Summa Theologica Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 28

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 14:8): "Why wilt Thou be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge?"

_I answer that,_ A man is called a wayfarer from tending to beat.i.tude, and a comprehensor from having already obtained beat.i.tude, according to 1 Cor. 9:24: "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']"; and Phil. 3:12: "I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']". Now man's perfect beat.i.tude consists in both soul and body, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 4, A.

6). In the soul, as regards what is proper to it, inasmuch as the mind sees and enjoys G.o.d; in the body, inasmuch as the body "will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption," as is written 1 Cor. 15:42. Now before His pa.s.sion Christ's mind saw G.o.d fully, and thus He had beat.i.tude as far as it regards what is proper to the soul; but beat.i.tude was wanting with regard to all else, since His soul was pa.s.sible, and His body both pa.s.sible and mortal, as is clear from the above (A. 4; Q. 14, AA. 1, 2). Hence He was at once comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the beat.i.tude proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, inasmuch as He was tending to beat.i.tude, as regards what was wanting to His beat.i.tude.

Reply Obj. 1: It is impossible to be moving towards the end and resting in the end, in the same respect; but there is nothing against this under a different respect--as when a man is at once acquainted with what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what he does not know.

Reply Obj. 2: Beat.i.tude princ.i.p.ally and properly belongs to the soul with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say, instrumentally, bodily goods are required for beat.i.tude; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8), that exterior goods minister "organically" to beat.i.tude.

Reply Obj. 3: There is no parity between the soul of a saint and of Christ, for two reasons: first, because the souls of saints are not pa.s.sible, as Christ's soul was; secondly, because their bodies do nothing by which they tend to beat.i.tude, as Christ by His bodily sufferings tended to beat.i.tude as regards the glory of His body.

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QUESTION 16

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO CHRIST IN HIS BEING AND BECOMING (In Twelve Articles)

We must now consider the consequences of the union; and first as to what belongs to Christ in Himself; secondly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation with His Father; thirdly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation to us.

Concerning the first, there occurs a double consideration. The first is about such things as belong to Christ in being and becoming; the second regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether this is true: "G.o.d is man"?

(2) Whether this is true: "Man is G.o.d"?

(3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man?

(4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Son of G.o.d, and conversely?

(5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of G.o.d of the human nature?

(6) Whether this is true: "The Son of G.o.d was made man"?

(7) Whether this is true: "Man became G.o.d"?

(8) Whether this is true: "Christ is a creature"?

(9) Whether this is true: "This man," pointing out Christ, "began to be"? or "always was"?

(10) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is a creature"?

(11) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is G.o.d"?

(12) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is a hypostasis or person"?

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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 1]

Whether This Is True: "G.o.d Is Man"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "G.o.d is man." For every affirmative proposition of remote matter is false. Now this proposition, "G.o.d is man," is on remote matter, since the forms signified by the subject and predicate are most widely apart.

Therefore, since the aforesaid proposition is affirmative, it would seem to be false.

Obj. 2: Further, the three Divine Persons are in greater mutual agreement than the human nature and the Divine. But in the mystery of the Incarnation one Person is not predicated of another; for we do not say that the Father is the Son, or conversely. Therefore it seems that the human nature ought not to be predicated of G.o.d by saying that G.o.d is man.

Obj. 3: Further, Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.) that, "as the soul and the flesh are one man, so are G.o.d and man one Christ." But this is false: "The soul is the body." Therefore this also is false: "G.o.d is man."

Obj. 4: Further, it was said in the First Part (Q. 39, A. 4) that what is predicated of G.o.d not relatively but absolutely, belongs to the whole Trinity and to each of the Persons. But this word "man" is not relative, but absolute. Hence, if it is predicated of G.o.d, it would follow that the whole Trinity and each of the Persons is man; and this is clearly false.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:6, 7): "Who being in the form of G.o.d ... emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of man, and in habit found as a man"; and thus He Who is in the form of G.o.d is man. Now He Who is in the form of G.o.d is G.o.d. Therefore G.o.d is man.

_I answer that,_ This proposition "G.o.d is man," is admitted by all Christians, yet not in the same way by all. For some admit the proposition, but not in the proper acceptation of the terms. Thus the Manicheans say the Word of G.o.d is man, not indeed true, but fict.i.tious man, inasmuch as they say that the Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed an imaginary body, and thus G.o.d is called man as a bronze figure is called man if it has the figure of a man. So, too, those who held that Christ's body and soul were not united, could not say that G.o.d is true man, but that He is figuratively called man by reason of the parts. Now both these opinions were disproved above (Q. 2, A. 5; Q.

5, A. 1).

Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of man, but deny the reality on the part of G.o.d. For they say that Christ, Who is G.o.d and man, is G.o.d not naturally, but by partic.i.p.ation, i.e. by grace; even as all other holy men are called G.o.ds--Christ being more excellently so than the rest, on account of His more abundant grace.

And thus, when it is said that "G.o.d is man," G.o.d does not stand for the true and natural G.o.d. And this is the heresy of Photinus, which was disproved above (Q. 2, AA. 10, 11). But some admit this proposition, together with the reality of both terms, holding that Christ is true G.o.d and true man; yet they do not preserve the truth of the predication. For they say that man is predicated of G.o.d by reason of a certain conjunction either of dignity, or of authority, or of affection or indwelling. It was thus that Nestorius held G.o.d to be man--nothing further being meant than that G.o.d is joined to man by such a conjunction that man is dwelt in by G.o.d, and united to Him in affection, and in a share of the Divine authority and honor. And into the same error fall those who suppose two supposita or hypostases in Christ, since it is impossible to understand how, of two things distinct in suppositum or hypostasis, one can be properly predicated of the other: unless merely by a figurative expression, inasmuch as they are united in something, as if we were to say that Peter is John because they are somehow mutually joined together. And these opinions also were disproved above (Q. 2, AA. 3, 6).

Hence, supposing the truth of the Catholic belief, that the true Divine Nature is united with true human nature not only in person, but also in suppositum or hypostasis; we say that this proposition is true and proper, "G.o.d is man"--not only by the truth of its terms, i.e. because Christ is true G.o.d and true man, but by the truth of the predication. For a word signifying the common nature in the concrete may stand for all contained in the common nature, as this word "man"

may stand for any individual man. And thus this word "G.o.d," from its very mode of signification, may stand for the Person of the Son of G.o.d, as was said in the First Part (Q. 39, A. 4). Now of every suppositum of any nature we may truly and properly predicate a word signifying that nature in the concrete, as "man" may properly and truly be predicated of Socrates and Plato. Hence, since the Person of the Son of G.o.d for Whom this word "G.o.d" stands, is a suppositum of human nature this word man may be truly and properly predicated of this word "G.o.d," as it stands for the Person of the Son of G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 1: When different forms cannot come together in one suppositum, the proposition is necessarily in remote matter, the subject signifying one form and the predicate another. But when two forms can come together in one suppositum, the matter is not remote, but natural or contingent, as when I say: "Something white is musical." Now the Divine and human natures, although most widely apart, nevertheless come together by the mystery of the Incarnation in one suppositum, in which neither exists accidentally, but [both]

essentially. Hence this proposition is neither in remote nor in contingent, but in natural matter; and man is not predicated of G.o.d accidentally, but essentially, as being predicated of its hypostasis--not, indeed, by reason of the form signified by this word "G.o.d," but by reason of the suppositum, which is a hypostasis of human nature.

Reply Obj. 2: The three Divine Persons agree in one Nature, and are distinguished in suppositum; and hence they are not predicated one of another. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the natures, being distinct, are not predicated one of the other, in the abstract. For the Divine Nature is not the human nature. But because they agree in suppositum, they are predicated of each other in the concrete.

Reply Obj. 3: "Soul" and "flesh" are taken in the abstract, even as G.o.dhead and manhood; but in the concrete we say "animate" and "carnal" or "corporeal," as, on the other hand, "G.o.d" and "man."

Hence in both cases the abstract is not predicated of the abstract, but only the concrete of the concrete.

Reply Obj. 4: This word "man" is predicated of G.o.d, because of the union in person, and this union implies a relation. Hence it does not follow the rule of those words which are absolutely predicated of G.o.d from eternity.

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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 2]

Whether This Is True: "Man Is G.o.d"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Man is G.o.d." For G.o.d is an incommunicable name; hence (Wis. 13:10; 14:21) idolaters are rebuked for giving the name of G.o.d, which is incommunicable, to wood and stones. Hence with equal reason does it seem unbecoming that this word "G.o.d" should be predicated of man.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is predicated of the predicate may be predicated of the subject. But this is true: "G.o.d is the Father," or "G.o.d is the Trinity." Therefore, if it is true that "Man is G.o.d," it seems that this also is true: "Man is the Father," or "Man is the Trinity." But these are false. Therefore the first is false.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ps. 80:10): "There shall be no new G.o.d in thee." But man is something new; for Christ was not always man. Therefore this is false: "Man is G.o.d."

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 9:5): "Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, Who is over all things, G.o.d blessed for ever." Now Christ, according to the flesh, is man. Therefore this is true: "Man is G.o.d."

_I answer that,_ Granted the reality of both natures, i.e. Divine and human, and of the union in person and hypostasis, this is true and proper: "Man is G.o.d," even as this: "G.o.d is man." For this word "man"

may stand for any hypostasis of human nature; and thus it may stand for the Person of the Son of G.o.d, Whom we say is a hypostasis of human nature. Now it is manifest that the word "G.o.d" is truly and properly predicated of the Person of the Son of G.o.d, as was said in the First Part (Q. 39, A. 4). Hence it remains that this is true and proper: "Man is G.o.d."

Reply Obj. 1: Idolaters attributed the name of the Deity to stones and wood, considered in their own nature, because they thought there was something divine in them. But we do not attribute the name of the Deity to the man in His human nature, but in the eternal suppositum, which by union is a suppositum of human nature, as stated above.