Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 38

_I answer that,_ Mercy is especially to be attributed to G.o.d, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of pa.s.sion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to G.o.d; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is G.o.d, as shown above (Q. 6, A. 4). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above (Q. 6, AA. 1, 4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said (A. 1); in so far as G.o.d does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by G.o.d expel defects, it belongs to mercy.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of pa.s.sion.

Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven you" (Eph. 4:32). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above judgement"

(James 2:13).

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 4]

Whether in Every Work of G.o.d There Are Mercy and Justice?

Objection 1: It seems that not in every work of G.o.d are mercy and justice. For some works of G.o.d are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the unG.o.dly; and others to justice, as the d.a.m.nation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy" (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work of G.o.d do mercy and justice appear.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rom. 15).

Therefore not in every work of G.o.d are justice and mercy.

Obj. 3: Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of G.o.d are justice and mercy.

Obj. 4: Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing.

Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 24:10): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth."

_I answer that,_ Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all G.o.d's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect.

Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to G.o.d, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work of G.o.d: because G.o.d can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything is due to G.o.d. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all G.o.d's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown.

Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will--which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So in every work of G.o.d, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does G.o.d out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers; because between creatures and G.o.d's goodness there can be no proportion.

Reply Obj. 1: Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the d.a.m.nation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.

In the justification of the unG.o.dly, justice is seen, when G.o.d remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (Luke 7:47).

Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises made to the fathers.

Reply Obj. 3: Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to G.o.d.

As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to G.o.d."

Reply Obj. 4: Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of G.o.d. In this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.

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QUESTION 22

THE PROVIDENCE OF G.o.d (In Four Articles)

Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation.

For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong. Concerning G.o.d's providence there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether providence is suitably a.s.signed to G.o.d?

(2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?

(3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?

(4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 1]

Whether Providence Can Suitably Be Attributed to G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that providence is not becoming to G.o.d. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.

vi, 5, 9, 18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to G.o.d, Who never has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is in G.o.d, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29).

Therefore there is no providence in G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, there is nothing composite in G.o.d. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.']."

_I answer that,_ It is necessary to attribute providence to G.o.d. For all the good that is in created things has been created by G.o.d, as was shown above (Q. 6, A. 4). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (Q. 21, A. 4). This good of order existing in things created, is itself created by G.o.d. Since, however, G.o.d is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (Q. 19, A. 4), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other parts are directed--namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself--as for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (Matt. 24:45), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to G.o.d. For in G.o.d Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in G.o.d called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9, 10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. I-II, Q. 57, A. 6]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to G.o.d, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to G.o.d, according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pa.s.s away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to G.o.d.

Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in G.o.d; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the cert.i.tude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).

Reply Obj. 2: Two things pertain to the care of providence--namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition; and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.

Reply Obj. 3: Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. n.o.body gives a precept about things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appet.i.tive faculty is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in G.o.d both the will and intellect are one and the same thing, as we have said above (Q. 19).

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 2]

Whether Everything Is Subject to the Providence of G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything was foreseen by G.o.d, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.

Obj. 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, G.o.d cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.

vi, 5, 9, 10, 11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.

Obj. 4: Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by G.o.d in accordance with the words: "G.o.d made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" (Ecclus. 15:14). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" (Ps. 80:13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine providence.

Obj. 5: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "G.o.d doth not care for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth G.o.d take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence.

_On the contrary,_ It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).

_I answer that,_ Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job 22:14): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.

We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of G.o.d, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to const.i.tuent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible.