Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 164

Whether Disobedience Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition given above (Q. 104, A. 2, Obj. 1). Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin would be mortal.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi) that disobedience is born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore is disobedience.

Obj. 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does not fulfil a superior's command. But superiors often issue so many commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them.

Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned (Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 24, A. 12; I-II, Q. 72, A. 5; I-II, Q. 88, A. 1), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love G.o.d and our neighbor. The charity of G.o.d requires that we obey His commandments, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 12). Therefore to be disobedient to the commandments of G.o.d is a mortal sin, because it is contrary to the love of G.o.d.

Again, the commandments of G.o.d contain the precept of obedience to superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior is a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of G.o.d, according to Rom. 13:2, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of G.o.d." It is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due.

Reply Obj. 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it.

Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially, but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept, not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to another species of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to another's command, it follows that disobedience arises from vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.

Reply Obj. 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin.

Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a mult.i.tude of precepts.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 105, Art. 2]

Whether Disobedience Is the Most Grievous of Sins?

Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins.

For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): "It is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey." But idolatry is the most grievous of sins, as stated above (Q. 94, A. 3).

Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 2). Now disobedience makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that "by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners." Now the cause is seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.

_On the contrary,_ Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is not the most grievous of sins.

_I answer that,_ Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey G.o.d than man. Secondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the person commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of all his commands: since every such person desires above all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of G.o.d, it is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment, because since G.o.d's will is essentially directed to the good, the greater the good the more does G.o.d wish it to be fulfilled.

Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the love of G.o.d sins more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to the greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that which is more in the intention of the person commanding.

Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which there is contempt of G.o.d's precept, from the very nature of disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart from the latter being a disobedience to G.o.d. And I say this because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against G.o.d's commandment. And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin is still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous than the sin which contemns the man who made the precept, because reverence for the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command.

In like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of G.o.d, such as blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving contempt of G.o.d's commandment alone.

Reply Obj. 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of G.o.d just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.

Reply Obj. 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt of any obstacle to sin that const.i.tutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins.

Reply Obj. 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was transmitted to all men, was not disobedience considered as a special sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to every sin.

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QUESTION 106

OF THANKFULNESS OR GRAt.i.tUDE (In Six Articles)

We must now consider thankfulness or grat.i.tude, and ingrat.i.tude.

Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?

(2) Who owes more thanks to G.o.d, the innocent or the penitent?

(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?

(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?

(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor received or the disposition of the giver?

(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 1]

Whether Thankfulness Is a Special Virtue, Distinct from Other Virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. For we have received the greatest benefits from G.o.d, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to G.o.d in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety.

Therefore thankfulness or grat.i.tude is not distinct from the other virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5, 4). Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs to grat.i.tude, is an act of justice. Therefore grat.i.tude is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.

viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is a.s.sociated with all the virtues, since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore thankfulness or grat.i.tude, to which it belongs to repay favors received, is not a special virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 60, A. 3), the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in G.o.d, in that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and private favors, on account of which we are under particular obligation to him.

Accordingly, since what we owe G.o.d, or our father, or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay G.o.d due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or grat.i.tude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it excelling thankfulness or grat.i.tude: wherefore giving thanks to G.o.d was reckoned above (Q. 83, A. 17) among things pertaining to religion.

Reply Obj. 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or grat.i.tude answers to the moral debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii).

Reply Obj. 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of grat.i.tude.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 106, Art. 2]

Whether the Innocent Is More Bound to Give Thanks to G.o.d Than the Penitent?