Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 145

Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between "likeness" and "image." For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above (A. 1): and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit"

(namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of G.o.d. "But the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some made to G.o.d's likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of G.o.d is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings.

But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the love of virtue": for there is no virtue without love of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so far as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects the idea of "image."

Reply Obj. 2: The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.

Reply Obj. 3: Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural "likeness" exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term "image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness."

Reply Obj. 4: Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as virtue itself belongs to likeness.

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QUESTION 94

OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (In Four Articles)

We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning the first there are two things to be considered:

(1) The condition of man as to his intellect;

(2) the condition of man as to his will.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of G.o.d?

(2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?

(3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?

(4) Whether he could err or be deceived?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 1]

Whether the First Man Saw G.o.d Through His Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man saw G.o.d through His Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. But the first man, "while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!" Therefore the first man in paradise saw G.o.d through His Essence.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that "the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." But our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw G.o.d through His Essence.

Obj. 3: Further, the vision of G.o.d in His Essence is whereby G.o.d is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence "saw G.o.d immediately," as the Master of the Sentences a.s.serts (Sent.

iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw G.o.d through His Essence.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see G.o.d through His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see G.o.d through His Essence.

_I answer that,_ The first man did not see G.o.d through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw G.o.d in a vision, when "G.o.d cast a deep sleep upon Adam" (Gen. 2:21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beat.i.tude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence has the same relation to G.o.d as a man has to beat.i.tude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beat.i.tude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness.

Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of G.o.d can willingly turn away from G.o.d, which means to sin. Hence all who see G.o.d through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of G.o.d, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see G.o.d through His Essence.

Nevertheless he knew G.o.d with a more perfect knowledge than we do now.

Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see G.o.d through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the vision of G.o.d through His Essence is contradistinguished from the vision of G.o.d through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to G.o.d, the more clearly is G.o.d seen in it; for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus G.o.d is seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible things. Now, it is written (Eccles. 7:30): "G.o.d made man right." And man was made right by G.o.d in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps G.o.d used to speak to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the partic.i.p.ation of the Divine Essence." Therefore, through these intelligible effects of G.o.d, man knew G.o.d then more clearly than we know Him now.

Reply Obj. 1: Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with "a life of happiness in a certain measure," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.

Reply Obj. 2: A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward.

Reply Obj. 3: A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. G.o.d was seen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of G.o.d by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew G.o.d simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw G.o.d in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect: secondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see G.o.d in an enigma.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 2]

Whether Adam in the State of Innocence Saw the Angels Through Their Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1): "In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of G.o.d; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels."

Obj. 2: Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body which "is a load upon the soul," as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained (Q. 89, A. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to see separate substances.

Obj. 3: Further, one separate substance knows another separate substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.

_On the contrary,_ The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours.

But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore neither could Adam's soul.

_I answer that,_ The state of the human soul may be distinguished in two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence; and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a "living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body--namely animal life. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said above (A. 1). Now it is clear from what has been already said (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1; Q. 89, A. 1) that since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of the first man also.

Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first is by the soul "pa.s.sing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be a.s.sociated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the third is when the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good,"

that is, to G.o.d.

In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external things, as we have said above (Q. 87, A. 3): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its surpa.s.sing excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence.

Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits."

This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply Obj. 2: That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.

Reply Obj. 3: The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as we have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others in its own measure.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 3]

Whether the First Man Knew All Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written." And if his knowledge came by infused species, it would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves.

Obj. 2: Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all things when he was first created.

Obj. 3: Further, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge.

Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things.

_On the contrary,_ Man named the animals (Gen. 2:20). But names should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals' natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other things.