Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 144

Obj. 3: Further, an image seems to apply princ.i.p.ally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of G.o.d is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.

Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of G.o.d, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:23,24): "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10): "Putting on the new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of G.o.d, "according to the image of Him that created him," where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of G.o.d. Therefore to be to the image of G.o.d belongs to the mind only.

_I answer that,_ While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to G.o.d, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" as we have explained above (AA. 1,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of G.o.d is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace"

represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army.

Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate G.o.d, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (A.

2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q. 28, A. 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to G.o.d by way of an "image" in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace."

Reply Obj. 1: Man is called to the image of G.o.d; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of G.o.d is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of G.o.d as existing in every part of man.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of G.o.d was not in man individually, but severally.

They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter." All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of G.o.d in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the image of G.o.d He created him," it added, "male and female He created them," not to imply that the image of G.o.d came through the distinction of s.e.x, but that the image of G.o.d belongs to both s.e.xes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no s.e.xual distinction.

Wherefore the Apostle (Col. 3:10), after saying, "According to the image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male nor female" [*these words are in reality from Gal. 3:28] (Vulg.

"neither Gentile nor Jew").

Reply Obj. 3: Although the image of G.o.d in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined p.r.o.ne to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to G.o.d's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But this is not to be understood as though the image of G.o.d were in man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of G.o.d in the soul by way of a trace.

Reply Obj. 4: Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen.

Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is advent.i.tious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 7]

Whether the Image of G.o.d Is to Be Found in the Acts of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of G.o.d is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man was made to G.o.d's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist does not signify an act. Therefore the image of G.o.d is not to be found in the soul's acts.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) a.s.signs G.o.d's image in the soul to these three things--mind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of G.o.d does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) a.s.signs the image of the Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But these three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of G.o.d is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Obj. 4: Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul.

But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of G.o.d does not extend to the acts.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) a.s.signs the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to G.o.d's image, must be referred to actual vision.

_I answer that,_ As above explained (A. 2), a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.

Reply Obj. 1: Our being bears the image of G.o.d so far as it is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself--namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine subsequently proves--De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and a.s.signs the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though the first a.s.signation were in part deficient.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually consider them, and when we do not think of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love [*Cf. Q. 79, A. 7, ad 1]. "But since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent." From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences.

Reply Obj. 4: Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things." Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): "If the rational soul is made to the image of G.o.d in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider G.o.d, then the image of G.o.d was in the soul from the beginning of its existence."

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 8]

Whether the Image of the Divine Trinity Is in the Soul Only by Comparison with G.o.d As Its Object?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with G.o.d as its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (A.

7), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object.

Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.

Obj. 3: Further, it is by grace that we can know and love G.o.d. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of the memory, understanding, and will or love of G.o.d, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.

Obj. 4: Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of G.o.d by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2 Cor. 3:18): "We ... are transformed into the same image from glory to glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision.

Therefore the image of G.o.d exists in us even according to temporal things.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of G.o.d exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love G.o.d by Whom it was made." Much less, therefore, is the image of G.o.d in the soul, in respect of other objects.

_I answer that,_ As above explained (AA. 2, 7), image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated (AA. 6, 7), are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of G.o.d is born of G.o.d by the knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from G.o.d according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of G.o.d, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of G.o.d is found in the soul according as the soul turns to G.o.d, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to G.o.d. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-gla.s.s he may be said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), that "the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, G.o.d, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of G.o.d." But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to G.o.d, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary).

Reply Obj. 1: For the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of G.o.d proceeds from knowledge of G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, "any third thing should be required to make up the trinity," as he adds in the same pa.s.sage. But in that part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although a trinity may be found; yet the image of G.o.d is not to be seen there,"

as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is advent.i.tious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith.

Reply Obj. 3: The meritorious knowledge and love of G.o.d can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (Q. 12, A. 12; Q. 56, A. 3; Q. 60, A. 5).

This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand G.o.d, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of G.o.d abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of G.o.d be so obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured and disfigured," as in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6).

Reply Obj. 4: By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in G.o.d Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of G.o.d. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures.

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NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 9]

Whether "Likeness" Is Properly Distinguished from "Image"?

Objection 1: It would seem that "likeness" is not properly distinguished from "image." For genus is not properly distinguished from species. Now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species: because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness"

is not properly to be distinguished from "image."

Obj. 2: Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi).

Obj. 3: Further, the image of G.o.d in man is threefold--the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained (A. 4). But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness."

Obj. 4: Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image.

Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue."

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and "likeness," since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed."

_I answer that,_ Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15).

Now, since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true.