The Battle of Atlanta Part 7

[Ill.u.s.tration: PUMPKIN b.u.t.tES

Prominent land-mark near where Colonels Cole and Walker fought the Indians in September, 1865, on Powder River.]

The wagon-road train that started from Sioux City under Colonel Sawyer's engineering party, with two companies of the Fifth United States Volunteer Infantry under the command of Captain George N. Williford, that were to open a wagon-road from Sioux City up the Niobrara River by a short route to the north end of the Black Hills, intended to cross to Powder River and then to the south end of the Big Horn Mountains, making a direct emigrant route into Montana. As soon as I heard of the instructions given this expedition I got word to Colonel Sawyer that it was impossible for him to travel on that route; that he must keep to the south end of the Black Hills and follow up the North Platte until he struck what was known as the Bozeman trail, that was laid out in 1864 by some emigrants going into Montana. This was the trail that Connor had taken on his route to Tongue River. It was feasible all the way from the Platte to Montana. Colonel Sawyer paid no attention to this information, but kept on his original route until he got into the brakes of the Powder River, not very far from where Cole struck them. When within twenty miles of the River, he ascertained by his own guide that it was impossible to advance any farther in that direction; consequently, he had to retrace his steps. On the second day they were attacked by a large band of Indians; evidently the Cheyennes and Sioux that afterwards attacked Colonels Cole and Walker.

These Indians kept them corralled nearly four days and nights, fighting through the day and withdrawing at night, only to begin their hostilities at dawn; but finding that their efforts only resulted in many being killed, they abandoned the siege and left, going south, striking Cole's trail on August 22d, which they followed, and on the 23d Colonel Sawyer marched into Port Connor. While Captain Williford does not say that he took charge of this train, that is a fact. He took charge of it and kept it until he got to Fort Connor. He was a splendid officer and it was through his good judgment and his ability as a soldier that he saved the whole outfit. The Bent Boys, who were at the head of the Cheyennes, would communicate with Sawyer and get him to send out persons for the purpose of trading with them, and whoever was sent inside their lines was held prisoner, the idea being to wear Sawyer's force out by this means. But they struck the wrong man in Captain Williford, who, comprehending the situation, attacked the Indians. I knew Williford in the Civil War, and he was a very efficient officer. At Fort Connor I relieved Williford, his men being mostly barefooted, and put Colonel Kidd of the Michigan Cavalry, in command, with a suitable escort, and instructed him to follow the Connor trail until they struck Tongue River, and then to swing towards the Yellowstone and strike the trail up that river to Bozeman. This train, when they got nearly opposite to where General Connor fought, was again attacked by the Indians; but Colonel Kidd managed to get news to General Connor and he sent two or three companies of his command to the rescue.

They were absent while he fought his battle on Tongue River. They drove off the Indians, and relieved the train, which reached Montana in safety.

Early in September I reached Fort Connor--before General Cole and Colonel Walker had concentrated there--and gave instructions under the direction of the authorities at Washington, forwarded to me by General Pope, to withdraw all the troops to Fort Laramie, and stop all their operations against the Indians, and endeavor to bring them in for a consultation, and, if possible, to make an agreement as to the cessation of all hostilities. This was a fatal mistake. When I received this dispatch from General Pope, on August 31st, I sent the following message to him:

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES.

FORT LARAMIE, DAKOTA TERRITORY, August 31, 1865.

_Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo._:

I consider the Indian matters here of so much importance, and knowing no one can judge of them so well as when he is on the ground, that I desire to make a proposition to the Government. If the Government will allow me to keep General Connor in the field with not to exceed 2,000 men of his present force, leaving the forces you have designated to garrison posts on the plains. I will settle these Indian difficulties before spring satisfactorily to the Government, and bring about a peace that will be lasting. I may do it in a month or two; or it may be longer. The additional expense to the Government will be the pay of that number of troops for the time detained. All the stores, forage, etc., to support them are here and _en route_. As soon as we settle with them we can send these troops in and take 2,000 more from our posts in addition and muster them out. General Connor left Powder River with sixty days' supplies, and I am satisfied if we will allow him he will settle the matter before he returns. Should he come back by our orders without settling the matter, the entire Indian tribes will be down on our lines, and we will have our hands full, and more too. The forces for Utah I will soon have on the road, and when Connor gets back he can go right there.

G. M. DODGE,

_Major-General_.

General Connor, after getting news of the position of Cole's and Walker's forces, moved back with his forces to Fort Connor, with a view of taking command of Cole's and Walker's forces and organizing them into two columns--one a light column with pack-mules, and the other with the trains,--and then to follow and attack the Indians that had been fighting Cole and Walker. When he arrived at Fort Connor he found my dispatches, which, of course, changed his whole policy. He knew then where all the Indians were located. They had all been forced away from the traveled lines to protect their villages, and it was only a question of time--weeks or months--before we would have conquered a peace that the Indians would have recognized.

The dispatches which I sent from Fort Laramie brought an answer from General Grant to the effect that the authorities at Washington were determined to stop all campaigns against the Indians. They had been made to believe by the Interior Department that all they had to do was to withdraw the troops and the Indians would come in and make peace. On my return from Fort Connor, when I reached the North Platte I sent this dispatch:

HORSESHOE, September 15, 1865.

_Major-General John Pope, St. Louis_:

Arrived here today on my return from Powder River. That post is well located, right in heart of Indian country, and is an important post.

The Indians' trails all cross at or near it, and it will have good effect hereafter in holding in check Indians. Have not heard from General Connor since August 24. We cannot reach him now. They have done a good deal of work on Powder River; got up stockade and commenced Quartermaster buildings; well under way. Great lack of Quartermaster's stores up there, the Powder River stores not having reached Laramie yet. From Laramie to Powder River, then to Virginia City, is an excellent wagon-road; good gra.s.s, water, and wood all the way, and the most direct road that can be got. The travel over it in another season will be immense; it saves at least 450 miles in distance. After the Indians attacked Colonel Sawyer's wagon-road party and failed in their attempt, they held a parley. Colonel Bent's sons, George and Charles Bent, appeared on part of Indians, and Colonel Sawyer gave them a wagon-load of goods to let him go undisturbed, Captain Williford, commanding escort, not agreeing to it. The Indians accepted proposition and agreed to it, but after receiving the goods they attacked party; killed three men. Bent said that there was one condition on which the Cheyennes would treat; viz., the hanging by Government of Colonel Chivington. He also said that the Indians considered that they were strong enough to fight the Government; preferred to do it; that they knew the Government would withdraw troops in fall; then they would have it all their own way again.

Expressed great fear about Connor, and said they were concentrating everything to meet him, which is true. Since he left no Indians have troubled the mail- or telegraph-lines, but are all moving north, stragglers and all. At Fort Connor they kill a few of them as they pa.s.s every few days. There is one band of Arapahoes in Medicine Bow Mountains, who are committing depredations around Denver, on Cache La Poudre and Big Thompson Creeks. They belong to the band that was at Cow Creek treaty. I shall be in Laramie tomorrow; see General Wheaton; thence to Denver. Bent also said that some of tribes had agreed to make peace on Missouri River, but they were doing this to keep us from sending a force that way. These Bent boys were educated in St.

Louis. One has been with Price in the rebel Army; was captured. His father got him released and took him to his ranch on the Arkansas River, when he joined the Cheyennes, of which he is a half-breed. He was dressed in one of our staff officer's uniforms.

G. M. DODGE,

_Major-General_.

On General Connor's arrival at Fort Connor he wired me the results of the campaign and protested strenuously against the order stopping it, saying he was then in condition and position to close it, conquer the Indians, and force a lasting peace. On receipt of his report I sent this dispatch:

CENTRAL CITY, COLO., September 27, 1865.

_Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo._:

On August 28th, General Connor surprised Medicine Man's band of Indians on Tongue River; killed fifty; captured village, all winter provisions, and 600 horses--all the stock they had. On the 1st of September the right column, under Colonel Cole, had a fight with the Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, on Powder River, and whipped them. On the evening of the 3d of September attacked them again, driving them down Powder River ten miles. Next morning at daylight attacked again, fight lasting until 10 a. m., when Indians were defeated with loss of 200 killed. They fled in every direction, losing large number of horses, camp equipage, provisions, etc. On 8th instant, Colonel Walker, commanding center column, who was in advance of Colonel Cole, met Indians in large force. Colonel Cole came up and after a short but spirited engagement they totally routed Indians, driving them in every direction with great loss, several of princ.i.p.al chiefs being killed in this fight. On the night of the 9th of September a severe snow-storm raged, in which 400 of Colonel Cole's horses perished. I was in that storm on Powder River. It was very severe, and I lost several animals.

Our total loss in all the engagements not more than fifty killed and wounded, including one officer. Colonel Cole or Colonel Walker had not communicated with General Connor and were on Powder River, but by this time they have communicated, as they had ascertained where General Connor's column was.

G. M. DODGE,

_Major-General_.

General Connor, in compliance with his orders, moved south from Fort Connor to distribute at the different posts where they had been a.s.signed, the forces not ordered to be mustered out. As soon as he started south to Fort Laramie the Indians followed him and swarmed immediately on the overland routes, both the North and South Platte, reaching even as far as the Arkansas, and committed great depredations. The troops along those lines had been mustered out, and the regular-army force that was to take their places had not arrived. It was a harvest for the Indians. In my absence General Pope had a.s.signed to the different districts regular-army officers for permanent command. They were to take the places of the volunteers. Under my instructions I immediately sent word to the Indians to come to Fort Laramie for the purpose of a consultation. To accomplish this I sent out the best-posted guides (using chiefs, sub-chiefs, half-breeds of friendly Indians) that I knew on the plains, to each of the hostile tribes asking them to come into Fort Laramie. I instructed the messengers to tell them that if any of their people had gone to the Missouri River for peaceable purposes to let them go, but to bring in all that were left, providing they felt disposed to settle without delay. I sent them word that if they did not come in and settle they would find that our summer campaign was only a taste of what they would get this winter, for we would give them no rest. I posted the district commanders thoroughly, telling them what we wanted was to settle with the Indians before they discovered the smallness of our forces on the plains. I told them they might say, also, that all of the Indians south of the Arkansas had made peace, and gave instructions that they be told about the battle with the Arapahoes and Cheyennes on Powder and Tongue Rivers. I sent the district commanders word to show Big Ribs, one of my messengers, the forces at their posts, and to impress upon him our power. The effect of this appeal to the different tribes was that early in the spring of 1866 we got together at Fort Laramie the princ.i.p.al chiefs and the head men of the North Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and the different tribes of the Sioux, when a council was held.

I had instructed General Frank Wheaton, who commanded at Fort Laramie, that we would agree to almost anything to bring a permanent peace except to allow the Indians to come down to the North Platte and occupy the country through which the new military road was laid out to Bozeman, Mont.

Our troops, in pa.s.sing up the east base of the Black Hills, had discovered gold. There were Colorado and California Regiments in the commands, and I knew, and so did General Connor, that many were preparing, as soon as a treaty was made, to go back into that country and prospect it, and I gave that reason to the Indians for holding them north of the Belle Fourche Fork of the Cheyenne River; but that country was their best hunting-ground. They were perfectly willing to give up all the country south of the Platte River, and not to interfere with the building of the Union Pacific road or with any of the overland routes up the North or South Platte; but they would not consent to give up the Black Hills north of the North Platte. Finally we made an agreement with them that they should occupy the country north of the North Platte River until such time as the Government should see proper to send a commission out to negotiate a permanent peace with them. I gave instructions to tell them that if the white men went into their territory and we did not keep them out, they were at liberty to do so. I knew that would deter any white man going in there, and as long as they kept the peace, we would. Red Cloud, who had then come to the head of the Ogalalla band of the Sioux Indians, took a prominent part in this conference, and was backed by such chiefs as Spotted Tail, Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses, Big Ribs, and the Bent boys on behalf of the Cheyennes. He declared that they would never give up their country north of the Platte. "You may take my country," said Red Cloud, "but I will mark every mile of that Bozeman trail from the North Platte to Yellowstone with the bodies of your soldiers;" and this he pretty nearly accomplished. This agreement, made at Fort Laramie, accomplished nothing.

During the years 1866, 1867 and 1868 the Indians swarmed across the lines agreed upon and occupied the country, especially along the Union Pacific, which was then being constructed through that country. The Government had to send in additional troops, and all the military posts over the country had to be re-occupied the same as they had been before. The Government endeavored to again reach these Indians through a peace commission in 1868. General W. T. Sherman was at the head of it, and it was composed of General Harney and others. They visited me at Fort Sanders, Wyo., before they went to make a treaty with the Indians, and wished to know my reasons for the position I took in the consultation of 1866. I then told General Sherman that my soldiers had found gold in all the streams heading in the Black Hills north of the North Platte, and that as soon as he allowed those Indians to come to the North Platte under a treaty of peace, he would not be across the Missouri River on his return before that country would be covered by prospectors from California and Colorado. General Sherman answered that their instructions were to make such a peace and they were sent there to do it, and, sure enough, they did; and as soon as the treaty was made the miners poured into the country. One of the first mines that was discovered was the Homestake or Homestead. Sitting Bull, who had taken part in this treaty and whose country was the Black Hills, sent in protest after protest, demanding that the Government live up to the terms of the treaty and drive the miners out, but no attention was paid to them. The miners and settlers poured into the Black Hills country and drove the Indians out, and Sitting Bull said in a conference he had with some of the Army officers in the 70's that if the Government did not protect their territory as provided in the treaty, they would themselves; and they started to do it. The ma.s.sacres of that year came from his band, the troubles finally ending with the sacrifice of the Custer Regiment in 1876. While this was a horrible event, the Indians, under the treaty, were fully justified in it. During this same time Red Cloud occupied the Bozeman trail. He killed emigrants, besides murdering Captain Fetterman and his company at Fort Phil Kearney, and other troops located at the posts that we established along there in 1866, such as Forts Reno, McKinney, Phil Kearney, and C. F. Smith. It was not until after the Custer ma.s.sacre that these Indians were brought to time and put on reservations; since then peace has prevailed.

The Government had the same difficulty on the Arkansas River route that we had on the Platte routes in the summer of 1866, 1867, and 1868. The Indians that had made the agreement with Colonel Leavenworth were all committing depredations until finally the Government sent General Sheridan there with instructions to punish them. They tried to play the same game with Sheridan that they had played with us, but he would have none of it.

There was no one in Washington who would force him to listen to the appeals of the peace commission. His troops, under Colonels Custer, Evans, and others, fought three battles south of the Arkansas, noticeably wiping out some bands, and making them give up their prisoners, stop their murders, and go on reservations in the Indians' territory. From that time on they have been peaceable.

We were much better prepared, in the fall of 1865, both on the Arkansas and on the Yellowstone, to conquer these Indians. We had got up to their villages and had plenty of troops, plenty of provisions, and plenty of clothing, and could carry on the campaign through the winter, if necessary; and so, if we had allowed General Ford or General Sanborn to have gone forward with the columns and punish those southern Indians, they would have made a permanent peace. But the fact is the Indians did not give up until they were thoroughly thrashed and made to recognize the power and authority of the Government.

The policy of the United States in dealing with the Indian problem is beyond the comprehension of any sensible man. They were treated the same as foreign nations; and while they made treaties they never carried out their part of them, breaking them whenever the trend of civilization westward interfered with them in any way. The Government attempted to deal with and govern the Indians with civil agents and at the same time tried to enforce peace through the military authorities. This caused friction; and deception and cheating in the supplying of them through their contractors and civil agents brought untold complaints. If the Government had treated the Indians as a ward that they were bound to protect, as the English did, they would have had very little trouble in handling them. The military force would have held all conferences with them; fed them when they needed it; located them in an early day on unoccupied good hunting-grounds; and finally, as civilization moved into their territories and as their tribes wasted away, would have given them reservations where the Government from the money they received from the lands the Indians claimed, could have kept and fed them without any great burden or cost. In all the days of Indian warfare and treaties, there never was such a farce, or failure to comprehend the frontier situation, as in the years 1865 and 1866, and the failure of the Government to take advantage of the comprehensive plans inst.i.tuted by the military authorities, as well as of the great expenditures made, and to punish the Indians as they deserved, brought, in after years, greater expenditures and more disturbances than ever.

Early in the campaign, after General Pope had made known his views to the Government, he requested me to write fully mine to the Secretary of the Interior, who had charge of Indian affairs, and who was from my state, and I sent him this letter:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI.

ST. LOUIS, MO., June 22, 1865.

_Hon. James Harlan, Secretary of the Interior, Washington, D. C._:

MY DEAR SIR: Copies of Senator Doolittle's and Commissioner Dole's letters to you of dates May 31 and June 12 have been furnished me. My acquaintance with you leads me to believe that you are endeavoring to get at the real facts of our Indian difficulties and the best methods for putting an end to them. So far as Senator Doolittle's letter refers to "some general getting up of an Indian war on his own hook"

and for his own purposes, I shall indulge no reply. You know me, and if it was intended in any way to apply to me I leave you to judge of how much credence should be attached to it. My sincere desire is to terminate these Indian troubles, and I have no hesitation in saying that if I am allowed to carry out the policy now being pursued toward them I will have peace with them before another emigration crosses the plains. When I a.s.sumed command of the former Department of Kansas I found all the important Indian tribes on the plains in open hostility against us. Whether it was the fault of the white man or the Indian, the fact was patent. They were holding the entire overland route from Julesburg to Junction Station, had destroyed the telegraph-lines, captured trains, burned ranches, and murdered men, women, and children indiscriminately. I soon stopped these proceedings, opened our broken lines of communication; repaired, so far as possible, the injury done; pushed troops out there, and then tried to effect a settlement with the Indians. On the southern route I found a similar state of affairs existing. The Indians were on the warpath, and I at once started expeditions against them, learning of which Colonel Leavenworth, Indian Agent, informed me that he could make peace with them; that we were at fault, etc. I stopped my expeditions on the southern route to give him an opportunity to accomplish this object. He started for their camps; they robbed him, stole his mules, and he hardly escaped with his scalp; and on his return stated that it was useless to attempt to make peace with them. I then, in accordance with the orders of the Secretary of War, started for the Indians again, and had just got my forces under way when the committee, of which Senator Doolittle is a member, reached Fort Larned, and after an interview with Colonel Leavenworth, gave orders for the expeditionary movements to stop. The grounds for this action the Senator gives in his letter. I was then aware that the Indians were moving north to attack that line, and was moving two columns in concert with General Ford to intercept and punish them; and I at that time telegraphed that the tribes spoken of by Senator Doolittle were on their way north to attack our trains.

They had then driven out all traders, made a treaty with the southern Indians and Texans, and sent me word that they wanted no peace.

Within ten days from the time Senator Doolittle and his party left Fort Larned, and before I had time to countermand their orders and get my troops disposed, the Indians attacked the posts and trains all along the line, running off stock, capturing trains, etc., murdering men, and showing conclusively that they were determined on war at all hazards. Our overtures to them, as well as those of the agents sent out by General Carleton, were treated with disdain. From Fort Laramie I sent word to the Sioux, Cheyennes, etc., that if they wanted peace to come in and stop their hostilities. A few of each tribe responded by coming in; the rest refused, and indicated their purposes and feelings by attacking the posts west of Fort Laramie, and on Laramie Plains, murdering, stealing, etc. I undertook to remove the friendly Indians from Fort Laramie to Fort Kearney, in order to get them away from the troubles. When about sixty miles south of Fort Laramie they attacked their guard, killed a captain and four privates, turned upon five of their chiefs who were disposed to be friendly, killed them, and then escaped, leaving their camps, etc., in our hands; so that now we have every Indian tribe capable of mischief from the British Possessions on the north to the Red River on the south, at war with us, while the whites are backing them up. These facts, it appears to me, are a sufficient answer to the letters of Senator Doolittle and Commissioner Dole. That these Indians have been greatly wronged I have no doubt, and I am certain that the agents who have been connected with them are as much to blame as any one else. So far as the Chivington fight was concerned, it occurred before I a.s.sumed command.

I condemned it, and I have issued orders that no such acts will be tolerated or allowed; that the Indians on the warpath must be fought wherever and whenever found, but no outrages or barbarities must be committed. I am convinced that the only way to effectually settle these troubles is for us to move our columns directly into their country, punish them when we find them, show them our power, and at the same time give them to know that: we are ready to make peace with them--not, however, by paying them for murdering our people and plundering our trains and posts, but by informing them that if they will refrain from further hostilities they shall not be molested; that neither agents nor citizens shall be allowed to go among them to swindle them; that we will protect them in their rights; that we will enforce compliance with our part of the treaty, and will require them to do the same on their part. Let them ask for peace. We should keep citizens out of their country. The cla.s.s of men sent among them as agents go there for no good purpose. They take positions for the sole purpose of making money out of the Indians by swindling them, and so long as they can do this they shield them in their crimes.

Colonel Leavenworth, who stands up so boldly for the southern Indians, was dismissed from the United States service. He "blows hot and cold"

with singular grace. To my officers he talks war to the knife; to Senator Doolittle and others he talks peace. Indeed, he is all things to all men. When officers of the army deal with these Indians, if they mistreat them, we have a certain remedy for their cases. They can be dismissed and disgraced, while Indian agents can only be displaced by others perhaps no better. Now I am confident we can settle these Indian difficulties in the manner I have indicated. The Indians say to me that they will treat with an officer of the army (a brave), in all of whom they seem to have confidence, while they despise and suspect civilian agents and citizens, by whom they say they have been deceived and swindled so much that they put no trust in their words. I have given orders to the commanders of each of my columns that when they have met and whipped these Indians, or even before, if they have an opportunity, to arrange, if possible, an informal treaty with them for a cessation of hostilities, and whatever they agree to do, to live to strictly, allowing no one, either citizen or soldier, to break it. I shall myself go out on the plains in a few weeks and try to get an interview with the chiefs and if possible effect an amicable settlement of affairs; but I am utterly opposed to making any treaty that pays them for the outrages they have committed, or that hires them to keep the peace. Such treaties last just as long as they think them for their benefit, and no longer. As soon as the sugar, coffee, powder, lead, etc., that we give them, is gone, they make war to get us to give them more. We must first punish them until we make them fear us and respect our power, and then we must ourselves live strictly up to the treaties made. No one desires more than I do to effect a permanent peace with these Indians, and such is the desire of every officer under me, all of whom agree in the method suggested for bringing it about.

Very many of these officers on the plains have been there for years, and are well acquainted with these Indians and their character, and my own opinions in this matter are founded not alone from my experience and observations since I have commanded here, but also with intercourse with them on the plains during a number of years prior to the war, in which time I met and had dealings with nearly every tribe east of the Rocky Mountains. Until hostilities cease I trust that you will keep all agents, citizens and traders away from them. When peace is made with them, if civilian agents and citizens are sent among them, send those who you know to be of undoubted integrity. I know you desire to do so, and from the appointments you have already made I believe you will be successful. My plan, however, would be to keep these Indians under the care of officers of the army, stationed in their country; that what is given them be given by these officers, and that all citizens, agents and traders should, while among them, be subject to their (the officers') supervision and police regulations.

In this way I have no doubt these Indians can be kept in their own country, their outrages stopped, and our overland routes kept safe.

Now, not a train or coach of any kind can cross the plains in safety without being guarded, and I have over 3,000 miles of route to protect and guard. The statement that the Sand Creek affair was the first Indian aggression is a mistake. For months prior to that affair the Indians had been attacking our trains, posts, and ranches; had robbed the emigrants and murdered any party they considered too weak to defend themselves.

The theory that we cannot punish these Indians effectually, and that we must make or accept any kind of a peace in order to hold our overland routes, is not sustained by the facts, is singularly erroneous, and I cannot agree to it by any means. I have now seven different columns of troops penetrating their country in all directions, while at the same time I am holding the overland routes.

This display of force alone will alarm and terrify them; will show them that we are in earnest, have the power, and intend at all hazards to make them behave themselves. After we have taught them this they will sue for peace; then if the government sees fit to indemnify them for any wrongs inflicted upon them, they will not charge it to our fears or inability to cope with them. The cost of carrying on this war with them is, to be sure, considerable; but the question arises, Had we not better bear this cost now while the preparations are made and the force on hand ready to be thrown in such strength into their country as to make quick, effective, and final work of it, than to suffer a continuance of their outrages for a long time and finally have to do the work at greater expense of blood and treasure? I have written you this frankly and truly, knowing that you want to get at the facts and do that which is for the best, and I am convinced that when you fully understand these matters you will agree with me. I shall be glad at any and all times to furnish you any information in my possession that you may desire, and I a.s.sure you I shall bend all my energies to the accomplishment of the great object in view and so much desired--a lasting and just peace with these Indians.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

G. M. DODGE,

_Major-General Commanding_.

Since writing this report of the Indian campaign of 1865 and 1866, I have seen Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells's diary of the reconstruction period, from which the following extracts are taken:

Tuesday, August 8, 1865.