The Grammar of English Grammars Part 13

The same may be said of all the characters used for abbreviation; as, & for _and_, $ for _dollars_, or the marks peculiar to mathematicians, to astronomers, to druggists, &c. None of these are alphabetic, and they represent significant words, and not single elementary sounds: it would be great dullness, to a.s.sume that a word and an elementary sound are one and the same thing. But the reader will observe that this definition embraces _no idea_ contained in the faulty one to which I am objecting; neither indeed could it, without a blunder. So wide from the mark is that notion of a letter, which the popularity of Dr. Lowth and his copyists has made a hundred-fold more common than any other![67] According to an other erroneous definition given by these same gentlemen, "_Words_ are articulate _sounds_, used by common consent, as signs of our ideas."--_Murray's Gram._, p. 22; _Kirkham's_, 20; _Ingersoll's_, 7; _Alger's_, 12; _Russell's_, 7; _Merchant's_, 9; _Fisk's_, 11; _Greenleaf's_, 20; and many others. See _Lowth's Gram._, p. 6; from which almost all authors have taken the notion, that words consist of "_sounds_" only. But letters are no principles or parts of _sounds_ at all; unless you will either have visible marks to be sounds, or the sign to be a principle or part of the thing signified. Nor are they always principles or parts of _words_: we sometimes write what is _not a word_; as when, by letters, we denote p.r.o.nunciation alone, or imitate brute voices. If words were formed of articulate sounds only, they could not exist in books, or be in any wise known to the deaf and dumb. These two primary definitions, then, are both false; and, taken together, they involve the absurdity of dividing things acknowledged to be indivisible. In utterance, we cannot divide consonants from their vowels; on paper, we can. Hence letters are the least parts of written language only; but the least parts of spoken words are syllables, and not letters.

Every definition of a consonant implies this.

15. They who cannot define a letter or a word, may be expected to err in explaining other grammatical terms. In my opinion, nothing is well written, that can possibly be misunderstood; and if any definition be likely to _suggest_ a wrong idea, this alone is enough to condemn it: nor does it justify the phraseology, to say, that a more reasonable construction can be put upon it. By Murray and others, the young learner is told, that, "A _vowel_ is an articulate _sound_, that can be perfectly _uttered by itself_;" as if a vowel were nothing but a sound, and that a sort of echo, which can _utter itself_; and next, that, "A _consonant_ is an articulate _sound_, which cannot be perfectly uttered _without the help of_ a vowel."

Now, by their own showing, every letter is either a vowel or a consonant; hence, according to these definitions, all the letters are articulate _sounds_. And, if so, what is a "silent letter?" It is a _silent articulate sound!_ Again: ask a boy, "What is a _triphthong?_" He answers in the words of Murray, Weld, Pond, Smith, Adams, Kirkham, Merchant, Ingersoll, Bacon, Alger, Worcester, and others: "A triphthong is the union of three vowels, _p.r.o.nounced in like manner_: as _eau_ in beau, _iew_ in view." He accurately cites an entire paragraph from his grammar, but does he well conceive how the three vowels in _beau_ or _view_ are "p.r.o.nounced _in like manner?_" Again: "A _syllable_ is a _sound_, either simple or _compound_, p.r.o.nounced by a single impulse of the voice."--_Murray's Gram._, 8vo, p.

22. This definition resolves syllables into _sounds_; whereas their true elements are _letters_. It also mistakes the participle _compounded_ for the adjective _compound_; whereas the latter only is the true reverse of _simple_. A _compound sound_ is a sound composed of others which may be separated; a _sound compounded_ is properly that which is made an ingredient with others, but which may itself be simple.

16. It is observable, that in their attempts to explain these prime elements of grammar, Murray, and many others who have copied him, overlook all _written_ language; whereas their very science itself took its origin, name, and nature, from the invention of writing; and has consequently no bearing upon any dialect which has not been written. Their definitions absurdly resolve letters, vowels, consonants, syllables, and words, all into _sounds_; as if none of these things had any existence on paper, or any significance to those who read in silence. Hence, their explanations of all these elements, as well as of many other things equally essential to the study, are palpably erroneous. I attribute this to the carelessness with which men have compiled or made up books of grammar; and that carelessness to those various circ.u.mstances, already described, which have left diligence in a grammarian no hope of praise or reward. Without alluding here to my own books, no one being obliged to accuse himself, I doubt whether we have any school grammar that is much less objectionable in this respect, than Murray's; and yet I am greatly mistaken, if nine tenths of all the definitions in Murray's system are not faulty. "It was this sort of definitions, which made _Scaliger_ say, _'Nihil infelicius definitore grammatico_.'"--See _Johnson's Gram. Com._, p. 351; also _Paragraph_ 5th, above.

17. Nor can this objection be neutralized by saying, it is a mere matter of opinion--a mere prejudice originating in rivalry. For, though we have ample choice of terms, and may frequently a.s.sign to particular words a meaning and an explanation which are in some degree arbitrary; yet whenever we attempt to define things under the name which custom has positively fixed upon them, we are no longer left to arbitrary explications; but are bound to think and to say that only which shall commend itself to the understanding of others, as being altogether true to nature. When a word is well understood to denote a particular object or cla.s.s of objects, the definition of it ought to be in strict conformity to what is known of the real being and properties of the thing or things contemplated. A definition of this kind is a proposition susceptible of proof and ill.u.s.tration; and therefore whatsoever is erroneously a.s.sumed to be the proper meaning of such a term, may be refuted. But those persons who take every thing upon trust, and choose both to learn and to teach mechanically, often become so slavishly habituated to the peculiar phraseology of their text-books, that, be the absurdity of a particular expression what it may, they can neither discover nor suspect any inaccuracy in it. It is also very natural even for minds more independent and acute, to regard with some reverence whatsoever was gravely impressed upon them in childhood. Hence the necessity that all school-books should proceed from skillful hands. Instruction should tell things as they are, and never falter through negligence.

18. I have admitted that definitions are not the only means by which a general knowledge of the import of language may be acquired; nor are they the only means by which the acquisition of such knowledge may be aided. To exhibit or point out _things_ and tell their names, const.i.tutes a large part of that instruction by which the meaning of words is conveyed to the young mind; and, in many cases, a mere change or apposition of terms may sufficiently explain our idea. But when we would guard against the possibility of misapprehension, and show precisely what is meant by a word, we must fairly define it. There are, however, in every language, many words which do not admit of a formal definition. The import of all definitive and connecting particles must be learned from usage, translation, or derivation; and nature reserves to herself the power of explaining the objects of our simple original perceptions. "All words standing for complex ideas are definable; but those by which we denote simple ideas, are not.

For the perceptions of this latter cla.s.s, having no other entrance into the mind, than by sensation or reflection, can be acquired only by experience."--_Duncan's Logic_, p. 63. "And thus we see, that as our simple ideas are the materials and foundation of knowledge, so the names of simple ideas may be considered as the elementary parts of language, beyond which we cannot trace the meaning and signification of words. When we come to them, we suppose the ideas for which they stand to be already known; or, if they are not, experience alone must be consulted, and not definitions or explications."--_Ibid._, p. 69.

19. But this is no apology for the defectiveness of any definition which might be made correct, or for the effectiveness of our English grammars, in the frequent omission of all explanation, and the more frequent adoption of some indirect form of expression. It is often much easier to make some loose observation upon what is meant by a given word or term in science, than to frame a faultless definition of the thing; because it is easier to refer to some of the relations, qualities, offices, or attributes of things, than to discern wherein their essence consists, so as to be able to tell directly and clearly what they are. The improvement of our grammatical code in this respect, was one of the princ.i.p.al objects which I thought it needful to attempt, when I first took up the pen as a grammarian. I cannot pretend to have seen, of course, every definition and rule which has been published on this subject; but, if I do not misjudge a service too humble for boasting, I have myself framed a greater number of new or improved ones, than all other English grammarians together. And not a few of them have, since their first publication in 1823, been complimented to a place in other grammars than my own. This is in good keeping with the authorship which has been spoken of in an other chapter; but I am constrained to say, it affords no proof that they were well written. If it did, the definitions and rules in Murray's grammar must undoubtedly be thought the most correct that ever have been given: they have been more frequently copied than any others.

20. But I have ventured to suggest, that nine tenths of this author's definitions are bad, or at least susceptible of some amendment. If this can be shown to the satisfaction of the reader, will he hope to find an other English grammar in which the eye of criticism may not detect errors and deficiencies with the same ease? My object is, to enforce attention to the proprieties of speech; and this is the very purpose of all grammar. To exhibit here all Murray's definitions, with criticisms upon them, would detain us too long. We must therefore be content to take a part of them as a sample. And, not to be accused of fixing only upon the worst, we will take a _series_. Let us then consider in their order his definitions of the nine parts of speech;--for, calling the participle a verb, he reduces the sorts of words to that number. And though not one of his nine definitions now stands exactly as it did in his early editions, I think it may be said, that not one of them is now, if it ever has been, expressed grammatically.

21. FIRST DEFINITION:--"An Article is a word _prefixed_ to substantives, _to point them out_, and to show how far their[68] signification extends."--_Murray, and others, from, Lowth's Gram._, p. 10. This is obscure. In what manner, or in what respect, does an article point out substantives? To point them out _as such_, or to show which words are substantives, seems at first view to be the meaning intended; but it is said soon after, "_A_ or _an_ is used in a vague sense, to _point out_ one single _thing_ of the kind, in other respects _indeterminate_; as, 'Give me _a_ book;' 'Bring me _an_ apple.'"--_Lowth_, p. 11; _Murray_, p. 31. And again: "It is _of the nature_ of both the articles to determine or limit _the thing_ spoken of."--_Murray's Gram._, 8vo, p. 170. Now to point out _nouns_ among the parts of speech, and to point out _things_ as individuals of their cla.s.s, are very different matters; and which of these is the purpose for which articles are used, according to Lowth and Murray? Their definition says the former, their explanations imply the latter; and I am unable to determine which they really meant. The term _placed before_ would have been better than "_prefixed_;" because the latter commonly implies junction, as well as location. The word "_indeterminate_" is not a very easy one for a boy; and, when he has found out what it means, he may possibly not know to which of the four preceding nouns it ought to be referred:--"in a vague _sense_, to point out one single _thing_ of the _kind_, in other _respects_ indeterminate." What is this "vague sense?" and what is it, that is "indeterminate?"

22. SECOND DEFINITION:--"A Substantive or Noun is the name of any thing _that_ exists, or of _which_ we have any notion."--_Murray, and others_.

According to his own syntax, this sentence of Murray's is wrong; for he himself suggests, that when two or more relative clauses refer to the same antecedent, the same p.r.o.noun should be used in each. Of clauses connected like these, this is true. He should therefore have said, "A Substantive, or Noun, is the name of any thing _which_ exists, or of _which_ we have any notion." His rule, however, though good against a text like this, is utterly wrong in regard to many others, and not very accurate in taking _two_ for a "_series_" thus: "Whatever relative is used, in one of a _series_ of clauses relating to the same antecedent, the same relative ought, generally to be used in _them all_. In the following sentence, _this rule is violated_: 'It is remarkable, that Holland, against _which_ the war was undertaken, and _that_, in the very beginning, was reduced to the brink of destruction, lost nothing.' The clause ought to have been, 'and _which_ in the very beginning.'"--_Murray's Gram._, 8vo, p. 155. But both the rule and the example, badly as they correspond, were borrowed from Priestley's Grammar, p. 102, where the text stands thus: "Whatever relative _be_ used, in one of a _series_ of clauses, relating to the same antecedent, the same ought to be used in _them all_. 'It is remarkable, that Holland,'" &c.

23. THIRD DEFINITION:--"An Adjective is a word added to a substantive, to express _its_ quality."--_Lowth, Murray, Bullions, Pond, and others_. Here we have the choice of two meanings; but neither of them is according to truth. It seems doubtful whether "_its_ quality" is the _adjective's_ quality, or the _substantive's_; but in either sense, the phrase is false; for an adjective is added to a noun, not to express any quality either of the adjective or of the noun, but to express some quality of the _thing signified_ by the noun. But the definition is too much restricted; for adjectives may be added to p.r.o.nouns as well as to nouns, nor do they always express _quality_.

24. FOURTH DEFINITION:--"A p.r.o.noun is a word used instead of a noun, to _avoid the too frequent_ repet.i.tion of _the same word_."--_Dr. Ash's Gram._, p. 25; _Murray's_, 28 and 50; _Felton's_, 18; _Alger's_, 13; _Bacon's_, 10; _and others_. The latter part of this sentence is needless, and also contains several errors. 1. The verb _avoid_ is certainly very ill-chosen; because it implies intelligent agency, and not that which is merely instrumental. 2. The article _the_ is misemployed for _a_; for, "_the_ too frequent repet.i.tion," should mean _some particular_ too frequent repet.i.tion--an idea not intended here, and in itself not far from absurdity. 3. The phrase, "_the same word_" may apply to the p.r.o.noun itself as well as to the noun: in saying, "_I_ came, _I_ saw, _I_ conquered,"

there is as frequent a repet.i.tion of _the same word_, as in saying, "_Caesar_ came, _Caesar_ saw, _Caesar_ conquered." If, therefore, the latter part of this definition must be retained, the whole should be written thus: "A p.r.o.noun is a word used _in stead_ of a noun, to _prevent_ too frequent _a_ repet.i.tion of _it_."

25. FIFTH DEFINITION:--"A Verb is a word which signifies _to be, to do_, or _to suffer_"--_Lowth, Murray, and others_. NOTE:--"A verb may generally be distinguished by _its making sense_ with any of the personal p.r.o.nouns, or the word _to_ before it."--_Murray, and others_. It is confessedly difficult to give a perfect definition of a _verb_; and if, with Murray, we will have the participles to be verbs, there must be no small difficulty in forming one that shall be tolerable. Against the foregoing old explanation, it may be objected, that the phrase _to suffer_, being now understood in a more limited sense than formerly, does not well express the nature or import of a pa.s.sive verb. I have said, "A Verb is a word that signifies _to be, to act_, or _to be acted upon_." Children cannot readily understand, how every thing that is in any way _acted upon_, may be said _to suffer_.

The participle, I think, should be taken as a distinct part of speech, and have its own definition. The note added by Murray to his definition of a verb, would prove the participle not to be included in this part of speech, and thus practically contradict his scheme. It is also objectionable in respect to construction. The phrase "_by its making sense_" is at least very questionable English; for "_its making_" supposes _making_ to be a noun, and "_making sense_" supposes it to be an active participle. But Lowth says, "Let it be either the one or the other, and abide by its own construction." Nay, the author himself, though he therein contradicts an other note of his own, virtually condemns the phrase, by his caution to the learner against treating words in _ing_, "as if they were of an _amphibious species_, partly nouns and partly verbs."--_Murray's Gram._, 8vo, p. 193.

26. SIXTH DEFINITION:--"_An_ Adverb is _a part of speech joined_ to a verb, an adjective, _and sometimes to_ another adverb, to express some _quality_ or _circ.u.mstance_ respecting _it_."--_Murray's Gram._, pp. 28 and 114. See _Dr. Ash's Gram._, p. 47. This definition contains many errors; some of which are gross blunders. 1. The first word, "_An_," is erroneously put for _The: an_ adverb is _one_ adverb, not the whole cla.s.s; and, if, "_An_ adverb is a part of speech," any and every adverb is a _part of speech_; then, how many parts of speech are there? 2. The word "_joined_" is not well chosen; for, with the exception of _not_ in _cannot_, the adverb is very rarely _joined_ to the word to which it relates. 3. The want of a comma before _joined_, perverts the construction; for the phrase, "_speech joined_ to a verb," is nonsense; and to suppose _joined_ to relate to the noun _part_, is not much better. 4. The word "_and_" should be _or_; because no adverb is ever added to three or four different terms at once.

5. The word "_sometimes_" should be omitted; because it is needless, and because it is inconsistent with the only conjunction which will make the definition true. 6. The preposition "_to_" should either be inserted before "_an adjective_," or suppressed before the term which follows; for when several words occur in the same construction, uniformity of expression is desirable. 7. For the same reason, (if custom may be thus far conformed to a.n.a.logy,) the article "_an_" ought, in cases like this, if not always, to be separated from the word _other_; thus, "An adverb is a word added to _a_ verb, _a_ participle, _an_ adjective, or _an_ other adverb." Were the eye not familiar with it, _another_ would be thought as irregular as _theother_. 8. The word "_quality_" is wrong; for no adverb ever expresses any _quality_, as such; qualities are expressed by _adjectives_, and never, in any direct manner, by adverbs. 9. The "_circ.u.mstances_" which we express by adverbs never belong to the _words_, as this definition avers that they do, but always to the _actions_ or _qualities_ which the words signify. 10.

The p.r.o.noun _it_, according to Murray's second rule of syntax, ought to be _them_, and so it stands in his own early editions; but if _and_ be changed to _or_, as I have said it should be, the p.r.o.noun _it_ will be right.

27. SEVENTH DEFINITION:--"Prepositions serve to connect words with _one another_, and to show the relation _between them_."--_Lowth, Murray, and others_. This is only an observation, not a definition, as it ought to have been; nor does it at all distinguish the preposition from the conjunction.

It does not reach the thing in question. Besides, it contains an actual solecism in the expression. The word "_between_" implies but _two_ things; and the phrase "_one another_" is not applicable where there are but two.

It should be, "to connect words with _each other_, and to show the _relation between_ them;"--or else, "to connect words with _one an other_, and to show the _relations among_ them." But the latter mode of expression would not apply to prepositions considered severally, but only to the whole cla.s.s.

28. EIGHTH DEFINITION:--"A Conjunction is _a part of speech_ that is _chiefly_ used to connect sentences; so as, out of two _or more_ sentences, to make but one: it sometimes connects only words."--_Murray, and others_.

Here are more than thirty words, awkwardly and loosely strung together; and all that is said in them, might be much better expressed in half the number. For example: "A Conjunction is a word which connects other terms, and commonly of two sentences makes but one." But verbosity and want of unity are not the worst faults of this definition. We have three others to point out. 1. "A conjunction is" not "_a part of speech_;" because _a_ conjunction is _one_ conjunction, and a part of speech is a whole cla.s.s, or sort, of words. A similar error was noticed in Murray's definition of an adverb; and so common has this blunder become, that by a comparison of the definitions which different authors have given of the parts of speech, probably it will be found, that, by some hand or other, every one of the ten has been commenced in this way. 2. The words "_or more_" are erroneous, and ought to be omitted; for no one conjunction can connect more than two terms, in that consecutive order which the sense requires. Three or more simple sentences may indeed form a compound sentence; but, as they cannot be joined in a _cl.u.s.ter_, they must have two or more connectives. 3. The last clause erroneously suggests, that any or every conjunction "_sometimes connects only words_;" but the conjunctions which may connect only words, are not more than five, whereas those which connect only sentences are four times as many.

29. NINTH DEFINITION:--"Interjections are words _thrown in between the parts of a sentence_, to express the pa.s.sions or emotions of the _speaker_; as, 'O Virtue! how amiable thou art!'"--_Murray, and many others_. This definition, which has been copied from grammar to grammar, and committed to memory millions of times, is obviously erroneous, and directly contradicted by the example. Interjections, though often enough thrown in between the parts of a _discourse_, are very rarely "thrown in between the parts of a _sentence_." They more frequently occur at the beginning of a sentence than any where else; and, in such cases, they do not come under this narrow definition. The author, at the head of his chapter on interjections, appends to this definition two other examples; both of which contradict it in like manner: "_Oh_! I have alienated my friend."--"_Alas_! I fear for life." Again: Interjections are used occasionally, in _written_, as well as in _oral_ discourse; nor are they less indicative of the emotions of the _writer_, than of those "of the _speaker_."

30. I have thus exhibited, with all intentional fairness of criticism, the entire series of these nine primary definitions; and the reader may judge whether they sustain the praises which have been bestowed on the book,[69]

or confirm the allegations which I have made against it. He will understand that my design is, here, as well as in the body of this work, to teach grammar practically, by _rectifying_, so far as I may, all sorts of mistakes either in it or respecting it; to compose a book which, by a condensed exposition of such errors as are commonly found in other grammars, will at once show the need we have of a better, and be itself a fit subst.i.tute for the princ.i.p.al treatises which it censures. Grammatical errors are universally considered to be small game for critics. They must therefore be very closely grouped together, to be worth their room in this work. Of the tens of thousands who have learned for grammar a mult.i.tude of ungrammatical definitions and rules, comparatively few will ever know what I have to say of their acquisitions. But this I cannot help. To the readers of the present volume it is due, that its averments should be clearly ill.u.s.trated by particular examples; and it is reasonable that these should be taken from the most accredited sources, whether they do honour to their framers or not. My argument is only made so much the stronger, as the works which furnish its proofs, are the more esteemed, the more praised, or the more overrated.

31. Murray tells us, "There is no necessary connexion between words and ideas."--_Octavo Gram._, Vol. i, p. 139. Though this, as I before observed, is not altogether true, he doubtless had very good reason to distinguish, in his teaching, "between _the sign_ and _the thing signified_." Yet, in his own definitions and explanations, he frequently _confounds_ these very things which he declares to be so widely different as not even to have a "necessary connexion." Errors of this kind are very common in all our English grammars. Two instances occur in the following sentence; which also contains an error in doctrine, and is moreover obscure, or rather, in its literal sense, palpably absurd: "To substantives belong gender, number, and case; and _they_ are _all of_ the third person _when spoken of_, and of the second person _when spoken to_."--_Murray's Gram._, p. 38; _Alger's Murray_, 16; _Merchant's_, 23; _Bacon's_, 12; _Maltby's_, 12; _Lyon's_, 7; _Guy's_, 4; _Ingersoll's_, 26; _S. Putnam's_, 13; _T. H. Miller's_, 17; _Rev. T. Smith's_, 13. Who, but a child taught by language like this, would ever think of _speaking to a noun_? or, that a noun of the second person _could not be spoken of_? or, that a noun cannot be put in the _first person_, so as to agree with _I_ or _we_? Murray himself once taught, that, "p.r.o.nouns _must always agree_ with their antecedents, _and_ the nouns for which they stand, in gender, number, and _person_;" and he departed from a true and important principle of syntax, when he altered his rule to its present form. But I have said that the sentence above is obscure, or its meaning absurd. What does the p.r.o.noun "_they_" represent? "_Substantives_,"

according to the author's intent; but "_gender, number_, and _case_,"

according to the obvious construction of the words. Let us try a parallel:"

To scriveners belong pen, ink, and paper; and _they_ are all of primary importance when there is occasion to use them, and of none at all when they are not needed." Now, if this sentence is _obscure_, the other is not less so; but, if this is perfectly _clear_, so that what is said is obviously and only what is intended, then it is equally clear, that what is said in the former, is gross absurdity, and that the words cannot reasonably be construed into the sense which the writer, and his copyists, designed.

32. All Murray's grammars, not excepting the two volumes octavo, are as _incomplete_ as they are _inaccurate_; being deficient in many things which are of so great importance that they should not be excluded from the very smallest epitome. For example: On the subject of the _numbers_, he attempted but one definition, and that is a fourfold solecism. Ho speaks of the _persons_, but gives neither definitions nor explanations. In treating of the _genders_, he gives but one formal definition. His section on the _cases_ contains no regular definition. On the _comparison_ of adjectives, and on the _moods_ and _tenses_ of verbs, he is also satisfied with a very loose mode of teaching. The work as a whole exhibits more industry than literary taste, more benevolence of heart than distinctness of apprehension; and, like all its kindred and progeny, fails to give to the principles of grammar that degree of clearness of which they are easily susceptible. The student does not know this, but he feels the effects of it, in the obscurity of his own views on the subject, and in the conscious uncertainty with which he applies those principles. In grammar, the terms _person, number, gender, case, mood, tense_, and many others, are used in a technical and peculiar sense; and, in all scientific works, the sense of technical terms should be clearly and precisely defined. Nothing can be gained by subst.i.tuting other names of modern invention; for these also would need definitions as much as the old. We want to know the things themselves, and what they are most appropriately called. We want a book which will tell us, in proper order, and in the plainest manner, what all the elements of the science are.

33. What does he know of grammar, who cannot directly and properly answer such questions as these?--"What are numbers, in grammar? What is the singular number? What is the plural number? What are persons, in grammar?

What is the first person? What is the second person? What is the third person? What are genders, in grammar? What is the masculine gender? What is the feminine gender? What is the neuter gender? What are cases, in grammar?

What is the nominative case? What is the possessive case? What is the objective case?"--And yet the most complete acquaintance with every sentence or word of Murray's tedious compilation, may leave the student at a loss for a proper answer, not only to each of these questions, but also to many others equally simple and elementary! A boy may learn by heart all that Murray ever published on the subject of grammar, and still be left to confound the numbers in grammar with numbers in arithmetic, or the persons in grammar with persons in civil life! Nay, there are among the professed _improvers_ of this system of grammar, _men_ who have actually confounded these things, which are so totally different in their natures! In "Smith's New Grammar on the Productive System," a work in which Murray is largely copied and strangely metamorphosed, there is an abundance of such confusion. For instance: "What is the meaning of the word _number_? Number means _a sum that may be counted_."--_R. C. Smith's New Gram._, p. 7. From this, by a tissue of half a dozen similar absurdities, called _inductions_, the novice is brought to the conclusion that the numbers are _two_--as if there were in nature but two sums that might be counted! There is no end to the sickening detail of such blunders. How many grammars tell us, that, "The first person is the _person who speaks_;" that, "The second person is the _person spoken to_;" and that, "the third person is the _person spoken of_!" As if the three persons of a verb, or other part of speech, were so many _intelligent beings_! As if, by exhibiting a word in the three persons, (as _go, goest, goes_,) we put it first _into the speaker_, then _into the hearer_, and then _into somebody else_! Nothing can be more abhorrent to grammar, or to sense, than such confusion. The things which are identified in each of these three definitions, are as unlike as Socrates and moonshine! The one is a thinking being; the other, a mere form peculiar to certain words. But Chandler, of Philadelphia, ("the Grammar King," forsooth!) without mistaking the grammatical persons for rational souls, has contrived to crowd into his definition of _person_ more errors of conception and of language,--more insult to common sense,--than one could have believed it possible to put together in such s.p.a.ce. And this ridiculous old twaddle, after six and twenty years, he has deliberately re-written and lately republished as something "adapted to the schools of America." It stands thus: "_Person is a distinction which is made in a noun between its representation of its object, either as spoken to, or spoken of_."--Chandler's E. Grammar; Edition of 1821, p. 16; Ed. 1847, p. 21.

34. Grammarians have often failed in their definitions, because it is impossible to define certain terms in the way in which the description has been commonly attempted. He who undertakes what is impossible must necessarily fail; and fail too, to the discredit of his ingenuity. It is manifest that whenever a generic name in the singular number is to be defined, the definition must be founded upon some property or properties common to all the particular things included under the term. Thus, if I would define a _globe_, a _wheel_, or a _pyramid_, my description must be taken, not from what is peculiar to one or an other of these things, but from those properties only which are common to all globes, all wheels, or all pyramids. But what property has _unity_ in common with _plurality_, on which a definition of _number_ may be founded? What common property have the _three cases_, by which we can clearly define _case_? What have the _three persons_ in common, which, in a definition of _person_, could be made evident to a child? Thus all the great cla.s.ses of grammatical modifications, namely, _persons, numbers, genders, cases, moods_, and _tenses_, though they admit of easy, accurate, and obvious definitions in the plural, can scarcely be defined at all in the singular. I do not say, that the terms _person, number, gender, case, mood_, and _tense_, ia their technical application to grammar, are all of them equally and absolutely undefinable in the singular; but I say, that no definition, just in sense and suitable for a child, can ever be framed for any one of them. Among the thousand varied attempts of grammarians to explain them so, there are a hundred gross solecisms for every tolerable definition. For this, as I have shown, there is a very simple reason in the nature of the things.

35. But this reason, as well as many other truths equally important and equally clear, our common grammarians, have, so far as I know, every man of them, overlooked. Consequently, even when they were aiming at the right thing, they frequently fell into gross errors of expression; and, what is still more surprising, such errors have been entailed upon the very art of grammar, and the art of authorship itself, by the prevalence of an absurd notion, that modern writers on this subject can be meritorious authors without originality. Hence many a school-boy is daily rehearsing from his grammar-book what he might well be ashamed to have written. For example, the following definition from Murray's grammar, is found in perhaps a dozen other compends, all professing to teach the art of speaking and writing with propriety: "_Number_ is the _consideration of an object_, as _one_ or _more_." [70] Yet this short sentence, as I have before suggested, is a fourfold solecism. _First_, the word "_number_" is wrong; because those modifications of language, which distinguish unity and plurality, cannot be jointly signified by it. _Secondly_, the word "_consideration_" is wrong; because _number_ is not _consideration_, in any sense which can be put upon the terms: _condition, const.i.tution, configuration_, or any other word beginning with _con_, would have done just as well. _Thirdly_, "the consideration of _an_ object as _one_," is but idle waste of thought; for, that one thing is one,--that _an_ object is _one_ object,--every child knows by _intuition_, and not by "_consideration_." _Lastly_, to consider "_an_ object as _more_" than one, is impossible; unless this admirable definition lead us into a misconception in so plain a case! So much for the art of "the grammatical definer."

36. Many other examples, equally faulty and equally common, might, be quoted and criticised for the further proof and ill.u.s.tration of what I have alleged. But the reader will perhaps judge the foregoing to be sufficient.

I have wished to be brief, and yet to give my arguments, and the neglected facts upon which they rest, their proper force upon the mind. Against such prejudices as may possibly arise from the authorship of rival publications, or from any interest in the success of one book rather than of an other, let both my judges and me be on our guard. I have intended to be fair; for captiousness is not criticism. If the reader perceives in these strictures any improper bias, he has a sort of discernment which it is my misfortune to lack. Against the compilers of grammars, I urge no conclusions at which any man can hesitate, who accedes to my preliminary remarks upon them; and these may be summed up in the following couplet of the poet Churchill:

"To copy beauties, forfeits all pretence To fame;--to copy faults, is want of sense."

CHAPTER XI.

BRIEF NOTICES OF THE SCHEMES OF CERTAIN GRAMMARS.

"Sed ut perveniri ad summa nisi ex principiis non potest: ita, procedente jam opere, minima incipiunt esse quae prima sunt."--QUINTILIAN. _De Inst.

Orat._, Lib. x, Cap. 1, p. 560.

1. The _history_ of grammar, in the proper sense of the term, has heretofore been made no part of the study. I have imagined that many of its details might be profitable, not only to teachers, but to that cla.s.s of learners for whose use this work is designed. Accordingly, in the preceding pages, there have been stated numerous facts properly historical, relating either to particular grammars, or to the changes and progress of this branch of instruction. These various details it is hoped will be more entertaining, and perhaps for that reason not less useful, than those explanations which belong merely to the construction and resolution of sentences. The attentive reader must have gathered from the foregoing chapters some idea of what the science owes to many individuals whose names are connected with it. But it seems proper to devote to this subject a few pages more, in order to give some further account of the origin and character of certain books.

2. The manuals by which grammar was first taught in English, were not properly English Grammars. They were translations of the Latin Accidence; and were designed to aid British youth in acquiring a knowledge of the Latin language, rather than accuracy in the use of their own. The two languages were often combined in one book, for the purpose of teaching sometimes both together, and sometimes one through the medium of the other. The study of such works doubtless had a tendency to modify, and perhaps at that time to improve, the English style of those who used them. For not only must variety of knowledge have led to copiousness of expression, but the most cultivated minds would naturally be most apt to observe what was orderly in the use of speech. A language, indeed, after its proper form is well fixed by letters, must resist all introduction of foreign idioms, or become corrupted. Hence it is, that Dr.

Johnson avers, "The great pest of speech is frequency of translation. No book was ever turned from one language into another, without imparting something of its native idiom; this is the most mischievous and comprehensive innovation."--_Preface to Joh. Dict._, 4to, p. 14. Without expressly controverting this opinion, or offering any justification of mere metaphrases, or literal translations, we may well a.s.sert, that the practice of comparing different languages, and seeking the most appropriate terms for a free version of what is ably written, is an exercise admirably calculated to familiarize and extend grammatical knowledge.

3. Of the cla.s.s of books here referrred [sic--KTH] to, that which I have mentioned in an other chapter, as Lily's or King Henry's Grammar, has been by far the most celebrated and the most influential. Concerning this treatise, it is stated, that its parts were not put together in the present form, until eighteen or twenty years after Lily's death. "The time when this work was completed," says the preface of 1793, "has been differently related by writers. Thomas Hayne places it in the year 1543, and Anthony Wood, in 1545. But neither of these accounts can be right; for I have seen a beautiful copy, printed upon vellum, and illuminated, anno 1542, in quarto. And it may be doubted whether this was the first edition."--_John Ward, Pref._, p. vii. In an Introductory Lecture, read before the University of London in 1828, by Thomas Dale, professor of English literature, I find the following statement: "In this reign,"--the reign of Henry VIII,--"the study of grammar was reduced to a system, by the promulgation of many grammatical treatises; one of which was esteemed of sufficient importance to be honoured with a royal name. It was called, 'The Grammar of King Henry the Eighth;' and to this, 'with other works, the young Shakspeare was probably indebted for some learning and much loyalty.'

But the honour of producing the first English grammar is claimed by William Bullokar, who published, in the year 1586, 'A Bref Grammar for English,'

being, to use his own words, 'the first Grammar for English that ever waz, except my Grammar at large.'"

4. Ward's preface to Lily commences thus: "If we look back to the origin of our common _Latin Grammar_, we shall find it was no hasty performance, nor the work of a single person; but composed at different times by several eminent and learned men, till the whole was at length finished, and by the order of _King Henry_ VIII.[,] brought into that form in which it has ever since continued. The _English introduction_ was written by the reverend and learned Dr. _John Colet_, Dean of St. _Paul's_, for the use of the school he had lately founded there; and was dedicated by him to _William Lily_, the first high master of that school, in the year 1510; for which reason it has usually gone by the name of _Paul's Accidence_. The substance of it remains the same, as at first; though it has been much altered in the manner of expression, and sometimes the order, with other improvements. The _English syntax_ was the work of _Lily_, as appears by the t.i.tle in the most ancient editions, which runs thus: _Gulielmi Lilii Angli Rudimenta_.

But it has been greatly improved since his time, both with, regard to the method, and an enlargement of double the quant.i.ty."

5. Paul's Accidence is therefore probably the oldest grammar that can now be found in our language. It is not, however, an English grammar; because, though written in antique English, and embracing many things which are as true of our language as of any other, it was particularly designed for the teaching of _Latin_. It begins thus: "In speech be these eight parts following: Noun, p.r.o.noun, Verb, Participle, declined; Adverb, Conjunction, Preposition, Interjection, undeclined." This is the old platform of the Latin grammarians; which differs from that of the Greek grammars, only in having no Article, and in separating the Interjection from the cla.s.s of Adverbs.

Some Greek grammarians, however, separate the Adjective from the Noun, and include the Participle with the Verb: thus, "There are in Greek eight species of words, called Parts of Speech; viz. Article, Noun, Adjective, p.r.o.noun, Verb, Adverb, Preposition, and Conjunction."--_Anthon's Valpy_, p.

18. With respect to our language, the plan of the Latin Accidence is manifestly inaccurate; nor can it be applied, without some variation, to the Greek. In both, as well as in all other languages that have _Articles_, the best amendment of it, and the nearest adherence to it, is, to make the Parts of Speech _ten_; namely, the Article, the Noun, the Adjective, the p.r.o.noun, the Verb, the Participle, the Adverb, the Conjunction, the Preposition, and the Interjection.

6. The best Latin grammarians admit that the Adjective ought not to be called a Noun; and the best Greek grammarians, that the Interjections ought not to be included among Adverbs. With respect to Participles, a vast majority of grammarians in general, make them a distinct species, or part of speech; but, on this point, the English grammarians are about equally divided: nearly one half include them with the verbs, and a few call them adjectives. In grammar, it is wrong to deviate from the old groundwork, except for the sake of truth and improvement; and, in this case, to vary the series of parts, by suppressing one and subst.i.tuting an other, is in fact a greater innovation, than to make the terms ten, by adding one and dividing an other. But our men of nine parts of speech innovated yet more: they added the Article, as did the Greeks; divided the Noun into Substantive and Adjective; and, without good reason, suppressed the Participle. And, of latter time, not a few have thrown the whole into confusion, to show the world "the order of [their] understanding." What was grammar fifty years ago, some of these have not thought it worth their while to inquire! And the reader has seen, that, after all this, they can complacently talk of "the censure so frequently and so justly awarded to _unfortunate innovators_."--KIRKHAM'S _Gram._, p. 10.

7. The old scheme of the Latin grammarians has seldom, if ever, been _literally_ followed in English; because its distribution of the parts of speech, as declined and undeclined, would not be true with respect to the English participle. With the omission of this unimportant distinction, it was, however, scrupulously retained by Dilworth, by the author of the British Grammar, by William Ward, by Buchanan, and by some others now little known, who chose to include both the article and the adjective with the noun, rather than to increase the number of the parts of speech beyond eight. Dr. Priestley says, "I shall adopt the _usual distribution_ of words into eight cla.s.ses; viz. Nouns, Adjectives, p.r.o.nouns, Verbs, Adverbs, Prepositions, Conjunctions, and Interjections.[71] I do this in compliance with the practice of most Grammarians; and because, _if any number, in a thing so arbitrary, must be fixed upon_, this seems to be as comprehensive and distinct as any. All the innovation I have made hath been to throw out the _Participle_, and subst.i.tute the _Adjective_, as more evidently a distinct part of speech."--_Rudiments of English Gram._, p. 3. All this comports well enough with Dr. Priestley's haste and carelessness; but it is not true, that he either adopted, "the usual distribution of words," or made an other "as comprehensive and distinct as any." His "_innovation_,"

too, which has since been countenanced by many other writers, I have already shown to be greater, than if, by a promotion of the article and the adjective, he had made the parts of speech ten. Dr. Beattie, who was Priestley's coeval, and a much better scholar, adopted this number without hesitation, and called every one of them by what is still its right name: "In English there are _ten_ sorts of words, which are all found in the following short sentence; 'I now see the good man coming; but, alas! he walks with difficulty.' _I_ and _he_ are p.r.o.nouns; _now_ is an adverb; _see_ and _walks_ are verbs; _the_ is an article; _good_, an adjective; _man_ and _difficulty_ are nouns, the former substantive, the latter abstract; _coming_ is a participle; _but_, a conjunction; _alas!_ an interjection; _with_, a preposition. That no other sorts of words are necessary in language, will appear, when we have seen in what respects these are necessary."--_Beattie's Moral Science_, Vol. i, p. 30. This distribution is precisely that which the best _French_ grammarians have _usually_ adopted.

8. Dr. Johnson professes to adopt the division, the order, and the terms, "of the common grammarians, without inquiring whether a fitter distribution might not be found."--_Gram. before 4to Dict._, p. 1. But, in the Etymology of his Grammar, he makes no enumeration of the parts of speech, and treats only of articles, nouns, adjectives, p.r.o.nouns, and verbs; to which if we add the others, according to the common grammarians, or according to his own Dictionary, the number will be _ten_. And this distribution, which was adopted by Dr. Ash about 1765, by Murray the schoolmaster about 1790, by Caleb Alexander in 1795, and approved by Dr. Adam in 1793, has since been very extensively followed; as may be seen in Dr. Crombie's treatise, in the Rev. Matt. Harrison's, in Dr. Mandeville's reading-books, and in the grammars of Harrison, Staniford, Alden, Coar, John Peirce, E. Devis, C.

Adams, D. Adams, Chandler, Comly, Jaudon, Ingersoll, Hull, Fuller, Greenleaf, Kirkham, Ferd. H. Miller, Merchant, Mack, Nutting, Bucke, Beck, Barrett, Barnard, Maunder, Webber, Emmons, Hazen, Bingham, Sanders, and many others. Dr. Lowth's distribution is the same, except that he placed the adjective after the p.r.o.noun, the conjunction after the preposition, and, like Priestley, called the participle a verb, thus making the parts of speech _nine_. He also has been followed by many; among whom are Bicknell, Burn, Lennie, Mennye, Lindley Murray, W. Allen, Guy, Churchill, Wilson, Cobbett, Davis, David Blair, Davenport, Mendenhall, Wilc.o.x, Picket, Pond, Russell, Bacon, Bullions, Brace, Hart, Lyon, Tob. H. Miller, Alger, A.