Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 39

Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by G.o.d towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those things that are of G.o.d are well ordered [*Vulg. 'Those powers that are, are ordained of G.o.d': 'Quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this pa.s.sage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" (Rom. 13:1). Since, therefore, as the providence of G.o.d is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they partic.i.p.ate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown (Q. 14, AA. 6, 11) that G.o.d knows all things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art.

Reply Obj. 1: There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance circ.u.mstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent them to meet at the one place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other.

Reply Obj. 2: It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered.

Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since G.o.d, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty G.o.d would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things--e.g. casual and evil things--as removed from the care of divine providence.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since G.o.d is the author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and others of the ancients.

Reply Obj. 4: When it is said that G.o.d left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since the very act of free will is traced to G.o.d as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of G.o.d, as a particular under a universal cause.

G.o.d, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love G.o.d, all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.

Reply Obj. 5: Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 10), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of G.o.d: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.

_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 3]

Whether G.o.d Has Immediate Providence Over Everything?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to G.o.d. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has G.o.d Himself immediate providence over all things.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore G.o.d were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be a.s.signed to G.o.d. Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Job 34:13): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which pa.s.sage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made."

_I answer that,_ Two things belong to providence--namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, G.o.d has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He a.s.signs to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of G.o.d's providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes.

The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human affairs, he a.s.signed to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the G.o.ds, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).

Reply Obj. 1: It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.

Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above (Q. 19, AA. 5, 8).

Reply Obj. 3: It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This does not hold with G.o.d, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.

_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 4]

Whether Providence Imposes Any Necessity on Things Foreseen?

Objection 1: It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a _per se_ cause, either present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of G.o.d, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.

Obj. 2: Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But G.o.d is most powerful. Therefore He a.s.signs the stability of necessity to things provided.

Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.

_I answer that,_ Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the princ.i.p.al good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes.

Reply Obj. 1: The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.

Reply Obj. 2: The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.

Reply Obj. 3: That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking "necessary" and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of G.o.d, who provides universally for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.

_______________________

QUESTION 23

OF PREDESTINATION (In Eight Articles)

After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to G.o.d?

(2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?

(3) Whether to G.o.d belongs the reprobation of some men?

(4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?

(5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?

(6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?

(7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?

(8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?

_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 1]

Whether Men Are Predestined by G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that men are not predestined by G.o.d, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that G.o.d foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by G.o.d; and thus man's predestination is done away.

Obj. 2: Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by G.o.d. Therefore neither are men.

Obj. 3: Further, the angels are capable of beat.i.tude, as well as men.

But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity [miserendi]" [*See Q. 22, A. 3]. Therefore men are not predestined.

Obj. 4: Further, the benefits G.o.d confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of G.o.d: that we may know the things that are given us from G.o.d." Therefore if man were predestined by G.o.d, since predestination is a benefit from G.o.d, his predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 8:30): "Whom He predestined, them He also called."

_I answer that,_ It is fitting that G.o.d should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (Q. 22, A. 2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). The end towards which created things are directed by G.o.d is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing G.o.d which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (Q. 12, A. 4). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by G.o.d. The reason of that direction pre-exists in G.o.d; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done.

Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not excluded by Him.