Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 34

This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in _Phys._ ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since G.o.d is first in the order of agents, He must act by intellect and will.

This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (Q. 7, A. 2). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.

Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause.

Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of G.o.d is the cause of things.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from G.o.d absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.

Reply Obj. 2: Because the essence of G.o.d is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and will.

Reply Obj. 3: Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because G.o.d is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A. 2, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in G.o.d all these things are one.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 5]

Whether Any Cause Can Be a.s.signed to the Divine Will?

Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be a.s.signed to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lx.x.xiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that G.o.d made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of G.o.d has some cause.

Obj. 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause a.s.signed except by the will of him who wills. But the will of G.o.d is the cause of all things, as has been already shown (A. 4). If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to a.s.sign causes to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must a.s.sign some cause to the divine will.

Obj. 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of G.o.d has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lx.x.xiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than the will of G.o.d. We must not then seek for a cause of it.

_I answer that,_ In no wise has the will of G.o.d a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.

Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as G.o.d by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in G.o.d to understand the cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.

Reply Obj. 1: The will of G.o.d is reasonable, not because anything is to G.o.d a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.

Reply Obj. 2: Since G.o.d wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of G.o.d. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of G.o.d."

Reply Obj. 3: Since G.o.d wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of G.o.d, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that G.o.d willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of G.o.d; but the others on the order of other causes.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 6]

Whether the Will of G.o.d Is Always Fulfilled?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of G.o.d is not always fulfilled.

For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "G.o.d will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen.

Therefore the will of G.o.d is not always fulfilled.

Obj. 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now G.o.d knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of G.o.d is not always fulfilled.

Obj. 3: Further, since the will of G.o.d is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of G.o.d, therefore, is not always fulfilled.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 113:11): "G.o.d hath done all things, whatsoever He would."

_I answer that,_ The will of G.o.d must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of G.o.d is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of the Apostle, "G.o.d will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "G.o.d wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every cla.s.s of individuals, not to every individual of each cla.s.s; in which case they mean that G.o.d wills some men of every cla.s.s and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of G.o.d; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.

To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by G.o.d. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circ.u.mstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way G.o.d antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be d.a.m.ned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circ.u.mstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever G.o.d simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.

Reply Obj. 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appet.i.te faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in G.o.d, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore G.o.d knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.

Reply Obj. 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of G.o.d, as said above.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 7]

Whether the Will of G.o.d Is Changeable?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of G.o.d is changeable. For the Lord says (Gen. 6:7): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore G.o.d has a changeable will.

Obj. 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them"

(Jer. 18:7, 8). Therefore G.o.d has a changeable will.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever G.o.d does, He does voluntarily. But G.o.d does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.

Obj. 4: Further, G.o.d does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before (A. 3). Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore G.o.d is changeable as regards His will.

_On the contrary,_ It is said: "G.o.d is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (Num. 23:19).

_I answer that,_ The will of G.o.d is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of G.o.d and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (QQ.

9, A. 1; 14, A. 15). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.

Reply Obj. 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore G.o.d is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had made.

Reply Obj. 2: The will of G.o.d, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And G.o.d wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that G.o.d sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (Isa. 38:1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of G.o.d changes, but not His counsel"--that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.

Reply Obj. 3: It does not follow from this argument that G.o.d has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.

Reply Obj. 4: Although G.o.d's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above (A. 3).

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 8]

Whether the Will of G.o.d Imposes Necessity on the Things Willed?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of G.o.d imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom G.o.d has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."

Obj. 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of G.o.d cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rom. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of G.o.d imposes necessity on the things willed.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by G.o.d are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if G.o.d wills a thing, it comes to pa.s.s; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that G.o.d wills is necessary absolutely.