this moment fighting for my Malagasy friends. Not only did Lord Granville snub me, but Courtney wrote from the Treasury: "I hope you will get rid of these people as soon as possible. Even the Baby Jenkins sees the absurdity of the anti-French feeling." But whatever "Ginx's Baby" might do, I could not see the absurdity of the anti-French feeling with regard to Madagascar, for the French were wantonly interfering with an interesting civilized black people in whose country they had not even trade, for All the trade was in American, British, or German hands.

'On December 15th, 1882, there was a fresh trouble, for Lord Granville was furious at a speech by Lord Derby, and, indeed, I never knew him so cross about anything at all. The difficulty was once more Madagascar. Lord Granville _meant_ to do nothing about Madagascar, but he did not like Lord Derby saying so in public. It spoiled his play, by allowing his French adversary to look over his hand and see how bad the cards were.'

The Malagasys were unique in that since 1869 they had become definitely a Christian State, and a State Christianized by English missionaries, and this fact was impressively brought home to Sir Charles by a scene which he afterwards (in 1886) thus described in a public lecture:

"At Westminster Abbey there came in to the Morning Service the whole of the members of the Madagascar Emba.s.sy, which had just come to London from France. The two Malagasy Amba.s.sadors were at the head of the party. They sat very silently through the service, which the senior Amba.s.sador did not understand at all, and which the second Amba.s.sador only partly understood, until a hymn which had been given out was sung, when, recognizing the familiar tune, the two Amba.s.sadors and the whole of their secretaries struck boldly in with the Malagasy words. There could be no better instant proof, to anyone who saw the scene, of their familiarity with the missionary teaching of England and America, and of the extent to which, though separated from us by language, they look upon themselves as members of the Christian Church."

In 1882-83 Sir Charles failed to interest his colleagues in the matter, till on August 22nd, 1883, just before Parliament was prorogued, the Cabinet had to discuss 'what was known as the Tamatave incident, which nearly brought England and France to war over matters growing out of the French operations in Madagascar.'

The town of Tamatave had been bombarded and occupied by the French in June. The matter was aggravated by the treatment of the British Consul and of a British missionary, and difficulties were made as to adequate apology and indemnity.

'In the course of September I had frequent interviews with Fitzmaurice at the Foreign Office with regard to Madagascar.... Lord Granville wrote to me, about the middle of October, that (the French Amba.s.sador) Waddington "professed to have a solution of the Tamatave" difficulty, and on the 22nd a Cabinet was called with regard to the Tamatave difficulty, Egypt, and South Africa. The French despatch from Challemel to Waddington was most unsatisfactory.'

Another Cabinet having been summoned for October 25th, Harcourt wrote: "I have heard nothing about its cause or object, but conjecture that it is Granville's Cabinet for France.... It is ominous Northbrook (First Lord of the Admiralty) being a princ.i.p.al a.s.sistant. I am myself for being _stiff_ with France."

'The Cabinet was upon the two points of Tamatave and withdrawal from Egypt, but, in the absurd way in which Cabinets behave when summoned upon important questions, we spent most of our time in discussing a scheme of Lefevre's for widening Parliament Street; Mr. Gladstone wishing to widen King Street and to make a fork. A Committee was appointed on the matter, to consist of Harcourt, Childers, Lefevre, Northbrook, and myself. Hartington came late as usual, and on his arrival our Tamatave despatch was discussed.'

The complete destruction of the native State and dynasty did not come at this time, and French "protection" of Madagascar was only recognized by Lord Salisbury's Government in 1890. But the encroachments of France led in this year to further friction, arising from their conflict for the possession of Tonquin. On November 17th the Cabinet discussed 'the protection of British subjects in China in view of a French attack on the Chinese Empire, and decided to concert measures with Germany and the United States.' On the 19th they proposed to France mediation in the Chinese difficulty, 'with the full expectation that it would be refused.'

'On December 7th there was a paragraph in the _Times_ in large type intended to rea.s.sure the French, by stating that our interference in China to protect our own subjects was not combined with Germany in particular. The paragraph, although it may have been wanted, was untrue. We _had_ combined our action with the Germans, and then found it was resented by the French.'

So dissension grew at a pace which enabled Bismarck to turn his attention from European politics, and, in one of his many meetings with Count Herbert, Sir Charles reports that about the second week in November

'I had a conversation with H. Bismarck about his father. He said that the Prince had turned as yellow as a guinea, and could not now work more than an hour at a time, and that the only thing on which he troubled himself was his workman's insurance scheme.'

CHAPTER x.x.xIII

EGYPT AFTER TEL-EL-KEBIR SEPTEMBER, 1882, TO DECEMBER, 1883

'On September 19th, 1882, at noon we had a conference at the War Office with regard to the future of Egypt, at which were present Lord Granville, Childers, Sir Auckland Colvin, and myself, and which was followed afterwards by a further conference, when there were admitted to us Pauncefote for the Foreign Office and Sir Louis Mallet for the India Office, Admiral Sir Cooper Key for the Admiralty, Sir F.

Thompson, Permanent Under-Secretary for War, and Generals Sir Andrew Clarke and Sir Henry Norman for the War Office. In preparation for the conference I had stirred up Lord Granville as to the volunteering of Indian Moslem troops for the Khedive's guard. But Lord Granville in his reply to me was more concerned with abusing my handwriting in choice language than with answering my questions. Hartington, however, had telegraphed to India for me on the 17th to ask the opinion of the Indian Government on the point. Harcourt, writing from Balmoral on the 19th, said: "If you have any ideas on the settlement of Egypt, I wish you would let me have them. I confess I am myself _in nubibus_, and I do not find that my betters are much more enlightened. I am constantly asked here what we are going to propose, and I do not know what to say. I have written to Mr. G. and to Lord G. to ask for light, but I should like to have your own personal views as to what is practicable.

I think we must cut the cord between Egypt and Turkey, but one cannot conceal from oneself that the consequences will be serious, and may lead to far-reaching complications. The one good thing is that Bismarck is honestly friendly, and I believe will support us in whatever we propose. Austria seems to be almost as nasty as Russia, and France naturally jealous. I suppose Bismarck can and will keep Austria in order. Please write me a real letter on these knotty points."

'Our Egyptian conference decided upon free navigation of the Ca.n.a.l, or, in other words, that ships of war were to pa.s.s at all times; on increased influence for England on the Directorate of the Ca.n.a.l; and on the destruction of the Egyptian fortresses. Childers promised to prepare a scheme for taking over the Egyptian railroads. A paper by us was printed for the use of the Cabinet on October 20th, in which we stated our views about the Ca.n.a.l, and incidentally our decision against a British protectorate of Egypt. The arrangement proposed by us was pretty much that afterwards agreed upon by the Powers.'

Before this paper was issued Sir Charles had seen emile Ollivier, who, as a legal adviser of the Khedive, 'had great knowledge of the affairs of the Suez Ca.n.a.l':

'I possess the draft of a full memorandum of Ollivier's conversation which I sent to Lord Granville, and which represented his private protests to Lesseps and his argument to the Khedive. Ollivier, who was more English than French in the matter, accepted the position that by the Khedival decree of August 14th England had been subst.i.tuted for the Khedive in all measures for the re-establishment of order in Egypt, and that it was under this decree that we occupied the ends of the Ca.n.a.l as the delegates of the Khedive; therefore there was no violation of the neutrality, and when the Ca.n.a.l Company on August 19th set up as a new Great Power, and addressed to the Khedive a diplomatic note, their arguments became nonsensical, inasmuch as they virtually argued that the Khedive himself had violated his own neutrality by an internal act. Moreover, the neutrality of the Ca.n.a.l had never been declared at all. The word "neutral" was indeed found in the original concession, but it evidently meant that the Company was not to give to one Power an advantage not given to others as regards trade and pa.s.sage. Lesseps had set up the Ca.n.a.l as a new Great Power, whereas it was only an Egyptian Limited Company.

'Even, however, if the Ca.n.a.l had been neutral, Ollivier would have argued against the Company that the suppression of an internal rebellion in the Khedive's name, at his request, was not war or violation of neutrality. It was the duty of the Khedive to suppress rebellion, and the duty of the Ca.n.a.l as an Egyptian Company to aid, and not to impede, as it had impeded, the lawful action of the Egyptian ruler through his representatives. It had not been contended by the Porte, as the overlord of the Khedive, that the Khedive had not power to delegate authority to England to suppress Arabi's rebellion.

The Porte had delegated to France power to suppress the rebellion in Syria in 1860 in its name. Lesseps seemed to think that it was within the power of the Khedive to delegate to him sovereignty over the Ca.n.a.l, and not in his power to delegate to anybody else the suppression of a rebellion.'

A casual reference at this point recalls the fact that the Khedive's dethroned predecessor was still moving about the world and capable of causing trouble. Sir Charles went abroad for his autumn vacation:

'In Paris' (in the middle of October) 'I found a letter from Lord Granville as to a visit which the ex-Khedive Ismail proposed to pay to London. Lord Granville said that the Government could not object to his "coming to this country. But at this moment his arrival would be misunderstood, and any civilities, which in other circ.u.mstances they would be desirous to show to His Highness, would lead to misconstruction."' [Footnote: 'In November, 1883, the ex-Khedive had come to London, and when asked to see him, at his wish, I at first refused, but as, after he clearly understood that I knew him to be a rascal, he wished to see me "all the same," I saw him privately at Lady Marian Alford's house in Kensington; but he had little to say, and seemed very stupid.' ]

'I was at this time in correspondence with my friend d'Estournelles, [Footnote: Baron d'Estournelles de Constant.] who was Acting Resident at Tunis, as to the capitulations. In the course of his letter d'Estournelles expressed his bitter regret that France had not gone to Egypt with us.'

When Sir Charles came back to London from France on October 20th, the Cabinet was still vacillating as to its Egyptian policy:

'I had found on my return that nothing had been done towards setting up such an Egyptian Army as could take the place of our own, although Sir Charles Wilson, Colonel Valentine Baker, Baring, [Footnote: Major Evelyn Baring, afterwards Lord Cromer, was then Financial Member of Council in India. Sir Charles Wilson (Colonel Wilson) must not be confounded with Sir Charles Rivers Wilson. Colonel Valentine Baker was head of the Egyptian Gendarmerie.] and others, had written memoranda upon the subject. Baring, in the course of his memorandum, strongly defended the honesty, humanity, and conscience of the Khedive, and opposed annexation and protectorate. On the whole, Baring's memorandum was a better one than that of his relative Lord Northbrook, or that of Lord Dufferin, which afterwards attracted much attention. Chamberlain and I discussed on Sat.u.r.day, October 21st, a letter to me from Labouchere, in which the latter seemed to take a different view from that recorded above. Labouchere said that the dissatisfaction with the Egyptian policy was growing, that we seemed to be administering Egypt mainly for the good of the bondholders. He was a bondholder, so it could not be said that he was personally prejudiced against such a policy. But he was sure that it would not go down.

'He went on to recommend the policy which I was in fact maintaining-- namely, that we should warn off other Powers, hand Egypt over to the Egyptians, but, establishing our own influence over the Ca.n.a.l, remain masters of the position so far as we needed to do so. Chamberlain wrote on Labouchere's letter: "I am convinced the war was submitted to rather than approved by Radicals, and, unless we can snub the bondholders in our reorganization scheme, we may suffer for it. I have written a long paper upon the subject, and sent it to Mr. G. I have arranged for a copy to be sent you."'

A further Cabinet held on Sat.u.r.day, October 21st, "decided" (so Sir Charles noted in his Diary at the moment) "to be very civil to the French --too civil by half, I think. They rejected a complicated scheme of Lord Granville's, and subst.i.tuted a single English (not to be so expressed) controller (not to be so called)."

At this moment the autumn Session was approaching, in which the th.o.r.n.y subject of reforming Parliamentary procedure must be disposed of, and the Cabinet were preoccupied with this till 6 p.m. on October 23rd. They

'scamped their work on the draft despatch to Lord Lyons as to what he was to tell the French as to Egypt, and so made a wretched job of it.

At night I pointed this out to Lord Granville, and told him that the despatch was slipslop, and on the next day, October 24th, I managed to get a good many changes made--one by telegraph, and the others by an amending despatch.'

'Chamberlain's view of Lord Granville's proposals was that they were childishly insincere. Europe would not be deceived into believing them to be anything more than a proposal to restore the old system in its entirety, with an English nominee as controller in place of the dual control. Nothing, Chamberlain thought, was being done to develop Egyptian interests or promote Egyptian liberties.

'Chamberlain was absent from some of the Cabinets at this moment, detained at Birmingham by the gout, but his memorandum was sent round the Cabinet. He was, however, in London on October 24th to a.s.sist me in somewhat improving the despatch. His memoranda show the strong view he held that, in spite of the almost unanimous approval of the Press, the war had not been popular, but had only been accepted on the authority of Mr. Gladstone as a disagreeable necessity; and that dissatisfaction existed upon several points, but above all with regard to the civil reorganization of the country. "There is great anxiety lest after all the bondholders should be the only persons who have profited by the war, and lest the phrases which have been used concerning the extension of Egyptian liberties should prove to have no practical meaning." Chamberlain thought that our first duty was to our principles and our supporters rather than towards other Powers, and that, if the other Powers insisted upon financial control, we should at least put forward as our own the legitimate aspirations of Egyptian national sentiment. Chamberlain refused to believe that an Egyptian Chamber would repudiate the debt, inasmuch as such a course of action would at once render them liable to interference by the Great Powers.'

'On October 27th, 1882, there was a dinner at Lord Granville's, at which I met Lords Hartington, Kimberley, and Northbrook' (representing India, the Colonies, and the Admiralty). 'I noted with regard to Egypt:

'"Chamber of Notables: decided to do nothing, at which I am furious.

What do four peers know about popular feeling?"'

In view of the temper of the House of Commons, Sir Charles Dilke warned Lord Granville by letter of the danger that the Fourth Party might carry "the ma.s.s of the Tories" with Liberals on a cry for the "liberties of the Egyptian people." Considerable delay was occasioned by negotiations as to whether Arabi and his a.s.sociates should or should not be represented by European counsel at their trial, and in the interval rumours were set afloat as to ill usage of them in prison.

'I had had in the course of this week a good deal of trouble in the House of Commons, caused by a sensational telegram in the _Daily News_, and a letter from a Swiss Arabist in the _Times_ containing most ridiculous lies as to the treatment of political prisoners in Egypt, but believed by our supporters, who were backed up by the Fourth Party.'

These attacks involved the British Agent-General in Egypt, and Sir Edward Malet felt the situation cruelly. He telegraphed home begging to be relieved from the sole responsibility.