Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 35

_On the contrary,_ All good things that exist G.o.d wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.

_I answer that,_ The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to a.s.sign to intermediate causes, holding that what G.o.d produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.

This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.

First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder G.o.d's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which G.o.d wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now G.o.d wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by G.o.d happen contingently, but because G.o.d prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.

Reply Obj. 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by G.o.d that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if G.o.d wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.

Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that G.o.d wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.

Reply Obj. 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that G.o.d wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.

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NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 8]

Whether G.o.d Wills Evils?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d wills evils. For every good that exists, G.o.d wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore G.o.d wills evil things.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10, 11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But G.o.d wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what G.o.d desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore G.o.d wills evil.

Obj. 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But G.o.d does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, G.o.d's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore G.o.d wills that evil should exist.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now G.o.d surpa.s.ses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is G.o.d the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by G.o.d's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore G.o.d wills not evil things.

_I answer that,_ Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (Q. 5, A. 1), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appet.i.te, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appet.i.te which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appet.i.tes. For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means.

Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now G.o.d wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another.

Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.

Reply Obj. 1: Some have said that although G.o.d does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.

Reply Obj. 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.

Reply Obj. 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. G.o.d therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.

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TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 10]

Whether G.o.d Has Free-Will?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "G.o.d alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."

Obj. 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But G.o.d does not will evil, as has been said (A. 9). Therefore there is not free-will in G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."

_I answer that,_ We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor by natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then G.o.d necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above (A. 3), He has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.

Reply Obj. 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to G.o.d not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which G.o.d wills all things, as above shown, it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.

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ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 11]

Whether the Will of Expression Is to Be Distinguished in G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in G.o.d. For as the will of G.o.d is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are a.s.signed to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be a.s.signed to the divine will.

Obj. 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions a.s.signed to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be a.s.signed to the divine will.

_On the contrary,_ The will of G.o.d is one, since it is the very essence of G.o.d. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of Ps. 110:2: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.

_I answer that,_ Some things are said of G.o.d in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (Q. 13, A. 3). When certain human pa.s.sions are predicated of the G.o.dhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some pa.s.sion, is signified metaphorically in G.o.d under the name of that pa.s.sion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to G.o.d. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in G.o.d; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of G.o.d, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (Matt.

6:10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to G.o.d properly, since in its primary meaning it includes pa.s.sion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in G.o.d there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.

Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.

Reply Obj. 2: Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that G.o.d wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in G.o.d. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in G.o.d; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.

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TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 12]

Whether Five Expressions of Will Are Rightly a.s.signed to the Divine Will?

Objection 1: It seems that five expressions of will--namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission--are not rightly a.s.signed to the divine will. For the same things that G.o.d bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.

Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (Wis. 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.

Obj. 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since G.o.d works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.

Obj. 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to a.s.sign one expression only in the case of evil--namely, prohibition--and two--namely, counsel and precept--in the case of good.

_I answer that,_ By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the will of G.o.d is clear from the words of Matt. 6:10: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of G.o.d is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."

Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good.

Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.

Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is no reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.

Reply Obj. 2: As G.o.d may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.

Reply Obj. 3: Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are a.s.signed to their acts, inasmuch as G.o.d ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.

Reply Obj. 4: All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is a.s.signed, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.

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QUESTION 20