Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 100

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is impossible to please G.o.d"; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to Prov. 8:17: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 4). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope.

_I answer that,_ Charity signifies not only the love of G.o.d, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 John 4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in G.o.d, and G.o.d in him,"

and from 1 Cor. 1:9, where it is written: "G.o.d is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship of man with G.o.d, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with G.o.d, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with G.o.d, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and hope.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is not any kind of love of G.o.d, but that love of G.o.d, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith and hope.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 4), and so charity is impossible without them.

Reply Obj. 3: In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above, Q. 4, A. 3]: so that in Him was perfect charity.

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QUESTION 66

OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (In Six Articles)

We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?

(2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?

(3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;

(4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;

(5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;

(6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 1]

Whether One Virtue Can Be Greater or Less Than Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written (Apoc. 21:16) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose." Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another.

Obj. 3: Further, the quant.i.ty of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from G.o.d Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another.

_On the contrary,_ Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and increase: for it is written (Matt. 5:20): "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven": and (Prov. 15:5): "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength (_virtus_)." Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another.

_I answer that,_ When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said (Q. 18, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 2) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpa.s.ses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appet.i.tive power, in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason.

Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining moral virtues; and fort.i.tude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6.

The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was said above (Q.

52, A. 1), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it great or little, according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a virtue, e.g.

temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art: for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius states in his _Commentary on the Predicaments,_ that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum.

If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of the giving of Christ," as stated in Eph. 4:9. And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several archers aim at a fixed target.

Reply Obj. 1: This equality is not one of absolute quant.i.ty, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we shall see further on (A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something _more_ or _less_ good, in the ways explained above: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.

Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures of virtue, according to Eph. 4:7: "To every one of you [Vulg.: 'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ."

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 2]

Whether All the Virtues That Are Together in One Man, Are Equal?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:7): "Everyone hath his proper gift from G.o.d; one after this manner, and another after that." Now one gift would not be more proper than another to a man, if G.o.d infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

Obj. 2: Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpa.s.ses another in one virtue, would surpa.s.s him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since various saints are specially praised for different virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith (Rom. 4), Moses for his meekness (Num. 7:3), Job for his patience (Tob. 2:12). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings: "There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High," [*See _Lesson_ in the Ma.s.s _Statuit_ (Dominican Missal)], since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

Obj. 3: Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those who are equal in fort.i.tude are equal in prudence and temperance," and so on. Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man.

_I answer that,_ As explained above (A. 1), the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature: and in this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Secondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree of partic.i.p.ation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss in its subject. In this sense all the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another.

Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above (Q. 65, A.

1) that a twofold connection of virtues may be a.s.signed. The first is according to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this way virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: "If you say these men are equal in fort.i.tude, but that one is more prudent than the other; it follows that the fort.i.tude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fort.i.tude, since the former's fort.i.tude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all in the same way."

The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective matters (Q. 65, AA. 1, 2). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 1). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: for in one and the same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right reason in each matter of virtue.

But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz.

the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected.

Reply Obj. 2: One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 3]

Whether the Moral Virtues Are Better Than the Intellectual Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to _Ethic._ vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters.

_On the contrary,_ Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by partic.i.p.ation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially rational part, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by partic.i.p.ation.