The Battle of Atlanta Part 6

There was enlisted for the Indian campaign, five Regiments of United States volunteers, recruited from the rebel prisoners, who, desiring to be at liberty, were willing to enlist under the United States flag to fight Indians, and these five Regiments had to be depended upon mostly for taking care of all the country west of the Lakes,--the overland routes on the plains, to man the posts on the upper Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, and for escorts for surveying parties, etc. So when I was ready to move all five columns I had less than 7,000 officers and men in my department.

The Indians commenced their depredations on all the routes in April, especially on the Arkansas route, where we had to contend with the South Cheyennes, Comanches, Apaches, Kiowas, and Arapahoe tribes. This district was under the command of Brigadier-General Ford, a very efficient officer, and it was planned that he should make a campaign in May and June into the Indian country, crossing the Arkansas and moving south for their villages, which we knew were situated in the Wichita Mountains. General Ford had a compact veteran command, and fought one or two battles before crossing the Arkansas. Just about the time he was ready to cross the Arkansas the Government sent west a peace commission composed of Senator Doolittle, General Alex McD. McCook, and others. The Indian agent for these tribes was Colonel J. H. Leavenworth. They no sooner reached the Indian country than they protested against the movement of any troops into the territory south of the Arkansas River. In fact, General McCook issued an order, using General Pope's name as authority, stopping General Ford's movement.

He had no authority to do this, but General Ford obeyed, as the information came to him that these chiefs were a.s.sembling at the mouth of the Little Arkansas to make peace. After parleying with the Indians, the commission accomplished nothing, and the Indians all the time were committing their depredations on the emigrant trains that were pa.s.sing up the Arkansas Valley to New Mexico and Colorado. All the protests and appeals of General Pope, General Ford and myself to the Government in relation to this matter seemed to have no effect. These Indians had murdered the settlers, wiped out their ranches, and stolen their property and their stock, and our scouts who went among them saw their captures in plenty. As soon as we would start out to punish them, even those that had crossed north of the Arkansas River, protests were sent to Washington and came back to us, so that we virtually accomplished nothing. The condition of matters became so complicated that on June 6, 1865, I stated my views of the question to Major-General John Pope, commanding the Military Division of the Missouri, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI.

FORT LEAVENWORTH, June 6, 1865.

_Major-General John Pope, Commanding Military Division of the Missouri_:

GENERAL: You have been notified of the action of Major-General McCook, under the orders of the Congressional Committee, in stopping the expedition of General Ford south of the Arkansas, that they might confer, and, if possible, make peace with the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, etc. Colonel Leavenworth started south a week ago to bring the chiefs up to the mouth of Cow Creek, and while we are endeavoring to make terms with them, their warriors are strung along the route from Zarah to Lyon, dashing in on any train that they find off its guard. They are in parties of from fifteen to fifty, and hide in the valleys and ravines. These Indians now have their villages at Fort Cobb, and have driven out all friendly Indians and traders, declaring that they mean war and nothing else. They are composed of one band of Arapahoes, led by Little Rover; one small band of Cheyennes, three bands of Apaches, a large body of Comanches, also the Southern Comanches, and all the Kiowas, and they have no respect for our authority or power, and I have no faith in any peace made by them until they are made to feel our strength. I do not believe it will be a month before we hear of large trains being captured or attacked by them in force. They notified Jesus, the Mexican trader sent in by General Carleton, to leave, and it is said they murdered Major Morrison, a trader permitted to go in by General Carleton. It appeared to me bad policy to give permits to any of the traders to go among them to trade. Not one of them will act as guide to take a force toward them.

Colonel Leavenworth satisfied the committee, and I think General McCook also, that the Comanches and others had not committed any depredations. There is not an officer or trader who has been on the plains but knows they have been in all or nearly all the outrages committed. I desire very much to have peace with the Indians, but I do think we should punish them for what they have done, and that they should feel our power and have respect for us. My plan to reach them is to start in three columns for Fort Cobb; viz., First, by Major Merrill's route; second, by Captain Booner's route; third, from the mouth of Mulberry Creek, on the Arkansas. Make the parties about 400 or 500 strong, and march direct for their villages. This will draw every warrior after us and leave the Santa Fe route free. When we get down there if the Indians are so anxious for peace, they will have an opportunity to show it, and we can make an agreement with them that will stop hostilities until the properly authorized authorities conclude a lasting peace. I have attempted to get these expeditions off twice. The first time they were stopped by General Halleck, on Colonel Leavenworth's representations. He started to make peace; the Indians stole all his stock, and very nearly got his scalp. He came back for fight and wished to whip them, but has now changed again, and it is possible he may get the chiefs together, but I very much doubt it; and, even if he does, they will only represent a portion of each tribe. I have concluded, by representations of the Congressional Committee made to General Ford, to wait and see the effects of Colonel Leavenworth's mission. I will have my troops at the designated points.

If he should fail I will go forward and make the campaign as originally ordered. I desire to add that there is not a leading officer on the plains who has had any experience with Indians who has faith in peace made with any of these Indians unless they are punished for the murders, robberies and outrages they have committed for over a year; and unless we have a settled policy, either fight and allow the commanding officer of the department to dictate terms of peace to them, or else it be decided that we are not to fight, but make some kind of peace at all hazards, we will squander the summer without result. Indians will rob and murder, and some Indian agents will defend them, and when fall comes I will be held responsible for not having protected the route or punished them for what they may have done. It must be evident to the Government that I cannot be making war on the Indians while other parties are at the same time making peace, as has been the case so far. Whatever may be the desire of the Government, I will lend all my energies to carry it out and make every officer and man under me do the same. I cannot approve the manner in which the Indians have been treated, and have no faith in them, nor will I allow such treatment as shown at the Big Sandy fight. If peace is concluded I trust that their reservations may be made at safe distances from overland routes so far as possible, and that they be made to keep away from them.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. M. DODGE,

_Major-General_.

The Government, after receiving General Pope's and my own views, sent out Inspector-General D. B. Sackett, of the Regular Army, to investigate the conditions in that country and to report to the Government the actual facts. In the meantime the peace commission that had been endeavoring to negotiate with these Indians had gone on to Denver, still protesting against any movement against the Indians, believing that peace could be brought about. General Sackett, upon reaching the Indian country, sent the following dispatch, on June 14, 1865, to the commanding officer at Fort Larned, Kas.:

For the last few days the Indians along the route have been very active and hostile; many men have been murdered, hundreds of animals have been stolen, Fort Dodge has lost every animal. The force can now do nothing with the Indians. A large and effective cavalry force under a good commander must be sent here without delay, or the large number of trains now on the plains will be destroyed or captured.

Upon the receipt of this dispatch I immediately gave orders to the commanding officer to go out and concentrate our forces north of the Arkansas, and to protect the trains, but not to go south of the river.

This they accomplished very effectively, and drove all the Indians south of the Arkansas, killing and capturing a good many. On June 14th, General Pope wrote a long letter to General U. S. Grant, enclosing my letter to him, reiterating what I had said, and insisting for very strong reasons that the Indians should be left entirely to the military; that there should be no peace commission sent until the military had met these Indians and brought them to terms, either by fighting or negotiations; and afterwards for the commission to go there and make such arrangements as they saw proper. In the mustering out of troops General Ford was relieved of the command and Major-General John B. Sanborn, a very efficient officer, was sent to take his place. It was now agreed that after the failure of the peace commission to accomplish anything with these Indians that I should make the campaigns south of the Arkansas, and General Sanborn concentrated his troops and moved to the Arkansas. Before I reached there I received a communication from Colonel Leavenworth stating that all the chiefs of the Indians were then on Cow Creek, anxious to meet him. At the same time, a dispatch came from Washington to General Pope, stopping Sanborn's movement. General Pope immediately arranged to have an interview with these Indians, and General Sanborn went there with instructions to make an agreement with them that they should keep off of the overland trails, and to arrange a time for a commission to meet them, later in the year. On August 5th Sanborn agreed with the chiefs of the Kiowas, Apaches, Comanches, and Arapahoes, on the part of the Government, to suspend all actions of hostility towards any of the tribes above mentioned and to remain at peace until the fourth day of October, 1865, when they were to meet the Government commissioners at Bluffs Creek about forty miles south of the Little Arkansas. This agreement did not take in the South Cheyennes, who had been more mischievous than any of the tribes, but this tribe kept south of the Arkansas, retaining all the stock they captured, and none of them were punished for the murders they committed.

It was a business matter on their part to remain at peace only until the troops moved out of that country and to prevent Sanborn with his organized forces from going south to their villages and punishing them. The effect of this agreement was that the Indians continued their depredations through the following years,--not so much by killing but by stealing,--until finally they became so hostile that in the campaign against them by General Sheridan, in 1868, an agreement was made with them forcing all the tribes to move into the Indian Territory. If General Ford or General Sanborn had been allowed to go forward and punish these Indians as they deserved, they would have been able to make not only a peace, but could have forced them to go on the reservation in the Indian territories, and thus have saved the murders and crimes that they committed for so many years afterwards; however, this agreement of Sanborn's allowed the emigration to go forward over the Arkansas, properly organized and guarded, and it was not molested during the rest of that year.

To show the conditions on the overland routes up the two forks of the Platte River at the time, I sent this dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI.

ST. LOUIS, MO., June 17, 1865.

_Major-General John Pope, Commanding Military Division of the Missouri, St. Louis_:

GENERAL: There is no doubt but that all, or nearly all, the tribes of Indians east of the Rocky Mountains from the British Possessions on the north to the Red River on the south are engaged in open hostilities against the Government. It is possible that in a few of the tribes there are some chiefs and warriors who desire to be friendly, but each day reduces the number of these, and they even are used by the hostile tribes to deceive us as to their intentions and keep us quiet. The Crows and Snakes appear to be friendly, but everything indicates that they too are ready to join in the hostilities, and the latter (the Snakes) are accused of being concerned in the depredations west of the mountains. In my opinion there is but one way to effectually terminate these Indian troubles; viz., to push our cavalry into the heart of their country from all directions, to punish them whenever and wherever we find them, and force them to respect our power and to sue for peace. Then let the military authorities make informal treaties with them for a cessation of hostilities. This we can accomplish successfully, for the Indians will treat with soldiers, as they fear them and have confidence in their word. Any treaty made now by civilians, Indian agents, or others, will, in my opinion, amount to nothing, as the Indians in all the tribes openly express dissatisfaction with them and contempt for them. The friendly Indians say that whenever the hostile bands are made aware of our ability and determination to whip them, they will readily and in good faith treat with our officers and comply with any demands we may make. If we can keep citizen agents and traders from among them we can, I am confident, settle the matter this season, and when settled I am clearly of the opinion that these Indians should be dealt with entirely by competent commissioned officers of the Army, whom they will respect and who will not only have the power to make them comply with the terms of the agreements made, but will also have the power and authority to compel troops, citizens and others to respect implicitly and to comply strictly with the obligations a.s.sumed on our part. The cavalry now moving into the Indian country will, I doubt not, if allowed to proceed and carry out the instructions given them, accomplish the object designed by bringing about an effectual peace and permanent settlement of our Indian difficulties.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. M. DODGE,

_Major-General_.

The campaign to the north was planned with a view of going after all the northern Indians then at war--the Arapahoes, North Cheyennes, and the different bands of the Sioux. Their depredations had extended east to the Missouri River, and General Pope sent General Sully with a force up that river to take care of the hostile Sioux that had gathered and had been fighting the troops at Forts Rice, Berthoud, and other points. Before reaching these posts his column was turned and sent to Devil's Lake after the Santee Sioux, who had been committing depredations in Minnesota, but after reaching the lake he failed to find any Indians, they having fled to the British Possessions. He returned to the Missouri River and endeavored to make terms with the tribes concentrated on it, but only partially succeeded. We knew that there were from two to three thousand of the Sioux, Cheyennes and Arapahoes concentrated at or near Bear b.u.t.te, near the north end of the Black Hills, and it was the intention of General Sully with his force to go after this band, but, being turned to the east, I organized a force about 1,000 strong under Colonel Nelson Cole, who went up the Missouri River in boats to Omaha and whose orders were to move from Omaha to Columbus up the Loup Fork to its head and thence across the Niobrara to the White Earth River and then to Bear b.u.t.te. Failing to find the Indians there, he was to push on to Powder and Tongue Rivers, where he was to join Brigadier-General P. E. Connor, who was in command of this district. Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Walker's column of about 500 men of the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry was to go north from Fort Laramie along the west base of the Black Hills and join Colonel Cole, and later join General Connor on the Tongue River; while General Connor, with a small command of about 500 men, was moving north along the Platte to the head of Salt Creek down the Salt to Powder River, where he was to establish a fort and supply station; from thence he was to move along the east base of the Big Horn Mountains until he struck the hostile Indians in that vicinity. These columns should have moved in May or June, but it was July and August before they got started, on account of the failure of the contractors to deliver the supplies to them on the plains at the different supply-depots; but when they started they moved with alacrity, and would, no doubt, have accomplished the purpose of the campaign had it not been for the fact that they were stopped by an order from Washington to return to Fort Laramie by October 15th.

During May, June, and July the Indians were very aggressive all along the South Platte and North Platte routes. Every Government train had to go guarded; every emigrant train had to be organized into trains of 50 or 100 wagons, with the teamsters armed and placed under an officer, and even then a great many of their people were killed and a great deal of stock run off. The commanding officer at Fort Laramie, during June, had concentrated at his post about 2,000 of what was considered friendly Indians. Most of these Indians had been captured during the spring campaign. They had brought in with them most of the prisoners that had been captured on their raids upon the stage-lines and the ranches. General Connor, desiring to get these Indians removed as far as possible from the hostile Indians, under my order moved them south toward the Republican River, in charge of two companies of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, commanded by Captain Fouts. These Indians did not take kindly to this movement, and the escort sent with them was not as large as it ought to have been. When they were sixty miles south of Fort Laramie they were communicated with by a band of hostile Indians who followed down the opposite side of the Platte River, and early in the morning they attacked their escort, killing Captain Fouts and four soldiers, and wounding seven others. In the fight there were a great many Indians killed and wounded, but these Indians were allowed to go south with their arms, to convince them that we put confidence in them and did not treat them as prisoners. With the aid of the other Indians on the north side of the Platte, they forced the escort to intrench itself, by doing which the train and the women and others who had been rescued from the Sioux Indians were saved, as word was gotten to Fort Laramie and relief was sent. The Indians after this fight crossed the North Platte River and moved north toward the Black Hills.

Colonel Moonlight, in command of Fort Laramie, as soon as he heard of this revolt, went to relieve the intrenched party. The Indians, however, had crossed the Platte River. He followed them. When within ten or fifteen miles of the band, through carelessness in taking care of his horses, the Indians turned upon him, stampeded his stock, and, in fact, drove off 200 or 300 head of it, leaving his command on foot. The attack of the hostiles frightened the horses so that they could not be controlled, and they ran towards the Indians. Moonlight and his command had to march back to Laramie, a long distance, without food or transportation, as they had started out with only one or two days' rations. Colonel Moonlight was immediately relieved of his command, but the damage had been done, which gave the hostile Indians great encouragement. General Connor sent this dispatch:

JULESBURG, June 15, 1865.

(Received 9:50 p. m.)

_Major-General Dodge_:

I ordered the Indians who surrendered at Laramie to be sent to Kearney. Colonel Moonlight sent them without first dismounting them, under charge of two companies of Seventh Iowa Cavalry. They revolted sixty miles this side of Laramie, killing Captain Fouts, who was in command, and four soldiers, and wounding seven; also killed four of their own chiefs who refused to join them; fifteen Indians were killed; the Indians fled north with their ponies, women, and children, leaving all their camp equipage. Troops are in pursuit. Mail-stages have stopped west of Camp Collins. Everything appears to work unfavorably owing to failure of corn contractors and incompetency of some of my subordinates. I will overcome all obstacles, however, in a short time. Have you sent me cavalry yet? J. D. Doty, Governor of Utah, was buried at Camp Douglas Cemetery this morning. Died of heart disease.

P. E. CONNOR, _Brigadier-General_.

During July, a band of the Arapahoes raided the South Platte River stage-line between Fort Collins and Fort Halleck, drove off most of the stock from the stations, and committed other depredations. Colonel Porter, who was in command of that district, concentrated his force and went after the Indians, and in a very few days restored the stage stations and gave the Indians sound whippings, which kept that line clear nearly all summer.

The Indians that had done this work had gone into Fort Collins claiming to be friendly and wishing to make a treaty, and after being fed there for some time, left one night and committed the depredations before troops could stop them. From here they moved immediately north to join the hostile Indians north of the North Platte. I had received notice from Washington that the Interior Department had information that these Indians were peaceable and would not join in the campaigns; but, being on the ground, I knew better, because we were capturing them in nearly all of the attacks that they made. With them was a portion of one of the bands of the Sioux.

On July 27, ten miles west of the North Platte Bridge station, a Mormon train coming east was attacked by the Indians and Lieutenant Casper W.

Collins, of the Eleventh Ohio, and twenty-five men of the Eleventh Kansas, went out to relieve it, when about one thousand Indians attacked him.

While he saved the train he lost his own life, and twenty-five of his men were scalped and their bodies horribly mutilated; but while the Indians had heavy losses in the fight, they were able to divide up and scatter before any of the troops sent to attack them could reach them. I named the post at Platte Bridge Fort Casper, and it is now known as the town of Casper, on the North-Western railroad.

On August 16th a large band of Sioux Indians attacked a military station on the South Platte route. They were overtaken by the p.a.w.nee Indian Battalion of our forces, who gave them a good whipping. They killed a large number and took their stock and scattered them. This was a band of Sioux Indians that had been lying on the North Platte and made this dash to the South Platte stage-line, thinking we had withdrawn the troops from it to the northern expedition. Very few of them ever got back to their tribes.

The battalion of p.a.w.nees with General Conner had made a great capture of a band of Cheyennes who had been down on the Fort Halleck route. The latter had there captured a part of a company of a Michigan Regiment who were escorting a few wagons, the captives having been tied to the wagons and burned. By some means, General Conner got word of this, and knew the trail they would take to get back to the main command, and on this trail he placed Major North and his battalion of p.a.w.nees. Major North, in describing to me what followed, said that when the Indians came back and discovered that they were surrounded, one, an old man, moved up towards him and placed his hand up to his mouth, telling him to come on; that they were ready to die; that they were full of white men up to that,--meaning up to his mouth. The p.a.w.nees killed every one of this band and scalped them. On one of them was found a diary of one of the Michigan soldiers who had been killed, and one of the Cheyennes had used the book to give an account of their travels, their camps and fights, and what they had done on this raid. From this diary our guides could tell just exactly where the party had been, where they had camped, where they had captured the Michigan soldiers, and their route on their return. A half-breed had written in the book a defiance of the troops, telling what the Indians demanded. Among other things they demanded that before they would make peace we should give up all their prisoners; that we should abandon the country north of the Platte River, etc.

As soon as General Connor reached Powder River he established his post and named it Fort Connor. (It was afterward named Fort Reno by me.) Connor immediately pushed on to the Crazy Woman Mountain fork of Powder River and then to the east base of the Big Horn Mountains, following that to the Tongue River and down the Tongue until James Bridger, the chief scout and guide of the expedition, claimed to have seen the smoke a long distance away, of an Indian camp. No one else could see it, but, as a precaution, Connor sent out the p.a.w.nee scouts, and on August 27th they discovered about 2,000 Indians camped on the Tongue River, near the mouth of Wolf Creek. It is a singular fact that in this vicinity General Crook fought his great battle on the Rosebud, the Custer ma.s.sacre occurred, and it was not very far away that the Phil Kearney disaster occurred, when Lieutenant Fetterman and his whole command was slaughtered. General Connor immediately corralled the trains and took his available forces, about 250 men, and marched all night and struck this band at daylight, giving them a complete surprise. They were Arapahoes under Black Bear and Old David, with several other noted chiefs. The band was just breaking up their camp, but the Indian soldiers rallied and fought desperately. Captain H. E.

Palmer, A. A. G., with General Connor, gives this description of the attack:

The word was pa.s.sed back for the men to close up and follow the General and not to fire a shot until he fired in advance. General Conner then took the lead, riding his horse up the steep bank of the ravine and dashing out across the mesa as if there were no Indians just to his left. Every man followed as close as possible. At the first sight of the General the Indian ponies grazing on the table-land in front of us sent up a tremendous whinnying, and galloped down toward the Indian village. More than 1,000 dogs began to bark, and more than 700 Indians made the air ring with their fearful yelling. It appeared that the Indians were in the act of breaking camp. The most of their tepees were down and packed for the march. The ponies, more than 3,000, had been gathered in and most of the squaws and children were mounted, some of them having taken the line of march up the stream to the new camp. The General watched the movements of his men until he saw the last man emerge from the ravine, when he wheeled on the left into line. The whole line then fired a volley into the village without stopping their horses, and the bugles sounded a charge. Not a man but realized that the charge into the village without a moment's hesitation was our only salvation. We already saw that we were greatly outnumbered, and that only desperate fighting would save our scalps. We were in the village in the midst of a hand-to-hand fight with the warriors and squaws, for many of the squaws did as brave fighting as their savage lords. Unfortunately for the squaws and children, our men had no time to direct their aim, and bullets from both sides and murderous arrows filled the air. Women and children fell among the killed and wounded. The scene was indescribable. Each man seemed an army by himself. Near the sweathouse I emptied my revolver into the carca.s.ses of three warriors. One of our men, a member of the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, a fine-looking soldier with as handsome a face as I ever saw on a man, grabbed me by the shoulder and turned me about that I might a.s.sist him in drawing an arrow from his mouth. Having no surgeon of a higher grade than a hospital steward, it was decided that in order to get the arrow out of his mouth the tongue would have to be cut out, which was done. The Indians made a brave stand trying to save their families, and succeeded in getting away with a large majority of their women and children, leaving behind nearly all of their plunder.

We now went up a stream called Wolf Creek, General Connor in close pursuit. Soon after we left the village General Connor advised me to instruct Captain North to take his battalion of Indians and get all the stock he could possibly gather. General Connor pursued the savages fully ten miles from camp, when he found himself accompanied by only fourteen men. Our horses were so worn out that it was impossible for the men to keep up. The Indians noticed his movements and turned upon him and his soldiers. They fell back as fast as possible. Captain North and myself had succeeded in coralling about a thousand ponies.

Scores of buffalo-robes, blankets, and furs were heaped up on lodge-poles, and on these we placed our dead, and burned their bodies to keep the Indians from mutilating them. Our attack on the village began at 9 a. m. We remained until 2:30 and had destroyed a great deal of Indian property. At 2:30 we took up the line of march for the corralled train. Captain North with his eighty Indians undertook to drive the captured stock. They were soon a great ways ahead, while the rest of the force was engaged in beating back the Indians. The Indians pressed on every side. They seemed to have plenty of ammunition, but they did most of their fighting with arrows. Before dark we were reduced to forty men, and had only a little ammunition. The Indians showed no signs of stopping the fight, but kept on charging on us, dashing away at the stock, and keeping us constantly on the move until fifteen minutes of twelve, when the last shot was fired by our pursuers. The incidents of this fight would make very interesting reading. Every man was a general. Not a man in the company but realized that his life was in the balance. We must either whip the Indians and whip them badly or be whipped ourselves. We could see that the Indians greatly outnumbered us, but we were better armed than they. As for fighting qualities the savages proved themselves as brave as any of our men. We had accomplished a great deal; 250 Indian lodges and their contents had been burned, with the entire winter's supplies; the son of Black Bear was killed: sixty-three Indians were killed, 1,100 ponies were captured, and a lot of women and children were taken prisoners.

General Connor's report of this battle was burned in Utah, and consequently was never forwarded to me or to the Government, so we do not know what the loss on his part was; but it was severe.

General Connor now moved down the Tongue River to make a connection with Colonel Walker and Colonel Cole, at the appointed rendezvous. His scouts discovered that Colonel Cole in moving north had endeavored to reach the mouth of Powder River and had failed, and after six days' fighting had marched south, expecting to go to Port Laramie, not knowing that there were supplies at Fort Connor.

Colonel Cole, who with his column had started from Omaha, had made reasonable progress, following out the routes laid down, and did not discover any Indians until he reached the Little Missouri River, on a branch of the Piney that he was coming down. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, of the center column, visited his camp and was two days behind him. He should have immediately joined him, to carry out his instructions. Cole was headed toward the Tongue River, near the Wolf Mountains. When he got into the brakes of the Powder River, he discovered many signs of Indians. This is a very rough country, and he had great difficulty in getting his long trains through it; however, he dropped into the valley about fifty miles above the mouth of Powder River and sent a detachment with his best guide fifty miles across to Tongue River and Panther Mountains and discovered nothing of Connor. In Cole's instructions he was told that there would be a supply-depot at Panther or Wolf Mountains, but General Connor had changed this and made the supply-depot at what was known as Camp Connor, on Powder River, and he did not notify either Cole or Walker of this change, which he should have done, as had he done so it would have avoided all the trouble that these two columns encountered. Cole's detachment of cavalry discovered no signs of Connor on Tongue River and so followed down the river, while they should have gone up; and failing to find any sign of any depot at Panther Mountains, reported back to Cole. Cole's rations were now exhausted, or nearly so, as he had not been as careful of them as he should have been, expecting as he did to find a depot where he could get plenty at the end of his sixty days' march. It shows that he was not up to the woodcraft of the country. In examining Powder River towards its mouth he found it dest.i.tute of gra.s.s and full of canyons. He, therefore, made up his mind to move south up the Powder River valley, with a view to either meeting Connor or making for Fort Laramie. The Indians, seeing this retreat, became very bold. There were at least 2,000 of them, Cheyennes and Sioux, and without making an attack they simply hara.s.sed him, sometimes forcing a fight; but very few were hurt. Colonel Cole should have parked his train, placed it in a defensive position under a good guard, and then mobilized the rest of his force, and, with what rations he had, gone after the Indians, giving them battle and forcing the fight with them. He had plenty of men.

Cole had not advanced very far towards Port Connor when, on September 6th, Colonel Walker and his command joined him. Then he had plenty of men to meet all the Indians in the country, if his force was properly handled.

When this fighting commenced he was not over thirty miles from where Connor fought his battle, and Captain Palmer states that they heard a cannon, but could not tell which direction the noise came from. Connor, hearing nothing from Cole, sent out Major North with a couple of Indian scouts and with Bridger as guide. They got over into the Powder River country and discovered Cole's trail. During Cole's retreat up the Powder there came a fearful snow-storm. The animals having marched so far without grain, were already very much exhausted, and the storm lasting three days, they became so weak that they were not fit to use, and they were therefore shot, just as they stood at the picket-line, to prevent them from falling into the Indians' hands. This destruction of the animals and the burning of all their equipment was about the first thing that Major North struck, and of course he experienced a great anxiety, fearing that Cole had met with great disaster, and immediately reported to General Connor, who at once sent Sergeant C. L. Thomas with two p.a.w.nees with dispatches to Colonel Cole to march on up Powder River to Fort Connor, where he would find supplies. Cole's troops seem to have started out not fully prepared for such a trip, especially in the line of shoes and leggings, although they were carefully instructed by me to be sure to take a surplus, as I knew the country. Cole's excuse is that while he made ample requisition, the Quartermaster never shipped them, and so when he reached Omaha he had to buy such as he could find. Colonel Cole's troops seem to have kept up their organization and their fighting qualities, for whenever they met the Indians they always whipped them; but they were on the retreat, which gave every advantage to the Indians. When Cole's troops reached Port Connor they were in a deplorable condition--ragged, barefooted, and almost without rations and ammunition.

The Indians surrounding Fort Connor at this time had become so numerous that the commanding officer thought it prudent to intrench the post, which shows good judgment; but Colonel Cole complains in his report that the troops were made to help do this intrenching. Speaking of this he says:

While camped here (Fort Connor) an occurrence took place, strange but most true, which as an integral part of the closing history of the command must have full relation. Some thirty-six hours after reaching this post, a fatigued detail of 400 men was ordered from the Second Missouri Light Artillery to work on the earthworks being thrown up around the place. If the spirit that prompted the detail expected to force its principles through insubordination or rebellion, it was disappointed. What a sight was here! Four hundred ragged, bare-footed men, emaciated with fatigue, who had met and worsted the enemy on three several occasions, marched up in the face of a garrison of 2,000 or more.

I don't know where he got the 2,000 troops, as all the troops when he reached Fort Connor were two companies of Michigan cavalry, General Connor then not having reached that post; and when he did, all told there were not 2,000 troops there. Cole's loss was very light,--nine killed,--while he claims to have killed from 200 to 500 of the Indians.

It was very evident to me that there was no very severe fighting here; it was simply a skirmish on a retreat.

Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's column, which started from Fort Laramie on August 2d, moved up the west base of the Black Hills, and struck Cole's column on August 20th on what was known as Piney Creek. After striking Cole's trail he followed it a short distance, and then left it and struck Powder River, much farther south than Cole had, and on reaching the river he fell right into the same band of Indians that were gathered along the Powder River to hara.s.s Cole. He, too, was short of provisions, although he was equipped to travel very rapidly, having all his supplies on pack-mules. As soon as he got in touch with Cole he joined him and followed him to Fort Connor. General Connor's idea was to make up a rapid-moving column of about 1,000 men, using the pack-mules of Walker, and then combine his and Cole's troops to move on a line farther to the west and follow these Indians to the British Possessions if necessary. He had the ammunition, equipment and everything at Fort Connor to fit out these columns with. As near as they could estimate there were about 6,000 Indians all told.