Summa Theologica Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 29

Reply Obj. 2: This word "Father" is predicated of this word "G.o.d,"

inasmuch as this word "G.o.d" stands for the Person of the Father. And in this way it is not predicated of the Person of the Son, because the Person of the Son is not the Person of the Father. And, consequently, it is not necessary that this word "Father" be predicated of this word "Man," of which the Word "G.o.d" is predicated, inasmuch as "Man" stands for the Person of the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the human nature in Christ is something new, yet the suppositum of the human nature is not new, but eternal. And because this word "G.o.d" is predicated of man not on account of the human nature, but by reason of the suppositum, it does not follow that we a.s.sert a new G.o.d. But this would follow, if we held that "Man" stands for a created suppositum: even as must be said by those who a.s.sert that there are two supposita in Christ [*Cf. Q. 2, AA. 3, 6].

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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 3]

Whether Christ Can Be Called a Lordly Man?*

[*The question is hardly apposite in English. St. Thomas explains why we can say in Latin, e.g. _oratio dominica_ (the Lord's Prayer) or _pa.s.sio dominica_ (Our Lord's Pa.s.sion), but not speak of our Lord as _h.o.m.o dominicus_ (a lordly man)].

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ can be called a lordly man.

For Augustine says (Qq. lx.x.xiii, qu. 36) that "we are to be counseled to hope for the goods that were in the Lordly Man"; and he is speaking of Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ was a lordly man.

Obj. 2: Further, as lordship belongs to Christ by reason of His Divine Nature, so does manhood belong to the human nature. Now G.o.d is said to be "humanized," as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth.

iii, 11), where he says that "being humanized manifests the conjunction with man." Hence with like reason may it be said denominatively that this man is lordly.

Obj. 3: Further, as "lordly" is derived from "lord," so is "Divine"

derived from "Deus" [G.o.d]. But Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iv) calls Christ the "most Divine Jesus." Therefore with like reason may Christ be called a lordly man.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 19): "I do not see that we may rightly call Jesus Christ a lordly man, since He is the Lord Himself."

_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 2, ad 3), when we say "the Man Christ Jesus," we signify the eternal suppositum, which is the Person of the Son of G.o.d, because there is only one suppositum of both natures. Now "G.o.d" and "Lord" are predicated essentially of the Son of G.o.d; and hence they ought not to be predicated denominatively, since this is derogatory to the truth of the union. Hence, since we say "lordly" denominatively from lord, it cannot truly and properly be said that this Man is lordly, but rather that He is Lord. But if, when we say "the Man Christ Jesus," we mean a created suppositum, as those who a.s.sert two supposita in Christ, this man might be called lordly, inasmuch as he is a.s.sumed to a partic.i.p.ation of Divine honor, as the Nestorians said. And, even in this way, the human nature is not called "divine" by essence, but "deified"--not, indeed, by its being converted into the Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with the Divine Nature in one hypostasis, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 11, 17).

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine retracts these and the like words (Retract.

i, 19); hence, after the foregoing words (Retract. i, 19), he adds: "Wherever I have said this," viz. that Christ Jesus is a lordly man, "I wish it unsaid, having afterwards seen that it ought not to be said although it may be defended with some reason," i.e. because one might say that He was called a lordly man by reason of the human nature, which this word "man" signifies, and not by reason of the suppositum.

Reply Obj. 2: This one suppositum, which is of the human and Divine natures, was first of the Divine Nature, i.e. from eternity.

Afterwards in time it was made a suppositum of human nature by the Incarnation. And for this reason it is said to be "humanized"--not that it a.s.sumed a man, but that it a.s.sumed human nature. But the converse of this is not true, viz. that a suppositum of human nature a.s.sumed the Divine Nature; hence we may not say a "deified" or "lordly" man.

Reply Obj. 3: This word Divine is wont to be predicated even of things of which the word G.o.d is predicated essentially; thus we say that "the Divine Essence is G.o.d," by reason of ident.i.ty; and that "the Essence belongs to G.o.d," or is "Divine," on account of the different way of signifying; and we speak of the "Divine Word,"

though the Word is G.o.d. So, too, we say "a Divine Person," just as we say "the person of Plato," on account of its different mode of signification. But "lordly" is not predicated of those of which "lord" is predicated; for we are not wont to call a man who is a lord, lordly; but whatsoever belongs to a lord is called lordly, as the "lordly will," or the "lordly hand," or the "lordly possession."

And hence the man Christ, Who is our Lord, cannot be called lordly; yet His flesh can be called "lordly flesh" and His pa.s.sion the "lordly pa.s.sion."

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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 4]

Whether What Belongs to the Human Nature Can Be Predicated of G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of G.o.d. For contrary things cannot be said of the same. Now, what belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper to G.o.d, since G.o.d is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the human nature to be created temporal and mutable.

Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, to attribute to G.o.d what is defective seems to be derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now what pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer, to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human nature can nowise be said of G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, to be a.s.sumed pertains to the human nature; yet it does not pertain to G.o.d. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "G.o.d a.s.sumed the idioms," i.e. the properties, "of flesh, since G.o.d is said to be pa.s.sible, and the G.o.d of glory was crucified."

_I answer that,_ On this question there was a difference of opinion between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide words predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained to human nature should not be predicated of G.o.d, and that such as pertained to the Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man.

Hence Nestorius said: "If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to the Word, let him be anathema" [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 29].

But if there are any words applicable to both natures, of them they predicated what pertained to both natures, as "Christ" or "Lord."

Hence they granted that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity; but they did not say that G.o.d was born of a virgin, or that the Man was from eternity. Catholics on the other hand maintained that words which are said of Christ either in His Divine or in His human nature may be said either of G.o.d or of man. Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or substances," i.e. hypostases, "such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and believes that some are to be applied to the Man, and apportions some to the Word alone--let him be anathema." And the reason of this is that, since there is one hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus whether we say "man" or "G.o.d," the hypostasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of G.o.d may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of human nature.

Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being predicated. Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are predicated, since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that belong to the human nature are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 11): "We must distinguish what is said by Scripture in reference to the form of G.o.d, wherein He is equal to the Father, and what in reference to the form of a servant, wherein He is less than the Father": and further on he says (De Trin. i, 13): "The prudent, careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point of view of what is said."

Reply Obj. 1: It is impossible for contraries to be predicated of the same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being predicated of the same in different aspects. And thus contraries are predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.

Reply Obj. 2: If the things pertaining to defect were attributed to G.o.d in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since it would be derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of wrong done to G.o.d if they are attributed to Him in His a.s.sumed nature. Hence in a discourse of the Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. 10] it is said: "G.o.d accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man's salvation. For no lowliness that He a.s.sumed for us injures that Nature which can be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its own, to save our nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless things do no harm to the Divine Nature, but bring about our salvation, how dost thou maintain that what was the cause of our salvation was the occasion of harm to G.o.d?"

Reply Obj. 3: To be a.s.sumed pertains to human nature, not in its suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not belong to G.o.d.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 5]

Whether What Belongs to the Human Nature Can Be Predicated of the Divine Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature can be said of the Divine Nature. For what belongs to the human nature is predicated of the Son of G.o.d, and of G.o.d. But G.o.d is His own Nature.

Therefore, what belongs to the human nature may be predicated of the Divine Nature.

Obj. 2: Further, the flesh pertains to human nature. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), "we say, after the blessed Athanasius and Cyril, that the Nature of the Word was incarnate." Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the human nature may be said of the Divine Nature.

Obj. 3: Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature belongs to Christ's human nature; such as to know future things and to possess saving power. Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the human may be said of the Divine Nature.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4): "When we mention the G.o.dhead we do not predicate of it the idioms," i.e. the properties, "of the humanity; for we do not say that the G.o.dhead is pa.s.sible or creatable." Now the G.o.dhead is the Divine Nature.

Therefore what is proper to the human nature cannot be said of the Divine Nature.

_I answer that,_ What belongs to one cannot be said of another, unless they are both the same; thus "risible" can be predicated only of man. Now in the mystery of the Incarnation the Divine and human natures are not the same; but the hypostasis of the two natures is the same. And hence what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated of the other if they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete words stand for the hypostasis of the nature; and hence of concrete words we may predicate indifferently what belongs to either nature--whether the word of which they are predicated refers to one nature, as the word "Christ," by which is signified "both the G.o.dhead anointing and the manhood anointed"; or to the Divine Nature alone, as this word "G.o.d" or "the Son of G.o.d"; or to the manhood alone, as this word "Man" or "Jesus." Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Palaest. cxxiv): "It is of no consequence from what substance we name Christ; because since the unity of person remains inseparably, one and the same is altogether Son of Man by His flesh, and altogether Son of G.o.d by the G.o.dhead which He has with the Father."

Reply Obj. 1: In G.o.d, Person and Nature are really the same; and by reason of this ident.i.ty the Divine Nature is predicated of the Son of G.o.d. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is different; and hence certain things are said of the Son of G.o.d which are not said of the Divine Nature; thus we say that the Son of G.o.d is born, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature is born; as was said in the First Part (Q.

39, A. 5). So, too, in the mystery of the Incarnation we say that the Son of G.o.d suffered, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature suffered.

Reply Obj. 2: Incarnation implies union with flesh, rather than any property of flesh. Now in Christ each nature is united to the other in person; and by reason of this union the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate and the human nature deified, as stated above (Q. 2, A.

1, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 3: What belongs to the Divine Nature is predicated of the human nature--not, indeed, as it belongs essentially to the Divine Nature, but as it is partic.i.p.ated by the human nature. Hence, whatever cannot be partic.i.p.ated by the human nature (as to be uncreated and omnipotent), is nowise predicated of the human nature.

But the Divine Nature received nothing by partic.i.p.ation from the human nature; and hence what belongs to the human nature can nowise be predicated of the Divine Nature.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 6]

Whether This Is True: "G.o.d Was Made Man"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "G.o.d was made man."

For since man signifies a substance, to be made man is to be made simply. But this is false: "G.o.d was made simply." Therefore this is false: "G.o.d was made man."

Obj. 2: Further, to be made man is to be changed. But G.o.d cannot be the subject of change, according to Malachi 3:6: "I am the Lord, and I change not." Hence this is false: "G.o.d was made man."

Obj. 3: Further, man as predicated of Christ stands for the Person of the Son of G.o.d. But this is false: "G.o.d was made the Person of the Son of G.o.d." Therefore this is false: "G.o.d was made man."