Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 101

Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.

_I answer that,_ A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle, _Topic._ iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as explained above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1).

Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appet.i.te: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, while the appet.i.te tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular.

Consequently, speaking simply, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the appet.i.te.

But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appet.i.te, whose function it is to move the other powers to act, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 1: The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2: The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because the appet.i.te moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 3). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively.

Reply Obj. 3: Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6; vi, 13.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 4]

Whether Justice Is the Chief of the Moral Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice.

Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice.

Obj. 2: Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to Jam. 1:4, "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice.

Obj. 3: Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue,"

as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice.

Therefore it is greater than justice.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is the most excellent of the virtues."

_I answer that,_ A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above (A. 1). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appet.i.te, as stated above (Q.

8, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 1): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues, which are about the pa.s.sions, the more excellent the matter in which the appet.i.tive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fort.i.tude which subjects the appet.i.tive movement to reason in matters of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the pa.s.sions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good.

Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former," i.e. fort.i.tude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fort.i.tude comes temperance, which subjects the appet.i.te to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, viz. in matters of food and of s.e.x. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called princ.i.p.al virtues, in excellence also.

A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a princ.i.p.al virtue: even as substance is more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to justice.

Reply Obj. 2: Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues simply. Because fort.i.tude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fort.i.tude.

Reply Obj. 3: There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 5]

Whether Wisdom Is the Greatest of the Intellectual Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in _Ethic._ i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best," as stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to Job 26:26: "Behold G.o.d is great, exceeding our knowledge."

Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Obj. 4: Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue than wisdom.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpa.s.ses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is G.o.d, as stated at the beginning of the _Metaphysics._ And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all.

Reply Obj. 1: Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" (1 Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king.

Reply Obj. 2: Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its princ.i.p.al object, which is G.o.d, it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or partic.i.p.ation of future happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though it be based on weak and probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about G.o.d pertains, is beyond the reach of man, especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to G.o.d alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this little knowledge about G.o.d which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge.

Reply Obj. 4: The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are const.i.tuted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is G.o.d. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by pa.s.sing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 6]

Whether Charity Is the Greatest of the Theological Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appet.i.tive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above (Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity.

Obj. 2: Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity.

Obj. 3: Further, a cause is more n.o.ble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Matt. 1:3 says that "faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at G.o.d as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written (1 John 4:16): "He that abideth in charity, abideth in G.o.d, and G.o.d in him."

Reply Obj. 1: Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the theological virtues have an object surpa.s.sing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man.

Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man.

Secondly, because prudence moderates the appet.i.tive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appet.i.tive movement tending to G.o.d, which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appet.i.tive movement towards its object surpa.s.ses human knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which surpa.s.seth all knowledge."

Reply Obj. 2: Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 3: An efficient cause is more n.o.ble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more n.o.ble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other.

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QUESTION 67

OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (In Six Articles)

We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?