The English Language Part 94

J. MILTON.

4. _If_ this _be_ the case.

5. _Although_ my house _be_ not so with G.o.d.--_Old Testament._

6. He shall not eat of the holy thing _unless_ he _wash_ his flesh with water.--_Old Testament._

Expressions like _except_ and _unless_ are equally conditional with words like _if_ and _provided that_, since they are equivalent to _if--not_.

Expressions like _though_ and _although_ are peculiar. They join propositions, of which the one is a _prima facie_ reason against the existence of the other: and this is the conditional element. In the sentence,_ if the children be so badly brought up, they are not to be trusted_, the _bad bringing-up_ is the reason {486} for their _being unfit to be trusted_; and, as far as the expression is concerned, _is admitted to be so_. The only uncertainty lies in the question as to the degree of the badness of the education. The inference from it is unequivocal.

But if, instead of saying _if_, we say _although_, and omit the word _not_, so that the sentence run _although the children be so badly brought up they are to be trusted_, we do two things: we indicate the general relation of cause and effect that exists between _bad bringing-up_ and _unfitness for being trusted_, but we also, at the same time, take an exception to it in the particular instance before us. These remarks have been made for the sake of showing the extent to which words like _though_, &c., are conditional.

It must be remembered, however, that conjunctions, like the ones lately quoted, do not govern subjunctive moods because they are conditional, but because, in the particular condition which they accompany, there is an element of uncertainty.

-- 612. This introduces a fresh question. Conditional conjunctions are of two sorts:--

1. Those which express a condition as an actual fact, and one admitted as such by the speaker.

2. Those which express a condition as a possible fact, and one which the speaker either does not admit, or admits only in a qualified manner.

Since _the children_ are _so badly brought up_, &c.--This is an instance of the first construction. The speaker admits as an actual fact the _bad bringing-up of the children_.

If _the children_ be _so badly brought-up_, &c.--This is an instance of the second construction. The speaker admits as a possible (perhaps, as a probable) fact the _bad bringing-up of the children_: but he does not adopt it as an indubitable one.

-- 613. Now, if every conjunction had a fixed unvariable meaning, there would be no difficulty in determining whether a condition was absolute, and beyond doubt, or possible, and liable to doubt. But such is not the case.

_Although_ may precede a proposition which is admitted as well as one which is doubted. {487}

_a._ Although _the children_ are, &c.

_b._ Although _the children_ be, &c.

_If_, too, may precede propositions wherein there is no doubt whatever implied: in other words it may be used instead of _since_.

In some languages this interchange goes farther than in others; in the Greek, for instance, such is the case with [Greek: ei], to a very great extent indeed.

Hence we must look to the meaning of the sentence in general, rather than to the particular conjunction used.

It is a philological fact (probably referable to the _usus ethicus_) that _if_ may stand instead of _since_.

It is also a philological fact that when it does so it should be followed by the indicative mood.

This is written in the way of ill.u.s.tration. What applies to _if_ applies to other conjunctions as well.

-- 614. As a point of practice, the following method of determining the amount of doubt expressed in a conditional proposition is useful:--

Insert, immediately after the conjunction, one of the two following phrases,--(1.) _as is the case_; (2.) _as may or may not be the case_. By ascertaining which of these two supplements expresses the meaning of the speaker, we ascertain the mood of the verb which follows.

When the first formula is one required, there is no element of doubt, and the verb should be in the indicative mood. _If_ (_as is the case_), _he _is_ gone, I must follow him_.

When the second formula is the one required, there _is_ an element of doubt, and the verb should be in the subjunctive mood. _If_ (_as may or may not be the case_) _he _be_ gone, I must follow him_.

-- 615. The use of the word _that_ in expressions like _I eat that I may live_, &c., is a modification of the subjunctive construction, that is conveniently called _potential_. It denotes that one act is done for the sake of supplying the _power_ or opportunity for the performance of another.

In English the word _that_, so used, cannot be said to govern a mood, although generally followed by either _may_ or _might_. {488} It should rather be said to require a certain combination to follow it. The most important point connected with the powers of _that_ is the so-called _succession of tenses_.

-- 616. _The succession of tenses._--Whenever the conjunction _that_ expresses intention, and consequently connects two verbs, the second of which takes place _after_ the first, the verbs in question must be in the same tense.

I _do_ this _that_ I _may_ gain by it.

I _did_ this _that_ I _might_ gain by it.

In the Greek language this is expressed by a difference of mood; the subjunctive being the construction equivalent to _may_, the optative to _might_. The Latin idiom coincides with the English.

A little consideration will show that this rule is absolute. For a man _to be doing_ one action (in present time) in order that some other action may _follow_ it (in past time) is to reverse the order of cause and effect. To do anything in A.D. 1851, that something may result from it in 1850 is a contradiction; and so it is to say _I _do_ this _that_ I _might_ gain by it_.

The reasons against the converse construction are nearly, if not equally cogent. To have done anything at any _previous_ time in order that a _present_ effect may follow, is, _ipso facto_, to convert a past act into a present one, or, to speak in the language of the grammarian, to convert an aorist into a perfect. To say _I _did_ this_ that _I may gain by it_, is to make, by the very effect of the expression, either _may_ equivalent to _might_, or _did_ equivalent to _have done_.

_I _did_ this_ that _I _might_ gain_.

_I _have done_ this_ that _I _may_ gain_.

A clear perception of the logical necessity of the law of the succession of tenses, is necessary for understanding the nature of several anomalous pa.s.sages in the cla.s.sical writers. In the following, an aorist is followed not by an optative, but by a subjunctive.

[Greek: Ouk agathon polukoiranie; heis koiranos esto,]

[Greek: Heis basileus, hoi edoke Kronou pais ankulometeo]

[Greek: Skeptron t' ede themistas, hina sphisin embasileuei.]

{489}

Here it is necessary to construe [Greek: edoke], _has given and continues to allow_, which is to construe it like a _perfect_[64] tense. Upon similar pa.s.sages Mathiae writes, "but frequently the conjunctive is used, although the preceding word be in the time past, viz., when the verb which depends upon the conjunction shows an action continued to the present time." That means when the verb is really a perfect.

In Latin, where the same form is both aorist and perfect, the succession of tenses is a means of determining which of the two meanings it conveys.

_Veni ut videam_=_I have come that I may see._ _Veni ut viderem_=_I came that I might see_.

Arnold states, from Kruger and Zumpt, that even where the praeterite was clearly a perfect (_i. e._, =_to have_ with the participle), the Roman ear was so accustomed to the _imperfect_ subjunctive, that it preferred such an expression _as diu dubitavi num melius esset to diu dubitavi num melius sit_. The latter part of the statement is sure enough; but it is by no means so sure that _dubitavi_, and similar forms in similar constructions are perfects. There is no reason for considering this to be the case in the present instance. It seems to be so, because it is connected with _diu_; but an action may last a long time, and yet not last up to the time of speaking. _Diu dubitavi_ probably expresses, _I doubted a long time_, and leaves it to be inferred that _now I do not doubt_.

-- 617. It has been stated above that whilst the Latin and English have a succession of _tenses_, the Greek language {490} exhibits what may be called a succession of _moods_. This suggests inquiry. Is the difference real? If so, how is it explained? If not, which of the two grammatical systems is right?--the English and Latin on the one side, or the Greek on the other? Should [Greek: tuptoimi] be reduced to a past tense, or _verberarem_ be considered an optative mood.

The present writer has no hesitation in stating his belief, that all the phaenomena explicable by the a.s.sumption of an optative mood are equally explicable by an expansion of the subjunctive, and a different distribution of its tenses.

1. Let [Greek: tupso] be considered a subjunctive _future_ instead of a subjunctive aorist.

2. Let [Greek: tuotoimi] be considered an _imperfect subjunctive_.

3. Let [Greek: tetuphoimi] be considered a _pluperfect subjunctive_.

4. Let [Greek: tupsaimi] be considered an aorist _subjunctive_.