Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election Part 5

The non-representation of minorities in Belgium accentuated the racial religious and language differences between Flanders and Wallony.

Flanders was represented by Catholics only; the French-speaking districts by Liberals and Socialists. With proportional representation members of all three parties are returned in both areas, and this result has brought in its train a great national advantage, the political consolidation of Belgium. Another example of the disintegrating effects of the disfranchis.e.m.e.nt of minorities is to be seen in the American Civil War. A committee of the United States Senate unanimously reported in 1869 that this war might have been averted had the minorities in the North and South been duly represented in Congress. In the words of the report the absence of minority representation "in the States of the South when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were taken to break the Union was unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men of those States together and have given them voice in the electoral colleges.... Dispersed, unorganized, unrepresented, without due voice and power, they could interpose no effectual resistance to secession and to civil war."

_Defective representation in munic.i.p.al bodies_.]

False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation, the weakening of the House of Commons, both in authority and in personnel, the degradation of party warfare, the undue exaltation of party machinery, the heightening of racial differences and of sectional interests, these are the fruits of that rough and ready system of Parliamentary elections with which hitherto we have been content. The electoral methods in force both in County Council and in Munic.i.p.al elections are based on the same false principle, and in these spheres of corporate activity results almost equally disastrous are produced. The London County Council elections of 1907 presented most of the features which characterized the Parliamentary elections of 1906. Such catastrophic changes in the personnel of the County Council as took place in 1907 involves serious consequences to London ratepayers. In this election two ex-chairmen of the Council, the vice-chairman and several chairmen of committees, lost their seats. These were men who had been chosen by their colleagues because of their special fitness for their positions, and this wholesale dismissal as a result of a temporary wave of public feeling may make it more difficult to secure as candidates those who are prepared to devote the necessary time to the study of London's problems, for it is generally admitted that the position of a London County Councillor is no sinecure. The effective discharge of his duties demands unremitting attention to details. The new Council was remarkable for the number of members who had yet to win their spurs in public work, and London was the poorer for the loss of those able administrators whom thousands of voters desired as their representatives. A true electoral system would not only secure the adequate representation of all parties, but the presence in the Council of the most competent exponents of different policies.

_Wasteful munic.i.p.al finance._

Not only does the electoral system involve undue changes in the personnel of the Council, but it leads to an extremely wasteful expenditure of public money. Whether the London County Council was or was not justified in establishing a steamboat service, nothing can be more wasteful than that one Council should establish such a service at great cost, and that its successor should immediately reverse that policy. The steady development of a works department by one Council and its abandonment by a succeeding Council similarly involves useless expenditure. A fully representative Council would not display such violent alterations of policy, and it is of the utmost importance that the objects on which it is decided to spend public moneys should be the deliberate and considered choice of a Council on which all interests are fairly represented.

_No continuity in administration_.]

The Metropolitan Borough Council elections tell a similar tale. The Lewisham Borough Council consisted in 1900 of 35 Moderates and 7 Progressives; in 1903 of 34 Progressives and 8 Moderates and Independents; in 1906 of 42 Moderates, no representatives of the Progressive or Labour parties being elected. In three successive elections there was a complete change in the composition of the Council.

Lewisham's experience is typical of that of several other London boroughs. Many councillors of the widest experience in munic.i.p.al affairs lose their seats at the same time, and there is in consequence no security of continuity in the administration of the business of the Metropolitan boroughs. Dr. Gilbert Slater, in giving evidence before a select committee of the House of Lords, said: "I found, of course, when I came on to the Council without any previous munic.i.p.al experience except by observation, that I and other members equally inexperienced had to take great responsibilities upon ourselves. For instance, I was vice-chairman of the Finance Committee, and my Chairman also had had no previous munic.i.p.al experience; the Finance Committee was felt to be one of the most important of the Committees of the Council, and the fact that its Chairman and Vice-chairman were two new members itself was a weakness."[13] Dr. Slater added that it took three years' hard work before a councillor could really master the affairs of a London borough, and that being so, is it surprising that it is becoming increasingly difficult to secure the services of competent men for the work of our local bodies? There undoubtedly are, on both aides, men of marked ability and of whole-hearted devotion to public affairs, but if our electoral system is such that, in the presence of an undiscriminating swing of the pendulum, their ability and devotion count for nothing, such men tend, albeit unwillingly, to withdraw from public life. The influence of the permanent official increases; the authority of the representative a.s.sembly declines.

_The root of the evil._

In parliamentary, in county, and in borough council elections alike we trace the evils of defective electoral methods. These evils const.i.tute a complete answer to Lord Morley's criticism of Mill, that the latter laid undue stress upon the efficiency of electoral machinery. Erected on a false basis, those democratic inst.i.tutions, on which so many hopes have been built and on which our future still depends, are found full of shortcomings due not only to the imperfections of human nature but to the ill-working of a defective electoral system. The evils arising from the latter cause can at least be remedied, and in remedying them we may make it possible for the electors to put more intelligence and conscience into their votes. Since Mill was, as Lord Morley says, concerned with the important task of moulding and elevating popular character, he was rightly anxious that the electoral machinery should be such as to give due weight to those who desired to take an intelligent interest in the affairs of their country.

[Footnote 1: _The Manchester Guardian_, 12 February 1909.]

[Footnote 2: Annual Meeting, Proportional Representation Society, 9 May 1906.]

[Footnote 3: _The Times_, 8 January 1906.]

[Footnote 4: _Human Nature in Politics_, pp. 241 _et seq_.]

[Footnote 5: _The Times_, 22 August 1906.]

[Footnote 6: _The Essentials of Self-Government,_ pp. 102 _et seq_.]

[Footnote 7: It is a matter for congratulation that in so many States there is now (1911) a movement of revolt against the domination of the "boss."]

[Footnote 8: _The Manchester Guardian_, 21 April 1908.]

[Footnote 9: _The Times_, 22 January 1909.]

[Footnote 10: Letter read at the annual meeting of the Proportional Representation Society, 24 April 1907.]

[Footnote 11: Eighty Club, 25 July 1910.]

[Footnote 12: Before the Union.]

[Footnote 13: _Report on Munic.i.p.al Representation Bill (H. L.)_, 1907 (132).]

CHAPTER IV

THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES

The one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority that succeeds by force or fraud in carrying elections. To break off that point is to avert the danger. The common system of representation perpetuates the danger. Unequal electorates afford no security to majorities. Equal electorates give none to minorities. Thirty-five years ago it was pointed out that the remedy is proportional representation.

It is profoundly democratic, for it increases the influence of thousands who would otherwise have no voice in the Government; and it brings men more near an equality by so contriving that no vote shall be wasted, and that every voter shall contribute to bring into Parliament a member of his own opinion."--LORD ACTON

The disfranchis.e.m.e.nt of minorities, noted in the two previous chapters as the outcome of our electoral methods, attracted considerable attention during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and several legislative proposals were carried with the specific object of remedying the evil. Indeed every electoral reform bill, beginning with that of 1832, has been accompanied with a demand or a suggestion for an improvement in methods of election in order to secure for the House of Commons a fully representative character. For it was clearly realized that without some such improvement neither an extension of the franchise nor a redistribution of seats would necessarily make the House a mirror of the nation. These attempts to secure representation for minorities have, however, often been confounded with the movement in favour of proportional representation--the just representation of all parties--and this confusion of thought may be partly due to the eloquent plea for the representation of minorities advanced by Mill in the chapter in _Representative Government_ devoted to the advocacy of Hare's scheme of proportional representation. This confusion showed itself in the speech which the Marquis of Ripon contributed to the debate[1] on the second reading of the Munic.i.p.al Representation Bill, introduced by Lord Courtney of Penwith in 1907, for the purpose of enabling munic.i.p.alities to adopt a system of proportional representation. "It was a remarkable thing," Lord Ripon said, "that so far as the experiments had gone they had not succeeded, and that, he thought, should make them cautious when looking into proposals of this kind." The experiments to which Lord Ripon referred were legislative proposals for the representation of minorities, and it cannot be admitted that these experiments were failures. They did secure the representation of minorities. The machinery provided did not enable them to do more, and an a.n.a.lysis of the results of these experiments will show to what extent they succeeded in their object, and at the same time disclose in what respects these experiments fell short of a true electoral method.

_The Limited Vote_.]

The first of these experiments was known as the Limited Vote--a method of voting which involves the creation of const.i.tuencies returning several members but limits the elector in the number of his votes; the elector is only permitted to vote for a number of candidates which is less than the number of members to be elected, whilst he may not give more than one vote to any one candidate. The Limited Vote was first proposed by Mr. Mackworth Praed in Committee on the Reform Bill of 1831, and the proposal was renewed by him in the following year in the Bill which became the great Reform Act of 1832. Up to that time the const.i.tuencies of England returned two members apiece, with the exception of the City of London, which returned four, and of five boroughs each returning one member. The Reform Bill provided that a third member should be added to the representation of each of seven counties, and that certain other counties should be divided into two or more const.i.tuencies, each returning two members. Mr. Praed proposed to drop this subdivision of counties, although permitting the additional members to be given, and proposed that in const.i.tuencies returning three or four members an elector should not be allowed to vote for more than two candidates. The arguments advanced by Mr. Praed are worth quoting. "He was of opinion," said he, "that it was an error in the original construction of the Representative a.s.sembly of this country to allow any person to have more than one vote, for, by the present system, it was frequently the case that the same persons, const.i.tuting perhaps a bare majority of the electors, returned both members.... In the present case, if large counties were not divided each freeholder would have four votes. He wished to restrict them to two, and he thought that this object might be attained even without the division of counties by allowing each freeholder to vote only for two members although four was to be the number returned. Some measure should be taken to make the vote and views of a large minority known in the legislature."

This form of voting was proposed by Lord Aberdeen's Government in the Parliamentary Representation Bill of 1854. In this Bill it was proposed to give a third member to 38 counties and divisions of counties (in addition to the seven counties which already possessed that privilege), and also to eight boroughs. Lord John Russell, in introducing the measure, made a powerful plea on behalf of the representation of minorities in each of these const.i.tuencies, but the Crimean War rendered further consideration of the Bill impossible. The system was, however, applied to thirteen const.i.tuencies by the Representation of the People Act of 1867. It was not provided for in the Bill as submitted by the Government, nor was it supported by the leader of the Opposition. Its introduction was due to the action of Lord Cairns, who, on 30 July 1867, carried in the House of Lords, with the support of Lord Russell and Lord Spencer, the following amendment:--

"At a contested election for any county or borough represented by three members, no person shall vote for more than two candidates." A further amendment applicable to the City of London, which returned four members, was also carried. The system remained in force until the Redistribution Act of 1885, when three-member const.i.tuencies were abolished. "There is nothing," said Lord Cairns, in the course of a memorable speech, "so irksome to those who form the minority of one of these large const.i.tuencies as to find that from the mere force of numbers they are virtually excluded from the exercise of any political power, that it is in vain for them to attempt to take any part in public affairs, that the election must always go in one direction, and that they have no political power whatever."

The following table will show that Lord Cairns' proposal secured the object which he had in view--the representation of minorities:--

1868. 1874. 1880.

Const.i.tuency. Actual Probable Actual Probable Actual Probable results results results results results results with without with without with without Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote.

L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C Berkshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 Birmingham 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 Buckinghamshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 Cambridgeshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 Dorsetshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 Glasgow 3 0 3 0 2 1 3 0 3 0 3 0 Herefordshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 2 1 3 0 Hertfordshire 2 1 3 0 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 Leeds 2 1 3 0 1 2 3 0 2 1 3 0 Liverpool 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 London (City) 3 1 4 0 1 3 0 4 1 3 0 4 Manchester 2 1 3 0 1 2 0 3 2 1 3 0 Oxfordshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 3 0 1 2 0 3

Totals 22 18 19 21 16 24 9 31 20 20 15 25

The actual results show the relative strength of the two great political parties in each const.i.tuency; the probable results are based on the hypothesis that if each voter could have given one vote to each of three candidates, each of the parties would have nominated three candidates, and that as the electors would for the most part have voted on party lines, the larger body would have secured all three seats. In Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Dorsetshire, Hertfordshire, Oxfordshire, Liverpool and London, the Liberal minorities each obtained a representative, whilst the Conservative minorities in Herefordshire, Leeds, and Manchester also obtained representatives. There were only two const.i.tuencies--Birmingham and Glasgow--where the minority failed to obtain representation, and this was due to the fact that the minorities in these particular const.i.tuencies were comparatively small.

A consideration in detail of the election in Birmingham in 1880 will show why the minority sometimes failed to obtain representation, and will, at the same time, direct attention to the defects of the system.

The figures of this election were as follows:--

H. Muntz (Liberal) 22,969 John Bright (Liberal) 20,079 Joseph Chamberlain (Liberal) 19,544

62,592

Major F. Burnaby (Con.) 15,735 Hon. A. C. G. Calthorpe (Con.) 14,208

29,943

It will be seen that the Liberals obtained 62,592 votes and the Conservatives 29,943 votes, and that the latter therefore numbered slightly less than a third of the const.i.tuency. If the Liberal votes had not been distributed as evenly as they were over their three candidates, it might have resulted that the lowest candidate on the poll, Joseph Chamberlain, would have received less votes than Major Burnaby, who was the highest of the two Conservative candidates. In order to obtain the full advantage of their numerical superiority it was necessary for the Liberal organization to make an extensive canva.s.s of their supporters, to ascertain as accurately as possible their strength, and to issue precise instructions to the voters in each district as to the manner in which they should record their votes. The memorable cry a.s.sociated with these elections--"Vote as you are told and we'll carry you through "--was fit accompaniment of these efforts of the Birmingham caucus.[2]

But had there been a mistake in the calculations of the Liberal organization, had the polls disclosed a larger number of Conservatives, disaster would have followed the nomination of three Liberal candidates.

If for example the votes had been as follows:--

Muintz Liberal)...... 21,000 Bright (Liberal)..... 20,000 Chamberlain (Liberal) 20,000

61,000

Burnaby (Conservative). 22,000 Calthorpe (Conservative). 21,000