The Grammar of English Grammars Part 12

16. Of all methods of teaching grammar, that which has come nearest to what is recommended above, has doubtless been the most successful; and whatever objections may have been raised against it, it will probably be found on examination to be the most a.n.a.logous to nature. It is a.n.a.lytic in respect to the doctrines of grammar, synthetic in respect to the practice, and logical in respect to both. It a.s.sumes the language as an object which the learner is capable of conceiving to be one whole; begins with the cla.s.sification of all its words, according to certain grand differences which make the several parts of speech; then proceeds to divide further, according to specific differences and qualities, till all the cla.s.ses, properties, and relations, of the words in any intelligible sentence, become obvious and determinate: and he to whom these things are known, so that he can see at a glance what is the construction of each word, and whether it is right or not, is a good grammarian. The disposition of the human mind to generalize the objects of thought, and to follow broad a.n.a.logies in the use of words, discovers itself early, and seems to be an inherent principle of our nature. Hence, in the language of children and illiterate people, many words are regularly inflected even in opposition to the most common usage.

17. It has unfortunately become fashionable to inveigh against the necessary labour of learning by heart the essential principles of grammar, as a useless and intolerable drudgery. And this notion, with the vain hope of effecting the same purpose in an easier way, is giving countenance to modes of teaching well calculated to make superficial scholars. When those principles are properly defined, disposed, and exemplified, the labour of learning them is far less than has been represented; and the habits of application induced by such a method of studying grammar, are of the utmost importance to the learner. Experience shows, that the task may be achieved during the years of childhood; and that, by an early habit of study, the memory is so improved, as to render those exercises easy and familiar, which, at a later period, would be found very difficult and irksome. Upon this plan, and perhaps upon every other, some words will be learned before the ideas represented by them are fully comprehended, or the things spoken of are fully understood. But this seems necessarily to arise from the order of nature in the development of the mental faculties; and an acquisition cannot be lightly esteemed, which has signally augmented and improved that faculty on which the pupil's future progress in knowledge depends.

18. The memory, indeed, should never be cultivated at the expense of the understanding; as is the case, when the former is tasked with ill-devised lessons by which the latter is misled and bewildered. But truth, whether fully comprehended or not, has no perplexing inconsistencies. And it is manifest that that which does not in some respect surpa.s.s the understanding, can never enlighten it--can never awaken the spirit of inquiry or satisfy research. How often have men of observation profited by the remembrance of words which, at the time they heard them, they did not "_perfectly understand!_" We never study any thing of which we imagine our knowledge to be perfect. To learn, and, to understand, are, with respect to any science or art, one and the same thing. With respect to difficult or unintelligible phraseology alone, are they different. He who by study has once stored his memory with the sound and appropriate language of any important doctrine, can never, without some folly or conceit akin to madness, repent of the acquisition. Milton, in his academy, professed to teach things rather than words; and many others have made plausible profession of the same thing since. But it does not appear, that even in the hands of Milton, the attempt was crowned with any remarkable success.

See _Dr. Barrow's Essays_, p. 85.

19. The vain pretensions of several modern simplifiers, contrivers of machines, charts, tables, diagrams, vincula, pictures, dialogues, familiar lectures, ocular a.n.a.lyses, tabular compendiums, inductive exercises, productive systems, intellectual methods, and various new theories, for the purpose of teaching grammar, may serve to deceive the ignorant, to amuse the visionary, and to excite the admiration of the credulous; but none of these things has any favourable relation to that improvement which may justly be boasted as having taken place within the memory of the present generation. The definitions and rules which const.i.tute the doctrines of grammar, may be variously expressed, arranged, ill.u.s.trated, and applied; and in the expression, arrangement, ill.u.s.tration, and application of them, there may be room for some amendment; but no contrivance can ever relieve the pupil from the necessity of committing them thoroughly to memory. The experience of all antiquity is added to our own, in confirmation of this; and the judicious teacher, though he will not shut his eyes to a real improvement, will be cautious of renouncing the practical lessons of h.o.a.ry experience, for the futile notions of a vain projector.

20. Some have been beguiled with the idea, that great proficiency in grammar was to be made by means of a certain fanciful method of _induction._ But if the scheme does not communicate to those who are instructed by it, a better knowledge of grammar than the contrivers themselves seem to have possessed, it will be found of little use.[59] By the happy method of Bacon, to lead philosophy into the common walks of life, into the ordinary business and language of men, is to improve the condition of humanity; but, in teaching grammar, to desert the plain didactic method of definition and example, rule and praxis, and pretend to lead children by philosophic induction into a knowledge of words, is to throw down the ladder of learning, that boys may imagine themselves to ascend it, while they are merely stilting over the low level upon which its fragments are cast.

21. The chief argument of these inductive grammarians is founded on the principle, that children cannot be instructed by means of any words which they do not perfectly understand. If this principle were strictly true, children could never be instructed by words at all. For no child ever fully understands a word the first time he hears or sees it; and it is rather by frequent repet.i.tion and use, than by any other process, that the meaning of words is commonly learned. Hence most people make use of many terms which they cannot very accurately explain, just as they do of many _things_, the real nature of which they do not comprehend. The first perception we have of any word, or other thing, when presented to the ear or the eye, gives us some knowledge of it. So, to the signs of thought, as older persons use them, we soon attach some notion of what is meant; and the difference between this knowledge, and that which we call an understanding of the word or thing, is, for the most part, only in degree. Definitions and explanations are doubtless highly useful, but induction is not definition, and an understanding of words may be acquired without either; else no man could ever have made a dictionary. But, granting the principle to be true, it makes nothing for this puerile method of induction; because the regular process by definitions and examples is both shorter and easier, as well as more effectual. In a word, this whole scheme of inductive grammar is nothing else than a series of _leading_ questions and _manufactured_ answers; the former being generally as unfair as the latter are silly. It is a remarkable tissue of ill-laid premises and of forced illogical sequences.

22. Of a similar character is a certain work, ent.i.tled, "English Grammar on the _Productive System_: a method of instruction recently adopted in Germany and Switzerland." It is a work which certainly will be "_productive_" of no good to any body but the author and his publishers.

The book is as dest.i.tute of taste, as of method; of authority, as of originality. It commences with "the _inductive_ process," and after forty pages of such matter as is described above, becomes a "_productive_ system," by means of a misnamed "RECAPITULATION;" which jumbles together the etymology and the syntax of the language, through seventy-six pages more. It is then made still more "_productive_" by the appropriation of a like s.p.a.ce to a reprint of Murray's Syntax and Exercises, under the inappropriate t.i.tle, "GENERAL OBSERVATIONS." To Prosody, including punctuation and the use of capitals, there are allotted six pages, at the end; and to Orthography, four lines, in the middle of the volume! (See p.

41.) It is but just, to regard the _t.i.tle_ of this book, as being at once a libel and a lie; a libel upon the learning and good sense of Woodbridge;[60] and a practical lie, as conveying a false notion of the origin of what the volume contains.

23. What there is in Germany or Switzerland, that bears _any resemblance_ to this misnamed system of English Grammar, remains to be shown. It would be prodigal of the reader's time, and inconsistent with the studied brevity of this work, to expose the fallacy of what is pretended in regard to the origin of this new method. Suffice it to say, that the anonymous and questionable account of the "Productive System of Instruction," which the author has borrowed from a "valuable periodical," to save himself the trouble of writing a preface, and, as he says, to "_a.s.sist_ [the reader] in forming an opinion of the comparative merits of _the system_" is not only dest.i.tute of all authority, but is totally irrelevant, except to the whimsical _name_ of his book. If every word of it be true, it is insufficient to give us even the slightest reason to suppose, that any thing a.n.a.logous to his production ever had existence in either of those countries; and yet it is set forth on purpose to convey the idea that such a system "_now predominates_" in the schools of both. (See _Pref._, p. 5.) The infidel _Neef_, whose new method of education has been tried in our country, and with its promulgator forgot, was an accredited disciple of this boasted "productive school;" a zealous coadjutor with Pestalozzi himself, from whose halls he emanated to "teach the offspring of a free people"--to teach them the nature of things sensible, and a contempt for all the wisdom of _books_. And what similarity is there between his method of teaching and that of _Roswell C. Smith_, except their pretence to a common parentage, and that both are worthless?

24. The success of Smith's Inductive and Productive Grammars, and the fame perhaps of a certain "Grammar in Familiar Lectures," produced in 1836 a rival work from the hands of a gentleman in New Hampshire, ent.i.tled, "An a.n.a.lytical Grammar of the English Language, embracing the _Inductive and Productive Methods of Teaching_, with _Familiar Explanations in the Lecture Style_" &c. This is a fair-looking duodecimo volume of three hundred pages, the character and pretensions of which, if they could be clearly stated, would throw further light upon the two fallacious schemes of teaching mentioned above. For the writer says, "This grammar professes _to combine_ both the _Inductive_ and _Productive_ methods of imparting instruction, of which much has been said within a few years _past_"--_Preface_, p. iv. And again: "The inductive and productive methods of instruction contain the essence of modern improvements."--_Gram._, p. 139. In what these modern improvements consist, he does not inform us; but, it will be seen, that he himself claims the _copyright_ of _all_ the improvements which he allows to _English grammar_ since the appearance of Murray in 1795. More than two hundred pretenders to such improvements, appear however within the time; nor is the grammarian of Holdgate the least positive of the claimants. This new purveyor for the public taste, dislikes the catering of his predecessor, who poached in the fields of Murray; and, with a tacit censure upon _his productions_, has _honestly bought_ the rareties which he has served up. In this he has the advantage. He is a better writer too than some who make grammars; though no adept at composition, and a total stranger to method. To call his work a "_system_" is a palpable misnomer; to tell what it is, an impossibility. It is a grammatical chaos, bearing such a resemblance to Smith's or Kirkham's as one ma.s.s of confusion naturally bears to an other, yet differing from both in almost every thing that looks like order in any of the three.

25. The claimant of the combination says, "this new system of English grammar now offered to the public, embraces _the principles_ of a 'Systematic Introduction to English Grammar,' by John L. Parkhurst; and the _present author_ is indebted to Mr. Parkhurst for a knowledge of _the manner_ of applying the principles involved in _his peculiar method_ of teaching grammatical science. He is also under obligations to Mr.

Parkhurst for many useful hints received several years since while under his instruction.--The _copy right_ of Parkhurst's Grammar has been purchased by the writer of this, who alone is responsible for the present application of _its definitions._ Parkhurst's Systematic Introduction to English Grammar has pa.s.sed through two editions, and is _the first improved system_ of English grammar that has appeared before the public _since the first introduction_ of Lindley Murray's English Grammar."--_Sanborn's Gram., Preface_, p. iii. What, then, is "THE PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM?" and with whom did it originate? The thousands of gross blunders committed by its professors, prove at least that it is no system of writing grammatically; and, whether it originated with Parkhurst or with Pestalozzi, with Sanborn or with Smith, as it is confessedly a method but "recently adopted," and, so far as appears, never fairly tested, so is it a method that needs only to be _known_, to be immediately and forever exploded.

26. The best instruction is that which ultimately gives the greatest facility and skill in practice; and grammar is best taught by that process which brings its doctrines most directly home to the habits as well as to the thoughts of the pupil--which the most effectually conquers inattention, and leaves the deepest impress of shame upon blundering ignorance. In the language of some men, there is a vividness, an energy, a power of expression, which penetrates even the soul of dullness, and leaves an impression both of words unknown and of sentiments unfelt before. Such men can teach; but he who kindly or indolently accommodates himself to ignorance, shall never be greatly instrumental in removing it. "The colloquial barbarisms of boys," says Dr. Barrow, "should never be suffered to pa.s.s without notice and censure. Provincial tones and accents, and all defects in articulation, should be corrected whenever they are heard; lest they grow into established habits, unknown, from their familiarity, to him who is guilty of them, and adopted by others, from the imitation of his manner, or their respect for his authority."--_Barrow's Essays on Education_, p. 88.

27. In the whole range of school exercises, there is none of greater importance than that of parsing; and yet perhaps there is none which is, in general, more defectively conducted. Scarcely less useful, as a means of instruction, is the practice of correcting false syntax orally, by regular and logical forms of argument; nor does this appear to have been more ably directed towards the purposes of discipline. There is so much to be done, in order to effect what is desirable in the management of these things; and so little prospect that education will ever be generally raised to a just appreciation of that study which, more than all others, forms the mind to habits of correct thinking; that, in reflecting upon the state of the science at the present time, and upon the means of its improvement, the author cannot but sympathize, in some degree, with the sadness of the learned Sanctius; who tells us, that he had "always lamented, and often with tears, that while other branches of learning were excellently taught, grammar, which is the foundation of all others, lay so much neglected, and that for this neglect there seemed to be no adequate remedy."--_Pref. to Minerva_. The grammatical use of language is in sweet alliance with the moral; and a similar regret seems to have prompted the following exclamation of the Christian poet:

"Sacred Interpreter of human thought, How few respect or use thee as they ought!"--COWPER.

28. No directions, either oral or written, can ever enable the heedless and the unthinking to speak or write well. That must indeed be an admirable book, which can attract levity to sober reflection, teach thoughtlessness the true meaning of words, raise vulgarity from its fondness for low examples, awaken the spirit which attains to excellency of speech, and cause grammatical exercises to be skillfully managed, where teachers themselves are so often lamentably deficient in them. Yet something may be effected by means of better books, if better can be introduced. And what withstands?--Whatever there is of ignorance or error in relation to the premises. And is it arrogant to say there is much? Alas! in regard to this, as well as to many a weightier matter, one may too truly affirm, _Multa non sunt sicut multis videntur_--Many things are not as they seem to many.

Common errors are apt to conceal themselves from the common mind; and the appeal to reason and just authority is often frustrated, because a wrong head defies both. But, apart from this, there are difficulties: multiplicity perplexes choice; inconvenience attends change; improvement requires effort; conflicting theories demand examination; the principles of the science are unprofitably disputed; the end is often divorced from the means; and much that belies the t.i.tle, has been published under the name.

29. It is certain, that the printed formularies most commonly furnished for the important exercises of parsing and correcting, are either so awkwardly written or so negligently followed, as to make grammar, in the mouths of our juvenile orators, little else than a crude and faltering jargon. Murray evidently intended that his book of exercises should be constantly used with his grammar; but he made the examples in the former so dull and prolix, that few learners, if any, have ever gone through the series agreeably to his direction. The publishing of them in a separate volume, has probably given rise to the absurd practice of endeavouring to teach his grammar without them. The forms of parsing and correcting which this author furnishes, are also misplaced; and when found by the learner, are of little use. They are so verbose, awkward, irregular, and deficient, that the pupil must be either a dull boy or utterly ignorant of grammar, if he cannot express the facts extemporaneously in better English. They are also very meagre as a whole, and altogether inadequate to their purpose; many things that frequently occur in the language, not being at all exemplified in them, or even explained in the grammar itself. When we consider how exceedingly important it is, that the business of a school should proceed without loss of time, and that, in the oral exercises here spoken of, each pupil should go through his part promptly, clearly, correctly, and fully, we cannot think it a light objection that these forms, so often to be repeated, are so badly written. Nor does the objection lie against this writer only: "_Ab uno disce omnes_." But the reader may demand some ill.u.s.trations.[61]

30. First--from his etymological parsing: "O Virtue! how amiable thou art!"

Here his form for the word _Virtue_ is--"_Virtue_ is a _common substantive, of_ the _neuter_ gender, _of the third_ person, _in the_ singular number, _and the_ nominative case."--_Murray's Gram._, 8vo, Vol. ii, p. 2. It should have been--"_Virtue_ is a common _noun_, personified _proper_, of the _second_ person, singular number, _feminine_ gender, and nominative case." And then the definitions of all these things should have followed in regular numerical order. He gives the cla.s.s of this noun wrong, for virtue addressed becomes an individual; he gives the gender wrong, and in direct contradiction to what he says of the word in his section on gender; he gives the person wrong, as may be seen by the p.r.o.noun _thou_, which represents it; he repeats the definite article three times unnecessarily, and inserts two needless prepositions, making them different where the relation is precisely the same: and all this, in a sentence of two lines, to tell the properties of the noun _Virtue!_--But further: in etymological parsing, the definitions explaining the properties of the parts of speech, ought to be regularly and rapidly rehea.r.s.ed by the pupil, till all of them become perfectly familiar; and till he can discern, with the quickness of thought, what alone will be true for the full description of any word in any intelligible sentence. All these the author omits; and, on account of this omission, his whole method of etymological parsing is, miserably deficient.[62]

31. Secondly--from his syntactical parsing: "_Vice_ degrades us." Here his form for the word _Vice_ is--"_Vice_ is a common substantive, _of_ the third person, _in the_ singular number, _and the_ nominative case."--_Murray's Gram._, 8vo, Vol. ii, p. 9. Now, when the learner is told that this is the syntactical parsing of a noun, and the other the etymological, he will of course conclude, that to advance from the etymology to the syntax of this part of speech, is merely, _to omit the gender_--this being the only difference between the two forms. But even this difference had no other origin than the compiler's carelessness in preparing his octavo book of exercises--the gender being inserted in the duodecimo. And what then? Is the syntactical parsing of a noun to be precisely the same as the etymological? Never. But Murray, and all who admire and follow his work, are content to pa.r.s.e many words by halves--making, or pretending to make, a necessary distinction, and yet often omitting, in both parts of the exercise, every thing which const.i.tutes the difference. He should here have said--"_Vice_ is a common noun, of the third person, singular number, neuter gender, and nominative case: and is the subject of _degrades_; according to the rule which says, 'A noun or a p.r.o.noun which is the subject of a verb, must be in the nominative case.' Because the meaning is--_vice degrades_." This is the whole description of the word, with its construction; and to say less, is to leave the matter unfinished.

32. Thirdly--from his "Mode of verbally correcting erroneous sentences:"

Take his first example: "The man is prudent which speaks little." (How far silence is prudence, depends upon circ.u.mstances: I waive that question.) The learner is here taught to say, "This sentence is incorrect; because _which_ is a p.r.o.noun _of the neuter gender, and does not agree in gender_ with its antecedent _man_, which is masculine. But a p.r.o.noun should agree with its antecedent in gender, &c. according to the fifth rule of syntax.

_Which_ should _therefore_ be _who_, a relative p.r.o.noun, agreeing with its antecedent _man_; and the sentence should stand thus: 'The man is prudent _who_ speaks little.'"--_Murray's Octavo Gram._, Vol. ii, p. 18; _Exercises_, 12mo, p. xii. Again: "'After I visited Europe, I returned to America.' This sentence," says Murray, "_is not correct_; because the verb _visited_ is in the imperfect tense, and yet used here to express an action, not only past, but prior to the time referred to by the verb _returned_, to which it relates. By the thirteenth rule of syntax, when verbs are used that, in point of time, relate to each other, the order of time should be observed. The imperfect tense _visited_ should therefore have been _had visited_, in the pluperfect tense, representing the action of _visiting_, not only as past, but also as prior to the time of _returning_. _The sentence corrected would stand thus_: 'After I _had visited_ Europe, I returned to America.'"--_Gr._, ii, p. 19; _and Ex._ 12mo, p. xii. These are the first two examples of Murray's verbal corrections, and the only ones retained by Alger, in his _improved, recopy-righted edition_ of Murray's Exercises. Yet, in each of them, is the argumentation palpably false! In the former, truly, _which_ should be _who_; but not because _which_ is "of the _neuter gender_;" but because the application of that relative to _persons_, is now nearly obsolete. Can any grammarian forget that, in speaking of brute animals, male or female, we commonly use _which_, and never _who_? But if _which_ must needs be _neuter_, the world is wrong in this.--As for the latter example, it is right as it stands; and the correction is, in some sort, tautological. The conjunctive adverb _after_ makes one of the actions subsequent to the other, and gives to the _visiting_ all the priority that is signified by the pluperfect tense. "_After_ I _visited_ Europe," is equivalent to "_When_ I _had visited_ Europe." The whole argument is therefore void.[63]

33. These few brief ill.u.s.trations, out of thousands that might be adduced in proof of the faultiness of the common manuals, the author has reluctantly introduced, to show that even in the most popular books, with all the pretended improvements of revisers, the grammar of our language has never been treated with that care and ability which its importance demands.

It is hardly to be supposed that men unused to a teacher's duties, can be qualified to compose such books as will most facilitate his labours.

Practice is a better pilot than theory. And while, in respect to grammar, the consciousness of failure is constantly inducing changes from one system to another, and almost daily giving birth to new expedients as constantly to end in the same disappointment; perhaps the practical instructions of an experienced teacher, long and a.s.siduously devoted to the study, may approve themselves to many, as seasonably supplying the aid and guidance which they require.

34. From the doctrines of grammar, novelty is rigidly excluded. They consist of details to which taste can lend no charm, and genius no embellishment. A writer may express them with neatness and perspicuity--their importance alone can commend them to notice. Yet, in drawing his ill.u.s.trations from the stores of literature, the grammarian may select some gems of thought, which will fasten on the memory a worthy sentiment, or relieve the dullness of minute instruction. Such examples have been taken from various authors, and interspersed through the following pages. The moral effect of early lessons being a point of the utmost importance, it is especially inc.u.mbent on all those who are endeavouring to confer the benefits of intellectual culture, to guard against the admission or the inculcation of any principle which may have an improper tendency, and be ultimately prejudicial to those whom they instruct. In preparing this treatise for publication, the author has been solicitous to avoid every thing that could be offensive to the most delicate and scrupulous reader; and of the several thousands of quotations introduced for the ill.u.s.tration or application of the principles of the science, he trusts that the greater part will be considered valuable on account of the sentiments they contain.

35. The nature of the subject almost entirely precludes invention. The author has, however, aimed at that kind and degree of originality which are to be commended in works of this sort. What these are, according to his view, he has sufficiently explained in a preceding chapter. And, though he has taken the liberty of a grammarian, to think for himself and write in a style of his own, he trusts it will be evident that few have excelled him in diligence of research, or have followed more implicitly the dictates of that authority which gives law to language. In criticising the critics and grammatists of the schools, he has taken them upon their own ground--showing their errors, for the most part, in contrast with the common principles which they themselves have taught; and has hoped to escape censure, in his turn, not by sheltering himself under the name of a popular master, but by a diligence which should secure to his writings at least the humble merit of self-consistency. His progress in composing this work has been slow, and not unattended with labour and difficulty. Amidst the contrarieties of opinion, that appear in the various treatises already before the public, and the perplexities inseparable from so complicated a subject, he has, after deliberate consideration, adopted those views and explanations which appeared to him the least liable to objection, and the most compatible with his ultimate object--the production of a work which should show, both extensively and accurately, what is, and what is not, good English.

36. The great art of meritorious authorship lies chiefly in the condensation of much valuable thought into few words. Although the author has here allowed himself ampler room than before, he has still been no less careful to store it with such information as he trusted would prevent the ingenious reader from wishing its compa.s.s less. He has compressed into this volume the most essential parts of a ma.s.s of materials in comparison with which the book is still exceedingly small. The effort to do this, has greatly multiplied his own labour and long delayed the promised publication; but in proportion as this object has been reached, the time and patience of the student must have been saved. Adequate compensation for this long toil, has never been expected. Whether from this performance any profit shall accrue to the author or not, is a matter of little consequence; he has neither written for bread, nor on the credit of its proceeds built castles in the air. His ambition was, to make an acceptable book, by which the higher cla.s.s of students might be thoroughly instructed, and in which the eyes of the critical would find little to condemn. He is too well versed in the history of his theme, too well aware of the precarious fortune of authors, to indulge in any confident antic.i.p.ations of extraordinary success: yet he will not deny that his hopes are large, being conscious of having cherished them with a liberality of feeling which cannot fear disappointment. In this temper he would invite the reader to a thorough perusal of these pages.

37. A grammar should speak for itself. In a work of this nature, every word or t.i.ttle which does not recommend the performance to the understanding and taste of the skillful, is, so far as it goes, a certificate against it. Yet if some small errors shall have escaped detection, let it be recollected that it is almost impossible to compose and print, with perfect accuracy, a work of this size, in which so many little things should be observed, remembered, and made exactly to correspond. There is no human vigilance which multiplicity may not sometimes baffle, and minuteness sometimes elude. To most persons grammar seems a dry and difficult subject; but there is a disposition of mind, to which what is arduous, is for that very reason alluring. "Quo difficilius, hoc praeclarius," says Cicero; "The more difficult, the more honourable." The merit of casting up a high-way in a rugged land, is proportionate not merely to the utility of the achievement, but to the magnitude of the obstacles to be overcome. The difficulties encountered in boyhood from the use of a miserable epitome and the deep impression of a few mortifying blunders made in public, first gave the author a fondness for grammar; circ.u.mstances having since favoured this turn of his genius, he has voluntarily pursued the study, with an a.s.siduity which no man will ever imitate for the sake of pecuniary recompense.

CHAPTER X.

OF GRAMMATICAL DEFINITIONS.

"Scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant, nisi in animi motionibus atque rationibus: qua de causa _definitiones_ rerum probabant, et has ad omnia, de quibus disceptabatur, adhibebant."--CICERONIS _Academica_, Lib. i, 9.

1. "The first and highest philosophy," says Puffendorf, "is that which delivers the most accurate and comprehensive _definitions_ of things." Had all the writers on English grammar been adepts in this philosophy, there would have been much less complaint of the difficulty and uncertainty of the study. "It is easy," says Murray, "to advance plausible objections against almost every definition, rule, and arrangement of grammar."--_Gram._, 8vo, p. 59. But, if this is true, as regards his, or any other work, the reason, I am persuaded, is far less inherent in the nature of the subject than many have supposed.[64] Objectionable definitions and rules are but evidences of the ignorance and incapacity of him who frames them. And if the science of grammar has been so unskillfully treated that almost all its positions may be plausibly impugned, it is time for some attempt at a reformation of the code. The language is before us, and he who knows most about it, can best prescribe the rules which we ought to observe in the use of it. But how can we expect children to deduce from a few particulars an accurate notion of general principles and their exceptions, where learned doctors have so often faltered? Let the abettors of grammatical "_induction_" answer.

2. Nor let it be supposed a light matter to prescribe with certainty the principles of grammar. For, what is requisite to the performance? To know certainly, in the first place, what is the _best usage_. Nor is this all. Sense and memory must be keen, and tempered to retain their edge and hold, in spite of any difficulties which the subject may present. To understand things exactly as they are; to discern the differences by which they may be distinguished, and the resemblances by which they ought to be cla.s.sified; to know, through the proper evidences of truth, that our ideas, or conceptions, are rightly conformable to the nature, properties, and relations, of the objects of which we think; to see how that which is complex may be resolved into its elements, and that which is simple may enter into combination; to observe how that which is consequent may be traced to its cause, and that which is regular be taught by rule; to learn from the custom of speech the proper connexion between words and ideas, so as to give to the former a just application, to the latter an adequate expression, and to things a just description; to have that penetration which discerns what terms, ideas, or things, are definable, and therefore capable of being taught, and what must be left to the teaching of nature: these are the essential qualifications for him who would form good definitions; these are the elements of that accuracy and comprehensiveness of thought, to which allusion has been made, and which are characteristic of "the first and highest philosophy."

3. Again, with reference to the cultivation of the mind, I would add: To observe accurately the appearances of things, and the significations of words; to learn first principles first, and proceed onward in such a manner that every new truth may help to enlighten and strengthen the understanding; and thus to comprehend gradually, according to our capacity, whatsoever may be brought within the scope of human intellect:--to do these things, I say, is, to ascend by sure steps, so far as we may, from the simplest elements of science--which, in fact, are our own, original, undefinable notices of things--towards the very topmost height of human wisdom and knowledge. The ancient saying, that truth lies hid, or in the bottom of a well, must not be taken without qualification; for "the first and highest philosophy" has many principles which even a child may understand. These several suggestions, the first of which the Baron de Puffendorf thought not unworthy to introduce his great work on the Law of Nature and of Nations, the reader, if he please, may bear in mind, as he peruses the following digest of the laws and usages of speech.

4. "Definitions," says Duncan, in his Elements of Logic, "are intended to make known the meaning of words standing for _complex ideas_;[65] and were we always careful to form those ideas exactly in our minds, and copy our definitions from that appearance, much of the confusion and obscurity complained of in languages might be prevented."--P. 70. Again he says: "The writings of the mathematicians are a clear proof, how much the advancement of human knowledge depends upon a right use of definitions."--P. 72.

Mathematical science has been supposed to be, in its own nature, that which is best calculated to develop and strengthen the reasoning faculty; but, as speech is emphatically _the discourse of reason_, I am persuaded, that had the grammarians been equally clear and logical in their instructions, their science would never have been accounted inferior in this respect. Grammar is perhaps the most comprehensive of all studies; but it is chiefly owing to the unskillfulness of instructors, and to the errors and defects of the systems in use, that it is commonly regarded as the most dry and difficult.

5. "Poor Scaliger (who well knew what a definition should be) from his own melancholy experience exclaimed--'_Nihil infelicius grammatico definitore!_' Nothing is more unhappy than the grammatical definer."--_Tooke's Diversions_, Vol. i, p. 238. Nor do our later teachers appear to have been more fortunate in this matter. A majority of all the definitions and rules contained in the great mult.i.tude of English grammars which I have examined, are, in some respect or other, erroneous. The nature of their mult.i.tudinous faults, I must in general leave to the discernment of the reader, except the pa.s.sages be such as may be suitably selected for examples of false syntax. Enough, however, will be exhibited, in the course of this volume, to make the foregoing allegation credible; and of the rest a more accurate judgement may perhaps be formed, when they shall have been compared with what this work will present as subst.i.tutes. The importance of giving correct definitions to philological terms, and of stating with perfect accuracy whatsoever is to be learned as doctrine, has never been duly appreciated. The grand source of the disheartening difficulties encountered by boys in the study of grammar, lies in their ignorance of the meaning of words. This cause of embarra.s.sment is not to be shunned and left untouched; but, as far as possible, it ought to be removed. In teaching grammar, or indeed any other science, we cannot avoid the use of many terms to which young learners may have attached no ideas. Being little inclined or accustomed to reflection, they often hear, read, or even rehea.r.s.e from memory, the plainest language that can be uttered, and yet have no very distinct apprehension of what it means. What marvel then, that in a study abounding with terms taken in a peculiar or technical sense, many of which, in the common manuals, are either left undefined, or are explained but loosely or erroneously, they should often be greatly puzzled, and sometimes totally discouraged?

6. _Simple ideas_ are derived, not from teaching, but from sensation or consciousness; but _complex ideas_, or the notions which we have of such things as consist of various parts, or such as stand in any known relations, are definable. A person can have no better definition of _heat_, or of _motion_, than what he will naturally get by _moving_ towards a _fire_. Not so of our complex or general ideas, which const.i.tute science.

The proper objects of scientific instruction consist in those genuine perceptions of pure mind, which form the true meaning of generic names, or common nouns; and he who is properly qualified to teach, can for the most part readily tell what should be understood by such words. But are not many teachers too careless here? For instance: a boy commencing the process of calculation, is first told, that, "Arithmetic is the art of computing by numbers," which sentence he partly understands; but should he ask his teacher, "What is a _number_, in arithmetic?" what answer will he get? Were Goold Brown so asked, he would simply say, "_A number, in arithmetic, is an expression that tells how many_;" for every expression that tells how many, is a number in arithmetic, and nothing else is. But as no such definition is contained in _the books_,[66] there are ten chances to one, that, simple as the matter is, the readiest master you shall find, will give an erroneous answer. Suppose the teacher should say, "That is a question which I have not thought of; turn to your dictionary." The boy reads from Dr.

Webster: "NUMBER--the designation of a unit in reference to other units, or in reckoning, counting, enumerating."--"Yes," replies the master, "that is it; Dr. Webster is unrivalled in giving definitions." Now, has the boy been instructed, or only puzzled? Can he conceive how the number _five_ can be a _unit_? or how the word _five_, the figure 5, or the numeral letter V, is "the designation of a _unit_?" He knows that each of these is a number, and that the oral monosyllable _five_ is the same number, in an other form; but is still as much at a loss for a proper answer to his question, as if he had never seen either schoolmaster or dictionary. So is it with a vast number of the simplest things in grammar.

7. Since what we denominate scientific terms, are seldom, if ever, such as stand for ideas simple and undefinable; and since many of those which represent general ideas, or cla.s.ses of objects, may be made to stand for more or fewer things, according to the author's notion of cla.s.sification; it is sufficiently manifest that the only process by which instruction can effectually reach the understanding of the pupil and remove the difficulties spoken of, is that of delivering accurate definitions. These are requisite for the information and direction of the learner; and these must be thoroughly impressed upon his mind, as the only means by which he can know exactly how much and what he is to understand by our words. The power which we possess, of making known all our complex or general ideas of things by means of definitions, is a faculty wisely contrived in the nature of language, for the increase and spread of science; and, in the hands of the skillful, it is of vast avail to these ends. It is "the first and highest philosophy," instructing mankind, to think clearly and speak accurately; as well as to know definitely, in the unity and permanence of a general nature, those things which never could be known or spoken of as the individuals of an infinite and fleeting mult.i.tude.

8. And, without contradiction, the shortest and most successful way of teaching the young mind to distinguish things according to their proper differences, and to name or describe them aright, is, to tell in direct terms what they severally are. Cicero intimates that all instruction appealing to reason ought to proceed in this manner: "Omnis enim quse a ratione suscipitur de re aliqua inst.i.tutio, debet a _definitione_ proficisci, ut intelligatur quid sit id, de quo disputetur."--_Off_. Lib.

i, p. 4. Literally thus: "For all instruction which from reason is undertaken concerning any thing, ought to proceed from a _definition_, that it may be understood what the thing is, about which the speaker is arguing." Little advantage, however, will be derived from any definition, which is not, as Quintilian would have it, "Lucida et succincta rei descriptio,"--"a clear and brief description of the thing."

9. Let it here be observed that scientific definitions are of _things_, and not merely of _words_; or if equally of words _and_ things, they are rather of nouns than of the other parts of speech. For a definition, in the proper sense of the term, consists not in a mere change or explanation of the verbal sign, but in a direct and true answer to the question, What is such or such a thing? In respect to its extent, it must with equal exactness include every thing which comes under the name, and exclude every thing which does not come under the name: then will it perfectly serve the purpose for which it is intended. To furnish such definitions, (as I have suggested,) is work for those who are capable of great accuracy both of thought and expression. Those who would qualify themselves for teaching any particular branch of knowledge, should make it their first concern to acquire clear and accurate ideas of all things that ought to be embraced in their instructions. These ideas are to be gained, either by contemplation upon the things themselves as they are presented naturally, or by the study of those books in which they are rationally and clearly explained. Nor will such study ever be irksome to him whose generous desire after knowledge, is thus deservedly gratified.

10. But it must be understood, that although scientific definitions are said to be _of things_, they are not copied immediately from the real essence of the things, but are formed from the conceptions of the author's mind concerning that essence. Hence, as Duncan justly remarks, "A mistaken idea never fails to occasion a mistake also in the definition." Hence, too, the common distinction of the logicians, between definitions of the _name_ and definitions of the _thing_, seems to have little or no foundation. The former term they applied to those definitions which describe the objects of pure intellection, such as triangles, and other geometrical figures; the latter, to those which define objects actually existing in external nature.

The mathematical definitions, so noted for their certainty and completeness, have been supposed to have some peculiar preeminence, as belonging to the former cla.s.s. But, in fact the idea of a triangle exists as substantively in the mind, as that of a tree, if not indeed more so; and if I define these two objects, my description will, in either case, be equally a definition both of the name and of the thing; but in neither, is it copied from any thing else than that notion which I have conceived, of the common properties of all triangles or of all trees.

11. Infinitives, and some other terms not called nouns, may be taken abstractly or substantively, so as to admit of what may be considered a regular definition; thus the question, "What is it _to read?_" is nearly the same as, "What is _reading?_" "What is it _to be wise?_" is little different from, "What is _wisdom?_" and a true answer might be, in either case, a true definition. Nor are those mere translations or explanations of words, with which our dictionaries and vocabularies abound, to be dispensed with in teaching: they prepare the student to read various authors with facility, and furnish him with a better choice of terms, when he attempts to write. And in making such choice, let him remember, that as affectation of _hard_ words makes composition ridiculous, so the affectation of _easy_ and _common_ ones may make it unmanly. But not to digress. With respect to grammar, we must sometimes content ourselves with such explications of its customary terms, as cannot claim to be perfect definitions; for the most common and familiar things are not always those which it is the most easy to define. When Dr. Johnson was asked, "What is _poetry_?" he replied, "Why, sir, it is easier to tell what it is not. We all know what _light_ is: but it is not easy _to tell what it is_."--_Boswell's Life of Johnson_, Vol. iii, p. 402. This was thought by the biographer to have been well and ingeniously said.

12. But whenever we encounter difficulties of this sort, it may be worth while to seek for their _cause_. If we find it, the understanding is no longer puzzled. Dr. Johnson seemed to his biographer, to show, by this ready answer, the acuteness of his wit and discernment. But did not the wit consist in adroitly excusing himself, by an illusory comparison? What a.n.a.logy is there between the things which he compares? Of the difficulty of defining _poetry_, and the difficulty of defining _light_, the reasons are as different as are the two things themselves, _poetry_ and _light_. The former is something so various and complex that it is hard to distinguish its essence from its accidents; the latter presents an idea so perfectly simple and unique that all men conceive of it exactly in the same way, while none can show wherein it essentially consists. But is it true, that, "We all know _what light is_?" Is it not rather true, that we know nothing at all about it, but what it is just as easy to tell as to think? We know it is that reflexible medium which enables us to see; and this is definition enough for all but the natively blind, to whom no definition perhaps can ever convey an adequate notion of its use in respect to sight.

13. If a person cannot tell what a thing is, it is commonly considered to be a fair inference, that he does not know. Will any grammarian say, "I know well enough what the thing is, but I cannot tell?" Yet, taken upon this common principle, the authors of our English grammars, (if in framing their definitions they have not been grossly wanting to themselves in the exercise of their own art,) may be charged, I think, with great ignorance, or great indistinctness of apprehension; and that, too, in relation to many things among the very simplest elements of their science. For example: Is it not a disgrace to a man of letters, to be unable to tell accurately what a letter is? Yet to say, with Lowth, Murray, Churchill, and a hundred others of inferior name, that, "_A letter_ is _the first principle_ or _least part_ of a word," is to utter what is neither good English nor true doctrine. The two articles _a_ and _the_ are here inconsistent with each other. "_A_ letter" is _one_ letter, _any_ letter; but "_the first principle_ of a word" is, surely, not one or any principle taken _indefinitely_. Equivocal as the phrase is, it must mean either _some particular principle_, or some particular _first_ principle, of a word; and, taken either way, the a.s.sertion is false. For it is manifest, that in _no sense_ can we affirm of _each_ of the letters of a word, that it is "_the first principle_" of that word. Take, for instance, the word _man_.

Is _m_ the first principle of this word? You may answer, "Yes; for it is the first _letter_." Is _a_ the first principle? "No; it is the _second_."

But _n_ too is a letter; and is _n_ the first principle? "No; it is the _last_!" This grammatical error might have been avoided by saying, "_Letters_ are the first principles, or least parts, of words." But still the definition would not be true, nor would it answer the question, What is a letter? The true answer to which is: "A letter is an alphabetic _character_, which commonly represents some elementary sound of human articulation, or speech."

14. This true definition sufficiently distinguishes letters from the marks used in punctuation, because the latter are not alphabetic, and they represent silence, rather than sound; and also from the Arabic figures used for numbers, because these are no part of any alphabet, and they represent certain entire words, no one of which consists only of one letter, or of a single element of articulation.