Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 163

Hence Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xv) that "obedience is rightly preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas by obedience we slay our own will." Wherefore even any other acts of virtue are meritorious before G.o.d through being performed out of obedience to G.o.d's will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to give all one's goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from obedience. For it is written (1 John 2:4, 5): "He who saith that he knoweth G.o.d, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar ... but he that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of G.o.d is perfected": and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.

Reply Obj. 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence for one's parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it proceeds from reverence for G.o.d, it comes under religion, and pertains to devotion, which is the princ.i.p.al act of religion.

Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey G.o.d than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, "in a sacrifice we slay another's body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will," as Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xv). As to the special case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey G.o.d than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the commandment of G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue act causally or dispositively towards their generation and preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues.

And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to G.o.d. Secondly, because infusion of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love G.o.d, and so forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. x.x.xv), "he who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from starvation, through being deprived of every good." Thus the loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 4]

Whether G.o.d Ought to Be Obeyed in All Things?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d need not be obeyed in all things. For it is written (Matt. 9:30, 31) that our Lord after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying: "See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country." Yet they are not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey G.o.d in all things.

Obj. 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue.

Now we find that G.o.d commanded certain things contrary to virtue: thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen. 22); and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was an adulteress (Osee 3), and this is contrary to chast.i.ty. Therefore G.o.d is not to be obeyed in all things.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever obeys G.o.d conforms his will to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as stated above (I-II, Q. 19, A. 10). Therefore man is not bound to obey G.o.d in all things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 24:7): "All things that the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), he who obeys is moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now just a G.o.d is the first mover of all things that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown above (I-II, Q. 9, A. 6). Therefore just as all natural things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the divine command.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), "gave an example to His servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that others might profit by their example."

Reply Obj. 2: Even as G.o.d does nothing contrary to nature (since "the nature of a thing is what G.o.d does therein," according to a gloss on Rom. 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course of nature; so to G.o.d can command nothing contrary to virtue since virtue and rect.i.tude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with G.o.d's will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since G.o.d is the author of life and death. Nor again was it contrary to justice that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was it contrary to chast.i.ty that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress, because G.o.d Himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the persons aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying G.o.d or by willing to obey Him.

Reply Obj. 3: Though man is not always bound to will what G.o.d wills, yet he is always bound to will what G.o.d wills him to will. This comes to man's knowledge chiefly through G.o.d's command, wherefore man is bound to obey G.o.d's commands in all things.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 5]

Whether Subjects Are Bound to Obey Their Superiors in All Things?

Objection 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:20): "Children, obey your parents in all things," and farther on (Col. 3:22): "Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh." Therefore in like manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.

Obj. 2: Further, superiors stand between G.o.d and their subjects, according to Deut. 5:5, "I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and you at that time, to show you His words." Now there is no going from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of G.o.d, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 4:14): "You ...

received me as an angel of G.o.d, even as Christ Jesus" and (1 Thess.

2:13): "When you had received of us the word of the hearing of G.o.d, you received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of G.o.d." Therefore as man is bound to obey G.o.d in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors.

Obj. 3: Further, just as religious in making their profession take vows of chast.i.ty and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a religious is bound to observe chast.i.ty and poverty in all things.

Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Acts 5:29): "We ought to obey G.o.d rather than men." Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior are against G.o.d. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all things.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 4), he who obeys is moved at the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is subject to the latter's action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in all things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on Rom. 13:2, "They that resist [Vulg.: 'He that resisteth'] the power, resist the ordinance of G.o.d" (cf. St.

Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). "If a commissioner issue an order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul?

Again if the proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another, will you hesitate to disregard the former and serve the latter?

Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and G.o.d another, you must disregard the former and obey G.o.d." Secondly, a subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii): "It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man: for the better part of him is excepted." His body is subjected and a.s.signed to his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but G.o.d alone.

Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household; and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1: When the Apostle says "in all things," he refers to matters within the sphere of a father's or master's authority.

Reply Obj. 2: Man is subject to G.o.d simply as regards all things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between G.o.d and his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is immediately under G.o.d, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or by the written law.

Reply Obj. 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors: wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not contrary to G.o.d or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be unlawful.

Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey: secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 104, Art. 6]

Whether Christians Are Bound to Obey the Secular Powers?

Objection 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular power. For a gloss on Matt. 17:25, "Then the children are free," says: "If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom."

Now Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of G.o.d, according to John 1:12: "He gave them power to be made the sons of G.o.d, to them that believe in His name." Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 7:4): "You ... are become dead to the law by the body of Christ," and the law mentioned here is the divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law of the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become members of Christ's body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby they were under the power of secular princes.

Obj. 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them with violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): "Without justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?" Since therefore the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that Christians ought not to obey secular princes.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (t.i.tus 3:1): "Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers," and (1 Pet. 2:13, 14): "Be ye subject ... to every human creature for G.o.d's sake: whether it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him."

_I answer that,_ Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice, according to Rom. 3:22, "The justice of G.o.d by faith of Jesus Christ:" wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of justice, but strengthens it. Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of obeying secular princes.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 5), subjection whereby one man is bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as the Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that in his mind he served the law of G.o.d, but in his flesh the law of sin.

Wherefore those that are made children of G.o.d by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on 1 Tim. 6:1, "Whosoever are servants under the yoke," etc.

Reply Obj. 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament, and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the comparison with human law does not stand because thereby one man is subject to another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in order to avoid scandal or danger.

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QUESTION 105

OF DISOBEDIENCE (In Two Articles)

We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 105, Art. 2]