Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 167

Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay the debt of grat.i.tude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes a mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that is done.

It must be observed, however, that when ingrat.i.tude arises from a mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingrat.i.tude, and when it arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character.

Reply Obj. 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful to G.o.d to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingrat.i.tude: but there is something of ingrat.i.tude in a venial sin, in so far as it removes a virtuous act of obedience to G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: When ingrat.i.tude is a venial sin it is not contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of charity, but excludes some act thereof.

Reply Obj. 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): "When we say that a man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it."

Reply Obj. 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly, wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on whom he is conferring the favor.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 4]

Whether Favors Should Be Withheld from the Ungrateful?

Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful. For it is written (Wis. 16:29): "The hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice." But this hope would not melt away unless favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from the ungrateful.

Obj. 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an occasion of ingrat.i.tude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the ungrateful.

Obj. 3: Further, "By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented" (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be deprived of the favor.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 6:35) that "the Highest ...

is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil." Now we should prove ourselves His children by imitating Him (Luke 6:36). Therefore we should not withhold favors from the ungrateful.

_I answer that,_ There are two points to be considered with regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. iii), "a man is often grateful although he repays not," because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into grat.i.tude, and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him.

Reply Obj. 1: The pa.s.sage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man deserves to suffer.

Reply Obj. 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords him an occasion not of sin but of grat.i.tude and love. And if the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingrat.i.tude, this is not to be imputed to the bestower.

Reply Obj. 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part of a punisher of ingrat.i.tude, but rather that of a kindly physician, by healing the ingrat.i.tude with repeated favors.

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QUESTION 108

OF VENGEANCE (In Four Articles)

We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether vengeance is lawful?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;

(4) On whom should vengeance be taken?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 1]

Whether Vengeance Is Lawful?

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps what is G.o.d's sins. But vengeance belongs to G.o.d, for it is written (Deut. 32:35, Rom. 12:19): "Revenge to Me, and I will repay."

Therefore all vengeance is unlawful.

Obj. 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant. 2:2, "As the lily among the thorns," says: "He is not a good man that cannot bear with a wicked one." Therefore we should not take vengeance on the wicked.

Obj. 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.

Obj. 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: "Let us learn after Christ's example to bear our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer G.o.d's wrongs, not even by listening to them." Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.

Obj. 5: Further, the sin of a mult.i.tude is more harmful than the sin of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5-7): "Of three things my heart hath been afraid ... the accusation of a city, and the gathering together of the people, and a false calumny." But vengeance should not be taken on the sin of a mult.i.tude, for a gloss on Matt.

13:29, 30, "Lest perhaps ... you root up the wheat ... suffer both to grow," says that "a mult.i.tude should not be excommunicated, nor should the sovereign." Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful.

_On the contrary,_ We should look to G.o.d for nothing save what is good and lawful. But we are to look to G.o.d for vengeance on His enemies: for it is written (Luke 18:7): "Will not G.o.d revenge His elect who cry to Him day and night?" as if to say: "He will indeed."

Therefore vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful.

_I answer that,_ Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom.

12:21): "Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good."

If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and G.o.d honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circ.u.mstances be observed.

Reply Obj. 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to G.o.d but makes use of the power granted him by G.o.d. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of the earthly prince that "he is G.o.d's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." If, however, a man takes vengeance outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is G.o.d's and therefore sins.

Reply Obj. 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on G.o.d and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: "It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook G.o.d's wrongs is most wicked."

Reply Obj. 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.

Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on G.o.d and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i).

Reply Obj. 5: When the whole mult.i.tude sins, vengeance must be taken on them, either in respect of the whole mult.i.tude--thus the Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed (Gen. 19)--or as regards part of the mult.i.tude, as may be seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf.

Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the princ.i.p.als, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord (Num. 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the mult.i.tude.

On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the mult.i.tude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that this can be done without scandal to others; else the mult.i.tude should be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the sovereign, whom the mult.i.tude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the mult.i.tude: unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the mult.i.tude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to arise from his punishment.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 108, Art. 2]

Whether Vengeance Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a special virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fort.i.tude or zeal to avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance.

Therefore it is not a special virtue.