The Journal of Negro History Volume V Part 57

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has published a monograph ent.i.tled _Negro Migration during the War_ by Mr. Emmett J.

Scott, Secretary-Treasurer of Howard University. This is the first effort at a detailed treatment of the movement of the Negroes from the South to the North. It has such interesting chapters as the causes of the migration, stimulation of the movement, the call of the self-sufficient North, the draining of the black belt, efforts to check the movement, the effect of the migration on the South, the situation in the congested districts in the North and West, and remedies for relief. Persons who have an interest in this conspicuous event of our internal history will find it profitable to read this volume.

The Illinois Centennial Commission has published Volume V of the _Modern Commonwealth_, a history of that State. On page 21 appears this paragraph:

"Half way between the native stock and the foreign born stands the Negro population, practically all of whom have drifted into the state since the Civil War. In 1870 there were only 28,762 Negroes in Illinois, but since that time they have been increasing steadily and, with the exception of the decade 1880-1890, at a more rapid rate than the white population. Especially rapid was the growth in the decade ending with 1870, when it was 277 per cent or almost four times the rate of increase of the white population. As a result of this influx of Negroes the proportion which they const.i.tute of the total population has increased very steadily from 1.1 per cent in 1870 to 1.9 per cent in 1910. But the absolute number is still small, amounting only to 109,049 at the last census."

The American Negro Academy has published Number 20 of its _Occasional Papers_ containing a study of _Alexander Crummell, an Apostle of Negro Culture_ by William H. Ferris. This dissertation sets forth not only the main facts of the life of the subject of the sketch but gives also some interesting history in connection with the founding of the American Negro Academy.

Major John R. Lynch, one of the most conspicuous figures of the Reconstruction period now living, has discovered certain errors in the Reconstruction records published in the January number of the Journal of Negro History, and has written the editor the following letter to make the necessary corrections:

4352 FORESTVILLE AVENUE, CHICAGO, May 17th, 1920.

_Editor, Journal of Negro History._

In compliance with your request I write this to point out a few errors which appeared in the January 1920 issue of the Journal covering the Reconstruction period.

Page 67 the name of Benjamin F. Turner appears as a member of the 43d Congress, and Jeremiah Haralson as a member of the 44th Congress. Turner was a member of the 42d but not of the 43d Congress.

Haralson and Rapier were members of the 43d Congress, both having been elected in 1872.

On page 73, Rubert Gleed should be Robert Gleed. A.R. Davis should be A. K. Davis, Dr. Stiles should be Dr. St.i.tes, W.H.

Fonte should be W. H. Foote.

On page 74, H. M. Faley should be H. M. Foley. To the list of Colored men elected to that Legislature should be added the name of J. M. Wilson, of Marion County.

On the same page is the statement: "John R. Lynch elected speaker of the House." This is incorrect. Lynch was elected speaker in January 1872, by the Legislature that was elected in November 1871. The man who was elected speaker in January 1870, by the Legislature that was elected in November 1869, was Judge Freeman E. Franklin, a white Republican from Yazoo County. Shortly after the adjournment of the first session of that Legislature speaker Franklin died. When the second session convened in January 1871 Hon. H. W. Warren, a white Republican from Leake County was elected speaker for the unexpired term.

Respectfully yours, (Signed) JOHN R. LYNCH.

THE JOURNAL

OF

NEGRO HISTORY

VOL. V--OCTOBER, 1920--NO. 4

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN BEARING ON THE RETURN OF NEGRO SLAVES, 1783-1828[1]

Diplomatic relations bearing on the Negro of the Revolutionary period const.i.tute one of the mooted questions of American foreign policy. Yet although this question was then one of the disturbing factors in our relations with Great Britain, it has. .h.i.therto pa.s.sed unnoticed.[2] As a large number of Negroes were taken from the United States by Great Britain during the Revolutionary War there followed so much effort to secure the return of these Negroes that the subject had to be dealt with in the Treaty of Paris which ended the war in 1783. So numerous were the infractions of the stipulation prohibiting the carrying off of the Negroes and so fruitless were the discussions resulting from the non-fulfillment of the articles in the treaty that several diplomatic representatives were sent on missions to Great Britain, the last of which ended with the Jay Treaty of 1794. Obviously, no satisfactory settlement as to the Negro could then be reached. An array of evidence from the sources[3] shows that the question was frequently discussed and that its significance lies in its absence from the stipulations of the Jay Treaty. It is evident, moreover, that the United States was not satisfied with this treaty and that between Great Britain and this country there was widening a breach which culminated in the War of 1812, during which Great Britain committed the same offence that she did during the war for independence.[4]

How can one account then for the unfavorable att.i.tude of Great Britain toward the return of the Negro fugitives? The humanitarian spirit of Great Britain which, by the celebrated decision of Lord Mansfield in the Somerset case in 1772 guaranteed to every man his freedom as soon as he set foot on British soil, extended beyond the limits of the empire. Although this decision of the judge evoked some unfavorable comment, for slavery was the "normal condition of the Negro," his ideas were disseminated by the military authorities defending the Crown in America. During the Revolutionary War many of the British commanders issued proclamations of freedom to the Negro slaves. Lord Dunmore, the dethroned Governor of Virginia, was among the first to issue a proclamation of freedom[5] to all Negroes who would fight for the King. Soon thereafter, Clinton,[6] the Commander-in-chief of the British forces in America, issued a proclamation to the same effect.

Still later, Cornwallis issued a proclamation specifying the grant of "freedom and protection" to all Negroes who would seek his command.

Whatever motive prompted the issuance of these orders, it is evident that the status of the Negro during this "emergency" as regarded by Great Britain was that of a freeman.

To these proclamations many Negroes responded. For instance, General Greene learned on Long Island that a group of Negroes aggregating two hundred (200) had in July, 1776, sought freedom within the British lines and had been accepted as a regiment in that vicinity.[7] He reported, moreover, to General Washington in 1781 that enough Negroes in North Carolina to form two regiments had sought British freedom and protection and that they were being organized by the British.[8]

Whether they came within the British lines as a result of these proclamations or in recognition of the laws of war "it has been computed by good judges" says Ramsay,[9] "that at the evacuation of one part, two hundred and forty-one Negroes and their families were taken off to St. Lucia in one transport, the _Scimitar_; and that between the years 1775 and 1783, 25,000 Negroes, that is, one-fifth of all the slaves, were taken from the State of South Carolina." In Georgia,[10] there was made a report that the loss was much greater, probably three-fourths or seven-eighths of all the Negroes in the State. Again, from an estimate made at the time, Jefferson observed that about thirty thousand Negroes were taken from Virginia.[11] From the other slave-holding States which were invaded by the British, many other Negroes were carried away from their masters. So effectively was the scheme carried out that fear was expressed throughout the South less the economic position of that section would be threatened. In consequence of such actions on the part of Great Britain, General Washington receded from the position of excluding Negroes from the American Army and took drastic steps in preventing the carrying away of other Negroes by Great Britain.[12]

Considered, therefore, as an American slave in time of peace and an American soldier in time of danger, it is no anomaly that the status of the Negro complicated the negotiations between military representatives of Great Britain and the United States. Extended but fruitless negotiations ensued. A satisfactory settlement of the return of the Negroes seemed impossible. With independence a.s.sured through the representatives a.s.sembled, the Treaty of Paris was negotiated in 1783. Franklin urged in his communication with Oswald, 1779, that the question as to the return of Negroes taken away by Great Britain be adjusted immediately.[13] This suggestion was strengthened by the support given it by the American representative, Henry Laurens, who had been in confinement in London during the war and whose chance arrival on the closing day gave the subject increased importance. Thus credit for the incorporation of the article on the Negro into the Treaty of Paris is given to Henry Laurens.[14]

By the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Paris,[15] it was stipulated that the British troops should withdraw from the United States without carrying away or destroying any property belonging to the citizens of the United States. In spite of this agreement at the peace conference, this stipulation was not fulfilled by Great Britain. Convincing evidence of an infraction of this stipulation is seen in a letter written by General Washington to Sir Guy Carleton, May 6, 1783, in which the former expressed himself as being surprised to hear that embarkations of Negroes had taken place during the whole of that year.[16] He, moreover, expressed his private opinion to the effect that such an action "is totally different from the letter and spirit of the treaty." A few days thereafter the Virginia delegates in Congress wrote to the Governor of Virginia that they would make this the subject of a "pointed remonstrance from our minister in Europe to the British Court with a demand for reparation and in the meantime urge General Washington to insist on a more faithful observance of that stipulation at New York."[17]

Notwithstanding further orders which were issued by Sir Guy Carleton, May 12, 1783, to prevent the carrying away of any Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants many other infractions of the provision were reported.[18] Even General Washington remarked[19]

that "some of his own slaves and those of friends living with him were probably carried away to New York." "If by chance," continued he, "you should come at the knowledge of any of them, I will be much obliged by your securing them so that I can obtain them again." So numerous were the violations of this part of the treaty that Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, in a letter written to Vergennes, the Foreign Minister of France, asked for suggestions from France in regard to the infractions of this article of the Treaty of Paris. In it, he expressed the objection of the Crown, which was to the effect that Negroes had come within the British lines under the promise of freedom and protection and that this promise was fulfilled by Great Britain in preference to the stipulation in the treaty.[20]

The situation became more aggravated. The breach between the two countries was gradually widening. Sensing this acute situation, Washington suggested that Carleton meet him in a conference at Orangetown, New Jersey, May, 1783. At one of their meetings Washington called the attention of Carleton to several resolutions pa.s.sed by Congress relating to the return of all Negroes and other property of American inhabitants taken away by the British forces. Concerning these, Carleton replied that he wished to be considered as giving no construction of the treaty, but that he "conceived it could not have been the intention of the British Government by the treaty of peace to reduce themselves to the necessity of violating their faith to the Negroes who came within the British lines under the proclamation of the predecessors in command."[21] In point of fact, however, he said "delivering up the Negroes to their former masters would be delivering them up--some to execution and others to punishments which would in his own opinion be a dishonorable violation of the public faith." He concluded, nevertheless, that if the sending off of the Negroes should hereafter be declared an infraction of the treaty, "compensation ought to be made by Great Britain to the owners."[22]

In regard to the last suggestion of Carleton, Washington observed that many difficulties would arise in compensating the proprietors for their Negroes. He also thought it impossible to ascertain the value of the Negroes, for the value of a slave, contended he, "consists chiefly in his industry and sobriety." Another difficulty Washington observed was that of identifying the slave. He was of the opinion that the slave would give the wrong name of his master. Washington considered this conduct on the part of General Carleton, moreover, a departure from both the letter and spirit of the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Paris.

In answer to these contentions Carleton said that as the Negroes were free and secured against their masters they could have no inducement to conceal their true name or that of their masters. In commending compensation Carleton was of the opinion that he was pursuing a course which would operate most for the security of the proprietors. "If the Negroes were left to themselves," he remarked, "numbers of them would very probably go off and not return to the parts of the country from whence they came or clandestinely would get on board the transports in such a manner as would not be in his power to prevent." "In either case," continued Carleton, "an inevitable loss would ensue to the proprietors."[23] But as the business was then conducted they had at least a chance for compensation.

In conformity with these views, Carleton suggested that commissioners be appointed by the two countries "to agree upon the mode of compensating as well as the amount and other points with respect to which there was no provision made in the treaty." This suggestion was approved by Congress, and in compliance with it Egbert Benson, William Smith, and Daniel Parker were appointed[24] with specific instructions from Washington to "a.s.sist representatives of Great Britain in inspecting and superintending the embarkation of persons and property in fulfillment of the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Paris."[25]

These commissioners began their work immediately by examining the claim of one Phillip Lott to a Negro named Thomas Francis[26] on board a vessel called the _Fair American_ in New York harbor and about to be carried to the island of Jamaica. Concerning this inquiry a pointed remonstrance was made to Sir Guy Carleton. After the details of the examination were presented to him, the commissioners requested Great Britain to prohibit its representatives from carrying away the Negro and to deliver Francis to Lott. Notifying Washington, June 14, 1783, of their progress, the commissioners reminded him that Sir Guy Carleton intimated an impropriety in the claim, as the property was not suggested to be in danger of being sent away. "This left room,"

said the commissioners, "for an idea that possibly property about to be sent away would be restored ... and we conceive it is now reduced to a certainty that all applications for the delivery of property will be fruitless and we therefore desist from them."[27]

A few days later the commissioners reported to Washington that in superintending an embarkation of fourteen transports bound for Nova Scotia "about 3000 souls, among whom were at least 130 Negroes who appeared to be property of the citizens of the United States," were carried away. They also indicated that these embarkations were made in spite of their presence and remonstrance and for this reason asked General Washington for "further directions on this subject."[28] Other reports of the commissioners to General Washington, June 17, 1783, show that on many other occasions Negroes not residing within the British lines were taken away. To the remonstrances of the commissioners, Sir Guy Carleton gave a deaf ear. They, in the meantime, wrote General Washington that they had interpreted Carleton's silence as a "determination that all future applications should remain equally unnoticed." That they realized that their efforts were fruitless goes without saying, for they confessed that their work was ineffective and that the British vessels were never subjected to any rigid inspections and it was, therefore, impossible to determine, from the register provided by Sir Guy Carleton, the exact number of Negroes carried away in those vessels.[29]

The work of the commissioners, nevertheless, was noteworthy. They called Washington's attention to the fact that Sir Guy Carleton affected to distinguish between the cases of such Negroes as came within the British lines in consequence of the promise of freedom and protection promulgated by Carleton's predecessors and such as came in either previous to the proclamations or subsequent to the cessation of hostilities. "Negroes of the first description," insisted Carleton, "were not included in the treaty." The commissioners soon realized that even this limited construction given to the article was not intended to be fulfilled by Carleton's subordinate officers. They based their contention upon the fact that printed certificates granting Negroes the privilege of embarking[30] were distributed by the commandant of New York City, "as their convenience might require."[31] These certificates fell into the hands of many persons for whom they were not intended. So loosely were they distributed that one was picked up by the commissioners who transmitted the same to General Washington.

On the other hand, the commissioners insisted that the treaty stipulated specifically that his Brittanic Majesty should withdraw all his armies, garrisons and fleets from the United States and from every port, place and harbor within the same without causing any destruction or carrying away any Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants.[32] With these two interpretations of the Seventh Article invariably insisted upon by Carleton on the one hand and the commissioners on the other an agreement was less likely to be reached and, in spite of the efforts to the contrary, the deportation of Negroes took place steadily until all the British departed.[33]

In the meantime, Congress was discussing the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. The non-observance of the Seventh Article on the part of Great Britain and the destruction worked by Carleton evoked many resolutions opposing the ratification of the treaty for the expressed reason that it did not provide for the loss of Negroes. One of these resolutions was to the effect that it was "inexpedient to concur in pa.s.sing laws necessary for carrying into effect the treaty."[34] These efforts of Congress, however, like those of the commissioners were of no avail. Complaints of American citizens of the loss of their property were expressed by the representatives in Congress. They, to be sure, had their effect, for soon thereafter, Congress transferred the question of the return of Negroes to the realm of actual diplomacy.[35]

John Adams, 1788, who, by the way, was one of the representatives of the United States who signed the Treaty of Paris, received an appointment as representative of this country to England to settle the alleged violations of the Treaty of Paris. He was instructed in 1785 to press for a fulfillment of the terms of the treaty of peace on the part of Great Britain.[36] He had little time, however, to press his claim before representatives of Great Britain were inquiring why the United States did not perform her part in this reciprocal contract. To these inquiries, Adams replied that "America could not; that it was hardly a government at all." He, moreover, informed Congress that the reason a.s.signed by Laurens for incorporating the Seventh Article was that the people of the United States would be unable to comply with the part of the treaty which respects debts unless the provision which respects Negroes was made. "This construction," he continued, "was never denied and that it seemed to be understood by the ministry that on a settlement with the United States compensation must be made."

Obviously, then, both Great Britain and America understood that the Seventh Article would be fulfilled by Great Britain only when the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Articles were fulfilled by the United States.[37] This point, however, was discussed pro and con for many months and was seldom admitted by the American diplomatic representatives, Adams himself said that he could "get no comfort from his mission." The construction given the Seventh Article making its fulfillment by Great Britain contingent upon the execution of other provisions only complicated matters.

Another mission was planned in 1789,[38] but before another representative was appointed Washington urged upon Gouverneur Morris, who contemplated visiting London, "to find out the reasons why Great Britain had not complied with the Seventh Article." In a letter written to Morris, October 13, 1789, Washington desired Morris to converse with his Brittanic Majesty's Ministers as to whether there was any objection to performing those articles remaining to be performed on his part. "Learn with precision," he concluded, "what they mean to do on this head." In compliance with this request, on April 7, 1790, Morris interviewed the British representative, the Duke of Leeds, who gave to him only "general a.s.surances" for a faithful observance of the articles and, becoming a "little embarra.s.sed," could not say how the matter in regard to the Negroes stood. After many days of silence, the Duke of Leeds, April 23, 1790, "lamented every circ.u.mstance" which delayed the fulfillment of engagements on the part of the United States.[39] He also indicated that, if circ.u.mstances rendered their final completion impracticable, he had no scruples in declaring the object of Great Britain would be to "r.e.t.a.r.d the fulfillment of such subsequent parts of the treaty as depend entirely upon Great Britain until redress is granted to their subjects upon the specific points of the treaty itself or a fair and just compensation for the non-performance of those engagements on the part of the United States."[40]

Informing Washington of his progress, May 29, 1790, Morris disclosed the fact that he was no longer contending for the return of the Negroes, for that would involve either "breaking faith" with those whom they had seduced by the offer of freedom or the violation of the stipulation which they had made with the United States in the Treaty of Paris. In presenting America's side, however, he insisted upon compensation in order that it would not be difficult for the planters to show that they had sustained a heavy loss from the want of men to cultivate their lands and thereby produce the means of paying their debts. To this the Duke of Leeds replied that he wished to "consider the treaty subject generally" and thought that some compensation could be mutually made. He declared, nevertheless, that he would rather "make a new treaty than perform the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Paris."[41]

Subsequent diplomatic negotiations between Jefferson and Hammond, the Minister of Great Britain, indicate that Washington was not satisfied with the status of the case after Jefferson cited specific infractions of the Seventh Article of the treaty, enclosing doc.u.ments supporting these claims. Hammond informed the United States, November 30, 1791, that the King had suspended the execution of the Seventh Article in consequence of the non-compliance on the part of the United States of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Articles. In short, he insisted that the stipulations should be performed in the order in which they stood. He stated, moreover, that the "two objects were so mutually connected with each other as not to admit of separation either in the mode of discussing them or in any subsequent engagements which might result from that discussion."[42]

It was soon evident then that such extended discussions were fruitless. This state of affairs, to be sure, could not exist very much longer. Citizens of the United States were pressing "more zealously" for the return of the Negroes. For almost a decade the subject had been discussed without an amicable adjustment. In a communication to the Congress, April 16, 1794, Washington showed that he had grasped the situation by informing that body of the fact that "despatches received from our minister in London contain a serious aspect of our affairs with Great Britain." He suggested, therefore, to the Senate that an envoy extraordinary be sent to England. To this end Washington appointed John Jay to settle the infractions of the Treaty of Paris.[43]

In Jay's instructions nothing was specifically said concerning the carrying away of the Negroes by the British, but, as it appeared from subsequent transactions, it is quite certain that the infractions of the Seventh Article as well as those of other articles were to be adjusted. In this wise, the "irrepressible question"--relating to the return of Negroes carried away by Great Britain during the Revolutionary War became one of the purposes of Jay's mission.[44]

During the negotiation with Grenville there took place many heated debates, in which each party accused the other of the first aggression. Meanwhile Jay ascertained, September 13, 1794, that Grenville supported the contention held by his predecessors, that the article of the treaty was intended to prevent depredations at the departure of the army; that no alteration in the actual state of property was intended by the Seventh Article; that every Negro who strayed or escaped from the American lines and came into the lines of the British Army became by the laws of war British property; and that to extend the Seventh Article of the treaty to include Negroes who came within the British lines under the proclamation of freedom was to give it a "wider lat.i.tude than the terms of it would warrant."[45] In short, Grenville contended that in regard to those within the British lines before the signing of the treaty they were "left entirely without restrictions."[46]