The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke Volume I Part 58

Sir Charles Dilke's transference to the Local Government Board scarcely lessened his contact with the more important branches of the Foreign Office work, while his entry into the Cabinet greatly increased the range of his consultative authority.

The Triple Alliance was a fact, but only guessed as yet. It is not till the middle of 1883 that Sir Charles writes:

'On June 4th, 1883, I heard the particulars of the alliance of the Central Powers, signed at Vienna between Germany and Austria in October, 1879, and ratified at Berlin on October 18th of that year, to which Italy had afterwards adhered.' [Footnote: Sir Charles knew that Prince Bismarck had tried first for an English alliance, and wrote on August 17th, 1882, to Sir M. Grant Duff: "N. Rothschild told me that the late Government had twice declined an offensive and defensive alliance offered by Germany." See also _Life of Lord Granville_, vol.

ii., p. 211.]

An extension was contemplated which would have put France between two fires. Later, in the autumn of 1883,

'a private letter from Morier to Lord Granville showed that Bismarck had sent the Crown Prince of Germany to Spain to induce Spain to join the "peace league"' (Triple Alliance), 'and had failed.'

On November 22nd, 1883,

'At the Cabinet I saw a telegram from Lord Dufferin, No. 86, received late on the previous night, in which the Sultan asked our advice as to offers of alliance in the event of immediate general war, which had probably been made him by both sides. We replied to it after the Cabinet (No. 68): "We cannot enter into hypothetical engagements or make arrangements in contemplation of war between friendly Powers now at peace. The Sultan must be aware that Germany is the most powerful military nation on the Continent, and that she has no ambitious views against Turkey. Strongly advise the Sultan not to enter into entangling engagements." This whole story of the Sultan's was probably a lie, to get us to say whether we would defend his Armenian frontier, but, curiously enough, Dufferin seemed to believe it.'

'On May 24th, 1883, I informed the Ministers a.s.sembled of two interesting matters of foreign affairs. The one was Bismarck's denunciation to us of a league among the small Christian States of the Balkan Peninsula for provoking popular votes in Turkey in favour of annexation of various provinces to one or other of the partners. The other was an offer by the Grand Sherif of Mecca to turn the Turks out of Arabia, and place it under British protection.'

The gravest danger to the world's peace lay in the fact that to the ordinary Englishman Russia was still the natural enemy, and that France, smarting under the rebuff she had experienced in Egypt, was a.s.suming a more unfriendly att.i.tude towards Great Britain.

In South Africa the state of things established after Majuba was revealing itself as one of constant friction, and border wars between the Boers and African tribes claiming British protection led to ceaseless controversy.

'On the 10th (March, '83) there was another Cabinet. A Transvaal debate was coming on on Thursday the 15th, and in view of this Chamberlain asked for support of his opinion that an expedition should be sent out to save Montsioa. He was supported only by Hartington and myself, but he afterwards managed to commit us to it, and to force his view upon Mr. Gladstone. He pa.s.sed a paper to me when he found we could not win at the Cabinet: "How far would the difficulty be met by supplying arms to Mankowane and (query) to Montsioa, and permitting volunteers to go to their a.s.sistance?" I replied, "I don't think it would stand House of Commons discussion." To this he answered, "Perhaps not. But the first is what Mankowane himself asks for, and if we gave him what he wants that course ought to be defensible." I wrote, "Yes, I was thinking more of Montsioa."' [Footnote: Mankowane and Montsioa were independent native chiefs of Bechua.n.a.land, for whose protection the Aborigines' Protection Society was appealing to the British Government.]

'March 16th, 1883, Mr. Gladstone asked me to speak in the event of the Transvaal debate coming on again, and I refused, as I did not agree in the policy pursued. Chamberlain said he would speak in my place, and did so.

'May 26th or 27th. We decided at the Cabinet to keep Basutoland.

'June 13th. As to South Africa, the Colonial Office told us that they hoped to induce the Cape to take Bechua.n.a.land. A little later on the whole of their efforts were directed in the opposite direction-- namely, to induce the Cape to let us keep Bechua.n.a.land separate from the Cape. It was announced that Reay had accepted the Transvaal Mission.

'June 23rd. We decided that Reay was not to go out, because the Transvaal people preferred to come to us.

'November 30th. We talked of the Transvaal, which looked bad.'

The Transvaal deputation is mentioned immediately after this as having arrived.

There are also allusions to South African affairs having been raised at other Cabinets in this year, but no details given.

Late in 1883, Sir Charles says, 'I was pressing for the restoration of Cetewayo, and Lord Derby insisted that he had brought all his troubles on himself.'

At this time Russia had subdued the Turcomans and made herself paramount in the territories north of Persia and Afghanistan. It was only a matter of months before Russian troops would be on the ill-defined frontiers of Afghanistan. Great Britain was bound to the Amir of Afghanistan by an engagement to a.s.sist him against external attack, provided that he complied with British advice as to his foreign relations. Not only was a collision predicted between Russia and the Amir, whose territory Great Britain had thus guaranteed, but it was known where the struggle would be.

'It was also about this time' (February, 1883) 'that the Russian Government took up my suggestion as to the delimitation of the boundary of Afghanistan. But, as Currie wrote, "the object of the Russian Foreign Office may only be to keep the British Government quiet, while they are settling the boundary question with Persia and annexing ... Merv, with a view to a fresh departure in the direction of Herat as soon as that process is accomplished."'

'We already foresaw that the struggle would be over Penjdeh. A memorandum of 1882, by Major Napier, [Footnote: Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. G. C. Napier, C.I.E., son of the first Lord Napier of Magdala, and twin brother of the second Lord Napier.] had told us that "below Penjdeh the Afghans would not appear to have ever extended their authority." Mr. Currie, [Footnote: Afterwards Lord Currie, a.s.sistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office.] as he then was, prophesied that the line proposed by the Russians would strike the Murghab near Penjdeh.'

This was a situation well fitted to arouse Sir Charles, who wrote to Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice: "I'm as great a jingo in Central Asia as I am a scuttler in South Africa." His policy was not that of the India Office. He advocated delimitation of the Afghan frontiers, and in October, 1882, the Amir had asked for this. [Footnote: 'On October 17th, 1882, the Amir had proposed to Lord Ripon that delimitation of his frontiers which I was pressing at the time, but which had been refused by Lord Ripon. Lord Granville and Fitzmaurice had come round to my view. Northbrook strongly resisted, and wanted his famous treaty.'] 'The Government of India insisted at this time upon the proposal to Russia of a treaty with regard to Afghanistan.' Sir Charles thought that British interests in India would be better served by strengthening Afghanistan, by ascertaining exactly what the Amir's rights were, and by making him feel that he would be protected in them. To-day, when Afghanistan is one of the self-equipping Asiatic military powers, and admittedly an awkward enemy to tackle, the situation seems plain enough; but in those days Abdurrahman, new on the throne, was still a 'King with opposition.'

'On April 20th, 1883, there was a meeting at the Foreign Office as to Central Asia between Lord Granville, Hartington, Kimberley, Northbrook, Edmond Fitzmaurice, and myself. The Amir was in a friendly humour, and I felt that the evacuation of Kandahar had been better than a dozen victories.'

The evacuation of Kandahar had been Lord Ripon's work, but Lord Ripon was now inclining to compromise the unity of the Native State which he had then laboured to establish. He was disposed to keep the Amir at arm's length, and wished to decline a visit of ceremony which Abdurrahman proposed. All the Committee at the Foreign Office were against this, except Lord Northbrook, who 'did not believe in Abdurrahman's strength, and believed that he would soon be turned out of Herat by his own Governor.'

'On June 7th it was settled that the Amir should have twelve lakhs of rupees a year.' But Sir Charles had not yet carried his point as to preventing a treaty with Russia, and

'Philip Currie and Fitzmaurice both wrote to me in favour of the India Office view, while Condie Stephen [Footnote: Sir Alexander Condie Stephen, K.C.M.G., was in 1882-83 despatched from the Legation at Teheran on a mission to Khora.s.san, the north-east province of Persia]

returned from Central Asia with the same view in favour of a treaty.... But Currie put a postscript to his long letter, in which he departed altogether from the treaty position, and took up my own view as to delimitation: "In view of our engagement to defend Afghanistan from foreign aggression, we ought surely to know the limits of the territory we have guaranteed."

'I finally said that I had no objection to a treaty which would merely recapitulate facts and set out the Afghan frontier. This was my last word, and, Lord Granville agreeing with me, we went on with delimitation as against treaty.... It was not until June 8th, 1888, that the Emperor of Russia recognized the arrangement and the frontier marked by the boundary pillars.'

For Sir Charles's policy it was necessary to propitiate the ruler of Afghanistan, and in July, 1883, it was reported that the Amir had applied to the British Government for a new set of teeth. The application had really been for a European dentist. When Lord Ripon persisted in refusing Abdurrahman's proffered visit, Sir Charles tried to get civil expressions of regret from the Government, and, failing in this, wrote in despair to Lord Kimberley: "I hope to goodness he has got his teeth."

It was not, however, till 1885 that the tension with Russia became really acute.

In France, Gambetta's death had been followed by a Ministerial crisis, and in the disturbances which resulted M. Duclerc fell in February, 1883, and after a time of confusion M. Ferry became, for a second time, Prime Minister, having M. Challemel-Lacour, no lover of England, for his Foreign Secretary.

"In order to distract the country's attention from internal dissensions and the Eastern frontier," [Footnote: _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. ii., p. 313.] M. Ferry developed that "Colonial policy" of which Sir Charles said, in 1887, that

"it greatly weakens the military position of France in Europe, and disorganizes her finances, while it compromises the efficiency of the only thing which really counts in modern European war, the rapidity of mobilization of the reserves." [Footnote: _Present Position of European Politics_, p. 101.]

Germany also was embarking on a "Colonial policy" disapproved of by Bismarck, but to which later he had to bow. One instance of the difficulties thus created was that of the Congo. A sketch of our proposed treaty with Portugal has already been given; [Footnote: See Chapter XXVI., p. 418.] but while the negotiations were proceeding,

'de Brazza, employed by the French, had been making treaties in the Congo district, which had been approved by the French Government and Parliament. The King of the Belgians pulled the strings of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, and succeeded in arousing a good deal of feeling against our negotiations with the Portuguese, and ultimately the French and Germans joined the King of the Belgians in stopping our carrying through our treaty.'

Mr. Jacob Bright became the spokesman of those who opposed the Portuguese negotiations, and in 1883 Sir Charles, though offering to express his own clear belief that the treaty was right, foretold to Lord Granville that the House of Commons would not accept the arrangement, and Mr. Gladstone avoided an adverse vote only by promising that the treaty should not be made without the express consent of Parliament. Sir Charles's reference to this lays down an opinion upon the relation of Parliament to the Foreign Office which is interesting as coming from so strong a democrat:

'In the Congo debate, which took place on Tuesday, April 3rd, 1883, Mr. Gladstone went perilously near giving up the valuable treaty- making power of the Crown. What he said, however, applied in terms only to this one case. To Grant Duff I wrote: "In all other countries having parliamentary government, the Parliaments have to be consulted.

We stood alone, and it was hard to keep the special position, but it was good for the country, I feel sure."'

In 1883 a Committee of the Cabinet was appointed to deal with affairs on the West Coast of Africa, and this Committee 'by its delays and hesitations lost us the Cameroons,' where two native Kings had asked to be taken under British protection. [Footnote: See Chapter XXVII., p. 431.] On the East Coast there was a more serious result of procrastination in regard to Zanzibar.

'As late as November 16th, 1882, I wrote to Lord Northbrook, "Are you going to let Zanzibar die without a kick?" a note which applied to an offer which had been made to us by the Sultan, that we should become his heirs--an offer which Mr. Gladstone had wished us to decline, and which I was in favour of accepting.'

'The Foreign Office, in a memorandum upon this subject, a.s.signed as the chief reason for not accepting this trust "the fear lest it should infringe the agreement entered into with France in 1862." ... It may be open to argument whether our acceptance of a voluntary offer by the Sultan of the above nature would have been a breach of the agreement.

In the autumn of 1884 the Government, waking up too late, telegraphed to our agent at Zanzibar as to the importance of our not being forestalled by any European nation in the exercise of at least paramount influence over the mountain districts situated near the coast and to the north of the equator. The Foreign Office at my suggestion pointed out at this time that "to the north of the Portuguese dominions we are at present, but who can say for how long?

without a European rival; where the political future of the country is of real importance to Indian and Imperial interests, where the climate is superior, where commerce is capable of vast extension, and where our influence could be exercised unchecked by the rivalry of Europe in the extension of civilization and the consequent extinction of the slave trade." The Government, however, delayed too long, and we afterwards lost our position at Zanzibar, and had ultimately to buy half of it back again by the cession of a British colony.'

(Heligoland).

Sir Charles was especially concerned at the heedlessness which disregarded the interests of the great self-governing colonies, who had no authority to deal with foreign affairs. He gives the history of the New Hebrides.

Here native chiefs had asked to be taken under British protection; New South Wales had urged action; the French had three times declared intention to annex, but Great Britain had done nothing. Australian anxiety as to the French occupation extended to New Guinea, and in March, 1883, officials of the Government of Queensland declared an annexation of half New Guinea. They were disavowed, but their action had created a feeling that something must be done.

'On June 12th, 1883, there was hatched a scheme for the partial annexation of New Guinea, which had been prepared by the Chancellor, Mr. Gladstone, and Sir Arthur Gordon, [Footnote: Sir Arthur Gordon was one of the philanthropists who believed in making the coloured peoples work by a labour tax. Sir Charles had met him in 1879, and described him as one 'who invented, in the name of civilization and progress, a new kind of slavery in Fiji.'] of Fiji and New Zealand fame. On the 13th a Cabinet decided to go slowly in this matter, and they went so slowly that we lost half of our half of New Guinea to Germany, and almost lost the whole of it.'

'As early as June, 1883, we had told Italy that any attempt to occupy any portion of New Guinea without a previous agreement with the British Government would undoubtedly "excite a violent outbreak of public feeling in the Australian colonies." Lord Derby was a party to this communication to the Italians, and it was absurd for the Cabinet and Lord Derby afterwards to argue, when the Germans landed in New Guinea, that steps ought not to have been taken in advance to have prevented such action. The difference was that we were willing to bully Italy, and not willing to stand up to Germany.'

The Colonial Secretary's general att.i.tude upon these matters may be ill.u.s.trated from a correspondence which pa.s.sed between him and Sir Charles in the autumn of this year. Replying to criticisms concerning the Australian Colonies, Lord Derby

'somewhat sneeringly observed that in order to keep out foreign convicts "it is not necessary that they should annex every island within a thousand miles of their coast. They cannot have at once the protection of British connection and the pleasures of a wholly independent foreign policy."'

On this Sir Charles comments:

'Lord Derby had lost all credit with the Conservative party about the time of his resignation of the Secretaryship of State for Foreign Affairs in the Conservative Administration. But he had retained considerable weight with Liberals. During his tenure of the Secretaryship of State for the Colonies in Mr. Gladstone's Administration, he lost his credit with the Liberals as well, and his influence reached a position of decline which makes it difficult even to remember the enormous weight he had possessed in the earliest part of his political career. For many years Lord Derby was the ideal spokesman of the middle man not fiercely attached to either party.