Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 166

Whether the Repayment of Grat.i.tude Should Surpa.s.s the Favor Received?

Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of grat.i.tude to surpa.s.s the favor received. For it is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. Therefore grat.i.tude for a favor does not tend to something yet greater.

Obj. 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since "the indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text.

8). Therefore repayment of grat.i.tude should not surpa.s.s the favor received.

Obj. 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and opposed to justice.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return," and this is done by repaying more than we have received.

Therefore grat.i.tude should incline to do something greater.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), grat.i.tude regards the favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quant.i.ty of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received. Therefore grat.i.tude always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, ad 5; A. 5), in repaying favors we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for grat.i.tude.

Reply Obj. 2: The debt of grat.i.tude flows from charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of grat.i.tude has no limit.

Reply Obj. 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in grat.i.tude we consider equality of wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.

_______________________

QUESTION 107

OF INGRAt.i.tUDE (In Four Articles)

We must now consider ingrat.i.tude, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether ingrat.i.tude is always a sin?

(2) Whether ingrat.i.tude is a special sin?

(3) Whether every act of ingrat.i.tude is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?

_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 1]

Whether Ingrat.i.tude Is Always a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingrat.i.tude is not always a sin. For Seneca says (De Benef. iii) that "he who does not repay a favor is ungrateful." But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin.

Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that ingrat.i.tude is not always a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i), "no man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now sometimes it is not in the power of the sinner to avoid ingrat.i.tude, for instance when he has not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that "to forget a kindness is the height of ingrat.i.tude." Therefore ingrat.i.tude is not always a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), "Owe no man anything." Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingrat.i.tude is not always a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Ingrat.i.tude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim.

3:2), where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked." etc.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 106, A. 4, ad 1, A. 6) a debt of grat.i.tude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that every ingrat.i.tude is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Grat.i.tude regards a favor received: and he that helps another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and so no thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will, supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin, because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is contrary to grat.i.tude.

Reply Obj. 2: No man is excused from ingrat.i.tude through inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the repayment of the debt of grat.i.tude, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6, ad 1).

Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingrat.i.tude, not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when forgetfulness of favors lays hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their repayment."

Reply Obj. 3: The debt of grat.i.tude flows from the debt of love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for his benefactor.

_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 2]

Whether Ingrat.i.tude Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingrat.i.tude is not a special sin. For whoever sins acts against G.o.d his sovereign benefactor. But this pertains to ingrat.i.tude. Therefore ingrat.i.tude is not a special sin.

Obj. 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin, for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against a benefactor. Therefore ingrat.i.tude is not a special sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): "It is ungrateful to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but it is the height of ingrat.i.tude to forget it." Now these do not seem to belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingrat.i.tude is not a special sin.

_On the contrary,_ Ingrat.i.tude is opposed to grat.i.tude or thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin.

_I answer that,_ Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to the virtue of grat.i.tude by way of excess, for instance if one were to show grat.i.tude for things for which grat.i.tude is not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 4).

But still more opposed to grat.i.tude is the vice denoting deficiency of grat.i.tude, because the virtue of grat.i.tude, as stated above (Q.

106, A. 6), inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingrat.i.tude is properly denominated from being a deficiency of grat.i.tude. Now every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing. Therefore just as grat.i.tude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also is ingrat.i.tude one special sin.

It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the things required for grat.i.tude. The first of these is to recognize the favor received, the second to express one's appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time according to one's means. And since what is last in the order of generation is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first degree of ingrat.i.tude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the second when he declines to notice or indicate that he has received a favor, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover, since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that it belongs to the first degree of ingrat.i.tude to return evil for good, to the second to find fault with a favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it were unkindness.

Reply Obj. 1: In every sin there is material ingrat.i.tude to G.o.d, inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingrat.i.tude. But formal ingrat.i.tude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this is a special sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way the aspect of ingrat.i.tude is to be found in many kinds of sin.

Reply Obj. 3: These three are not different species but different degrees of one special sin.

_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 3]

Whether Ingrat.i.tude Is Always a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingrat.i.tude is always a mortal sin. For one ought to be grateful to G.o.d above all. But one is not ungrateful to G.o.d by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of ingrat.i.tude. Therefore no ingrat.i.tude is a venial sin.

Obj. 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). But ingrat.i.tude is contrary to charity, since the debt of grat.i.tude proceeds from that virtue, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 1, ad 3; A. 6, ad 2). Therefore ingrat.i.tude is always a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Between the giver and the receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget having received." Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that if ingrat.i.tude were a slight sin. Therefore ingrat.i.tude is always a mortal sin.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ No one should be put in the way of committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii), "sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives a.s.sistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he has received." But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of ingrat.i.tude. Therefore ingrat.i.tude is not always a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As appears from what we have said above (A. 2), a man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express his appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6), the debt of grat.i.tude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, however, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises either from some kind of negligence or from some disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingrat.i.tude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing withheld, this being needful to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of necessity.